

2019 AAP Conference

Book of Abstracts

(In alphabetical order of surname)

July 7 – 11, 2019

University of Wollongong



Australasian
Association of
Philosophy



UNIVERSITY
OF WOLLONGONG
AUSTRALIA

Bernardo Ainbinder

University of Wollongong

11:30 AM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

Ontological Pluralism and Generality: from Heidegger to Millikan

In recent discussions in metaontology, some authors - drawing on some ideas present in Heidegger's early work on 'modes of being' - have defended a form of ontological pluralism, i.e. the idea that there are different ways of being or existing (see Berto & Plebani 2015). Among them, two candidates have been offered to understand 'modes of being': either as existential quantifiers (McDaniel 2009) or as concepts with a maximum degree of universality (Kelly 2016). In this presentation, I will defend the idea that 'modes of being' is not to be understood in terms of a mere logical existential operator nor as universal predicates. Instead, I will claim that they can be understood as what Millikan calls a substance template. In the rest of the talk I will disambiguate that notion and defend a particular reading of it based on the distinction between different kinds of generality.

Mark Alfano

Australian Catholic University & Delft University of Technology

11:30 AM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.201

Stream: European Philosophy

The Nietzschean virtue of solitude

For Nietzsche, solitude is the drive to get away from, and often above, one's in-group or local community, to view that community and its values critically, and to divorce oneself from aspects of the community that one might otherwise adopt uncritically and by default. This motion tends to be associated with pangs of loneliness, alienation, self-doubt, and even despair. However, just as the ability to laugh at oneself is an important part of self-criticism, so the ability to look from a distance and a height down on one's community is essential to cultural critique. Solitude thus opposes vices like chauvinism, narrow-mindedness, and cozy cultural smugness. In addition, solitude is essentially restless. One sojourns in solitude then returns with cultural critique. One incessantly adopts new perspectives on his own community. For example, in *Daybreak* 114, Nietzsche suggests that "intellectual benefit" accrues to anyone who experiences "profound solitude." But solitude's value is not only epistemic. It also contributes to emotional wellbeing. In *Daybreak* 177, which is titled, "Learning solitude" Nietzsche declaims, "O you poor devils in the great cities of world politics, you gifted young men tormented by ambition who consider it your duty to pass some comment on everything that happens."

Efren Alverio II

La Trobe University

11:30 AM, Thursday July 11

Room: 52.G01

Stream: Practical Ethics

A Philosophy of Sad Stories: Towards a Critical-Sentimentalist Account of Human Rights

While philosophers are caught in a debate whether human rights justification is political or moral, practitioners are in a bind regarding what compliant force to use to affect the reduction of systemic human rights violations. Aside from criticisms that international laws just seem to legitimize foreign hegemony, it seems that economic and religious systems are also no help at all to combat apathy. One must admit that the current human rights framework is broken and needs repair.

In my paper, I will explore the critical-sentimentalist approach as espoused by Richard Rorty and Sharon Krause's take of Hume's "Sentiments must touch the heart, to make them controul our passions." Unfortunately, due to the pervading bias against the emotions – most likely perpetuated by the view that any appeal to pity is fallacious, and because of Nietzsche's critique of sympathy – any theory based on the sentiments is immediately in suspect. However, current basic realities can provide a balance.

By setting aside the adherence to ontology and metaphysics in favour of a cultural-historical framework and through the active creation of a human rights culture based on empathy, I believe that a philosophy based on "sad stories" provides a more relevant approach to human rights.

Eran Asoulin

Independent scholar

11:30 AM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.301

Stream: Philosophy of Mind

Phrase structure grammars as indicative of uniquely human thoughts

A revealing way in which to conceptualise the kind of thought that appears to be uniquely human is by considering the generative capacity of rule systems such as grammars and the way in which such systems can be arranged in a mathematical hierarchy of increasing generative power. One way in which to do so is the so-called Chomsky hierarchy, which was originally cast as part of the explanation of the formal properties of natural languages, but it turns out that it is also useful for understanding the formal properties of types of mental computations and hence of particular thought processes. I argue that the subset of human thought that is not shared with animals can be accounted for by the underlying computational mechanisms of language that structure this subset of human thought in a particular way. This subset of thought is unavailable to cognitive systems that do not have access to the computations underlying natural language. The study of grammars, and formal

language theory in general, is thus indispensable to studies of human cognition, for it makes explicit both the unique type of human thought and the underlying mechanisms in virtue of which this thought is made possible.

Sam Baron

University of Western Australia

2:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

Matter Emerges and Emergence Matters

A number of recent physical theories deny the fundamental existence of spacetime. Such theories face a threat of empirical incoherence. A theory is empirically incoherent when the truth of that theory undermines any reason to believe it. It has been argued that the threat of empirical incoherence can be addressed by treating spacetime as an emergent phenomenon. I argue that spacetime is not enough: we also need the emergence of matter. I outline a functionalist approach to the emergence of matter, before combining it with a functionalist account of spacetime. The result is a unified picture of the emergence of spacetime and of spatiotemporally located entities.

Christian Barry

Australian National University

11:30 AM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.102

Stream: Harm and Risk

Individual responsibility in collective harm cases: and indirect argument

Where a large number of people together cause harm, but no individual seems to make a difference, do these individuals do wrong? Unlike previous treatments of this question (Kagan 2011, Nefsky 2016) the paper does not try to identify some particular feature of what individuals do, qua individuals in such cases, and then demonstrate that it is this feature of their behaviour makes it plausible to attribute responsibility to them. Rather, it argues that we cannot reject individual responsibility in such cases without also rejecting other commitments that are deeply intuitive. In particular, it spells out the implications of what seem to be firm intuitive judgements about the manner in which force can be used against groups that avoidably cause unjust harm, either to prevent them from harming or to ensure that they compensate for the unjust harms they cause.

John Bigelow & Martin Leckey

Monash University

11:30 AM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

Asymmetric relations

Even those philosophers who accept the existence of properties sometimes experience difficulties in understanding relations, particularly asymmetric relations. There is something crying out for explanation in the fact that, say, 'love' is 'non-symmetric' whereas, say, 'smaller than' is 'asymmetric', 'is identical with' is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, ... and so on. This is akin to the problems Lewis raised concerning 'structural universals'. Lewis, Armstrong, Campbell, Heil, Forrest and others have wrestled with problems like these. Lewis and others explain relations by appeal to set theory. We explore an alternative way of explaining relations, by appealing to a theory that countenances the existence of higher-order properties.

Russell Blackford

University of Newcastle

2:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

An Unusual Argument Against Euthanasia Undermines Its Own Appeal

Typical arguments against euthanasia raise issues to do with inherent human dignity, vulnerable patients, and allegedly slippery slopes. Anti-euthanasia arguments from the disability rights movement may use this terminology but have a somewhat different appearance. In a recent article, Felicity Nimue Ackerman argues that there is no good basis to distinguish euthanasia for the terminally ill and euthanasia for other competent adults who want it. Since she assumes that we don't support euthanasia for other competent adults - which may, indeed, be our initial intuitive reaction - the implication is that we should not support euthanasia for the terminally ill. However, Ackerman's efforts to demonstrate that there is no good basis to distinguish the situations of other competent adult tends to undermine the initial intuitive appeal of the claim that we should not support euthanasia for other competent adults. To say the least, this complicates the argument. This situation recalls well-known difficulties that can arise with modus tollens arguments and slippery slope arguments, but something a bit different seems to be going on here. As a further question, we might wonder whether there are other arguments, in philosophical bioethics or elsewhere, that similarly undermine their own initial intuitive appeal.

Ricki Bliss

Lehigh University

1:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

The Regress Problem and Fundamentality (again)

Arguments from vicious infinite regress have an important role to play in justifying commitment to the existence of something fundamental. I defend an account of viciousness that ties it to explanatory projects, and argue that this has consequences for how we ought to understand fundamentality.

Ben Blumson

National University of Singapore

4:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

Mereotopological Connection

It's supposed to be a theorem of General Extensional Mereotopology that two individuals connect if and only if they or their closures overlap. I provide a countermodel to show that the proof of this theorem requires an additional axiom, to the effect that complex individuals are connected only if they have connected proper parts. I then discuss whether this axiom is true, especially in relation to questions about connection between atoms.

Christopher Boerdam

University of Queensland

4:00 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.101

Stream: Multicultural Philosophy

Slavoj Žižek's case against political correctness and identity politics

The recent debate between radical Marxist philosopher Slavoj Žižek and Canadian psychologist Jordan B. Peterson, two of the most influential intellectuals in the world today, could only be described as anti-climactic. What was touted as an epic clash between two outspoken thinkers from opposite ends of the political spectrum turned out to be quite a civil discussion in which the opponents agreed on most substantial points. This debate may have confused some viewers as to where Žižek should be placed on the political spectrum. On the one hand, Žižek is an outspoken critic of right-wing politics and global capitalism, and

he identifies himself as a Marxist and a communist. On the other hand, Žižek also criticises the most prominent versions of left-wing politics, and so joins a number of conservative thinkers, like Jordan B. Peterson, in condemning political correctness and identity politics as ideologically suspect. In this presentation, I will outline Žižek's criticism of political correctness and identity politics, and explain its theoretical basis. I doing so, I aim to demonstrate how Žižek's conceptualisations of subjectivity, universality and communism underpin an alternative vision of leftist struggle than the one offered today by left-wing versions of identity politics.

Renée Bolinger

Australian National University/Princeton University

11:30 AM, Monday July 8

Room: 19.2002

Stream: Moral Philosophy

Rewriting Rights: The Social Approach

The usual ways of thinking about how ignorance affects what agents must do to respect each others' moral rights frame this question as a problem in individual ethics, to be answered by settling whether an individual agent ought to do what is fact-relatively best, or what is best on her evidence. I argue that this is the wrong approach; we should instead understand rights as fundamentally social. I propose using resources from game theory to model agents' rights as the demands players can reasonably make of each other in a multi-agent partial coordination game.

Sandy Boucher

University of New England

11:30 AM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.104

Stream: Metaphilosophy

Methodological Naturalism in the Sciences

Supporters of Creationism have long argued that evolutionary science is committed to an priori metaphysics of naturalism and materialism, which is based on faith or ideology rather than evidence. The standard response to this has been to insist that science is not committed to any such metaphysical doctrine, but only to a methodological version of naturalism, according to which science may only appeal to natural entities and processes. But this whole debate presupposes that there is a clear distinction between the natural and the supernatural, and thus that naturalism is a meaningful doctrine. I argue that this assumption is false. The concepts of the natural and the supernatural are in fact hopelessly obscure, such that the claim that science is committed to methodological naturalism cannot be made good. This is no victory for anti-naturalists however; explicitly supernaturalist

theories, such as Creationism, can be ruled out of scientific consideration as a priori incoherent, given that they presuppose for their intelligibility that there is a meaningful natural-supernatural distinction. This is not the case for standard scientific theories however, as they are not explicitly naturalistic theories; they do not postulate natural or physical entities or processes as such.

Nick Brancazio

University of Wollongong

11:30 AM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.302

Stream: Minimal Cognition

Agency: A Multi-Scale Proposal

There is quite a mismatch between the intellectualist notion of agency as targeted in much philosophy of mind and the notion of agency of debate in biological approaches to explaining cognition and behaviour. Recent work on bacteria, slime moulds, and plant behaviours has made it clear that we need an account of agency that can cover a number of different kinds of purpose-driven actions. This has led some to posit a spectrum view of agency that does not presuppose cognition (Fulda 2016).

I argue that unlike the spectrum view, a multi-scale account can accommodate work on the relationships between these different kinds of agency while remaining agnostic on the best frameworks for explanation at different scales. I will look at two different boundary cases-- non-living individual/collective agential cases (active matter) and unicellular/multicellular cases (overlapping agents)—in order to demonstrate that a multi-scale account is a preferable option for explaining the nested agencies within organisms, collective agency, and temporally extensive senses of agency associated with long-term goals and rationality, as well as the relationships between them.

Hugh Breakey

Griffith University

11:30 AM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

The Rule of Law: Compliance, Reliance or Defiance?

Philosophical and ethical defences of the rule of law tend to conflate three distinct goods that can emerge from it: the goods of subjects being able to comply with the law, of subjects being able to rely on the law in their decision-making, and the goods of being protected by the law when subjects forge ahead with their own life plans. In this paper I show how these goods are both conceptually and practically distinct, and I demonstrate

how each depends not only on the law's formal properties, but also upon specific parts of its substantive content.

Shannon Brick

CUNY Graduate Center

1:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 52.G02

Stream: Moral Philosophy

Understanding, Authenticity, and the Problem of Moral Testimony

Amongst philosophers who agree that we can gain moral knowledge via testimony, some think it is sometimes not practically justified to rely on knowledge gained this way. Alison Hills, an advocate of this view, argues in favor of it by reference to the value of moral understanding. Moral understanding, on her view, is an epistemic good that is distinct from, and irreducible to, moral knowledge. Unlike moral knowledge, however, moral understanding cannot be attained by relying on moral testimony. Insofar as we value moral understanding more than moral knowledge, we have reason to resist relying on moral testimony. This paper defends Hills' account of moral understanding against the charge that it places an excessive demand on our capacity to reason, but argues that it is vulnerable to a different objection. On Hills' account, I contend, moral understanding is a kind of cognitive skill. So conceived, however, the problem with relying on moral testimony is represented as akin to what goes wrong when we try to gain a non-moral skill by relying on testimony. But I argue that this is not correct – that the moral and non-moral cases are importantly different. In order to explain why, I invoke the value of moral authenticity. Moral authenticity, as I conceive of it, consists in acting on reasons that are one's own, on the basis of reasoning that is also one's own. In order to explain what is wrong with relying on moral testimony, I argue that Hills' account of moral understanding must be supplemented with the idea that moral understanding confers moral authenticity.

Bernard Brown

Macquarie University

2:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.301

Stream: Philosophy of Mind

Panpsychism: Small Palette of Microtypes, Large Palette of Microparticulars

If Russellian constitutive panpsychism (RCP) is right, our type of qualitative experience is constituted of categorical qualitative microproperties that play the roles of physical microproperties. The Standard Model (SM) of physics claims there to be only three microproperties – mass, charge, and spin. On the supposition that qualitative microproperties are isomorphic with the physical microproperties they play, this confronts

RCP with the palette problem – how can the rich and diverse large palette of phenomenal qualities of our type of experience be constituted of a small palette of categorical qualitative microproperties.

This paper posits the qualitative microproperty Pspin which plays the role of the physical microproperty spin. Spin comes in two types, each with a multitude of microparticulars, and so does Pspin under the isomorphic thesis. Integer and half-integer spin types explain matter and forces (the means by which matter is related), and integer and half-integer Pspin types explain mental objects and the means by which they are mentally related, each with a multitude of qualitative microparticulars.

If SM is right, RCP is right, insofar as there is a small palette of qualitative microproperty types but wrong in that there is a large palette of qualitative microproperty particulars.

Francesca Bunkenborg

Humboldt University Berlin

1:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 19.2002

Stream: Moral Philosophy

Justified Moral Uncertainty

Our moral lives are rife with uncertainty. Much of this is due to uncertainty about empirical facts, but sometimes we are also uncertain about purely moral questions. Philosophers disagree about the correct norm for action under such pure moral uncertainty, with some denying that our pure moral uncertainty can have any bearing on how we ought to act at all. Very little attention, however, has so far been paid to the question of whether such pure moral uncertainty can be epistemically justified. I argue, first, that this is an oversight: the plausibility of the position which denies the normative relevance of pure moral uncertainty strongly depends on the assumption that pure moral uncertainty cannot be epistemically justified. Second, I argue that on both internalist and externalist accounts of epistemic justification, we have very good reason to think that pure moral uncertainty can sometimes be epistemically justified. I conclude that what we ought to do can depend on our epistemically justified pure moral uncertainty.

Krister Bykvist

Stockholm University

5:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

Taking values seriously

Recently, there has been a revival in taking empirical magnitudes seriously. Weights, heights, and the like have been accepted as abstract entities in their own right (and not equivalence classes). This magnitude realism has many virtues: it explains the equivalence between 'x is taller than y' and 'the height of x is greater than the height of y'; it gives a straightforward explanation of cross-world and cross-time comparisons of empirical magnitudes; and it makes it easier to satisfy the axioms for measurement of empirical magnitudes, since one is not bound to quantify over a finite domain of physical objects. The aim of my talk is to show something similar for value magnitudes. If we posit value magnitudes, we can easily explain the equivalence between 'x is better than y' and 'the value of x is greater than the value of y', and also explain cross-world and cross-time comparisons of value. We will also have an easier time satisfying the axioms for extensive measurement of value, since we are not bound to quantify over a finite domain of value bearers. To quote David Lewis, 'The price is right; the benefits in theoretical unity and economy are well worth the entities.'

Massimiliano Cappuccio

University of New South Wales Canberra

2:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.302

Stream: Minimal Cognition

Minimally social cognition: a constructivist approach

What are the lower boundaries of social cognition, and when can we say that simple cognizers engage socially with one another? Social robotics, the interdisciplinary study of the interactions between humans and robots, offers empirical data, computational models, and research methods to address this question. I propose a constructivist approach based on synthetic methods and the phenomenology of human-robot interaction to establish the minimal requirements to design and build artificial autonomous agents with legitimately social abilities. Using this approach I will examine recent results in the enactivist research on perceptual crossing paradigm (which investigates the minimal perceptual requirements to establish reciprocal alignment and recognition) and predictive processing (for which intersubjectivity emerges from mutual predictions about others' behaviors). Both of them indicate that, to establish reciprocity and coordination with another, the cognitive processes of an agent must incorporate the very possibility of a dynamic relationship with the other's body in a shared world-environment. However, the impossibility to construct social minds in

isolation challenges the traditional constructivist approach, and motivate the exploration of a new direction in social robotics research that takes into account the constitutive and genetic link between social agents.

Amandine Catala

University of Quebec at Montreal

1:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.104

Stream:

Structural Epistemic Injustice, Excellence, and Underrepresentation in Philosophy

Women and other non-dominant groups are significantly underrepresented in philosophy. Epistemic injustice is a type of injustice that affects individuals specifically as epistemic agents, i.e. as knowledge users or contributors. I argue that standard conceptions of academic excellence in philosophy constitute a form of epistemic injustice, which results in the underrepresentation of non-dominant groups in philosophy, which in turn perpetuates epistemic injustice by leaving intact standard conceptions of academic excellence – thereby creating a vicious circle. While many accounts of epistemic injustice are agential/interactional, I argue that standard conceptions of academic excellence produce and maintain epistemic injustice in a distinctively structural/institutional form. I argue that standard conceptions of academic excellence, much like standard conceptions of objectivity, conceal dominant (e.g. male, white, non-disabled) assumptions and interests, which result in the exclusion or marginalization, and hence in the underrepresentation, of members of non-dominant groups (e.g. women, racialized groups, people with disabilities) as epistemic agents in philosophy – resulting in an exclusionary process of philosophical knowledge production. Following the strategy adopted by feminist theorists for the concept of objectivity – namely, reconceptualizing rather than abandoning it – I propose to reconceptualize the concept of academic excellence from feminist insights and commitments for greater structural epistemic justice.

Ching-nam Chan

The Chinese University of Hong Kong

2:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

Upward and Downward Causation Revisited

The plausibility of upward causation, the causation from physical property to a higher-level property, and downward causation, the causation from a higher-order property to a physical property, are thought to be one of the main issues in the Mental Exclusion Problem. Autonomists thought a key assumption of the exclusion argument is that both

upward and downward causation are possible. They claimed that to preserve the causal efficacy of mental properties, both upward causation and downward causation should be rejected. I critically evaluate the autonomists' arguments against these two kinds of causation. I argue that all autonomists' argument considered are not successful. Then I argue that upward causation is so common that any plausible picture of the mental-physical relation should accommodate at least upward causation. I also argue that downward causation needs not be prohibited prior to an exploration to the mental-physical relation.

Ya-Ting Chang

Macquarie University

4:00 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.104

Stream: Action theory

The Normative Aspects of Self-Control

Discussions over self-control are mainly based on two different conceptions of agency, the causal and the normative conceptions of agency. According to the former, a person constitutes his agency in terms of certain causal capacity to bring about action in a particular way so that the action can be attributed to him. According to the latter, a person constitutes his agency by following certain norms. In this paper, I argue that a proper account of self-control should be one that based on the normative conception of agency. In addition, I argue that self-control involves two normative aspects. In the first aspect, a self-controlled person does what rational norms require him to do. In the second aspect, a self-controlled person does what social norms require him to do. To fully explain both, it is necessary to expand a normative account of self-control to one that appeals to rational norms internal to an agent as well as relevant social norms external to him. A self-control person is therefore a person who aligns his own judgment with the social judgment about what is overall good for him and whose action conforms to his overall better judgment under the guidance of rational norms.

