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**Fictional Realism and the Force of Fictive Utterance**  
Realists about fictional entities cite the apparent truth of statements such as “Sherlock Holmes is a detective” and “Sherlock Holmes exists” as evidence that Sherlock Holmes exists, but must then reconcile the conflicting implications of the truth of each for the nature of fictional entities. Any plausible realist position, I propose, must take the latter statement seriously, and hold that authors create fictional characters. The question then arises of how they do this. I argue that an adequate account of the nature of fictive utterance will yield an answer to this question, but that accounts according to which fictive utterances involve the pretend performance of illocutionary acts or the issuing of invitations or instructions to imagine are unable to do so. Instead, I argue that there is good independent reason to construe fictive utterances as declarations: illocutionary acts which are distinctive in their ability to affect the status of their objects simply in virtue of their successful performance. This account explains how authors are able to create fictional entities and gives us insight into their nature.

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**Is Cosmopsychism a Coherent Position?**  
Cosmopsychism is appearing back on the scene. It is most commonly described as the view that the cosmos is both the sole fundamental entity and a conscious subject of experience. The view is defended by Philip Goff, Itay Shani, Freya Mathews, and others. Idealist variants of the same basic position were popular at around the end of the 19th century, albeit with pantheistic trappings. And they were subject to serious attack by William James in *A Pluralistic Universe*. So are the modern versions immune from James’s attack? I argue that they are not—and attempts to avoid it only move the bumph to another part of the carpet. But there is a possible way out. Rather than renouncing the core idea of a universal cosmic consciousness, I suggest giving up the notion that such consciousness qualifies a subject of experience.

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**Why offline cognition does not guarantee representation**  
The distinction between offline and online cognition has gained traction recently as a way to separate cognitive acts that involve high-level cognition from those that don’t. I will argue against the usefulness of this distinction. While we may be able to demarcate between cognitive acts that involve direct interaction with the world (online cognition) from those that are decoupled (offline cognition), this gives us no insight into whether a system is, or is not, using mental representations or similar cognitive states. Furthermore, I will argue that if we accept that many online cases can be said to be representation free, then many offline cases would in fact share this trait.

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**Bayes + Moore = Uniqueness?**  
In this paper, I appeal to Moore’s paradox and to Bayes’ theorem to argue for the Uniqueness Thesis: The idea that there is at most one uniquely rational credence C towards a given proposition P given a total body of evidence E.
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**Silence Is Golden**  
I investigate various ways of understanding silence and go on to defend the thesis that silence is a legitimate subject of aesthetic appreciation.

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**Introspection is What?**  
William James stated that “the word introspection need hardly be defined—it means, of course, the looking into our own minds and reporting what we there discover.” This description gives the impression that introspection is a kind of inner perception, and that our privileged access to our own mental states arises from our ability to utilise this faculty. This theory has been met with criticism in recent years with views such as the Transparency view, the Self-Shaping view, and Expressivism, all attempting to explain privileged access without reference to inner perception. Given that such views deny that privileged self-knowledge is acquired by inner perception, should we still classify them as ‘introspective’? In this paper, I argue that the word ‘introspection’ should be seen as a theory-neutral term which is broad enough to encompass a number of different views. However, since not all processes should be described as introspective, a set of requirements is needed to distinguish introspective from non-introspective self-ascriptions. Current literature on self-knowledge lacks such a well-defined distinction, which harms our ability to understand the nature of the privileged access debate. This paper will put forward such a set of requirements.

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**The Ethics of a Biochemical Infidelity Antidote**  
In certain corners of the moral enhancement debate, it has been argued that we ought to consider the prospect of supplementing conventional methods of morally enhancing sexual fidelity (e.g. relationship counselling) with biochemical methods involving hormonal or genetic manipulation. In considering this argument, I begin from the premise that moral enhancement ought to expectably attenuate (or at least not exacerbate) vulnerability. Assuming conventional methods of enhancing sexual fidelity are at least partially effective in this respect – that relationship counselling sometimes successfully attenuates the particular vulnerability victims of infidelity feel – then presumably the case for supplementing conventional methods with biochemical methods turns, in part, on the claim that deploying both in conjunction will better promote attenuation of victim vulnerability.

In this paper I argue that, on a sufficiently sophisticated conception of what this vulnerability consists in, biochemical methods of enhancing fidelity will not expectably promote attenuation of vulnerability. And when combined with conventional methods, biochemical methods will in fact tend to exacerbate vulnerability by cancelling out whatever attenuation of vulnerability conventional methods expectably promote. Thus, I conclude that we have prudential reason to prefer conventional methods of morally enhancing sexual fidelity sans biochemical methods to conventional methods plus biochemical methods.