Marc Cheong

Monash University

5:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.102

Stream: Existentialism

Asymmetry in Online Social Networks

Varying degrees of symmetry can exist in a social network's connections (Cartwright and Harary, 1956). Some early online social networks (OSNs) were predicated on symmetrical connections, such as Facebook 'friendships' where both agents in a 'friendship' have an equal and reciprocal connection. Newer platforms -- Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook's

'Pages' inclusive -- are counterexamples of this, where 'following' another agent (friend, celebrity, business) does not guarantee a reciprocal exchange from the other.

This paper argues that the basic asymmetric connections in an OSN leads to emergent asymmetrical behaviour in the OSN's overall influence and connectivity, amongst others. This paper will then draw on empirical examples from popular sites (and prior network research) to illustrate how asymmetric connections can render individuals 'voiceless'.

The crux of this paper is an argument from the existentialist viewpoint on how the above asymmetric network properties lead to Sartrean bad faith (Sartre, 1943). Instead of genuine interpersonal connection, one finds varying degrees of pressure to assume the Sartrean 'in-itself' (the en soi) mode-of-being, irregardless of the magnitude of 'followers' one has.

Finally, this paper poses an open question: what other philosophical issues does this inherent asymmetry in modern social networking give rise to?

Ünsal Çimen

Muş Alparslan University

2:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 52.G02

Stream: History of Philosophy

Galileo's Realism and the Secularization of Science

Pierre Duhem argued that Greek astronomy was instrumentalist since it did not aim to reveal to us the real motions of the celestial bodies, only tried to make a hypotheses which could save the phenomena. However, Karl Popper rightly claimed that the instrumentalist attitude towards astronomy could firstly be seen among those theologians such as Osiander and Cardinal Robert Bellarmine who were opponents of the reality of Copernican heliocentrism. These theologians argued that both astronomers and natural philosophers could not know the real motions of the celestial bodies. In this study, it will be argued that Galileo's realism can be evaluated as the secularization of science, which gives priority to the demonstrative sciences in understanding the real meaning of scriptural passages about natural and celestial phenomena.

Noel Clemente

Macquarie University

4:00 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.203

Stream: Epistemology

A Continuum of Epistemic Dependence

Pritchard (2014) defends virtue epistemology from epistemic situationism by appealing to the notion of epistemic dependence: if knowledge acquisition is sometimes allowed to depend on factors outside the cognitive agency of the subject, then this modest form of virtue epistemology escapes the threat of the situationist challenge. Alfano (2017) suggests that this lowering of the threshold of cognitive agency required for knowledge might be too permissive. I respond to this objection by extending the notion of epistemic dependence as a continuum: not only could knowledge acquisition depend on external factors, but the degree of dependence varies among different epistemic agents, kinds of knowledge, and particular situations. This understanding that epistemic dependence comes in degrees, I argue, will allow us to establish epistemic virtue as the Aristotelian mean of epistemic dependence on the external factors, situated between the underestimation of the influence of external factors by robust virtue epistemology and its exaggeration by strong epistemic situationism. Moreover, this understanding of epistemic virtue cuts across the reliabilism/responsibilism divide, showing that these two conceptions of epistemic virtue share the fundamental structure of being the right degree of epistemic dependence given the situation.

Stephanie Collins

Australian Catholic University

1:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.208

Stream: Shared Intentionality and Social Minds

Moral Overdemandingness for Collective Agents

When an obligation is overdemanding, its bearer is excused from performing the obligation (or, on some interpretations, the obligation disappears altogether). This paper asks: when is a moral obligation overdemanding for a collective agent, such as a state, business, or not-for-profit? One answer is 'just in case its performance would be overdemanding for at least one member.' But an obligation's being overdemanding on members is neither necessary nor sufficient for its being overdemanding on the collective itself. Another answer is that an obligation is overdemanding for a collective agent just if its fulfilment would frustrate the collective's deep preferences. But existing justifications for this in the individual case do not extend to the collective case. I advocate a third answer, under which an obligation is overly demanding for a collective agent only if the obligation's content is beyond the agent's abilities. I analyse collective agents' abilities in terms of their 'procedural constraints.' The

result is that pure overdemandingness is never an excuse for a collective agent not to perform an obligation.

Axel Constant

University of Sydney

11:30 AM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.104

Stream: Philosophy of Psychiatry

Sketch of an Evolutionary Cultural Computational Psychiatry

Computational psychiatry studies the information processing underpinnings of mental disorders. To do so, computational psychiatrists produce computational phenotypes – i.e., the set of measurable traits associated with a given mental disorder. These are generative, graphical models that represent the structure and dynamics of the brain and can be manipulated to yield the artificial symptoms under study; for instance, by manipulating precision parameters, or by inducing lesions in connections. In turn, one can administer artificial treatments to study the effects of pharmacotherapy on those symptoms. These computational phenotypes, however, remain limited to the anatomy of the brain, and therefore, as they stand, can hardly accommodate our knowledge about the role of socio-cultural and evolutionary causes in mental disorders. Accordingly, non-pharmacological interventions (e.g., cognitive behavioral therapy) remain difficult to study in computational psychiatry. In this talk, I present a conceptual sketch of a computational phenotype able to integrate socio-cultural and evolutionary causes.

Justin D'Ambrosio

Australian National University

11:30 AM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.203

Stream: Philosophy of Language

Much Ado about 'Something': 'Something' as an Answer Quantifier

'Something' is a philosophically important expression. It figures prominently in a range of important debates in philosophy, including debates over the nature of consciousness, the objects of perception, and the metaphysics of the attitudes. However, at least since Prior (1975), we have known that 'something' is not an ordinary existential quantifier: it can replace a range of expressions in sentences whose function is not to refer, including adjectives, descriptions used predicatively, and the complements of nearly every attitude verb. There are two kinds of proposals concerning the semantics of 'something'. The first is to treat it as a higher-order objectual quantifier, and the second is to treat it as substitutional. Both of these proposals face decisive objections. I propose a novel approach to the semantics of 'something'. On my view, 'something' quantifies over answers to

questions; 'Mary seeks something' is true iff there is an answer to the question "what does Mary seek?" This view captures the appeal of the substitutional view in that it allows 'something' to be ontologically noncommittal, but it also captures the appeal of the objectual view in allowing the truth-conditions of quantified sentences to be totally independent of our language and its expressive resources.

Oscar Davis

Bond University

4:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 52.G01

Stream: Practical Ethics

Evolutionary Biology and the Foundation of Morality

In the last twenty years, evolutionary debunking arguments have become quite popular in metaethical debate. Reflecting on the merits of the debunking strategy, I argue that the attempt to incorporate evolutionary biology into metaethics has only brought us back to central questions about moral knowledge and the metaphysics of morality. By itself, the argument carries no unique challenge to moral realism. Instead, a new challenge arises as to how to best understand the role of evolutionary explanations about morality in metaethical discourse.

Laura Davy

University of New South Wales, Canberra

11:30 AM, Monday July 8

Room: 19.2001

Stream: Practical Ethics

Ethics and value in the care sector: what needs to change?

Leading feminist scholars have argued for some time that there is a need to reassess the way care work is organised and valued in society. The current policy attention on unethical practices in care settings, combined with recent research findings about the dynamics central to those care and support relationships that work well, bring a new perspective and urgency to this call for change.

This paper discusses an emerging body of empirical research analysing the behaviours, dispositions and interactions that characterise positive care and support relationships. This research resonates with the 'relational turn' in moral philosophy where characteristics of the person such as dignity and autonomy are understood as relational products bestowed, enhanced or undermined through one's interactions with others. The paper concludes that good relationships with care and support workers can play an important role in augmenting

the personhood of those they support. But the way we value and resource support and care work needs to radically change to fully realise the benefits of these relationships.

Patrick Dawson

The University of Sydney

2:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

"Hard" Presentism

Presentists do not believe that the past or the future exist. Presentists generally do believe, however, that one can make true statements about the past, and perhaps about the future. Many attempts have been made to establish a system of presentist truthmaking that allows for past truths, even though no past exists to ground them. These attempts have been criticised heavily, since they often invoke all sorts of unhappy ontological commitments or unintuitive truthmaking principles. This talk, which is based on a forthcoming paper, investigates whether presentists might do better by just denying that there are any past truths at all. While this approach has its challenges, I outline how an appropriate system of physics would explain why there still seems to be truths about the past, at least on the macroscopic scale. The result is a presentist account of time, and of quantum mechanics, with a starkly different (and perhaps superior) set of advantages and disadvantages than other presentist theories.

Robin Dembroff

Yale University

2:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.102

Stream: Gender

Gender Identity Trouble

On a common narrative, 'gender identity' is a liberatory concept that centers the existence and concerns of gender variant people. But what is gender identity? Typically, gender identity is assumed to be a psychological feature: either a recognition of one's (already determined) gender, or a psychological orientation toward one's body or toward gender roles and norms. But, on all variations, this psychological concept faces metaphysical and political problems. In particular, it is unable to explain the vast variety of gender self-classifications, incompatible with a constructionist view of gender categories, and silent (at best) as to why gender variant identities are valuable for feminist political aims. I argue that these problems can be avoided by adopting a relational, rather than psychological, concept of gender identity. On this view, to have (e.g.) a female gender identity is to relate--or attempt to relate--to others as a member of the category 'women'. On this view, what is

most significant about gender identities is not whether they are 'accurate', but rather, whether they reinforce or resist dominant gender categories. For this reason, I argue that gender identity is unique part of the broader practice of 'gender negotiation': i.e., the practice of culturally negotiating the number, membership conditions, and social meanings of gender categories.

Max Deutscher

Macquarie, UQ

11:30 AM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.104

Stream: Multicultural Philosophy

Steps towards reading aboriginal Dreaming stories

Approaching the ontological status of the dreaming as intended within Australian Aboriginal practice requires us to study the different registers of language within which the status of the Dreaming is strongly distinguished from everyday matters of fact.

Furthermore, there are practical and legal functions performed by the Dreaming stories that prevent a reasonable interpretation of them as only fanciful.

Finally, the system of evaluation of actions implicit in many of the Dreaming stories is a rich source of moral reflections, and a rewarding source of social and moral reflection.

Nicholas DiBella

Bilkent University

11:30 AM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.302

Stream: Epistemology

Neo-Cartesian Probabilistic Foundationalism

I develop a new form of foundationalism that I call Neo-Cartesian Probabilistic Foundationalism. Foundationalism is the view that one should adopt a given doxastic attitude -- for example, to believe that p , to have a credence of 95% in p , or to be more confident in p than in q -- just in case that doxastic attitude is inferentially justified by some collection of "basic" attitudes that are non-inferentially justified. Neo-Cartesian Probabilistic Foundationalism is a form of foundationalism that takes one's basic attitudes to be attitudes of certainty towards various putatively indubitable propositions, including certain propositions about one's mental states, logical truths, set-theoretic principles, as well as certain probabilistic principles of epistemic rationality. I will not provide a detailed defense of Neo-Cartesian Probabilistic Foundationalism in this talk, but I will motivate some of its core commitments from the perspective of an external-world skeptic.

Dominic Dimech

University of Sydney

11:30 AM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.102

Stream: History of Philosophy

Hume and Reid on Philosophical Problems

Why do philosophical arguments sometimes present problems that we worry about and that we expend effort trying to solve? Why do we feel disappointment (or worse) when we cannot solve them? In this talk, I use these general questions to establish a context for discussing philosophical scepticism. David Hume was driven to anxiety and despair because he thought that sceptical results followed from sound philosophical reasoning. Thomas Reid – Hume’s less famous contemporary – thought that philosophy had no right to contradict common sense, and that, when it did, so much the worse for philosophy. For Reid, sceptical worries never spill out into ordinary life (whereas for Hume – contrary to some readings of his epistemology – they always do). I diagnose Hume and Reid’s different attitudes towards scepticism in terms of their different attitudes towards philosophical problems. I suggest that directing our attention to this meta-issue offers a propitious strategy for responding to any argument for philosophical scepticism, one that is much in tune with recent efforts to diagnose the appeal of scepticism.

Sean Donahue

University of Southern California

1:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.201

Stream: Epistemology

Dark Knowledge

Obscuring the grounds of your own beliefs is commonly treated as a downside of reliance on testimony. I argue instead that in some cases this has the epistemically beneficial result of producing dark knowledge. Knowledge is dark when you have rational but false beliefs that would function as defeaters were you to inquire into the rationalizing explanation for your beliefs but that do not function as defeaters because of the difficulty of the inquiry. Dark knowledge can exist, and the amount of it is plausibly increasing. The concept of dark knowledge is also relevant to political philosophy. I appeal to the existence of dark knowledge to form a compelling argument for the conclusion that knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for the public justification of laws.

Heather Dyke

University of Otago

4:00 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

Explaining Manifest Time: What Language Can't Tell Us About Time

In a recent book, *What Makes Time Special?* (OUP, 2018), Craig Callender presents what he takes to be the chief problem in the philosophy of time: that of reconciling manifest and scientific representations of time. Before developing his distinctive new approach, he argues that attempts to resolve this problem in the latter part of the twentieth century went seriously awry, becoming fixated, first on questions of temporal language and meaning, and then on questions of existence. I take up his attack on the linguistic approach in the philosophy of time. I examine the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and argue that, even though it has been roundly rejected, it continued to influence the linguistic style of metaphysics carried out in the philosophy of time. I appeal to considerations from linguistics and from the evolved nature of natural language to argue against the linguistic approach in the philosophy of time as a means of investigating the nature of temporal reality.

Antony Eagle

University of Adelaide

11:30 AM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.203

Stream: Epistemology

Rational Forgetting?

Forgetting whether p should be distinguished from changing one's mind about p , and from cases in which one's belief in p is defeated. I suggest that one forgets when one ceases to know whether p without receiving any undermining evidence. So characterised, it is not a reasoned change in view, and cannot be rational. I then exhume the Sleeping Beauty problem, and say a couple of things about how thinking about forgetting helps us justify the 'thirder' answer.

Peter Ellerton

University of Queensland

4:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.302

Stream: Philosophy of Education

Threshold concepts in critical thinking

One of the constants in higher education is the imperative that students develop the skills and virtues associated with critical thinking. Another constant is disagreement about exactly what those elements are and whether they are best developed within a discipline context or within dedicated critical thinking courses. Since dedicated courses exist, and indeed are legion, the question of their design is salient. There are many potential candidate topics for inclusion in critical thinking classes, including formal logic, cognitive biases, logical fallacies, argumentation and so on. The list is a familiar one to those who have designed, taught or taken a critical thinking course. But the list lacks a clear organising principle. The idea of threshold concepts, first discussed by Ray Land and Jan Meyer (2006), provides a potential organising principle that can help inform course design in critical thinking. Threshold concepts are not just essential concepts, they represent deep and transformative shifts in knowledge and understanding away from that of the novice and towards that of the expert. I will suggest a way that threshold concepts in critical thinking can be identified and hence provide the outline of a coherently constructed dedicated course in critical thinking.

Peter Evans

University of Queensland

11:30 AM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.201

Stream: Philosophy of Science

On the Limits of Theory Confirmation

Dawid (2019) appeals to the distinction between "conclusive confirmation" and "significant confirmation" to demarcate the respective limits of empirical and non-empirical modes of (Bayesian) theory confirmation. He defines conclusive confirmation as the circumstances when the "theory has been established to be [empirically] viable in a given regime beyond reasonable doubt" (p. 105) and significant confirmation as the circumstances where there are "substantial probabilities for a theory's [empirical] viability" (p. 108). In this talk I consider the limits of conclusive confirmation in analogue experiments, paying particular attention to the crucial notion of "reasonable doubt". I distinguish two (not mutually exclusive) types of analogue experimentation -- analogue simulation (Dardashti, Hartmann, Thébault, and Winsberg 2019) and analogue representation -- which along with conventional experiments form the basis of three case studies that I consider to illustrate the limits of confirmation. (Joint work with Karim Thébault (Bristol))

Luara Ferracioli

The University of Sydney

11:30 AM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.101

Stream: Political Philosophy

Liberal Self-Determination and Refugees

In this paper, I defend a new account of who counts as a refugee. I argue that a refugee is not only someone who cannot lead a minimally decent life in her state of citizenship, but someone who also lacks the prospect of leading a minimally decent life because her state of citizenship both denies her the opportunities and services required for the protections and promotion of her interests, and makes the kind of political engagement required for bringing about change unduly costly. This new definition is in line with the spirit of the original Refugee Convention. On the one hand, it explains why Americans who lack access to adequate health care, and Australians who lack access to affordable housing do not count as refugees despite being currently unable to promote and protect all the interests required for a minimally decent life. On the other hand, it explains why citizens of failed persecutory states should count as refugees even before they have been directly targeted by their government.

Sandra Field

Yale-NUS College, Singapore

11:30 AM, Thursday July 11

Room: 52.G02

Stream: Multicultural Philosophy

Servility and integrity in the philosophy of Huang Zongxi

In this paper I draw out the conception of integrity implicit in the political writings of 17th century Chinese writer Huang Zongxi. In the Confucian tradition, it is common to praise the integrity of moral heroes, who hold strong in their commitment to what they see to be right, regardless of any pressure on them to yield. But such moralism does little to help us understand or overcome the more frequent failures of integrity that we witness around us every day. I argue that Huang addresses this lack. In particular, Huang shows that the contrary of integrity is not self-interest, but servility. The key to cultivating a society with moral integrity is thinking more broadly about the institutional conditions which make it safe for ordinary people not to be servile.

Matthew Flanagan

St Peters College, Auckland

4:00 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

Why the Horrendous Deeds Objection is still a Bad argument?

A common objection to divine command meta-ethics (DCM) is the horrendous deeds objection. Critics object that if DCM is true, anything at all could be right, no matter how abhorrent or horrendous. Defenders of DCM have responded by contending that God is essentially good: God has certain character traits essentially, such as being loving and just, which means God cannot command just anything.

In recent discussions of DCM, this “essentially goodness response” has come under fire. Critics of DCM such have offered various objections to the essential goodness response. This paper responds to these critics. I examine and refute four objections two the essential goodness response. (a) The opposition from counter-possibles. (b) The objection from omnipotence. (c) The objection from requirements of justice and, (d) The objection from God’s moral grounding power. I will maintain that despite all that has been said about the horrendous deeds objection in recent analytic philosophy the horrendous deeds argument is still a bad argument.

James Franklin

University of New South Wales

5:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

The Worth of Persons as Foundational Concept in Ethics

The worth of persons (or their inherent dignity or preciousness) is argued to be the foundational concept of (interhuman) ethics. Surely the fundamental reason why killing is wrong is the evil of the death of the victim, which matters because it is the destruction of a being of great worth. The usual topics in ethics, such as actions, obligations, consequences, right and wrong, rights, duties, virtues, care and harm are logically generated by the worth of the persons they apply to.

The worth of persons is a metaphysically robust but not free-standing property; it supervenes on certain apparently natural (in the sense of non-moral) properties of persons (and possibly to an extent animals, rainforests), such as their rationality, capacity for rationality, capacity for free choice, individuality, creativity, capacity to love. Moral supervenience can be compared with examples of supervenience which are better understood, such as the supervenience of (spatial) symmetry on the location of parts and the supervenience of the rationality of belief on logical relations. We can understand – in

principle fully and purely by thinking – how the base necessarily gives rise to the supervenient entities/properties, and how these entities/properties are therefore not “queer” in Mackie’s sense, nor supernatural.

Keiko Fukuhara

Nagoya University

2:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

A Solution to the Trolley Problem of Self-Driving Cars

When discussing ethical problems of self-driving cars, especially full self-driving car, the trolley problem is often mentioned. This problem is considered as no longer merely a thought experiment but a problem which should be resolved. Some argue that this question should be answered by ordinary people, not philosophers or ethicists. Actually, surveys have showed people’s different inclinations on variations of the trolley problem. However, this approach is controversial, for it is unclear that the majority opinion is correct and should be adopted.

In this paper, I argue that solving the trolley problem is not necessary for developing self-driving cars. Instead I propose the trolley problem should be prevented from occurring by improving technologies or environments. It will be possible to monitor road conditions through sensors or networks, as well as construct special roads for full self-driving cars, which are the only roads full self-driving cars use and where other vehicles and pedestrians are not allowed to enter. I suggest that full self-driving cars and their system are not an extension of existing cars. Rather, they should be deemed as a different kind of vehicles. I argue that more discussions are needed on the limitation of self-driving cars.

Melissa Fusco

Columbia University

2:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.201

Stream: Logic

Naturalizing Deontic Logic

It is an appealing idea that deontic modality is a modality of the open future, and that the indeterminacy of the open future is the key, within natural language, to understanding the puzzles that form the traditional subject-matter of deontic logic. Richmond Thomason makes this suggestion in “Indeterminist Time and Truth-Value Gaps” (1970), conjecturing that “Indeterministic logic...is particularly attractive for this purpose in view of the traditional position that obligations presuppose freedom.”

In this talk, I follow Thomason's call, taking seriously his remark about the freedom of agents. On this "active" brand of indeterminism---what I will call *agential indeterminism*---one sees positions in formal models not as mere places one might be, or as space one might eliminate via conversational update, but as a space of places an agent might *move to.* In this setting, I pull together three familiar elements---Thomason's settledness operator, the modal base of Kratzer (1981, 1991)'s analysis of modals, and Stalnaker (1978)'s notion of diagonal acceptance---to argue for two theses governing a deontic logic for natural language. My goal is to set up a logic for understanding Free Choice Permission (Kamp, 1973).

Nathaniel Gan

University of Sydney

2:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

Underdetermination problems and structuralism

Realists about some kinds of objects face an underdetermination problem: our practices about the objects in question underdetermine some important facts about them. A straightforward solution is to characterise those objects solely by the properties they have in virtue of our practices---call this structuralism. This paper argues that the structuralist approach may not be as promising as it first appears. A particular example---mathematical structuralism---is examined. Benacerraf (1965) raised an underdetermination problem for mathematical Platonists, which structuralism seems to solve. The most straightforward structuralist solution involves adopting a general criterion of mathematical identity, but two aspects of mathematical practice potentially raise difficulties for such an account: symmetric structures and cross-structure identifications. It is doubtful that a general structuralist criterion of mathematical identity can square perfectly with both aspects of mathematical practice. Structuralists can do without a general criterion of identity, but this leaves them with no advantage over non-structuralists regarding the underdetermination problem. It will be argued that similar observations may be made of some other forms of structuralism: they either disagree with our practices, or are unnecessary for solving the underdetermination problem, which undermines part of the motivation for adopting structuralism in the first place.

Adam Govers

University of Melbourne

2:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.203

Stream: Epistemology

A Condorcet-inspired reliabilist theory of group justification

In this talk I defend a reliabilist theory of group justification. Inspired by the work of List (2005) and Goldman (2014), the position draws upon the theory of judgement aggregation to argue that group beliefs are a function of individual member beliefs while explaining group justifiedness in terms of the collective reliability of the group belief. While the collective's beliefs are products of an aggregation procedure which takes individual beliefs as inputs, the justification of those collective beliefs is irreducibly a collective property: one which is attained through meeting truth-tracking and reliability conditions at the collective level.

For this presentation I address a set of interrelated objections raised by Lackey (2016, 2018) against views of this type. The objections maintain that the theory's inattentiveness to the evidential bases of the individual input beliefs produces a counterintuitive view of group justification. Lackey argues that a robust account of group justification requires attending to the evidential relations that exist between individual evidential bases and an explanation of the role they perform. I argue that: (1) the objection's suggestion that the reliabilist theory leads to problematic outcomes is false and misunderstands the thesis, and; (2) that the theory does have a story to tell regarding the role that evidence at the individual level performs for the resulting collective justification.

Samiksha Goyal

Monash University

1:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.101

Stream: Multicultural Philosophy

Gandhi's concept of Anāsakti

Bhagvad Gītā, an Indian scripture contained in the epic Mahābārata, promotes the concept of niśkāma karma (desireless/unattached action) as a condition for moral rightness of actions. This injunction requires one to act without any desires for results; it prohibits actions that promote selfish interest and desire. In that sense, the injunction has the same effect as the familiar principle of duty for duty's sake. In his introduction to the Gītā, M. K. Gandhi avoided the concept of niśkāma karma and introduced the concept of anāsakti instead. Anāsakti, like niśkāma karma, also advocates detachment from selfish interest. However, unlike niśkāma karma, it demands that the agent should not just submit to rules but be herself disinterested so as to promote the welfare of the other. The two concepts

differ fundamentally: anāsakti lays emphasis on the cultivation of individual virtue with an eye towards the consequence of an action, while niśkāma karma endorses the performance of duty. I will argue that the practice of disinterest promoted by anāsakti overcomes the problems of blindness towards the content of an action and its consequences as required by niśkāma karma.

Karen Green

University of Melbourne

11:30 AM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.102

Stream: Gender Balancing the Philosophy Curriculum

Gender balance in the Curriculum: the current state of play

As a prolegomena to the project of working towards gender balance in the philosophy curriculum, this paper offers an overview of the current situation with regard to gender balance, based on a study of text books published by the best established presses since the 1990s. The overview offers some reason for optimism in so far as a few recent anthologies have been published, whose editors have clearly made an effort to include more female authored works than was previously typical. There are interesting correlations between subject matter and the presence or absence of female authored texts, in particular, works by women appear more often in ethics anthologies. Even in these, however, they usually occur in a section devoted to discrimination or female related topics such as caring or abortion. Typically, most of the works by women are found clustered in some such section which is given relatively marginal status, by being situated later in the collection than the historical and foundational topics. Those texts which claim in their titles to offer 'classic' or 'central' texts remain stubbornly masculine. It is nevertheless clear that some works by women have achieved 'classic' status, and it is argued that the most fruitful initial strategy to be adopted in transforming the curriculum may well be to build on the reputation of the authors of these texts.

Karen Green

University of Melbourne

6:30 PM, Sunday July 7

Room: 67.107

Stream: Presidential Address

Presidential Address: Catharine Macaulay's Republicanism and Contemporary Democratic Malaise

Catharine Macaulay's eighteenth-century, democratic, republican theory is grounded in Christian eudaimonism and rational altruism and so is based on quite different assumptions

concerning human nature to those that are usually assumed to provide the grounds of contemporary democratic theory. Fundamental to her enlightenment view is a belief in God, and in the possibility of human moral progress. In this paper I argue that her alternative understanding of the grounds of democracy offers a potential anti-dote to our current democratic malaise and explore the question of the extent to which her characterization of the virtues of democracy and her progressive political views can be saved once the foundation of a belief in God is removed

Mike Grimshaw

University of Canterbury

4:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 52.G02

Stream: History of Philosophy

Arthur Prior: Calvinist?

Arthur Prior is best known for tense logic and recent interest has also turned to his work in philosophical theology. It is also well known that Prior was deeply interested in Scottish moral philosophy up to 1949. Prior was a theology student before he turned to philosophy- and even when a philosophy student he continued to think about and write on theology, stating in a letter from 1936: "I have hopes of ending up eventually as the editor of a religious periodical." Prior's theology was strongly influenced by the Swiss neo-orthodox theologian Karl Barth- and also by the nineteenth century theologian F.D. Maurice. What is far less well known is that Prior was also influenced by the work of John Calvin. This paper traces the influence of John Calvin on Prior's thought via previously unknown letters and articles written by Prior.

Marco Grix

Massey University

11:30 AM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.101

Stream: Political Philosophy

Flourishing, Needs, and Practice

I conceptualise human needs in terms of necessary conditions for flourishing qua human, which – by using theories of well-being like Kraut's perfectionist/developmentalist approach – enables us to determine our needs in a comprehensive but unavoidably abstract way. Unfortunately, abstract human needs are of little help when it comes to determining what does/doesn't qualify as legitimate needs of members of a particular political community. For example, a car purchase plausibly represents a legitimate requirement for many 'mainstream' Americans. Yet, it is not recognised as a legitimate need among the Amish.

Need theory has been having a hard time accounting for and justifying such claims because it has been finding it difficult to translate abstract needs into culturally/communally specific requirements. However, practice theory is ideally suited to solve that problem. I argue that a key aspect of political citizenship, the active participation in MacIntyre's meta-practice of politics, is the communal interpretation of both human flourishing (What does/doesn't it mean for members of our community to flourish as human beings?) and human needs (What does/doesn't it mean for members of our community to need A, B, C, etc?), which entails the determination of which practices are/aren't communally recognised ways of satisfying human needs and thus of flourishing qua human. I also argue that a key aspect of ordinary practice citizenship, the active participation in and management of MacIntyre's ordinary practice (eg, farming, chess-play), is the community of practitioners' determination of which characteristics – including roles, activity patterns, and institutions – represent legitimate attributes of the practice in question.

Mackenzie Groff

University of Auckland

1:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.301

Stream: Phenomenology

A Phenomenological Exploration of Home, Nostalgia and Exile

There are debates happening all across the world concerning the philosophy of home, place and nostalgia on one hand and the issues of globalization, exile and the dislocation of the modern world on the other but there has yet to be a bridge built between them. This paper will provide a productive and invaluable way to fill this gap and unpack the ways in which these existential moods and dispositions depend on each other and lay bare a deeper understanding of the reality of home in a modern world. If home is the fundamental pillar of this inquiry, then nostalgia and exile are the phenomenological tools that allow us to properly orient ourselves to questions about home in relation to the modern existential condition.

Julia Haas

The Australian National University

4:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.201

Stream: Decision-theory

Valuation as sui generis cognitive capacity

A new approach to motivation, choice, and action asks how an agent can learn from interactions with its environment. Known as reinforcement learning, this area of research

analyzes idealized versions of this question and develops formal, i.e. algorithmic solutions to it (Sutton and Barto 1998, 2018). The approach's robust mathematical and computational foundations and interdisciplinary, empirical support are often taken as signs of its scientific fecundity (Kitcher 1982, 35-48). In this paper, I argue for something stronger: namely, that these approaches in fact target a common cause, where this common cause is a sui generis cognitive capacity. This capacity is valuation: roughly, the attribution of subjective reward and value to internal and external stimuli. I present a theory of valuation that is sufficiently general to accommodate the wide range of discipline-specific characterizations already in circulation, as well as to accommodate necessary future refinements, such as the already-evolving picture of dopamine activity (Starkweather et al. 2017). At the same time, my view is sufficiently mechanistically detailed to offer principled responses to several psychological and philosophical questions about motivation and action, such as the nature of weakness of will and its relation to addiction-driven behavior.

Alan Hajek

Australian National University

1:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

Contra Counterfactuals

'If Oswald hadn't killed Kennedy, then Kennedy would have lived to the age of 81 years and 269 days.'

'If I were to toss this coin 1000 times, then it would land 572 heads'.

These counterfactuals presumably are not true with the exact numbers that I have used. But according to an increasingly influential view, there are true counterfactuals just like them—there are exact numbers that render them true. Hawthorne, Moss, Schulz, and Stefánsson have recently defended versions of this view. On Stefánsson's version, for example, there are primitive modal facts—what he calls "counterfactuals"—that serve as truth-makers for counterfactual claims. It is a fascinating thesis, worth investigating. Among other things, it prompts my metaphilosophical ruminations on what makes for good primitives in philosophical theorising.

I have long argued that most counterfactuals are false, either because of unspecificity (e.g. there are so many relevant possible ways for Kennedy not to have been killed by Oswald), or indeterminism (e.g. coin tossing is chancy). The thesis that there are counterfactuals, if true, would defang my arguments. But like the counterfactuals themselves, the thesis is false—or so I shall argue.

Richard Hamilton

University of Notre Dame Australia

4:00 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.208

Stream: Shared Intentionality and Social Minds

Moral Perception: A Gibsonian Account

I argue that virtue supervenes on social competence and that this can be fruitfully understood as species of perception. This is not a new idea but it has encountered significant resistance. I believe that many of these objections are motivated by the assumption that perception should be understood in standard representational terms. In this paper I argue that if we adopt a Gibsonian/ 4E view of perception many of these objections lose their force. I argue that we can understand both social and moral perception as the direct detection of affordances understood as socially relevant information in the environment. The virtuous person does well what the ordinary person does merely competently.

Matthew Hammerton

Singapore Management University

2:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 52.G02

Stream: Moral Philosophy

The Fundamental Divisions in Ethics

When classifying moral theories, which categories are most fundamental? A traditional answer to this question divides moral theories into consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. However, I argue that this division is non-exclusive, non-exhaustive, and unhelpful because it conflates different areas of concern in moral theorizing. I then suggest that there are three fundamental divisions we should use to classify moral theories. They are the relative/neutral division, the normative priority division, and the value-maximizing/non-maximizing division. Each division is logically independent of the others, and each reflects a different area of concern in moral theory. Furthermore, thinking of moral theories in terms of these three divisions can help us to clarify old debates (e.g. between utilitarians and Kantians), see new theoretical possibilities, and make progress in comparative ethics.

Elizabeth Harman

Princeton University

9:30 AM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.107

Stream: Keynote

Keynote: Can Actions be Blameworthy without being Morally Wrong?

It is natural to think that actions can be blameworthy only if they are morally wrong. Purported counterexamples may come from cases of ignorance, or from cases of doing good things from bad motives; but I argue that these purported counterexamples fail. A more promising route to a counterexample comes from considering the realm of the morally permissible — within this realm, some actions are morally good to do without being required (they are supererogatory) and, more controversially, some actions are morally bad to do without being morally wrong (they are suberogatory). I argue that agents can make moral mistakes in choosing which of their morally permissible options to take. Agents can make morally permissible moral mistakes — but, as I will argue, my view faces a puzzle about blameworthiness, about how to answer the title question. Ultimately, I will argue that actions can be blameworthy without being morally wrong; but a cost comes with giving this answer.

Riley Harris

University of Adelaide

2:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 19.2002

Stream: Moral Philosophy

Normative Uncertainty and the Problem of Arbitrary Evaluation

Has recent interest in moral uncertainty been for nothing? How should we value research about what we 'ought' to do? In general, should we prefer ignorance to bliss? I begin to analyse the value of information in this context. But there is an initial challenge that must be overcome. There is no non-arbitrary point from which we can evaluate options. This apparently vicious regress can be solved a number of ways.

Harits Hasra

Monash University

2:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.101

Stream: Political Philosophy

Contested Social Meaning

Deborah Hellman and Tarunabh Khaitan argue that part of the wrong of discrimination is what it expresses about its target: its social meaning. Epistemic access to social meaning can vary, however. Minorities are likely to be epistemically advantaged in assessing whether acts have a discriminatory social meaning, in virtue of their greater experience with acts that instantiate such social meanings.

In a predominantly white society such as Australia, Asians might view statements such as “You don’t act like a normal Asian!” as having a discriminatory social meaning. Suppose that most Australians would disagree. This poses a dilemma for understanding the social meaning of the statement. If social meaning was fixed by majority, then we would be neglecting the epistemic expertise of minority members. On the other hand, it seems deeply implausible that social meaning could be fixed by a minority view, even if it is epistemically advantaged. In this paper, I will review a number of possible solutions to this dilemma.

Anandi Hattiangadi

Stockholm University

11:30 AM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.201

Stream: Logic

Is Logic Normative?

This paper investigates whether logic is normative. First, it is argued that logic is normative in an interesting sense only if the concept of logical validity is normative, that is, if it is a condition on grasping the concept of logical validity that one’s judgments of validity carry normative commitments. Second, it is argued that the concept of logical validity is not normative. The paper proceeds by considering a range of logico-normative bridge principles which purport to characterize the normative commitments one makes in judging that an argument is valid. It is shown in each case that it is possible for a person competent with the concept of logical validity to accept that an argument is valid while sensibly rejecting the purported normative commitments carried by that judgment. Finally, the paper closes with a consideration of what logic describes, and whether logic has any special relevance for the normative theory of reasoning.

Lisa Hecht

Stockholm University

1:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.102

Stream: Harm and Risk

Taking Risks and Suffering Wrongs

In this paper, I explore whether the voluntary assumption of a risk of harm weakens the stringency of one's rights against that harm. I ultimately deny that the following Risk Thesis is true:

If it is permissible to impose harm h on innocent Non-Risk-Taker in order to secure good g for P , then it is permissible to impose a greater harm, $h+$, on innocent Risk-Taker in order to secure the same good.

The best explanation of the Risk Thesis rests on the following two claims: (1) Risk-takers value the good protected by the right less than non-risk-takers value the same good. Expected Utility Theory suggests this much. (2) The stringency of a right is sensitive to the value assigned to the good protected by the right. Judith Jarvis Thomson is sympathetic to this claim (*Some Ruminations on Rights*, 1977, p. 54). Therefore, a risk-taker's right not to be harmed is less stringent than a non-risk-taker's right against harm.

I call into doubt both claims. (1) Rival theories to EUT deny that subjective valuation of outcomes explains risk-taking behaviour. (2) I suggest that the stringency of rights reflects the importance of generic human interests not particular individuals' evaluation thereof.

Benjamin Henke

Australian National University/Washington University in St. Louis

4:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.301

Stream: Philosophy of Mind

Eliminating Perception

The concept of perception is of a type of mental state whose instances are apt to guide reasoning and action. Thus, perceptual states, as such, have a distinct and unified functional role. Current methodology in philosophy of perception assumes this unified picture of perception. This paper argues for the elimination of perception from our taxonomy. There is no type of mental state whose instances play the distinctive functional role purportedly served by perceptual states. Rather, this role fractionates into distinct state-types whose instances play a subset of these functional roles. I present evidence for such functional heterogeneity across two axes. First, drawing on the account of the two streams of late visual processing originally formulated by Milner and Goodale (1992, 2006), I argue that,

within a modality, distinct perceptual representations subserve online motor control and recognition, categorization, and reasoning respectively. These distinct state-types perform these different functional roles essentially. Second, I provide evidence that different modalities serve different functional roles in the action and cognition. Thus, progress in the philosophy and psychology of perception requires that we abandon the general notion of perception in exchange for a range of distinct state-types.

Jonathan Herington

University of Rochester

11:30 AM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

What's wrong with algorithmic bias?

Computer scientists have made great strides in characterizing different measures of algorithmic bias, and showing that certain measures of bias cannot be jointly satisfied. I suggest that thinking carefully about why discrimination is wrongful helps us identify (i) the wrongs that different measures of bias seek to capture, and (ii) the value trade-offs being made when we prefer one measure over another. I begin by introducing the ways in which these algorithms are constructed, and the potential sources from which bias can emerge. Next, I introduce three different measures of bias discussed in the computer science literature - independence, sufficiency and calibration - and discuss the implicit assumptions these measures make about the underlying causal structure of the behaviour they are predicting. Third, I discuss the normative motivation for each of these measures, with reference to the philosophical literature on the wrongfulness of disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination. I show how developers of these algorithms face a familiar tension between avoiding disparate treatment and avoiding disparate impact.

Stephen Hetherington

University of New South Wales

11:30 AM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.201

Stream: Epistemology

Open Knowledge; Closed Knowledge

Karl Popper gave philosophy the conceptual distinction between an open society and a closed one. This paper begins to develop the idea of an instance of knowledge being either open or closed. This idea builds upon earlier work of mine, on the nature of philosophical knowledge. Such knowledge is partly constituted by an openness to questioning – which can include its questioning itself. It can thus include what I call an attitudinal fallibilism. This is also, more generally, a distinguishing mark of open knowledge: one's knowing that p could

include one's being receptive to testing and questioning the knowledge, ready to relinquish it if need be. I do not argue that open knowledge is always epistemically better than closed knowledge: presumably, there are contexts where closed knowledge is epistemically sufficient, even preferable. The main point here is to notice the conceptual availability of this new epistemological distinction. But I end the paper by applying the distinction to Kripke's puzzle (first published by Harman in 1973) about knowledge and dogmatism: the puzzle can be dissolved by distinguishing between open knowledge and closed knowledge.

Ines Hipolito

University of Wollongong

2:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.101

Stream: Postgraduate Paper Prize

Perceiving and Cognising: Re-Drawing the Boundaries

This paper reviews three distinct ways of drawing the perception/cognition boundary. The traditional modular sharp boundary has been recently brought to question most prominently by predictive processing theories. This is because such theories assume that even at the lowest levels perceiving can be informed by the content of the perceiver's background cognizing. However, as this paper demonstrates, even if we abandon modular theories of perception and embrace many of the lessons of the predictive processing framework, it is possible that there is a strong perception/cognition boundary. To make this case, the paper starts by reviewing what motivated modular theories to draw a sharp boundary and detailing the challenges such theories face. The paper then briefly introduces the new contender – the predictive processing account of perception. It will be shown how purely cognitivist predictive processing offers an inverted theoretical foundation for understanding how perception and cognition mutually inform one another. There are reasons, however, to think that perceiving is sometimes not informed by cognising, which is yet an explanatory difficulty to the purely cognitivist account of predictive processing. The last section then claims that this problem can be overcome if some forms of perceiving are not contentful and, for such reason, it cannot be intelligibly informed by the contents of cognising. Radical enactivism offers a way of doing so in recognising a distinction between two forms of perceiving: contentful and contentless. The cost of adopting such an approach is that it requires us to re-conceive and re-draw the boundaries between perceiving and contentful cognizing yet again.