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**The Best Thing about the Deflationary Theory of Truth**  
In this paper I argue that deflationary theories of truth reveal an important lesson for the theory of truth: although the notion of truthmaking has played an essential role in the traditional theories of truth, it can be separated from and survive the rejection of the substantive theories of truth. I argue that the substantive theories of truth (correspondence, coherence, pragmatic) are unified in being defined in terms of the ontological grounds (or truthmakers) that are needed to account for truth. Deflationists reject the idea that a theory of truth needs such metaphysical implications, but in so doing they need not rule out the possibility of developing an independently motivated theory of truthmaking. I argue that deflationists can and should embrace truthmaker theory, when it is shorn from its connection to the traditional project of defining truth.
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Being a Wilful ‘Slut’: Political Progress and the Regulation vs. the Reclamation of Sexist Speech  
Rae Langton's speech-act account of hate-speech and slurs seeks to diminish their subordinating power through legal regulation. While Langton provides insight on how speech can function to subordinate, she seems to disallow the possibility that harmful speech might be reclaimed, where reclamation is understood as the process by which a subordinating slur can come to be used by the members of the social group targeted by the slur, for the purposes of political resistance and empowerment. Langton’s account thus contrasts with that of Judith Butler, who argues that legal regulation will render hate-speech static, enshrining its subordinating potential, and eliding the possibility of political progress through reclamation. However, while Butler elucidates the dynamism and subversive political potential of language, her view cannot reveal the workings of subordination with the same force as Langton’s.

I argue that both Langton and Butler offer crucial insights concerning the living and contested reality of hate-speech and empowerment in conditions of subordination. They also both provide vital tools for understanding political progress - Langton by highlighting social scripts and norms that function to subordinate, and Butler by describing individual or group acts of wilful resistance. Further, I do not think we need to ‘reconcile’ Langton and Butler's work to enjoy these insights.

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Thought Experiment and Fictional Narratives  
In this paper, I explore the possibility that there are illuminating and constructive parallels to be drawn between thought experiments and fictional narratives. I shall focus on two related claims:

(i) That the narrative presentation plays an important epistemic role in the practice of thought experimenting.
(ii) That the epistemic value of thought experiments lends support to cognitivist approaches to the arts; thought experiments produce knowledge, so fictional narratives can too.

Egan (2016) has recently cast doubt on the possibility of drawing a strong analogy between thought experiments and fictional narratives which presents a problem for the cognitivist position captured in (ii). A decoupling of thought experiments and fictional narratives would also pose problems for defenders of (i). This paper will respond to the objections raised by Egan, defending a strong analogy between thought experiments and fictional narratives, lending support to claims (i) and (ii).

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Stoljar, Gerech and positive S-Truths.  
An influential philosophical tradition extending from Hume and especially Priestley, to Chomsky and Stoljar, rejects the legitimacy of the traditional mind-body problem on grounds that we don’t understand body well enough to convince us that there is a legitimate problem to begin with. Stoljar holds that the remaining philosophical task is explaining away the anti-physicalist intuitions that give rise to the conceivability and knowledge arguments and that to do that all we need is assume that we are ignorant of certain ‘experience-relevant non-experiential truths’ (Ignorance Hypothesis.) Lets call these S-truths.

The epistemic view draws both its strength and weakness from avoiding a positive conception of the S-facts and the purpose of this paper is to try and form a more positive conception of S-truths that can dispel the aforementioned intuitions while still avoiding the unnecessary theoretical commitments that typify other theories that appeal to the inscrutability of matter like Russell’s monism or McGinn’s mysterianism. As a consequence it is much easier to conceive of positive-S facts than conceive of non-phenomenal facts that can give rise to phenomenality.

Consider the next premise:

a) M-truths - while it is difficult to even conceive of instruments that can measure consciousness it is possible to conceive of the discovery of measurement based spatiotemporal truths that can explain why this is so.

b) Parsimony Hypothesis – The same physical facts responsible for the way consciousness is inaccessible from ‘without’ are also responsible for the self-affirming nature of its peculiar, intimate and unmediated self-access. Lets call these PH truths and M-facts that satisfy the PH, MPH-truths.

c) MPH-truths - MPH-truths that result in internal actualization conditions (Think of ‘Island Universes’ whose demarcation conditions, expressive as MPH truths, constrain their internal temporal architecture in a way that guarantees internal
actualization.)
d) MPHI-truths, - MPH truths that are discovered to apply to a minimal NCC (including physical correlates.)
e) MPHI-truths can be used to dispel our anti-physicalist intuitions.
Conclusion: MPHI-truths are positive S-truths.