Ned Howells-Whitaker

University of Pittsburgh

2:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.208

Stream: Shared Intentionality and Social Minds

Imaginary Promises

In his recent book 'The Moral Nexus', R. Jay Wallace defends a general account of bipolar moral obligation modelled on promissory duties. Unlike promises, however, these obligations “do not rest on specific exchanges or transactions with other individuals, but ... specify what we owe to people just in virtue of the fact that they occupy a world in common with us” (§2.3). As such, these obligations float free from any particular practices.

In this connection, Wallace considers Michael Thompson’s concern (in his essay ‘What is it to Wrong Someone?’) that bipolar obligations rest on the availability of a shared practice of recognizing such obligations, and fail to bind in the absence of such a practice. In response, Wallace asserts that rational agents “can easily, through a modest exercise of abstraction, ... think of themselves as individuals who are capable of bipolar normative thoughts” (§4.2), and so recognize an obligation even in the absence of any mutually available practice.

I argue that this will not be enough. Abstracted obligations of this kind are simply not obligations; imagining an obligation cannot stand in for recognizing one.

John Howes

Learningguild

11:30 AM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 52.G02

Stream: Moral Philosophy

Cicero's treatment of Epicurean ethics

Cicero presents Epicurean ethics in Book I of his *De Finibus ...* (Ultimate Goods and Evils) and criticizes it in Book II. I argue that these books deserve the attention of moral philosophers and the students they may address, primarily because they attend perceptively to the best motivation for the virtues.

Bryce Huebner

Georgetown University

11:30 AM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.208

Stream: Shared Intentionality and Social Minds

Sharing illusory worlds

Across a wide range of social and political divides, people seem to perceive different things when they are presented with identical stimuli. In recent years, models of cognitive permeation and predictive processing have come to the fore as plausible explanations for these facts. But grappling with these different understandings of the world requires a shift in the way that we commonly understand the nature of the world that we all share. After all, if perception is merely a form of controlled hallucination, we need a story about why people who inhabit similar social positions hallucinate in the same way. In this talk, I will explore one plausible account of these phenomena, drawing on insights from Yogācāra buddhist philosophy as well as recent data from the cognitive and computational neurosciences. Put far too briefly for now, I will argue that networks of attentional and valuational mechanisms facilitate ongoing attunement to social and environmental regularities that we encounter; these mechanisms produce a socially structured affordance map of the world we frequently encounter; and through attempts to triangulate with others, using a wide range of linguistic resources, we come to accept that our experiences represent the world as it really is, and that our representations are shared with others who inhabit the same world as us.

Katrina Hutchison

Macquarie University

1:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.102

Stream: Epistemic Injustice

Epistemic injustice, know-how and the gender pay gap

Theories of epistemic injustice have potential to illuminate a variety of real-world situations where harm results from misjudging the credibility of a knower. One such context is the workplace, and specifically the gender pay gap. In this talk I will explore the relevance of epistemic injustice to women's experiences of work and material remuneration, drawing partly on empirical research with women surgeons. I argue that epistemic injustice understood narrowly (as Miranda Fricker has described it, focusing on testimonial and hermeneutical injustice) is only applicable to some types of wrongs women experience in their capacity as knowers in the workplace. One of the most significant limitations of Fricker's account in this context is its intellectualism about knowledge. In many careers, credibility tracks the skilled performance of the worker. For example, in surgery the

knowledge that matters most to patients (and employers such as hospitals) is not the surgeon's propositional knowledge, but her ability to enact knowledge of disease and anatomy through the successful hands-on performance of an operation. I argue that a non-intellectualist account of epistemic injustice could provide a more useful lens for understanding epistemic injustice in workplaces, including the gender pay gap.

Bruno Ippedico

Australian National University

5:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.301

Stream: Philosophy of Mind

Towards a Lineage Explanation of Conceptual Structure

According to Jackendoff (2002), our thinking takes place in a rich combinatorial system of mental representations, a language of thought (Fodor, 1975) known as Conceptual Structure. I will assume that is true. How did Conceptual Structure evolve? For Jackendoff, most of it was already present in our common ancestors with chimpanzees. But he doesn't say much more than that. I think we can say more, and we should. We need a lineage explanation (Calcott, 2009) of our Conceptual Structure: a model of change that describes, in as much detail as possible, the steps by which our ancestors' language of thought (or whatever medium their thinking took place in) evolved into our own. My aim is to sketch the character of the starting point—the ape baseline. Absent relevant ancestors, contemporary chimpanzees will be my model organisms. In order to characterise chimpanzees' thinking in terms of Conceptual Structure, one must first infer chimpanzees' cognitive abilities from behaviour and describe them in sufficiently theory-neutral terms. I will argue that informative theory-neutral descriptions of important cognitive abilities of chimpanzees can be given by using a small set of very simple ordinary words (Wierzbicka, 2014).

Suguru Ito

Nagoya University

4:00 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 52.G01

Stream: Ethics & AI

AI as a new object of ethical concern

In animal ethics and environmental ethics, it has been argued that something other than human beings (animals, lands and ecosystems) can also have rights.

Some researchers have suggested that animal ethics and environmental ethics can be applied to an argument about rights of AI or robots (e.g. Calverley, 2006).

However, AI would have important characteristics which has not been possessed by animals or ecosystems.

(1) Artificiality ... AI is newly created by human beings for a certain purpose. Since AI has never existed in the natural environment, it seems difficult to apply the concept of 'natural' or 'self-interest' to AI.

(2) Intelligence ... AI could have intelligence equal to or higher than human beings. Therefore, it could have social rights such as intellectual property rights in addition to the right to life. Perhaps AI itself might assert its rights.

(3) Informational substance ... AI could not need a physical body and specific individuality. Additionally, it could be easily replicated in cyberspace and become ageless and immortal.

In this paper, I will examine a potential problem caused by these characteristics referring to the argument in legal personality and information ethics.

Ushana Jayasuriya

University of New South Wales

1:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 52.G01

Stream: Practical Ethics

Who needs a Just Transition?

The concept of a just transition has been gaining traction politically as states look to move to renewable energy. Anthropogenic climate change has created obligations on some states to mitigate faster than others. Transitions to renewable energy provide a means by which states can adhere to their duties. However, there is currently confusion over what is meant by a “just” transition resulting in discussion of energy transitions with few considerations of justice. This paper explores the theoretical foundations of a just transition, grounding the need to transition in international obligations. It also explores some of the limitations in current literature on just transitions, particularly the almost exclusive focus on the rights and interests of workers. I argue that the rights and interests of indigenous peoples will also need to be taken into consideration for a transition to be just. This is due to both political and moral obligations of the state to indigenous peoples. There is potential for the transition to significantly benefit or harm many segments of society, and therefore, due consideration needs to be given to all sectors of society, not just workers, for the transition to be a just one.

Samuel Jones

Macquarie University

4:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.301

Stream: Cognitive Science

Affective Scaffolding in Skilled Listening

Affective scaffolding presents a framework for analysing the emotional regulatory practices agents employ to in their day to day lives. Recent literature has focused on the role of music listening in scaffolding. More specifically, it has been argued that listening to music is a part of the scaffold by which we create our emotional niche. However, much of the work on music listening does not take the varying expertise of listeners into account. I posit there are two kinds of listeners; the novice, who actively engages in music listening but has a low-level understanding of the technical component, and the skilled listener, a listener who not only engages in music listening, but is proficient in music making themselves. Specifically, I will argue that being a skilled listener allows more complex and dynamic regulatory behaviours.

Matthew Joseph

University of Sydney

5:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.101

Stream: Postgraduate Paper Prize

Duties and Privileges: Reconsidering States' Rights of Exclusion

Many political philosophers argue that nation-states have the right to unilaterally determine and enforce their own immigration policies. This 'right to exclude' is taken to be a particularly robust right, granting states the moral authority to deploy their defensive military capabilities against civilian non-citizens. In this paper, I reconsider the right to exclude in light of a Hohfeldian analysis of both the state's right to exclude and human rights. On my view the state's right to exclude is a privilege, and human rights are a claim-right imposing duties on states. If this analysis holds, then taking human rights seriously means that states have human rights duties that restrict their range of permissible exclusion practices. Rather than being a strong right to control the movements of human beings, the right to exclude is just the moral permission to do those things that it is not duty-bound under human rights obligations not to do.

Naoyuki Kajimoto

University of Sydney

1:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

Presentism and phenomenology as of the privileged present

We seem to have phenomenology as of the privileged present. That is, we seem to feel as if the present is somewhat privileged. In philosophy of time it is widely accepted that our phenomenology as of the privileged present offers reason to prefer presentism to eternalism since presentists can offer better explanation of why we seem to have phenomenology as of the privileged present than eternalists. For presentists can argue that we feel as if the present is somewhat privileged since only the present is real. On the other hand, since eternalists hold that the past, present, and future are equally real, they need to explain why we feel as if the present is privileged although the world is not in such a way. In this paper I will argue that presentists' explanation is not better than eternalists' explanation given how both explain our phenomenology as of the privileged present. I will conclude that our phenomenology as of the privileged present does not offer motivation for presentism.

Antonios Kaldas

Macquarie University

5:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.302

Stream: Minimal Cognition

Uniqueness About Consciousness—A Speculative Case for A New Metaphysical Category

To which metaphysical category does phenomenal consciousness belong? Is it an event, a property, a relation, or something else? The variety of answers to this question currently in play suggests that consciousness is the monotreme (echidnas and the platypus) of the philosophical world—it defies easy categorisation. Digging into the essential features of consciousness, I speculate on how we might progress this discourse, including consideration of the possibility that—like monotremes—consciousness may deserve its own unique metaphysical category: uniqueness about consciousness, and explore some practical consequences of such a move. I aim more to stimulate discussion rather than propose a solution.

Joel Katzav

The University of Queensland

1:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.208

Stream: History of Philosophy

Theodore and Grace de Lagunas' Dogmatism and Evolution

Grace and Theodore de Laguna were prominent American philosophers during the first half of the twentieth century. Their work has, however, virtually been forgotten. I examine their 1910 book, *Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in Modern Philosophy (DE)*. First, I argue that DE is an important contribution to epistemology and the philosophy of science. It develops a naturalistic and evolutionary confirmation holism that not only includes all the key theses of W. V. O. Quine's 1951 paper, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' but is more sophisticated than what is found in that paper and, indeed, is an epistemology from which we can still learn in the twenty-first century. Second, I argue that DE is an important contribution to the history of modern philosophy. DE provides a unique, and self-conscious, perspective on how its epistemology evolves out of Neo-Kantian, Absolute idealist and, especially, pragmatist epistemologies; this perspective suggests that Quine's epistemology, and the reactions to it, rehearse debates that took place in the late nineteenth, and early twentieth, century. Finally, I consider some of the effects on subsequent philosophy of the fact that DE, and the debates it was involved in, were forgotten.

David Killoren

Australian Catholic University

5:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

Moral Occasionalism to the Rescue

Moral Occasionalism (MO) is the view that in normal circumstances, our moral beliefs are occasioned. A moral belief that *p* is occasioned when it is based on (both justified by and caused by) fact(s) that ground the fact that *p*, where *p* is some true moral proposition. In this paper I offer MO as an alternative to David Enoch's "pre-established harmony" view. Enoch's view is intended to show that metaethical non-naturalists can explain why our moral beliefs are mostly true without positing any direct interaction between our minds and moral reality. MO also does this, but I show that MO is better than Enoch's view. I show that Enoch's view is incoherent in ways that MO isn't, and that Enoch's view requires implausible assumptions about the evolutionary history of human moral psychology whereas MO doesn't. Then I show that MO does a better job than Enoch's view in responding to epistemological attacks on non-naturalism that have been presented by Dan Korman and Dustin Locke, Matthew Bedke, Richard Rowland, and Folk Tersman. My thesis is that non-naturalists ought to abandon Enoch's view and defend MO instead.

Daniel Kilov

Australian National University

4:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.104

Stream: Metaphilosophy

Do Philosophers Show Signs of Expertise?

Experimental philosophy finds systematic variation between the case judgements of philosophers and folk. Several philosophers have argued that such variation shows that case judgments are unreliable. In response, defenders claim that such variation is evidence of philosophical expertise. They argue that the observed variation is analogous to what we would expect in other disciplines. For example, medical training produces systematic differences in the diagnostic judgements of medical experts. A difference between the judgment of a medical professional and a lay person is a sign that the medical professional is an expert. Some hold that we should think similarly about philosopher's judgments. We subject this claim to empirical scrutiny. We conducted a survey with 259 folk participants and 32 philosophers. The survey included tasks designed to elicit signs of expertise, consistent with the psychological literature. We found no evidence that philosophers are experts at evaluating thought experiments. We discuss the implications of our findings for two influential views on the role of the method of cases in philosophy, namely, Jackson's folk-analysis view and Williamson's experimental view.

Boris Kment

Princeton University

5:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.201

Stream: Decision-theory

Decision, Causality, and Pre-Determination

Most philosophical decision theorists endorse either evidential decision theory (EDT) or causal decision theory (CDT). CDT is partly motivated by the belief that EDT gets Newcomb cases wrong. But CDT faces counterexamples as well. I discuss two such examples (due to Arif Ahmed) in which intuition sides with EDT and aim to formulate an independently plausible new theory (distinct from CDT and EDT) that gets both Newcomb and Ahmed cases right. I argue on independent grounds that a rational agent determines the value of an option A by conditionalizing on (1) and then applying CDT.

(1) The facts beyond my control are compossible with my doing A.

This view entails that the value that an agent should assign to an option A is a weighted average of the values that CDT and EDT assign to A, where the weights depend on the agent's credence in (2).

(2) My action is determined by facts beyond my control.

In the limiting case where the agent is certain of (2), she should follow EDT. This account agrees with EDT and intuition about Ahmed's cases, since these involve agents who believe (2). At the same time, it makes the right predictions about Newcomb cases.

Christian Kronsted

The University of Memphis

5:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.208

Stream: Shared Intentionality and Social Minds

Dances and Affordances - Improvisational Dance and Conceptual Problem Solving

Studies indicate that improvisational dance can change how we approach conceptual problem-solving. For example, a person might be stuck on a complicated philosophical objection, but after a dance session, new solutions to the problem often emerge. However, it is not clear in the literature what it is about dance that can cause changes in problem-solving perspectives. I argue that an enactive embodied affordance-based approach to cognition can begin to answer this phenomenon.

I here use the enactive framework to analyze urban improvisational dance styles (House, Popping, and Breakdancing) to give a non-representational affordance-based account of dance improvisation. I argue that improvisational dance is a form of affordance exploration and generation. Through improvisational dance, agents can enrich their environments with new and more complex affordances. Since affordances are situated in the physical environment, those newly generated affordances can carry over into conceptual problem-solving.

Kristjan Laasik

Zhejiang University

2:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.201

Stream: European Philosophy

Constancy and Identity

When philosophers talk about objects as being numerically identical, they mean that these objects are really one and the same object. When philosophers talk about perceptual constancy, they usually mean that certain apparent properties are the same, or similar. I will argue that, from a Husserlian point of view, these topics are significantly interconnected. Indeed, I will venture to argue that constancy is the original criterion of identity, and central

to object-identification in pre-predicative experience. After defending the Husserlian view against certain objections, I will also argue that, despite superficial similarities, the Husserlian view of constancy is quite different from Jonathan Cohen's counterfactual view of constancy.

Holly Lawford-Smith

University of Melbourne

11:30 AM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.302

Stream: Feminist Philosophy

Women-Only Spaces and The Right To Exclude

The 'right to exclude' is much-discussed in the political philosophy literature on immigration. Theorists argue that a nation has the right to self-determination, and that a significant part of self-determination is the freedom to associate (and to not associate) at will. Thus, it is up to nations whether and to what extent they admit would-be migrants. In pushing back against this claim, opponents tend to draw distinctions between groups of different kinds, from intimate associations like marriages, through expressive associations like religions, to political associations like nations. Intimate and expressive associations, they concede, may have the right to self-determination and so a right to exclude; but political associations do not. I draw on this discussion over immigration to assess two different claims made by radical and gender critical feminists, first, that female people are entitled to female-only spaces (to the exclusion of all male people, regardless of gender identity), and second, that lesbians are entitled to lesbian-only spaces (to the exclusion of all male people, regardless of gender identity). I include under the broad category of 'spaces' both identity terms like 'woman', 'female', and 'lesbian', and also categories like women's sports and women-only shortlists. The right to exclude premised upon national self-determination is undermined by a difficulty in specifying what the 'self' in 'self-determination' is supposed to be, but this difficulty does not cross over to the category of 'women' or the category of 'lesbian', even though both terms are politically contested at present. I argue that for the same reasons some people think you cannot be racist against dominant racial groups, we should also think there is no problem in excluding members of dominant groups. Nations' right to exclude is at its most controversial precisely because of the vulnerability of would-be migrants (e.g. refugees, ecological migrants, and economic migrants). But transwomen are not made vulnerable by exclusion from female-only spaces, in particular when there are third spaces available. So the two cases are not parallel. Women, and lesbians, have the right to exclude.

Catherine Legg

Deakin University

1:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.302

Stream: Minimal Cognition

Discursive Habits: A Representationalist Rethinking of Teleosemiotics

Enactivism has greatly benefitted contemporary philosophy by showing in detail how the traditional intellectualist 'act-content' model of intentionality is simply insufficient both phenomenologically and naturalistically, and minds are built from 'operative intentionality' – world-involving bodily habits. It has been assumed that this insight must entail non-representationalism concerning at least basic minds. But what if we could show that representation is itself a form of skilled performance? I sketch the beginnings of such an account, drawing on Peirce's pragmatic semiotics, which understands signs as habits whose connections with rich schemas of possible experience render them subject to increasing degrees of self-control. This new framework, I argue, enables us to take a crack at the Information Processing Challenge (Hutto 2011), and offers the prospect of a new, entirely habit-based epistemology.

Chris Lernpass

Australian National University

2:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

Ill-Being & Disfavour

Assume welfare subjectivism is true. Subjectivism holds that something is basically good for a welfare subject if and only if and to the extent that the respective subject has (a) specified favouring attitude(s) or state(s) towards that thing under suitable conditions. In turn, the subjectivist seems committed to a corresponding account of when something is basically bad for a subject: an account of ill-being (cf. Kagan, 2015). As part of the account of ill-being, any complete subjectivist account owes us a theory of disfavour, i.e., a theory that explains what is (or are) the right kind of disfavouring attitude(s) or state(s). I'll argue that the major theories of favouring in the literature fail to provide plausible models for a theory of disfavouring. The problem is that disfavouring comes in many forms, and privileging any specific one is arbitrary. I sketch and defend a solution to this problem: the theory of disfavouring should be disjunctive. That is to say, any of a number of attitudes and affective states (and combinations of these) can play the role of disfavouring, and thus form part of the explanation of why something is basically bad for a subject.

Neil Levy

Macquarie University

11:30 AM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 52.G02

Stream: Moral Philosophy

The Suspicious Correlation

Moral judgments entail or consist in claims that certain ways of behaving are called for. These actions have expectable consequences. I will argue that these consequences are suspiciously benign: on controversial issues, each side assesses these consequences, measured in dispute-independent goods, as significantly better than the consequences of behaving in the ways their opponents recommend. This remains the case even when we have not formed our moral judgment by assessing consequences. I will suggest that the evidence indicates that our perception of the consequences of acting as recommended by our moral judgments is motivated, such that the warrant of such assessments is lower than we might have thought. The suspicion correlation between our moral judgments and our assessments of the implicated facts provides higher-order evidence that should lead us to reduce our confidence in these assessments.

Bruce Long

The University of Sydney

5:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.208

Stream: Model-Based Explanation Across the Sciences

Against True Information

The veridicality thesis in the philosophy of information and informational logic is based upon a popular argument due to Fred Dretske and Luciano Floridi. Floridi's implementation in his logic of being informed says that if agent a is informed that p , then p , or $(IaP \rightarrow P)$. It's based upon Dretske's argument that "Information is what is capable of yielding knowledge, and since knowledge requires truth, information requires it also". I will argue that this is too strong, and that it does not follow from Dretske's argument, nor from $(IaP \rightarrow P)$, that truth is a necessary condition of information. Instead, information is what makes encoded statements, representations, concepts, formulae, and theories true, but the information itself does not have the property of being true, only of existing. Put otherwise - advocates of the veridicality thesis are talking about the alethic value of encodings of information, not information. I'll suggest that an approach based upon epistemic content is the wrong choice for developing conceptions of the nature of semantic information and for developing informational logic. I'll recommend a different approach based upon gradients of abstraction and a scientific metaphysics.

Joshua Luczak

Leibniz Universitat Hannover

5:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.201

Stream: Philosophy of Science

Look At What You Are Aiming At!

This paper highlights that the aim of using statistical mechanics to underpin irreversible processes is, strictly speaking, ambiguous. Traditionally, however, the task of underpinning irreversible processes has been thought to be synonymous with underpinning the Second Law of thermodynamics. This paper claims that contributors to the foundational discussion are best interpreted as aiming to provide a microphysical justification of the Minus First Law, despite the ways their aims are often stated. This paper suggests that contributors should aim at accounting for both the Minus First Law and Second Law, but, importantly, that they neither directly or merely aim at accounting for these laws. This paper also suggests that contributors aim at accounting for the particulars of the phenomena that support these laws.

Cameron Lutman

University of Wollongong

1:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

Virtue, Well-Being, and Interactionism

The aim of this paper is to investigate some of the implications of situationism for philosophical thinking about well-being, in particular for perfectionist approaches to well-being. Given the deep connection between virtue and well-being for perfectionism, the situationist threat to conventional models of virtue also raises doubts over perfectionist accounts of well-being. While the situationist challenge to Aristotelian virtue ethics has received significant attention, the issues it raises for thinking about well-being have received far less consideration. In this paper I will consider what I call the 'Direct Challenge' to perfectionism that arises from the situationist literature and show how it undermines Aristotelian perfectionism. I will then introduce and motivate a shift towards a different version of perfectionism: interactionist perfectionism (IP). In showing that this interactionist version of perfectionism can counter the Direct Challenge from situationism, I will demonstrate that perfectionism can survive this empirically-motivated critique, and remains an appealing and viable way of approaching well-being.

Edouard Machery

University of Pittsburgh

9:30 AM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.107

Stream: Keynote

Keynote: Dogmatism and Parochialism

In this talk (based on chapter 4 of my recent book, *Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds*, OUP 2017) I describe the method of cases—a prominent method in much of philosophy—and I present two arguments based on experimental-philosophy findings that undermine its use in philosophy.

Fiona Macpherson

University of Glasgow

9:30 AM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.107

Stream: Keynote

Keynote: Does Virtual Reality Consist in Veridical, Illusory or Hallucinatory Experience?

Does virtual reality (VR) involve: (i) illusory or hallucinatory experience of things that are not there, or (ii) veridical experience of computational objects? I show that contemporary thinking about this issue involves a false dichotomy according to which the answer is either (i) or (ii), but not both. I begin this paper by first articulating my own account of illusion and hallucination in part by presenting new cases of illusion and hallucination that have not heretofore been identified. These cases show that the traditional accounts of illusion and hallucination are incorrect. I go on to provide a taxonomy of all of the different kinds of illusion and hallucination that I identify. New instances of illusion and hallucination provide much needed, important data for testing theories of experience and perception—and illuminate the nature of virtual reality experience. I go on to discuss virtual reality experience of the sort that is produced by today, and show that we need to take account of the nature of the technology used to produce it when considering whether the experience is veridical or not. I conclude that VR experience is highly complex, containing a variety of both veridical and non-veridical elements.

Ishani Maitra

University of Michigan

1:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.203

Stream: Philosophy of Language

Unsettling speech

This talk aims to draw attention to a hitherto under-theorised way in which some speech can be harmful. Theorists have already offered a number of distinct ways in which speech can be harmful: e.g., by silencing others' speech, enacting discriminatory norms, and more. In addition to these, I will argue that speech can be harmful by making it the case that certain questions that ought to be settled are not settled. I label speech that is harmful in this way 'unsettling speech.' In the talk, I sketch a framework for thinking about such speech, and explore what the resulting harm consists in. I argue, that though several kinds of speech can be harmful in this way, hate speech is especially prone to bring about these harms. Finally, I also argue that recognising the harmfulness of unsettling speech complicates several strategies for countering hate speech, such as via "more speech" or blocking speech.

Teresa Marques

University of Barcelona

4:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.203

Stream: Philosophy of Language

Disagreement with a bald-faced liar

How do we disagree with a bald-faced liar? To answer, we must settle on what bald-faced lies are: are they assertions? Are they lies? Does the speaker have the intent to deceive? In contexts of bald-faced lies, it is common knowledge that what the speaker says is false. Sorensen (2007) characterizes bald-faced lies as prima facie lies that are made without the intention to deceive. According to Maitra (2018), a bald-faced liar is not even making an assertion, rather he's engaged in a form of fictionality, like actors following a script. If that's the case, it doesn't seem possible to disagree with a bald-faced liar. Against Maitra, I argue, first, that the criticisms that can be directed at bald-faced liars aren't directed at actors following a script. Second, if the fictionality account were correct, we would be mistaken in criticizing walk backs of the illocutionary assertoric force of a bald-faced lie, as we do in political contexts. Moreover, it would be puzzling that bald-faced lies contribute to gaslight – i.e., to dominate the hearer by diminishing her good epistemic stance. Finally, I argue that the bald-faced liar and the hearer can disagree in attitude and can disagree in act.

Dan Marshall

Lingnan University

1:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.104

Stream: Metaphysics

A moderate-grain theory of states of affairs

A state of affairs is a way things are or a way things aren't. The two most popular theories of the individuation conditions of states of affairs are the possible worlds theory, according to which states of affairs are identical if and only if they are necessarily equivalent (that is, if and only if, necessarily, they either both obtain or both fail to obtain), and the structure theory, according to which states of affairs are structured in the same kind of way sentences are structured. Despite their popularity, both these theories have serious problems. This paper proposes a new moderate-grain theory of states of affairs that avoids these problems by individuating states of affairs more finely than the possible worlds theory and more coarsely than the structure theory. Roughly, according to the proposed theory, two states of affairs are identical if and only if they are necessarily equivalent and they are about the same things. In addition to arguing that this proposed theory is superior to both the possible worlds theory and the structure theory, the paper argues that the proposed theory is superior to other existing moderate-grain theories of states of affairs.

Jane McDonnell

Monash University

11:30 AM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.302

Stream: Metaphysics

Incompatible Descriptions

In standard logic, two statements are said to be "incompatible" if they cannot both be true. More generally, things are said to be "incompatible" if they are inconsistent or so different in nature as to be incapable of coexisting. I'll be considering descriptions which lead one to respond that "they can't both be right" or "they must be describing different things". However, in many interesting cases, I will argue that there is no underlying contradiction and that the things described are perfectly capable of coexisting in the one world. There are incompatible descriptions which have equal claim to truth, even though they cannot be brought together under one, over-arching framework. This "perspectivalism" is the natural way to understand the paradoxes of quantum mechanics.

Daniel McKay

University of Canterbury

11:30 AM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

Wagering on Free Will

Whether we possess libertarian free will is a controversial topic in philosophy and many contemporary philosophers argue that we do not. I present a novel pragmatic justification for believing that we do possess libertarian free will. Which is to say, a justification that turns on the idea that, if we have a preference for having true beliefs on this subject, we have something to gain and nothing to lose by adopting a belief in our possessing libertarian free will.

Travis McKenna

University of Pittsburgh

1:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.203

Stream: Philosophy of Language

Radical Contextualism and Kripke's Puzzle about Belief

In 'A Puzzle About Belief', Kripke (1979) argues against the thought that although modal contexts favour a Millian view of naming, attitude contexts (specifically belief) favour a Fregean/Russellian view. He does so by attempting to produce precisely the same kind of paradox relied upon by the anti-Millian arguments based on premises the anti-Millian would accept, considering a Frenchman who moves to London without recognising it and believes the proposition 'Londres est jolie' but not the proposition 'London is pretty'. Thus we are not left with an argument for or against Millianism, but a genuine puzzle. In this talk, I will suggest a response to this puzzle motivated largely by the radical contextualism outlined by Travis (1997), according to which words, depending on the context in which they are employed, "may make any of many semantic contributions to wholes of which they are a part". On this view, context plays a role in determining the truth conditions of the propositions employed in Kripke's formulation of the puzzle, and so we may see exactly why we are inclined to say that our Frenchman both does and doesn't believe that London is pretty.

Russell Meyer

University of Wollongong

1:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.201

Stream: Philosophy of Science

An Explanatory Taste for Mechanisms

Mechanists often argue that mechanistic explanations are an objective source of explanatory power (Craver 2007, Craver & Kaplan 2018) and that sociocultural influences have no bearing on how we adjudicate those explanations, since they are shaped by the real, metaphysically robust structure of nature (Craver 2014). I attempt to raise some doubts about this characterisation of explanation from outside Mechanism proper, and propose that sociocultural influences on our explanatory tastes play a large part in how we decide between what is an explanation and what isn't. First, I make an analogy between Craver-style mechanistic explanation and treatments of explanation in the social cognition literature. I argue that similar assumptions – particularly about the objective and inviolable goals and standards of explanations of social cognitive phenomena – have led to erroneous treatment of the available evidence, appealing to interactionist criticisms (Gallagher & Hutto 2008, Hutto 2008) of cognitivist accounts of social cognition. I also draw a comparison between the actual phenomenon of social reason-giving and its sociocultural basis (Hutto 2008) and Craver's characterisation of scientific reason-giving as neutral and objective. I raise the doubt that perhaps our scientific reason-giving might be more like our social reason-giving than Craver admits.

Marco Meyer

University of York / ANU

2:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 52.G01

Stream: Practical Ethics

Fake News, Conspiracy, and Intellectual Virtue

Recent work in virtue epistemology has suggested that conspiracy theorists suffer from intellectual vices. I present new evidence from survey experiments measuring intellectual virtue and the readiness of people to buy into conspiracy theories and their ability to spot fake news. I focus on three questions. First, can intellectual virtue and vice be measured? Second, what can philosophers learn from empirical measures about the nature of virtue? Third, do epistemic vices explain readiness to buy into conspiracy theorists, and to believe fake news?

Katina Michael

University of Wollongong / Arizona State University

2:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 19.2001

Stream: Practical Ethics

Technological Interventions for the Mentally Ill

This paper explores the use of technological interventions for the sedation, restraint and restoration of mental health patients, over the last 100 years. Manual technologies and processes created in the early part of the 1900s in the hope of full patient recovery from chronic suffering, self-harm, and suicidal ideations are presented. The birth of operative techniques like leucotomies is then discussed, as are their known effects on the patient population from the 1930s-1950s. The role and impact of pharmaceutical drugs is then described as the de-institutionalisation process of patients in hospitals took place.

Electronically-based therapies discovered from the late 1960s and more widely instituted from the 1980s onward, are considered in light of past practices and current clinical trials. The paper will address the impact of electro-convulsive therapies, and various pacemaker technologies for the brain. There are two fundamental questions that will be asked with respect to modern neuroprosthetics: (1) is it right to experiment on human beings when purportedly less than a third of patients are shown to go into remission as a result of technologically-oriented therapy; and (2) have we really progressed in the art of treating mental health as much as is stated.

Katsunori Miyahara, Shaun Gallagher & Tailer G. Ransom

University of Wollongong

4:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.208

Stream: Shared Intentionality and Social Minds

Embodied habits for social interaction: Ryle, Dreyfus, and Dewey

I explore the nature of embodied habit that underpins everyday social interaction. I first discuss Ryle's conception of habit as "one-track disposition" (Ryle 1949, 46). This account is fitted to explain some failed cases of social interaction. However, it cannot explain the flexibility exhibited in more successful cases. Then I turn to Dreyfus' account, which emphasizes our ability to be "directly drawn to meaningful social comportment" (Dreyfus 2013, 26). This account has limited application: It fails to capture the element of active seeking that characterizes many cases of social interaction. But how can social behavior be both active and habitual? Next, I address this question by drawing on Dewey's account of habit and especially what he calls intelligent habit (Dewey 1922, 71). I focus on two features of his account: (i) For Dewey, habitual actions are responses to the environment, yet they are also "ways of using and incorporating the environment" (15); (ii) Furthermore, they are sustained by a skillful search for "some course of action" (35) or more accurately, for

environmental cues that will affect the current course of action. I conclude that the nature of embodied habits for social interaction is best understood by combining all three accounts.

Sakinah Munday

The University of Melbourne

2:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.203

Stream: Philosophy of Language

Pragmatic Silencing

People can be silenced in unexpected and insidious ways. One attractive approach to defining this elusive form of silencing comes from Ishani Maitra (2009). Maitra's suggestion is this: a speaker is 'communicatively disabled' if the audience fails to grasp her Gricean speaker-meaning. In this talk, I argue that Maitra's account misses out on the full scope of what is required for an act of communication to succeed or fail, because it focuses too heavily on the dyadic relation between the speaker's intention and the hearer's adequate interpretation of these intentions. On my view, it won't be enough to merely have one's speaker intentions recognised to be a participant in the language game, as social norms may bar a speaker from making certain linguistic moves, regardless of how their intentions are taken. As such, I suggest that the problem of pragmatic silencing is not best understood in terms of a misrecognition of intentions, but should instead appeal to the social norms that undergird and restrict what different speakers can achieve with their words.

Nick Munn

University of Waikato

1:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.101

Stream: Political Philosophy

Generating Justice for Children via Political Inclusion

I argue that the global position of children can be improved by first ensuring them political representation, through inclusion in democratic process from a young age. Once children are embedded as equal participants in democratic processes, the structural disadvantages they are currently subject to within modern democracies are likely to diminish. Political and social institutions will have greater incentives to act proactively to support children, and children will have the same ability as other citizens to express their approval or disapproval of public actions undertaken on their behalf.

The argument is as follows: In a global environment still characterised primarily by independent nation states, democracies provide the most fertile ground for the generation of just institutions. Those institutions work best, for those who are the most active

participants in the democracy. Children are, in all states, expressly excluded from active political participation, and as such their voices, desires, needs and rights are marginalised. Political inclusion for children is a first step to address this marginalisation.

Daniel Munoz

MIT/Monash University

11:30 AM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

Why Isn't Supererogation Wrong?

Supererogatory acts, like donating a kidney to save a life, are optional and yet better than other permissible options. How is that combination possible? The standard view is that supererogation arises from a Self-Other Asymmetric view of benefits: we may treat our own welfare as uniquely (un)important. After presenting some counterexamples, including cases where supererogation is compensated or costless, I propose a new account: supererogation arises from a Self-Other Symmetric view of moral rights. The promise of this view is (1) to accommodate a fuller range of cases, (2) to reduce supererogatory permissions to something we already understand, viz. rights; and (3) to explain an intriguing duality: the supererogator makes a sacrifice that, if imposed on others, would be wrong, as a violation of their rights.

Erin Nash

UNSW (Sydney)

1:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.101

Stream: Political Philosophy

Misinformation & the democratic legitimacy of public policy

In this paper I argue that, so far, concerns about the impacts of misinformation about science on policymaking in democratic societies—such as those of Philip Kitcher and Naomi Oreskes— have implicitly involved a commitment to a conception of democratic legitimacy that depends, at least in part, on substantive features of outcomes. However, there are several issues with accounts of democratic legitimacy that turn on substantive features of outcomes. In particular, the assumption that there is a 'correct' policy outcome is controversial and, moreover, not well-suited to liberal democratic societies that endorse value pluralism and recognise the potential for reasonable disagreement about 'the good'. Instead, I adopt a version of a procedural account of democratic legitimacy — Fabienne Peter's Pure Epistemic Proceduralism — and show that even on an account that does not require a commitment to there being a correct outcome, some speech that counts as misinformation about science can undermine democratic legitimacy. In doing so, I offer an

alternative diagnosis of what goes wrong for public policymaking in democratic societies when problematic speech about science flourishes in our public knowledge systems.

Niccolo Negro

Monash University

1:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.208

Stream: Bayesian Cognitive Science - Open Challenges and Future Directions

Combining IIT with Predictive Processing: three challenges

Can we apply the principles of the predictive processing account to a theory of consciousness in order to develop a unified picture of the brain, and its relation to the mind and consciousness?

Here, I consider some problems we must face if we want to combine PP with the Integrated Information Theory (IIT). Since the two research programs are divergent, the first step towards a possible combination is to find some common ground at the level of the organ whose activity seems to bring about both cognition and consciousness: the brain.

After considering the notion of matching in IIT, which seems to have some resemblance with the idea of maximization of the accuracy of generative models in the PP framework, I focus on three conceptual problems that we have to face before any possible empirical work. First, the problem of internalism: are both mind and consciousness realized within the brain? Second, the problem of action: is it essential to the fundamental function of the brain? Third, the information problem: is the mathematical treatment behind IIT compatible with the Shannonian view of information, as employed in the PP framework?

David Neil

University of Wollongong

11:30 AM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 52.G01

Stream: Practical Ethics

Truth, lies and placebos

The principle of patient autonomy is standardly held to require disclosure of complete and accurate information about treatment options and risks. However, the placebo and nocebo effects show that, in some circumstances, therapeutic outcomes are sensitive to patients' expectations and knowledge. This paper surveys current views about the mechanism of the placebo effect, and examines the case for withholding or misrepresenting information with the intention of causing a placebo effect or avoiding a nocebo effect.

Donald Nordblom

Australian National University

1:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.301

Stream: Philosophy of Mind

An Argument Against Illusionism

In this paper I present an argument against illusionism, the view that there are no instantiated phenomenal properties, there only appear to be. I argue that illusionism must articulate an account of appearances that satisfies what I call the vividness constraint. I then argue that illusionism cannot satisfy this constraint without being committed to the existence of phenomenal consciousness.

Peter O'Connor

University of Wollongong

2:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.301

Stream: Philosophy of Mind

The Anatomical Turing Machine

Do silent vocal behaviours implement a language of thought?

Although classical cognitive science hypothesises that thought is composed in an inner language (Fodor 1975; 2008), many researchers doubt that such a language exists in the brain.

However early behaviourists like Watson (1920) believed that we think by using our speech organs to silently talk to ourselves, and developed a substantial body of empirical work in support of this theory. This idea would seem to present a possible “third way” in contemporary debates, in that it both describes an embodied, enactive account of cognition (Chemero 2009), and yet explicitly endorses a language of thought.

What is lacking however, is an account of how or why such a theory might work.

Recent research into sensorimotor recruitment and working memory (e.g. D’Esposito and Postle 2015) argues that covert vocal behaviours play an instrumental role in fixing and maintaining working memory. In this paper I consider these studies, along with other work from the theory of computation, to show that humans routinely use covert behaviours like self-speech to syntactically organise working memory and in doing so implement the computational competencies of higher reasoning.

Paul O'Halloran

University of Melbourne

4:00 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.201

Stream: European Philosophy

Duchamp's Fountain is a problem for Heidegger's origins of an artwork

Heidegger's phenomenal aesthetics was instrumental in forcing a re-evaluation of modern aesthetic assumptions in the early twentieth century. Heidegger's theory of the origin of the artwork was born from a hermeneutic analysis of a single van Gogh masterpiece. This paper turns his analysis to an alternative influential artwork - Duchamp's 'Fountain'. It will be shown that Heidegger's method can accommodate some hurdles thrown up by 'Fountain'. However the requirement to confine phenomenal engagement to the art object alone leads to problems when 'the object' was not exhibited and arguably may not have existed. The prospect of broadening the focus of our attention to the "drama" of 'Fountain' provides for a much richer phenomenal engagement. However, this move runs counter to a second stipulation of Heidegger's model for an artwork - that the artist's intentions/opinion and performative acts in making the art should be excluded from our engagement with the work. This paper will argue that Duchamp's ready-mades and Fountain, in particular, are best accommodated by broadening our scope for artworks to include the relevant performative acts.

Hiroshi Ohata

Osaka City University

2:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.104

Stream: Metaphysics

Bundle Theorists Should Believe in Thisness

Bundle Theory holds that material objects are constituted of properties only. However, if material object is a bundle of properties, then numerically two material objects with exactly the same properties would be indiscernibles. In response to this problem, there are several versions within bundle theory. The most popular one is probably Trope Bundle Theory. Other than that, there are Instance-View which holds that material objects are constituted of instances of universals, and Identity-View which holds that material objects can wholly present at some distance from themselves. I show that each of these responses has its own difficulties, and insist that bundle theorists should believe thinness. Thisness Bundle Theory has been criticized for thisness having the specific material object as its constituent. But this criticism is wrong. Thisness is exist ontologically prior to the specific material object.

Ross Pain & Szymon Bogacz

Australian National University

1:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.101

Stream: Postgraduate Paper Prize

Analyticity and easy ontology

Neo-Carnapianism is undergoing a resurgence in contemporary metaontology. One prominent defender of neo-Carnapianism is Amie Thomasson (2015). Analyticity plays an important role in Thomasson's view; however, analyticity is still a controversial notion. In particular, Timothy Williamson (2008) develops a powerful argument against it. Both Thomasson and Williamson are concerned with an epistemological notion of analyticity. We distinguish between epistemological-analyticity and formal-analyticity. We argue that formal-analyticity is immune to Williamson's critique. We then show how the notion can be put to use by giving a deflationary account of properties inspired by Thomasson's framework. Given this, we suggest that neo-Carnapians have strong reasons to prefer formal-analyticity over epistemological-analyticity.