Next I will argue that physics is rich enough to provide philosophically relevant MPH truths especially if one attributes the rupture associated with the other minds problem to spatiotemporal discontinuity.

A question that occupied philosophers from Descartes and Kant to Quinton and Smart is whether space can be cut in two. The question was resolved in a four dimensional framework by the topologist Robert Geroch who discovered in 1978 that cutting space in two is possible but that there is a temporal price to paid in the form of either closed timelike curves or temporally non-orientable manifolds. I will end by claiming that Geroch's theorem makes possible the conception of positive S-facts.

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The Concept of Objectivity

‘Her little brother's fish is found floating, so she surreptitiously spends her savings on a sufficiently similar substitute.’ This micro-fiction shows how easily language is able to convey the concept of objectivity – the big sister assumes the burden of knowing the surrogate fish is not the fish her brother will take it to be. Accounting for how language is able to do this is my aim. Using Donald Davidson's Triangulation arguments as a stepping off point, I argue that Michael Tomasello's empirically based theory of Cooperation complementarity supports Robert Brandom's inferentialistic account of conceptual objectivity.

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Do not revise Ockham's razor without necessity

Ockham's razor asks that we not multiply entities beyond necessity. The razor is a powerful methodological tool, enabling us to articulate reasons for preferring one theory to another. There are those, however, who would modify the razor. Schaffer (2010a: 313-our italics), for one, tells us that, 'I think the proper rendering of Ockham's razor should be 'Do not multiply fundamental entities without necessity". Our aim, here, is to challenge such re-workings of Ockham's razor.

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There is no logical negation: gaps, gluts, both, and neither.

Logic is said to be (properly) subclassical iff every logically valid argument is classically valid but not vice versa. In this paper I advance and defend a very simple position according to which logic is subclassical but is weaker than the leading subclassical-logic views have it. One salient feature of the view I advance concerns logical negation. On the target picture there is no interesting logical negation, no interesting negation connective whose stand-alone behavior (independent of interaction with other connectives) is characterized by logic itself. This is a radical departure from otherwise 'conservative' subclassical-logic positions. My aim is to show that the radical departure is not only philosophically motivated; it results in a simple and plausible view of logic. I am not in position to argue that the proposed view is the only sensible -- the true -- position; but I do hope that the position is clear enough to challenge its popular opponents.

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Ethical Puzzles of Time Travel

One often hears: "If time travel were possible, someone could go back in time and kill Hitler, and save millions of lives." But little thought has been given to the background issues surrounding such a claim: if time travel were possible, what sorts of ethical puzzles, dilemmas, and obligations would it introduce? For example, would one be morally permitted or even morally obligated to go back in time and kill Hitler? Would less dramatic interventions, such as travelling back in time to prevent a single car accident, also be subject to moral obligation? This paper is dedicated to these and similar ethical questions that
arise from the possibility of time travel. I articulate the ethical puzzles of time travel and divide them into three different categories: permissibility puzzles, obligation puzzles, and conflicts between past and future selves. In each category, I suggest that ethical problems involving time travel are not as dissimilar to parallel "normal" ethical puzzles as one might think.

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Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the foundations of knowledge
Wittgenstein expressed thoughts about the foundations of knowledge in his last writings, which were On Certainty. A.J. Ayer expressed similar thoughts in his book on The Problem of Knowledge. The examples Kripke uses in his discussion of "the contingent a priori" are linked to Wittgenstein's in "On Certainty"; and one of Kripke's footnotes deserves closer attention. This paper will investigate a way in which these materials could be used to furnish "foundations" for knowledge, and could be linked indirectly with "the Canberra Plan".

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Philosophy: Just Do It!
Generally we study philosophy as a particular domain of knowledge, be it aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, etc. In contrast, when I run philosophy for children (P4C) sessions, I plunge the children headlong into the activity of thinking itself. P4C utilises the philosopher's skills of interpretation and analysis; the critical assessment of arguments, ideas and presuppositions; the application of philosophical concepts, distinctions and methods to problems; and the pursual of effective written and oral communication as a method of education. Doing philosophy thus offers a change of focus from acquiring knowledge about particular theories, to applying knowledge to particular problems. This session is an experiment in broadening my P4C practice by applying it to adult learning. I have been practicing the method as a tutor, initially at the University of Adelaide and now at La Trobe University. In this session I will run a philosophical activity, based on the pedagogical idea that 'doing' rather than merely 'studying' philosophy enhances student learning in general. By attending the session you agree to participate in philosophical activities. The guiding question: What is art?