Ross Pain & Stephen Mann

Australian National University

2:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.104

Stream: Philosophy of Biology

Retaining the biology/cognition divide in the face of the free energy principle

In this talk we argue that a distinction between biology and cognition can be maintained in the face of the free energy principle. This can be done by appealing to decoupled representation. Proponents of the free energy principle have claimed that it applies to both biological and cognitive systems. The question then arises: if the same explanatory principle applies across these two domains, what remains of the distinction between them? One answer is that cognitive states involve content, and biological states do not. We push back against this move by demonstrating the surprising formal connections between the free energy principle and Millikan's teleosemantics. This produces a gradualist view which attributes content to biological signals. Consequently, we claim that the distinction between biology and cognition should instead be understood in terms of the distinction between coupled and decoupled representation. In the case of biological states, free energy is minimised through implicit modelling performed by coupled signals. In the case of cognitive states, free energy is minimised through explicit modelling performed by both coupled and decoupled signals at multiple levels of representation.

Anco Peeters

University of Wollongong

2:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 52.G01

Stream: Ethics & AI

Virtues, robots, and the extended self

Recent discussions in social robotics consider the effects that robots could have on the moral character of human agents, with some even proposing that designing robots to behave virtuously could support the flourishing of moral character. Accounts of this sort are vulnerable to the so-called situationist challenge to virtue ethics. The situationist might argue that if robots are required to support and maintain the cultivation of virtues in a human agent, then that human agent ought not to be considered virtuous at all. I consider two possible responses to this challenge, both inspired by recent movements in cognitive science and philosophy of technology. The first response suggests that robots can be seen as a scaffolding device to be thrown away once a certain level of virtuosity is reached. The second response suggests that we should broaden the notion of what may constitute moral character, based on the idea that our self may extend into the environment. I favour the second response, arguing that stretching the notion of moral character in this way will help in the design and understanding of social robotics from a virtue ethical perspective, as well as provide a new answer the situationist challenge.

Ricardo Augusto Perera

Monash University

4:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.208

Stream: Bayesian Cognitive Science - Open Challenges and Future Directions

The Free Energy Principle applied to language processing: finding the golden mean between entropy extremes

The central conjecture of the current proposal is that while sentences are read or listened, representations of states of affairs are modelled in a gradual and predictive fashion, and that upcoming stimuli are anticipated based on what appears to be "the most likely" in epistemic, semantic, syntactic, lexical and perceptual terms. In the light of the Free Energy Principle, it will be presented a neurobiologically plausible account of language processing as implementing a Bayesian, hierarchical predictive process. Perceptual priors are taken to encode information about continuous, physical aspects of the distal linguistic environment, while cognitive levels deal with discrete variables. A special focus will be given to the top-down constraining effect that semantic predictions have in perception, considering the information-theoretic entropy of the discrete probability mass functions. In order to minimise Free Energy, both probabilities functions need to avoid the extremes of low and high entropies, approximating the optimal, context-dependent balance between them.

Considering that the entropy of a semantic prediction is proportional to the degree of generality of the concept selected, and the entropy of the perceptual prediction is proportional to the prior variance, a low-entropic, specific semantic prediction will constrain more perceptual possibilities. However, if we over-limit semantic possibilities, perceptual prediction errors will be disproportionately weighted.

Ben Phillips

Arizona State University

5:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.301

Stream: Cognitive Science

Automaticity and Perception

It is common for researchers working at the intersection of social psychology and vision science to claim that we perceptually represent various features of the social environment (e.g. race, sex, and age). However, it is less common for these researchers to elaborate on what they mean by “perception.” Some make initial steps towards clarification by characterizing perceptual processes as “automatic” and “stimulus-controlled.”

Unfortunately, there is nothing close to a consensus regarding the extensions of these terms. I address this problem by drawing a principled distinction between perception and cognition: one that invokes certain notions of automaticity and stimulus-control. I then apply this distinction to case studies from the empirical literature on social perception.

Marcia Pinheiro

IICSE University DE

11:30 AM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.208

Stream: Shared Intentionality and Social Minds

A New Model for the Human Psyche

A new model for the human psyche is introduced. The argument to promote its acceptance is the liking of 'abductive reasoning': in this particular case, the 'inference to the best explanation'. Evidences as to why this theory explains the human psyche better than the Freudian, and the Jungian theories are presented. All concepts created by Jung, and Freud are included in this theory apart from the collective unconscious. The elements Extended ID, and Extended Ego, in terms of human personality, and the elements judgmental, non-judgmental, shared, and non-shared, in terms of human mind, are introduced. The methodology consists in performing a logical analysis of the theories of Freud, and Jung, and then putting them against the known reality to come up with solutions that address the gaps that both exhibit.

Adam Piovarchy

The University of Sydney

4:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.101

Stream: Postgraduate Paper Prize

Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Normative Powers

This paper examines why hypocrites lack the standing to blame others for certain wrongs. I first examine previous uses of the term 'standing', and note these all centre around the idea of entitlement. I argue that thinking of standing to blame as a moral entitlement faces problems. I then consider whether we can find an explanation for why hypocrites lack the standing to blame from within the moral responsibility literature on appropriate blame, and argue we can not. By examining how the concept of standing is used in other contexts, I argue we should think of standing to blame as a status which grants agents the ability to do certain things. Whilst hypocrites clearly can blame, they lack the normative power to change others' obligations through the making of demands that we ordinarily make in blaming. This is because hypocrites lack the authority to make such demands.

Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky

University of Melbourne

2:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.102

Stream: Epistemic Injustice

Elements of Gaslighting

The concept of gaslighting has received quite a bit of philosophical attention in recent time. In this talk I aim to get clear on elements of gaslighting that have been overlooked. I discuss three broad distinctions and their interrelations. First, individualist and anti-individualist gaslighting. This distinguishes between cases of gaslighting that are intentional from those that are unintentional. Second, first-order and second-order gaslighting. This distinguishes between cases of gaslighting that occur at different linguistic orders. Third, synchronic and diachronic gaslighting. This distinguishes between cases of gaslighting that occur at a time from those that occur over time. I finish by discussing unique wrongs of second-order gaslighting (at a time and across time) and explain how each constitute an epistemic injustice.

Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky & Kai Tanter

University of Melbourne

5:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.104

Stream: Metaphilosophy

Revision, Endorsement, and the Analysis of Meaning

Nietzsche once wrote that '[w]hat is needed above all is an absolute skepticism toward all inherited concepts' (1901, 409). This might seem extreme, yet it captures a growing attitude in philosophy that has made many theorists turn their attention away from the world, and onto the concepts that are used to represent it. The analysis of concepts to determine whether they should be removed, revised or replaced is called conceptual engineering or conceptual ethics. We will call it revisionary conceptual analysis (RCA). It standardly proceeds by describing the meaning of a concept, and then prescribing what it should mean. However, this stands in tension with prescriptivism, a metasemantic view that suggests all meaning-claims are prescriptions. If prescriptivism is correct, then the prescriptivist is faced with two options: either (1) give up on the possibility of RCA, or (2) come up with a version of RCA that is consistent with the idea that all meaning-claims are prescriptions. In this talk, we offer an argument for (2).

Alisha Rajaratnam

The University of Melbourne

4:00 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.301

Stream: Philosophy of Mind

Can dogs hallucinate?

Proponents of negative disjunctivism, M.G.F Martin and William Fish define the phenomenal character of a hallucination solely in terms of its indiscriminability from a veridical experience. All there is to the phenomenal character of a hallucination of a red apple is that it is indiscriminable from a veridical experience of a red apple. Indiscriminability is defined in terms of knowledge, where a subject is unable to know that her hallucinatory experience is not a particular kind of veridical experience. Siegel (2008) objects that the implication of defining hallucinations in terms of indiscriminability entails that cognitively unsophisticated creatures such as dogs or babies are unable to hallucinate as they entirely lack the capacity to discriminate or know. I argue that Siegel interprets the knowledge component of indiscriminability in too strong a light. I draw on Sosa's (2007) distinction between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge and Schellenberg's (2013) perceptual capacity view to argue that cognitively unsophisticated creatures do have the capacity to know. I argue that cognitively unsophisticated creatures have animal knowledge but not reflective knowledge,

where animal knowledge is construed in terms of an ability to reliably make use of one's perceptual recognitional faculties when having an experience.

Justin Ramsay

University of Wollongong

2:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.101

Stream: Political Philosophy

Reconceptualising the Public-Private Distinction on the Internet

Some conceptual frameworks that were developed to explain and understand phenomena in the physical world cannot be expected to operate without problems in the digital world. The public-private distinction is one of these frameworks that breaks down when applied to the digital world.

The private sector is ubiquitous on the Internet. Every digital interaction is governed by multiple contracts with digital service providers. Yet every digital interaction is also inherently public in nature, in that it is instantly accessible to all Internet users. When every digital action is simultaneously both public and private, the distinction carries no meaning and is useless.

This paper will examine the breakdown of the many forms of the public-private distinction on the Internet. It will be argued that this breakdown has allowed the private sector to assume many of the functions of the public sector in digital society. The asymmetrical power dynamic that this creates is being used to systematically take away some of the legal rights of individuals. I will conclude that restoring the public-private distinction in the digital world is integral in addressing this power imbalance, and that some concept of digital public goods and services needs to be developed.

Oliver Rawle

The Australian National University

1:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

Merely Justified Procreation

The Procreation Asymmetry holds that the suffering of possible suffering people provides us strong moral reasons to avoid bringing them into existence, but the happiness of possible happy people provides us no moral reasons to bring them into existence. While the Procreation Asymmetry reflects intuitions widely held by philosophers and non-philosophers alike, the view has proved difficult to vindicate. The main problem is that any

argument which suggests that we have moral reasons to avoid possible suffering seems to imply that we also have moral reasons to promote possible happiness. In response to such problems, I will propose a new version of the Procreation Asymmetry. This new version relies on what I call the justifying/requiring distinction, the view that moral reasons have two dimensions of normative strength, which play different roles in determining what is morally required or permissible. This distinction allows me to argue that while we are morally required to avoid bringing possible suffering people into existence, we are merely justified in bringing possible happy people into existence. In effect, I will accept that there are reasons to bring happy people into existence, but I will also argue that these reasons can be permissibly ignored.

Georg Repnikov

University of Sydney

2:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.104

Stream: Philosophy of Psychiatry

Constitutive vs Indicative Conceptions of Diagnostic Criteria in Psychiatry

In a recent paper, Kenneth Kendler asks how DSM diagnostic criteria should relate to the disorders they were designed to assess. Do diagnostic criteria index or constitute disorders? Kendler considers two positions that provide alternative answers to this question. According to the constitutive position, diagnostic criteria constitute the disorders in the sense that “having a particular disorder is nothing more than meeting the relevant DSM criteria” (Kendler 2017, p. 1). In contrast, proponents of the indexical position claim that diagnostic criteria merely index or reflect the respective disorder, while the disorder itself is conceived of as a “hypothetical diagnostic construct”. Kendler contends that we have to adopt the indexical view because the constitutive position is based on a serious conceptual error, or category mistake.

In this reply I challenge Kendler’s conclusion that the constitutive position is based on a category mistake. By providing a less realist — but more realistic — view of the role that diagnostic criteria play in psychiatric practice, I show that, if spelled out the right way, both the indexical and the constitutive position can be seen as legitimate views. Each one is appropriate for certain contexts, and neither of them is based on a category mistake.

Greg Restall

The University of Melbourne

11:30 AM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.203

Stream: Philosophy of Language

Accommodation, Inference and Generics

In this talk, I aim to give an account of norms governing our uses of generic judgements (like “kangaroos have long tails”, “birds lay eggs”, or “logic talks are boring”), norms governing inference, and the relationship between generics and inference. This connection goes some way to explain why generics exhibit some very strange behaviour: Why is it, for example, that “birds lay eggs” seems true, while “birds are female” seems false, despite the fact that only female birds lay eggs?

Given the connection between generics and inference, I’ll go on to consider how inference relates to the process of accommodation, which plays a significant role in how we manage dialogue and conversation. This, in turn, can inform options for how our vocabulary and our concepts can be revised or reformed.

John Reynolds

University of Wollongong

1:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 52.G01

Stream: Practical Ethics

Identifying the goals of power and big data

Within the current literature on the relationship between big data and power, there is a growing debate over which account of power is best suited for an analysis of big data. Foucault’s work on disciplinary power is immensely influential in the debate, though the debate has largely agreed that it is necessary to develop new forms of power in line with Foucault’s methodology such as control, smart power, or algorithmic governmentality. This paper will argue that this debate is misguided as it misses the goal-oriented nature of Foucauldian power, and the technical, non-goal-oriented nature of big data. As such there can be no one full account of big data and power. Instead, by examining various forms of power we can identify them in different uses of big data. This paper will examine Foucault’s disciplinary power, Deleuze’s control, Han’s smart power, and Rouvroy’s algorithmic governmentality as examples of goal-oriented forms of power. This examination will serve as a starting point from which to shift discussions of protections from potential harm arising from the use of big data away from monolithic and unwieldy concepts like privacy and towards more nuance and tailored responses to individual forms of power relations.

Jack Reynolds

Deakin University

11:30 AM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.301

Stream: Phenomenology

Embodiment and Emergence: Navigating an Epistemic and Metaphysical Dilemma

This paper suggests that phenomenologists of the body, and contemporary theorists of embodied cognition and enactivism, face a dilemma concerning emergence. While emergentism aims to provide a middle-way between physicalism (reductionism) and dualism, many think that what is today called weak and strong emergence ultimately collapse into physicalism and dualism. I argue the same risk accompanies many currently influential treatments of motor intentionality, the lived body (Leib), know-how, etc., and also suggest some strategies for dealing with this epistemic and metaphysical dilemma.

Louise Richardson-Self

University of Tasmania

11:30 AM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.101

Stream: Feminist Philosophy

Social Imaginaries: A Feminist Engagement

The concept 'social imaginaries' is has been deployed across feminist philosophy (e.g. by Moira Gatens), continental philosophy (e.g. by Cornelius Castoriadis), political philosophy (e.g. by Charles Taylor) and social epistemology (e.g. by Jose Medina).

Some scholars have evaluated the role that 'the imaginary' and 'imagination' have played in the work of canonical philosophers – e.g. Kathleen Lennon's (2015) treatment of this theme – but there has been less attention paid to more recent use of this concept, especially as deployed by feminist philosophers (who pay particular attention to the central roles of affect and embodiment). This paper is an attempt to synthesise some of this discussion into a conceptual model that can be readily engaged to analyse the struggles faced by oppressed collectives.

So, the aim is not just to trace this more recent genealogy, to describe the features of social imaginaries, or to enable one to articulate what specific social imaginaries look like. It is also to think more fully about how we might alter the content of our social imaginaries to bring about just social change.

David Ripley & Suzy Killmister

Monash University

1:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.102

Stream: Gender

Metaphysics and misgendering

Work in the metaphysics of gender often proceeds in light of a range of political commitments. In particular, some thinkers aim at metaphysical theories that help track and illuminate existing oppressive structures, particularly structures that oppress women and structures that oppress trans and nonbinary people.

We'll argue that there are risks, in offering a metaphysics that illuminates existing oppressive structures, of thereby reinforcing oppression. In particular, some metaphysical theories participate in the misgendering that forms part of trans and nonbinary people's oppression.

However, it would be a mistake simply to avoid metaphysics here, or to aim only at describing the way things ought to be, rather than how they are. We will attempt to navigate this tension by sketching a positive proposal for how to understand the metaphysics of gender. Our proposal aims to track and illuminate existing oppressive structures without reinforcing them.

Ian Robertson

University of Wollongong

2:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.203

Stream: Epistemology

Interface problems in skilful performance

Stanley and Williamson (2001; 2017; Stanley 2011) have recently advanced a powerful case for intellectualism—the view that knowledge-how as a species of propositional knowledge. They thereby seek to undermine Ryle's metaphysical distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that. Recently, influential intellectualists—e.g. Carlotta Pavese (2018, 2019)—have allowed that propositional content is not exhaustive of the intelligent aspects of fluid skilful performance, and claimed that a second finer-grained, non-propositional form of representational content is involved in skilful action. This raises the question of how, qua this modified intellectualism, propositional and non-propositional forms of content interface and interact in the generation of action. In this talk I demonstrate that intellectualists have relatively few ways to answer this interface problem without giving up on their theory of knowledge-how. I then argue that these answers are deeply implausible.

Jeyver Rodriguez

Australian Catholic University

2:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 52.G01

Stream: Practical Ethics

Questioning the “invulnerability myth”: MacIntyre, Narratives and dependence

This paper aims to examine what I call the “invulnerability myth” and highlight multiple sources of vulnerability that make clear the fact that the human being is a dependent animal, that needs care and attentiveness, and also a being that shares the world with other animals and that requires a healthy environment to create a narrative of meaningful living. The article is organized into three parts. First, it explores the posthumanism debate as one philosophical position in connection with the role of science and biotechnologies and its potential by overcoming aging, cognitive shortcomings, suffering, and ultimately death. Second, it analyzes multiple sources of vulnerability—bodily vulnerability, ontological vulnerability, existential and psychological vulnerabilities, and so on—and shows that even if we extend to the whole society access to technologies of human enhancement, this does not guarantee that universal vulnerability, as a key feature of the human condition, can be overcome completely. Third, it highlights the relevance of the concept of human life in MacIntyre and its role in the creation of fictional and social narratives that are building in the light of several conceptions of a possible shared future. This temporal perspective is the ground to articulate our actions and practices as “storytelling animals”.

Elka Sadler

Monash University

1:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.201

Stream: European Philosophy

Lyotard's Theory of Judgement as Plasticity

My paper outlines judgement as a central feature of Jean-François Lyotard’s postmodern philosophy. I contend that Lyotard developed, throughout his works, a theory of judgement as plasticity. In this presentation I discuss how Lyotard engaged with psychoanalysis in order to demonstrate that the unconscious functions as an ahistorical and plastic mode of judgement. Lyotard stipulates that it is through the plasticity of the unconscious that human beings can experience autonomy. For, if the unconscious relates to the world as a purely ahistorical event, then human beings are always capable of overturning their historically contingent beliefs about self and reality. However, I argue that Lyotard situates plasticity within an incompatible dualist, mind-body, framework. That is, Lyotard’s engagement with Freud inscribes mind-body dualism into consciousness by demarcating the subject as the locus of determinism from the unconscious (which functions the locus of autonomy). This is inappropriate because it positions the subject as the object of plasticity rather than its

conduit. My reading of Lyotard seeks to negate this limiting framework and, moreover, I argue that his theory of judgement as plasticity has a productive link to current debate in neurophilosophy.

Olusegun Samuel

University of New South Wales

4:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 19.2001

Stream: Practical Ethics

Conflicting Obligations Regarding Humans and Non-humans

Selflessness has played a significant role in environmental debates. In this paper, I understand selflessness as the sacrificing of one's interests to pursue something more significant. To be selfless, then, involves the pursuit of one's interest together with the interests of others. According to this account, selflessness does not contrast with self-love (but with selfishness). The essential point that I make, in this paper, is that construing self-love as something which is opposed to selflessness not only dichotomises our thinking about morality but it also oversimplifies that moral life consists in mutually exclusive concerns, either of caring for oneself or caring for others. I show that balancing the tension between self-love and selflessness is fundamental in resolving conflicting obligations regarding human and other beings by drawing on J. Baird Callicott's sentiment-based ethics.

Glenda Satne

University of Wollongong

11:30 AM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.208

Stream: Shared Intentionality and Social Minds

Communication as a root form of shared intentional activity

There are many different forms of joint action and shared activity. While some of these require little communication and exchange between participants, communication can make joint action smoother and help avoid misunderstandings. But the links between communication and joint action run deeper. Communication itself can be seen as a form of human collaborative activity. A tradition springing from the works of Grice (1957, 1975), and further elaborated by Sperber and Wilson (1996), Clark (1996) and Tomasello (2008), seeks to illuminate the nature of communication as a special form of shared intentional activity by describing the set of special intentional and inferential processes that are characteristic of such form of exchange. Furthermore, communication can be seen as a root form of collaborative activity, one that provides the platform for more sophisticated forms of shared activity as those dependent on sharing norms, instructions or joint practical reasoning. Thus, the ability to engage in simple forms of communication can be thought to be prior in

development compared to other abilities for shared activity. In this talk, I explore the social infrastructure of human communication understood as a root form of shared intentional activity. I argue based both on conceptual and empirical considerations, that the traditional view championed by Grice and others is not suited for this task. In end by presenting an alternative inspired by recent philosophical debates on the second person-that challenge the priority that “third-personal” views -based on observation, inference and theory- and that fits into the “minimal collective intentionality” model that I have defended elsewhere (cfr. Satne 2016, 2019, Satne & Salice 2019).

Thomas Schmidt

Humboldt University Berlin

4:00 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 52.G02

Stream: Moral Philosophy

Moral Obligation, Moral Reasons, and Supererogation

In this talk, I defend a reason-based explanation of moral obligation. More specifically, I argue that such an explanation can meet two important constraints that have been claimed (e.g., by Darwall and Wallace) to rule it out from the start. Standard reason-based explanations of moral obligations identify them with moral reasons and, thereby, are unable to account for the distinctive normative stringency of obligations. A more promising proposal holds that ‘an agent S is morally obliged to A iff, and because, there are decisive moral reasons for S to A’. Accordingly, obligations are not one factor amongst others to be considered in deliberation, but a specific form of practical requirement. On a natural understanding, whether moral reasons are decisive depends only on how they compare to other moral reasons. This view, however, would rule out supererogation. I propose a view according to which the decisiveness of moral reasons depends both on the moral as well as on the nonmoral reasons present in the context. The resulting account turns out to make sense of supererogation in a particularly attractive way. I close by indicating how it can also deal with the phenomena of directed obligations and of moral conflicts.

Vanessa Schouten

Massey University

1:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

Why Modern Marriage is (still) Discriminatory

There are a number of philosophers who argue that marriage either ought to be abolished or severely curtailed, for example Chambers’ egalitarian argument against marriage and Brake’s argument for minimal marriage on libertarian grounds. But there is a simpler and

more powerful objection to marriage. Marriage laws, even in states which allow same-sex unions, discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. My argument is as follows: 1. Marriage confers a number of benefits (legal, social, financial); 2. In most cases there is no good reason why such benefits could (or should) only be conferred upon people in a marriage-like relationship; 3. There is a group of people (asexuals) who either cannot access marriage, or could not access marriage without either denying or fundamentally misrepresenting their sexual orientation; 4. Given that asexuality is a sexual orientation, it follows that marriage laws (still) discriminate on the grounds of sexual orientation. What is more, marriage laws cannot be easily amended to avoid this discrimination – so a radical rethink of marriage is required if we are to avoid it.

Ted Shear, Benjamin Eva & Branden Fitelson

University of Queensland

4:00 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.302

Stream: Philosophy of Language

Four Approaches to Supposition

Legend has it there are two basic modes of supposition: those canonically expressed in the indicative and subjunctive grammatical moods. Under an indicative supposition, the acceptability of propositions is assessed relative to how the agent would expect things to be were she to learn that the supposition were true. By contrast, the evaluative contexts generated by subjunctive suppositions are supposed to align with how the agent thinks things would be if the supposition were, in fact, true (independent of whether they were aware of it). But, the types of judgment made under either type of supposition can also be divided along a different axis: they may be coarse-grained qualitative judgments about whether a given proposition is acceptable or they can be finer-grained quantitative ones about the degree to which propositions are acceptable. In sum, this leaves us with four disparate types of suppositional judgment: (1) qualitative judgment under indicative supposition, (2) quantitative judgment under indicative supposition, (3) qualitative judgment under subjunctive supposition and (4) quantitative judgment under subjunctive supposition. In this paper, we draw on the Lockean thesis to provide a bridge principle allowing us to systematically catalogue the relationship between these four classes of suppositional judgement.

On Yi Sin

The Chinese University of Hong Kong

1:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

The Uneasiness of Easy Ontology

Amie Thomasson (2015) presents an ontological picture, "easy ontology", that combines a deflationary metaontology and a robust (first-order) realism. Existence questions about a kind of thing K can be, she argues, answered "easily" by figuring out whether the application conditions of the corresponding nominative term "K" are fulfilled and drawing analytically entailed ontological conclusion therefrom. Much of "easy ontology" then bears on the semantics and ontological implications of application conditions. In this paper, I argue that, first, given Thomasson's favoured theory of meaning, we can see that the analytic entailments of a nominative term "K" is not known a priori once we distinguish pragmatic conditions of appropriateness and semantic conditions of correctness. Second, I argue that even if we grant all the semantic assumptions Thomasson wants, trivial inferences from the application conditions of a nominative term "K" still cannot deliver a robust realism about K.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Duke University

1:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 52.G01

Stream: Ethics & AI

Can AI Have Moral Status?

Saudi Arabia awarded citizenship to a robot, and the European Parliament is considering legislation giving some rights to computers. Does this make any sense? What conditions would an Artificial Intelligence need to meet in order to have moral status? Which rights can AI have? How strong can these rights be?

Jordan Skrzynski

Victoria University of Wellington

2:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.203

Stream: Philosophy of Language

Gappy Propositions and the Nature of Rigidity

Can a rigid designator refer to its object in literally every other possible world, or only those in which the designated object naturally exists? This is the distinction between the 'obstinate' and 'persistent' accounts of rigidity. In this paper, I will raise a novel argument in support of the persistent account by combining it with a theory of singular propositions known as the 'gappy proposition view'. I argue that introducing the gappy proposition view into this older debate on rigidity can undermine some of the strongest arguments for obstinate rigidity, as it offers a solution to the problems of negative existential and contingency statements which does not depend on an appeal to obstinacy. This may leave the persistent account of rigidity as the more favourable.

Peter Slezak

University of New South Wales

2:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.301

Stream: Philosophy of Mind

Intuitions and Illusionism: Dennett as malin génie?

If the meta-problem of consciousness is to explain "why we think that there is a problem" (Chalmers 2018, 6), it makes sense to attend to philosophers such as Strawson (2006) and Searle (1992) who provide the clearest expression of the "problem intuitions" in their criticisms of Dennett's (1991) materialism and his "Illusionism." Particularly revealing I suggest are the reasons for the systematic failure of these critics to grasp Dennett's position. In terms of Chalmers' (2018, 43) distinction, Dennett is widely seen as advocating "strong illusionism" according to which "phenomenal consciousness does not exist." However, I will suggest that, despite some ambiguities, his position must be understood as "weak illusionism" which holds phenomenal consciousness exists but some of our metaphysical and explanatory intuitions are false (Chalmers' 2018, 43). I suggest clarifications to Dennett's Illusionism to strengthen it against his critics as a solution to the meta-problem.

Gemma Lucy Smart

The University of Sydney

1:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.104

Stream: Philosophy of Psychiatry

(Internet) Gaming Disorder Pwned: limiting mechanistic models of disorder

(Internet) Gaming Disorder ((I)GD) is one of the most problematic psychiatric disorders to be added by the DSM-5 and ICD-11. One of the problems in the field of (I)GD research is that not enough time has been spent to establish clearly what is meant by addiction. Presented is a Picoeconomic and Neuroeconomic (PE/NE) model of addiction centred on Disordered and Addictive Gambling. I then begin application of the model to the evidence presented for the (I)GD. That a minority of gamers experience negative outcomes from excessive gaming is not in dispute. However, it is not yet clear that these problems should be attributed to a new disorder. Because of the diversity of both games and gamers, application of the PE/NE model to (I)GD will require specification of the structural mechanisms of games, and how gamers interact with them. It is possible that some individuals do experience a clinical addiction when they engage in specific activities within games. However; mechanistic models of mental disorder are limited, and a broader conception of all (video)gaming as socially undesirable and addictive is incorrect and potentially damaging. Ultimately, it is only with an interdisciplinary approach to research that we can hope to avoid such outcomes.

Tim Smartt

University of Sydney/University of Notre Dame Australia

4:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.203

Stream: Epistemology

Does Ought Imply Can in Epistemology?

A common objection to highly idealized epistemic norms is that they are too demanding for human reasoners to satisfy. Such objections seem to imply that 'ought' implies 'can' in some sense in epistemology. Although demandingness objections are common in epistemology, the principle on which they rest has not received much attention. In this paper, I consider the plausibility of several different possible versions an 'ought' implies 'can' principle for epistemology. I focus on the way in which the strength of the principle varies depending on what you mean by 'can' in an epistemological context. I outline the case for a principle according to which an epistemic 'ought' implies a psychological 'can.' Although I argue that this principle is attractive in a number of ways, I argue that it faces a serious challenge, and tentatively explore how this challenge might be met.

Michael Smith

Princeton University

11:30 AM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.104

Stream: Action theory

Are all actions bodily movements?

I provide a novel argument for the conclusion that all actions are bodily movements, and then consider whether mental actions provide a counterexample. I tentatively conclude that they do not.

Antonia Smyth

The University of Melbourne

4:00 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.102

Stream: Epistemic Injustice

Hermeneutical Injustice, Mental Healthcare, and Mad Pride

I here outline the problem of hermeneutical injustice, a form of epistemic injustice, as it occurs in psychiatry and mental healthcare more broadly. The practice of psychiatry largely rests on a medical model, which leaves little room for other perspectives, and the ability to correctly interpret experiences taken to be mental illness is assumed to lie with medical experts. In this context, people who experience mental illness can become epistemically marginalised, with limited capacity to contribute to shared social meanings. This is detrimental, as experiences of mental illness may have unique insight into what will be helpful for them, and can take positive value from certain phenomena (e.g. voice hearing). However, this will often be overlooked by professionals whose epistemic resources lead them to interpret such phenomena, one-sidedly, as inherently negative. In some cases, this distinct form of injustice can lead to significant practical harms, such as involuntary psychiatric treatment, which by definition places limits on liberty and autonomy, and which many find traumatising. To confront the problem of hermeneutical injustice in psychiatry, I argue that what is needed is a focus on liberation movements such as Mad Pride, which challenge dominant moral and epistemological frameworks of mental illness.

Razvan Sofroni

Humboldt University Berlin

4:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 19.2002

Stream: Moral Philosophy

Moral Knowledge through Experience

We have good reason to believe that there is a sense in which moral knowledge is a priori: that someone equipped with a full (non-moral) description of a situation could in principle come to know what he or she ought to do just by thinking about the matter at hand (Smith 2004). On the other hand, we do (still) attribute some measure of moral-epistemic authority to people that have a lot of life experience. More importantly, we don't just seek them out in order to attain information that we do not ourselves possess; we also give a lot of weight to their judgment and seek to learn from them and become better at discerning right from wrong. So how does one reconcile the idea that experience does more than just provide us with non-moral information about the world with the hypothesis that moral knowledge is a priori? I discuss Sarah McGrath's nuanced and persuasive attempt to do so in her 2011 paper "Moral Knowledge and Experience", showing that it does not capture the full range of the moral-epistemic import provided by experience. More concretely, I argue that we need to allow experience to play the role of evidence in acquiring pure moral knowledge.

Craig Stanbury

Monash University

11:30 AM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.301

Stream: Philosophy of Mind

Perception and the Problem of Attribution

What are the necessary conditions for personal level attribution? Ever since Dennett (1969) introduced the personal/subpersonal distinction, no agreed-upon metric has been forthcoming as to when, exactly, a perceptual state is attributable to the personal level. This lack of clarity has resulted in problems for the unconscious perception debate, with both advocates and critics of unconscious perception disagreeing on the necessary conditions for personal level attribution. Indeed, this disagreement is substantial because where one stands on the unconscious perception debate hinges on one's criterion for personal level attribution. Therefore, my paper aims to elucidate and settle the necessary conditions for personal level attribution by offering a criterion which states: the content of a representation C is attributable to person P if and only if the use of C for intentional coordination is available to P. I argue for and expound this criterion as the most plausible conception for personal level attribution. Consequently, if successful, then this criterion will show that alleged instances of unconscious perception are not, in fact, instances of personal level perception. However, I finish the paper by suggesting ways that current or future

alleged instances of unconscious perception may satisfy the criterion for personal level attribution.

Shawn Standefer

University of Melbourne

1:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.201

Stream: Logic

The limits of relevance

Routley-Meyer frames are used to provide a frame semantics for relevant and substructural logics. What are the limits, if any, of the sorts of connectives that can be interpreted on these frames while maintaining the broad relevance ideas that motivated relevant logics? This talk will present the start of an answer to this question using intuitionistic logic and classical modal logics as foils.

Kim Sterelny

Australian National University

1:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.104

Stream: Philosophy of Biology

Demography and Cultural Complexity

Until fairly recently, it was supposed that increasing complexity in human technology and cultural organisation reflected an evolutionary increase in human cognitive capacity. Over the last 15 years this idea has been challenged, and one of those challenges is based on the idea that complexity depends on demographic factors in very important ways; not just individual cognitive capacity. In this paper I aim to show that this challenge actually conflates a number of distinct theses about the demography-complexity connection, and they are not equally favoured by the evidence. In fact, the best known variant — that size makes social learning more efficient - is the least well supported by the data. More generally, the paper addresses the surprising mismatch between the history of biological change in our lineage and the history of social and technical change.

Steven Stern

Victoria University

2:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.101

Stream: Multicultural Philosophy

The Legal Philosophical Legacy of Professor Julius Stone

Professor Stone's scholarly work covers the extent to which the precepts of the law and the legal system in whole or in part might constitute a logical self-contained system. Professor Stone undertook this work in the context of identifying the ideals to which a legal system ought to conform; the actual effects of the law upon social behaviour and attitudes; and the effect of social attitudes and behaviour on the law. This work can be described as having resulted in an extraordinary legacy for legal philosophy with truly global ramifications. This paper seeks to identify some of the key practical ramifications of Professor Stone's scholarship in the field of legal philosophy to a multi-cultural world.

Robert Sternhell

The University of Sydney

1:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.301

Stream: Philosophy of Mind

Does the philosophy of mind have a combination problem?

Constitutive Panpsychism is the view that mentality is fundamental and ubiquitous. One major objection posited to this view is the combination problem, which states that many minds cannot combine to form another mind. Angela Mendelovici (forthcoming) argues that the combination problem applies to all theories of the mind. If true, then panpsychists are in a much better dialectical position, or the philosophy of mind has considerably more work to do, or both. In this paper, I will assess her claim argue that physicalists have an adequate response to her challenge. I will argue that her argument seems to show that the thesis of revelation is the source of some experiential combination problems. Through this connection, I seek to show that the presence of experiential combination problems strengthens the case for physicalism.

Chad Stevenson

University of Edinburgh

4:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.102

Stream: Existentialism

Agency and Outcomes in Meaningful Lives

What, if anything, makes a life meaningful? Roughly, Altruistic Welfarism states a life is made meaningful insofar as the existence of that life causes increases in, or protects, the welfare of other creatures. There are many objections to such a view, with some stemming from a widespread intuition that agency, in one guise or another, is a necessary (and for some views, sufficient) condition for a life to be rendered meaningful.

This talk examines three agency motivated objections marshalled against Altruistic Welfarism: luck, scope, and alienation. I argue these objections fail and do not provide us reason for thinking agency is a necessary condition for meaning in life.

Karola Stotz

Macquarie University

4:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.302

Stream: Minimal Cognition

Bringing Life to Mind: From Adaptive Development to Cognition

The question of the material or biological basis of cognition - the mark of the cognitive - is of deep interest to cognitive scientists. Some have begun to move towards seeing living systems are cognitive systems, in that processes of cognition are an important subset of living system. The task at hand is to distinguish cognition from other important processes of life. One strategy would be to ask, what are the basic, common problems organisms encounter that require a cognitive solution? Do signal transduction networks fit that bill, as they mediate adaptive changes in gene expression to specific inputs, not just those from the senses? Or how about a speculative hypothesis at the intersection of cognitive science and developmental biology that understands bioelectrical signaling among nonexcitable cells as simulating neural network-like dynamics? This paper focuses on the relationship between the intelligent control of adaptive behavior on the one hand and developmental plasticity and ontogenetic adaptation on the other. It contributes to an understanding of the myriad ways in which external influences – ‘experiences’ (which extends beyond information for action, and hence the tired dichotomy of innate versus acquired) - contribute to the development and expression of adaptive repertoires.

Xavier Symons

University of Notre Dame Australia/The University of Oxford

5:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 19.2001

Stream: Practical Ethics

Respect for persons, equality and a principle of need

ABSTRACT: Several theorists (Harris 1996; Waring 2004; McLachlan 2012) have argued that respect for persons requires that we give people an equal chance of receiving access to care when distributing lifesaving healthcare resources under conditions of scarcity. That is, respect for persons is said to require that we treat people the same, regardless of their circumstances. In this paper, I adopt a sceptical approach to this view. I argue that treating people equal does not require that we give each person's claim equal weight. It only requires that we take people's claims on resources seriously. This is compatible with a framework that prioritises patients on the basis of the strength of their claims. In the final section of this article I sketch a conception of a framework for allocation based on need that should satisfy egalitarian theorists while avoiding the implausible implications of a strict egalitarian approach to resource allocation.

Eyal Tal

University of Cologne

11:30 AM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.203

Stream: Epistemology

A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension

Is it ever rational to suspend judgment about whether a particular doxastic attitude of ours is rational? An agent who suspends about whether her attitude is rational has serious doubts that it is. These doubts place a special burden on the agent, namely, to rationally justify maintaining her chosen attitude over others. A dilemma arises. Upon providing justification for maintaining her chosen attitude, the agent would be committing herself to considering the attitude rational—contra her suspension on the matter. Alternatively, in the absence of such justification, the agent should take her attitude to be arbitrary, and should believe that it is irrational rather than suspend on the matter. So, suspending about whether an attitude of ours is rational is inconsistent both with having good reason to maintain it, and with having no good reason to maintain it.

David Tan

Deakin University

1:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.208

Stream: Shared Intentionality and Social Minds

Problems with Collective Intentions in Legislation

Legal philosophers have recently started using collective intentions to conceptualise the notion of legislative intentions. This is a crucial part of debates in statutory and constitutional interpretation. In the 90s, social choice theory (i.e. aggregative methods) was used to justify the existence of legislative intentions. However, this approach has fallen out of favour and Richard Ekins has influentially argued that we must rely on collective intentionality and not mere aggregation.

This paper argues against Ekins' position. Firstly, Ekins posits that aggregative methods are unsustainable due to mathematical problems. However, I argue that collective intentionality requires aggregation as well. Secondly, collective legislative intentions do a bad job at explaining how legislatures communicate through statutes. The kind of activities that collective intentions are traditionally used to explain are not present in the legislative context. Thirdly, I address Ekins' claim that legislative intentions based on mere aggregation would have no legislative authority.

Rosa Terlazzo

University of Rochester

5:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.302

Stream: Philosophy of Education

Transformative Experiences in Public Education

In this paper, I investigate the repercussions of childhood transformative experience for public education. In short, if alternative transformative experiences affect a person's prudential good in differential ways, and if in childhood one must choose between significant and irrevocable transformations, then adults have an obligation to vulnerable children to choose the transformations they undergo with an eye to their prudential good. In this paper I offer an action-guiding theory that can direct those judgments in the context of public education. Action guidance for public education will be an important complement to action guidance for parents, given both the extensive amount of time that children spend in public schools and the opportunity that public schools provide to reach children whose parents may not fulfill their own relevant obligations. I propose using an informed desire account of well-being, for four reasons. First, informed-desire accounts are better suited than plausible contenders for use in public education, insofar as the action guidance they give both coheres with political liberal commitments and avoids counterintuitive results.

Second, informed-desire accounts are well-suited to providing a route for approximating the post-transformation preferences of children. Third, informed-desire accounts justify the development of concrete skills of critical reflection, since they are necessary to ensure children's ability to approximate post-transformation preferences. And fourth, informed-desire accounts justify childhood exposure to a diverse range of life options since this is necessary to ensure that children do not become irrevocably transformed before they have the skills to approximate their own informed post-transformation preferences.

Yannick Thiem

Columbia University

2:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.104

Stream:

Exclusive Inclusion: Gender, Diversity, and Publication Ethics in Philosophy

Gender equity is increasingly championed as a category for assessment metrics for research productivity at universities. However, as we know, metrics not only distort what they seek to measure, but frequently undermine the underlying values that the measurement was supposed to further. This presentation will explore how "gender equity" points to how the general goal of "research excellence" leaves under-defined and often preempts discussions of the unacknowledged presupposed substantive values, power relationships, and legitimation mechanisms. These often-unstated presuppositions shape a) which kinds of knowledges to whose benefit are validated, supported, disseminated, and amplified, and b) how our institutions and practices of knowledge production and curation function and what the terms and conditions for successful inclusion and participation are. With a focus on journal publishing, I will argue that where "gender" as a category of research assessment primarily refers to the demographics of the researcher, "gender" functions to uphold the hegemonic settler whiteness and maleness of institutionalized knowledge production. I will close with some insights and recommendations for changes in the practices of journal publishing gathered from a grant project on publication ethics in philosophy.

Kramer Thompson

Macquarie University

5:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.203

Stream: Epistemology

Saving the Modal and Control Accounts of Luck

The concept of luck plays an important role in philosophical projects in epistemology, ethics, and theory of action. These projects are thus greatly affected by how luck is best analysed. Two of the most popular species of the analysis of luck rely upon the concepts of modal

fragility and control. But there are two serious problems for the use of these concepts in analysing luck. Firstly, modal accounts of luck hold as good-lucky those events which are positively significant and modally fragile. But, as I will argue, sometimes such events are bad-lucky or non-lucky due to even better events occurring in nearby worlds. Secondly, control accounts of luck hold that an event is not lucky if it is controlled. But sometimes agents exercise partial control over an event such that it is inappropriate to hold that it was controlled or that it was lucky. Accounts of luck which combine both the modal and control conditions inherit both of these problems. In this paper I solve these problems by proposing a new account of luck that includes both an amended modal principle which correctly accounts for counterfactual differences in significance, and an amended control principle which allows for gradients of control.

Hannah Tierney

University of Sydney

1:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 52.G02

Stream: Moral Philosophy

Guilty Confessions

In discussions of the relationship between the reactive attitudes and blameworthiness, resentment has historically taken centre stage. Recently, however, these discussions have prominently featured another reactive attitude: guilt. Guilt-based views of blameworthiness are promising, in part, because they are able to capture a particular function of blame better than any of the traditional views. If the point of blame is to allocate suffering to wrongdoers, then guilt-based accounts have a clear advantage over their competitors. This is due to the nature of guilt, and the philosophers who develop guilt-based views do an excellent job of attending to the cognitive and affective features of feeling guilty. However, these philosophers have been less attentive to guilt's distinctive action tendencies and the role admissions of guilt play in our blaming practices. In this talk, I will reflect on the nature of guilty confessions and argue that they illuminate an important function of blame that has been overlooked in the recent work on guilt as it relates to blameworthiness: Blame can communicate respect.

Carley Tonoli

The University of Melbourne

1:30 PM, Wednesday July 10

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

In a Faraway Land: AI, Autonomous Weapons and Moral Disengagement

Progression toward automated war is a defining characteristic of 21st century defence spending around the globe. Worldwide, militaries are investing heavily in research and development of autonomous weapons, and in artificial intelligence for use in command and control, strategy, and several other military applications. As a result, the role of humans in war is gradually being reduced to one of policy making and oversight. To date, much research has focussed on how introducing such technologies into the military arsenal will impact the nature of war. Less research, however, has addressed the human consequences, both domestically and internationally. Employing Bandura's Moral Disengagement theory, this paper examines potential moral costs of removing humans from war. Without risk to the lives of our soldiers—our sisters, brothers, daughters, and sons—the tyranny of war fades into the distance, behind more local, immediate, and pressing human concerns. Without the humanising accounts from returning soldiers, the men, women, and children, on the other side of the battle can easily be construed as a dangerous and homogenous 'other'. Without a human face, war becomes a primarily economic battle, where justice and righteousness are at risk of being overcome by wealth.

Shun Tsugita

Nagoya University

1:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.301

Stream: Philosophy of Mind

Reinforcement-based naturalization of the motivational states

Recent works concerning naturalistic semantics tend to be modest in the sense that they only give naturalistic account of the most basic representational capacities, such as perception of primitive animals. In a similar vein, this talk attempts to give a modest naturalistic account of motivational (desire-like) states. First, it is their fulfillment conditions that are the content of desires. Although the kinds of the fulfillment conditions would vary depending on the kinds of desires, the fulfillment conditions of motivational states such as thirst or hunger would be those where they "normally" disappear. Then, the problem is how to cash out the relevant notion of normality. One way of explicating the relevant notion of normality, once suggested by Dretske and Whyte, is by virtue of "reinforcement." But this maneuver faces the common circularity objection to the effect that reinforcers are what is wanted so that the notion of reinforcement is not available to explicate desires or desire-

like states. To this objection, this talk gives a reply based on the more recent literature from behavioral psychology to illuminate the metaphysical basis of motivational states.

William Tuckwell & Holly Lawford-Smith

University of Melbourne

2:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.102

Stream: Feminist Philosophy

What is an Ally?

For all the recent talk of people failing or succeeding as allies to marginalized groups, a well worked out philosophical theory of what it is for someone to be an ally is conspicuously absent. This makes it difficult to evaluate the claims of people failing or succeeding as allies, and consequently diminishes the concept's usefulness to marginalized groups by making it difficult to identify who will genuinely help to further their interests. We aim to rectify this absence by proposing a property cluster theory according to which a person isn't an ally if they fail to instantiate any of the properties, and is a better or worse ally depending on how many of the properties they instantiate. The five properties of an ally that we defend are (1) appropriate deference to the allied-with group; (2) motivation by a sincere desire to further the interests of the allied group (rather than, e.g., to enhance social status); (3) the taking on of costs to further the interests of the allied-with group; (4) the taking of actions that further the interests of the allied-with group, with the authorization or permission of the group, and; (5) recognition as an ally by the group that they seek to be allied with.

Martin Vacek

Slovak Academy of Sciences

4:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

Dispensing with Parsimony

Metaphysical parsimony is traditionally considered as a theoretical virtue. In my talk I doubt the claim and argue that given we differentiate between qualitative and quantitative ontology and ideology, neither entities nor kinds of entities play an important role in theory choice and comparison. Since such result has some surprising consequences I respond to three objections against the view.

Robert van't Hoff

Princeton University

5:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.303

Stream: Metaphysics

In Defence of Ontological Nihilism

My paper defends ontological nihilism—the view that, strictly speaking, there isn't anything at all—against a powerful objection, which has it that since nihilists are unable to eliminate quantificational structure from their ideology, there is no coherent way to be a nihilist. I argue that the equivalence principle on which this objection relies is misleading since it fails to take account of “intra-speaker” equivalences—dispositions of an individual speaker to treat or fail to treat two terms as equivalent. Given certain patterns of intra- and inter-speaker equivalence, speakers' dispositions do not provide enough evidence to establish that nihilistic ideology is tacitly quantificational. I suggest that in these cases, the equivalence principle misleads us. Finally, I argue that the failure of the objection should not surprise us: given that metaphysical theories typically represent the world as having a certain structure, terms that appear to be used equivalently by two speakers may nonetheless have different representational content. In the case of nihilism, it follows that it is never extensionally equivalent to quantificational accounts of reality.

Michael Vincent

University of Queensland & Australian Catholic University

11:30 AM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

Charting Moral Complexity

In this paper I present a pluralist and non-reductionist account of the nature of moral values, the sort of account which I think is becoming increasingly popular and which marks a sharp break with the ideals of 20th Century analytic metaethics. I first want to demonstrate the potential of a non-reductionist account in teaching the nature of values, including both discussions of contemporary psychology and some of the historical greats of western philosophy typically found in the curriculum. Second, I outline some of the problems that such an account of metaethics poses for contemporary work in moral philosophy.

Mary Jean Walker

Monash University

4:00 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.202

Stream: Ethics

Intoxication and Responsibility

Intoxication gives rise to conflicting intuitions about responsibility. It is sometimes thought to reveal the real person ('in vino veritas'); other times to distort someone's behaviour or introduce desires and behaviours out of her or his control. Legal practices surrounding crimes committed while intoxicated evidence a similar ambiguity: intoxication is sometimes a mitigating and sometimes an aggravating factor in sentencing; it can be argued to show lack of liability, or to make an offender liable to charges for a more serious offence. In recent years there has been a trend against its use as mitigating and towards its use as aggravating in several countries including Australia. This paper examines whether and how this could be justified on the basis of judgements of responsibility. I draw on Shoemaker's pluralist account of responsibility to analyse conflicting intuitions surrounding intoxicated offending. I then draw on the analysis to argue against a general practice of treating intoxication as an aggravating factor in sentencing, at least on the basis of considerations about responsibility.

Lachlan Walmsley

Australian National University

4:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.201

Stream: Philosophy of Science

The strategy of model building in climate science

In the 1960s, theoretical biologist Richard Levins criticised modellers in his own discipline of population biology for pursuing the "brute force" strategy of building hyper-realistic models. Instead of exclusively chasing complexity, Levins advocated for the use of multiple different kinds of complementary models, including much simpler ones. In this paper, I argue that the epistemic challenges Levins attributed to the brute force strategy still apply to state-of-the-art climate models today: they have big appetites for unattainable data, they are limited by computational tractability, and they are incomprehensible to the human modeller. Along the lines Levins described, this uncertainty generates a trade-off between complexity and simplicity. In addition to building ensembles of highly complex dynamical models, climate modellers can address model uncertainty by comparing models of different types, such as dynamical and data-driven models, and by systematically comparing models at different levels of what climate modellers call the model hierarchy. Despite its age and different target, Levins' paper provides insight into the future of climate modelling.

Adrian Walsh

University of New England

4:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.102

Stream: Harm and Risk

J. S. Mill, Classical Liberalism and Laissez-faire economics

The liberal political ideal of freedom from government interference in an agent's private life is a central tenet of a great deal of contemporary social thinking. It is embedded in many extant social views about, for instance, the right of competent mutually consenting adults to determine freely their own sexual practices. But what implications might this ideal of non-intervention have for government practices in the economic realm? Does it follow that a political liberal must be committed to limiting government intervention in economic affairs? These are important questions regarding what the limits of government should be. In considering this question about the role of government in public and private life, it is instructive to consider the writings of John Stuart Mill. Mill, not only formulated the Harm Principle, but also wrote extensively—most notably in his *Principles of Political Economy*—on economic affairs. However, while Mill claims in the *Principles* to be a defender of laissez-faire, on closer consideration his views are very much at odds with standard free market economics. In this paper I consider the relationship between the Harm Principle and laissez-faire economic theory and, in so doing, identify some key differences between political and economic liberalism.

Kirsten Walsh

University of Exeter

1:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 52.G02

Stream: History of Philosophy

Did Newton have an Economic Theory?

In April 1696, Isaac Newton moved to London to take up the position of Warden of the Mint. In his letter of offer (19 March 1696), Charles Montague described the position as follows: "'tis the Chief Officer in the Mint, 'tis worth five or six hundred pounds per An, and has not too much bus'nesse to require more attendance then you may spare". Indeed, the position had, in the past, been held as a sinecure (i.e. a position with a salary but requiring little active service), and presumably, Montague assumed that Newton would continue to hold the Lucasian Professorship at Cambridge, and spend most of his working hours on mathematics and natural philosophy. But Newton took the job seriously, resigning from his position at Cambridge in 1701, and working at the Mint until his death in 1727. During his tenure as Warden, and then Master, of the Mint, Newton played an active role in all aspects of minting: overseeing the Great Recoinage; moving Britain to its first gold standard; making recommendations regarding currency reform; and even prosecuting clippers and

counterfeiters. This paper explores Newton's work at the Mint by considering three related questions: (1) What qualified Newton for such a position? (2) To what extent did Newton bring his mathematical, philosophical and experimental skills to bear on his work at the Mint? (3) Did Newton have an economic theory?

Brian Weatherson

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

1:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.203

Stream: Epistemology

Epistemic Permissiveness and Symmetric Games

Permissivism in epistemology says that rationality is compatible with a number of distinct attitudes. This paper argues that thinking about symmetric games gives us new reason to believe in permissivism. It was recently discovered that there are symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria. In these games there are rational plays - namely the equilibrium strategies. But if permissivism is false, then there is no rational play. So permissivism is true.

Christopher Whyte

University of Sydney

2:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.208

Stream: Bayesian Cognitive Science - Open Challenges and Future Directions

Can precision-weighted prediction errors save prefrontal theories of consciousness?

Christopher J. Whyte

Neuroscientific accounts of visual consciousness can be roughly divided into early theories and late theories. Early theories argue that consciousness is intrinsically related to recurrent activity in early visual cortex. Late theories argue that consciousness requires the additional involvement of prefrontal cortex. Recently, so called "no-report" paradigms have shown that in the absence of explicit subjective reports, prefrontal cortex activity vanishes. This has been taken as strong evidence in favour of early theories. However, I will argue that while this is problematic for many late theories, a lack of prefrontal activity is actually predicted by late theories that are underwritten by a predictive coding architecture. More specifically, drawing on recent work on predictive coding showing that perceptual expectations silence activity when a stimulus is task irrelevant, and increase activity when a stimulus is task relevant, I will argue that the lack of prefrontal activity in no-report paradigms can be explained by the task-dependent precision weighting of prediction error.

Logan Wigglesworth

Rice University

5:00 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 19.2002

Stream: Moral Philosophy

Moral Deference, Ground Projects, and the Moral Web of Belief

If I defer to a weather expert on whether or not it is going to rain tomorrow, nothing seems problematic. However, if I simply defer to someone else on whether or not capital punishment is morally right or wrong, this seems more troubling. Sarah McGrath has pressed moral realism for its difficulty in accounting for this problematic nature of moral deference. In this paper, I examine what she takes to be the best realist explanation, critique it, and offer a better one. My explanation points to the structure of moral judgments borrowing the 'web of belief' analogy used by Quine as well as their close connection to ground projects. I argue that the reason we find moral deference problematic is that it indicates that the person might not have any moral beliefs of their own, from which we will begin to suspect that they lack ground projects, have very abnormal ones, or worry that they are ill-equipped to carry them out. I conclude by pointing to the problematic nature of adults deferring to their parents on moral issues and the unproblematic nature of children deferring to their parents as a puzzle for the other metaethical views.

Timothy Luke Williamson

Australian National University

2:30 PM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.201

Stream: Decision-theory

Look to the Future: Intransitive Preferences, Foresight, and Loss

Agents with intransitive preferences can be exploited with Money Pumps; that is, there are sequential choice scenarios in which intransitive agents accept foreseeable yet avoidable losses. This shows that it is irrational to have intransitive preferences. A prominent response to this argument is to claim that agents exploited by Money Pumps are not irrational in virtue of having intransitive preferences but in virtue of adopting short sighted or naive decision rules. This observation has led to a cottage industry: more complicated Money Pumps are designed to exploit sophisticated decision rules, which results in even more sophisticated decision rules, leading to yet more Money Pumps. Where will the madness end? I argue that these debates tend to ignore the key feature of the Money Pump: the way it dramatises inefficiency. After suitably characterising inefficiency, it becomes clear that the intransitive agent faces challenges from far more cases than simply the Money Pump and its recent variants. Moreover, many of these cases are far simpler than the traditional Money

Pump. I discuss one such case and provide reasons to think that no sequential choice rule, however sophisticated, could avoid inefficiency in it. It therefore remains irrational to have intransitive preferences.

James Willoughby

Australian National University

1:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 67.203

Stream: Epistemology

Our Embedded Epistemic Goal

Epistemic Instrumentalism is the idea that epistemic reasons are instrumental reasons, reasons having to do with achieving your goals. There is a powerful objection to this view. Instrumental Reasons vary with your goals but epistemic reasons do not. So epistemic reasons can't be instrumental reasons. In response to this objection, I offer an account of Instrumentalism that provides a robust epistemic goal. This robust goal allows for a response to the objection: in the vast majority of cases where people seem to have epistemic reasons, they also have instrumental reasons. And for extreme cases where epistemic reasons come apart from instrumental reasons, the view offers an Error Theory.

Alison Wylie

The University of British Columbia

9:30 AM, Thursday July 11

Room: 67.107

Stream: Keynote

Keynote: Radiocarbon Dating and Robustness Reasoning in Archaeology

Hailed as a revolution that got under way in the 1950s, radiocarbon dating was expected to establish an absolute chronology that would render obsolete the local and relative chronologies on which archaeologists had long relied. Transformative though it has been, the process of bringing these tools of physical dating to bear on archaeological problems has been a long, tortuous process, now described as proceeding through three radiocarbon revolutions. The first revolution, Libby's initial introduction of radiocarbon dating to archaeology, quickly gave rise to a decades-long process of calibration by which C14 chronologies were corrected and refined, often against the very lines of evidence they were meant to displace. Increasingly, however, the advocates of a third, "pragmatic Bayesian" revolution argue that, no matter how much it is refined, radiocarbon dating cannot on its own resolve the chronological problems that archaeologists address; diverse lines of evidence are required not only to calibrate C14 but to reinforce and constrain one another. This is a genre of robustness reasoning that illustrates its epistemic risks as well as its appeal. I identify a set of conditions that must be met if claims of robustness are to be

credible, all of which are an explicit focus of debate in cases of contestation about and reconciliation of chronologies based on legacy data.

Alison Wylie

The University of British Columbia

6:00 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: Wollongong Town Hall

Stream: Alan Saunders Lecture

Alan Saunders Lecture: Witnessing and Translating: The Indigenous/Science Project

Reconciliation is unfinished business in Australia. But we're not alone: the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission calls on non-Indigenous Canadians to build equitable, respectful and transparent partnerships with Indigenous Peoples as a primary means for advancing reconciliation. One project launched by the University of British Columbia brings the tools of archaeological science to Indigenous-led research projects designed to serve the interests of Indigenous communities. In this seventh annual Alan Saunders Memorial Lecture, Alison Wylie, philosopher of archeology, discusses her work on the project and on collaborative process, raising a number of challenging questions of power, hierarchy, and the role of experts.

Thomas Yates

University of Auckland

2:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.102

Stream: Harm and Risk

Blameworthiness Under Moral Uncertainty

In this talk, I argue that moral uncertainty is not, contrary to Elizabeth Harman (2015), irrelevant to blameworthiness. Agents can be directly blameworthy for wrongdoing under uncertainty of its wrongfulness (and when confident that an alternative is morally safe), but they cannot be directly blameworthy if it is done from false moral certainty. My case for this view does not rest on "moral uncertainty," however, according to which it is subjectively morally wrong to take moral risks and subjectively morally right to act from (false) moral certainty. In fact, I agree with Harman that moral uncertainty is false. Nevertheless, taking a moral risk and doing something objectively morally wrong is blameworthy, absent other excuses, because the agent's understanding of their options at the time gives them what I call a wrong-sensitive sufficient (internal) reason to do otherwise. Having at least a wrong-sensitive sufficient reason opens them up to a reasonable expectation to have done otherwise, and thereby to a blameworthiness ascription for wrongdoing. False moral certainty, when blameless, excuses the agent for doing wrong from it, because the agent

either has a decisive internal reason to commit wrongdoing or does not have a wrong-sensitive sufficient reason to do otherwise.

Shang Long Yeo

Australian National University

2:30 PM, Tuesday July 9

Room: 52.G02

Stream: Moral Philosophy

Debunking Arguments and their Implications for Action

Debunking arguments claim that some target normative beliefs are likely caused by non-truth-tracking processes, in the hopes of undermining such beliefs (a conclusion about what we should—or shouldn't—believe). The (often implicit) implication is that the debunked beliefs shouldn't factor in our actions or deliberations at all (a conclusion about how we should act). In this talk, I argue that this move—from what we should believe, to how we should act—is much too quick. First, because it's unclear what the epistemic conclusion of a debunking argument should be—and different versions of this conclusion will affect the recommendations for action differently. Secondly, the debunking conclusion will only impact recommendations for action when combined with some further theory that connects normative beliefs to action. In the process, I explore the more general question of how our normative beliefs might interact with other factors (like debunking arguments) to produce a recommendation about what we have all-things-considered reason to do.

Wei Zeng

Nagoya University

2:30 PM, Monday July 8

Room: 67.201

Stream: Philosophy of Science

Learning Philosophy of Mathematics from Working Mathematicians

Philosophy of mathematics is a branch of philosophy that studies the ontology and epistemology of mathematics. However, philosophers seldom listen to working mathematicians' views on central debates of this field such as "Is mathematics invention or discovery?", "What is mathematical proof?". This is because most philosophers assume very few mathematicians have seriously thought about these fundamental questions. However, based on my interview with more than 10 mathematicians, I argue that despite these questions on the foundation of mathematics do not bother mathematicians as much as philosopher, mathematicians do have views on these questions with philosophical significance. For instance, contrary to philosophers who insist one should either see mathematics as a discovery or an invention, some mathematicians argue that it can be both.

Also, some mathematicians emphasized that frequently visionary thinking help them to build a mathematical proof, which coincide Wittgenstein's idea that "A proof is a picture" and "Proof should be surveyable". Therefore, I argue that instead of sitting on armchairs, philosophers of mathematics should communicate with mathematicians to get insights and evidences either support their own theory or help them to rethink about them. Introducing empirical methods in philosophy of mathematics can bring inspiring new perspectives.