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Can Special Religious Education and Secular Ethics Education foster Growth? An Analysis of the New South Wales Primary Ethics Controversy
In 2010, a secular ethics curriculum was developed by philosopher Philip Cam and the St James Ethics Centre and trialled in 10 NSW government primary schools. It is now taught in over 350 schools. It was introduced as an alternative to Special Religious Education (SRE) classes, which the 1990 NSW Education Act required all state schools to offer. Special Religious Education (SRE) aims to instil in students the beliefs and values of a particular religion (predominantly Christianity in Australia). This is distinct from General Religious Education (GRE), which involves a study of world religions. The now amended 1990 Education Act specifically stated that secular ethics classes were not to be run concurrently with SRE. I will draw upon Dewey's notions of the self and growth to argue that schooling must provide students with the opportunity to critically inquire into diverse cultural knowledge and practices, including religious and ethical beliefs. SRE, GRE and secular ethics classes all have weaknesses in regards to their ability to foster such critical inquiry. SRE's dogmatism and narrow focus renders it the most problematic of the three. An approach which integrates aspects of GRE and philosophy based ethics may be the most facilitative of growth. This perspective extends upon the views Nel Noddings and Stephan Law.

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Comparative Resemblance Nominalism
Traditionally, resemblance nominalism attempts to analyse properties in terms of binary resemblance - the relation of a resembling b. This paper considers whether the relation of comparative resemblance - the relation of a resembling b more than c resembles d - is a better foundation for the analysis of properties.
Shaftesbury's criticism of Locke's Account of Personal Identity: A Return to Character Development and Virtue

Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, (1671-1713) knew Locke and his works well. Locke supervised his education and they corresponded until Locke's death. Shaftesbury distanced some of his philosophical views from Locke, argued that philosophy should be practical and focus on virtue and character development and criticized Locke for having thrown virtue out of the world. Several interepreters have acknowledged that Shaftesbury criticized Locke's account of personal identity, but Shaftesbury's positive contribution to the debates about personal identity is not yet well understood. In this paper I argue that in order to understand the differences between Locke's and Shaftesbury's accounts of personal identity, we have to take seriously their underlying moral views. I believe that Locke introduces the distinction between persons and human beings in order to make sense of questions of moral accountability. I show that Locke's moral views are influenced by the natural law tradition, while Shaftesbury emphasizes the importance of character development and virtue. According to Shaftesbury, consciousness is not stable enough to ground personal identity. Instead he proposes to understand a person's existence in terms of a stable character and that we should aim to develop the character of a genuine friend, because genuine friendship has greater stability than most other things.

Conceptual Broadening and Pragmatic Stances

One notable form of philosophical innovation in recent decades has been conceptual broadening – the broadening or extension of a concept to include more phenomena than it had previously been thought to by commonsense or received theory. So we have had proposals for the extended phenotype, the extended organism, extended inheritance, the extended replicator, and the extended mind, to name five from the philosophy of biology and philosophy of mind. I offer a general analysis of the form such broadenings take, and propose an empiricist/pragmatist interpretation of the radical positions defended by the broadeners, in the spirit of van Fraassen's work on stances. I explore the possibility that in most, perhaps all, of these cases there is no fact of the matter about whether the broadening proposals are objectively correct, and the only question is the broadly pragmatic one of whether they conduce to our practical and explanatory purposes.

Aristotle on Memory, Self, and Consciousness

In the first part of this paper I attempt to answer two questions about Aristotle’s account of memory: (1) What is the object of memory? (2) What does the act of remembering consist in? In answering (1) I argue against what I call the Mental State Theory, according to which what we remember are always past acts of perception, thought, etc, and in favour of what I call the Object Theory, according to which what we remember are at least sometimes the objects of past acts of perception, thought, etc. In answering (2) I argue that remembering is a complex activity with two components: an imaging component (in which I grasp a mental image as a representation of an object) and an awareness component (in which I am aware that I have previously perceived or thought the object represented). In the second part I examine Aristotle’s claim that the act of remembering essentially involves an awareness of oneself remembering. I conclude by arguing that my account of Aristotle’s answers to questions (1) and (2) allows us to understand this claim.

Won't somebody please think of the mammoths? De-extinction and animal welfare

In the debates surrounding de-extinction, discussion usually focuses on scientific viability, or the ethical issues accompanying such a project, with animal welfare concerns mentioned only briefly if at all. Here I argue that we have good reason to think the welfare of the animals involved will be poor, and this should thus be an important (though not decisive) consideration when making decisions on de-extinction projects.
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**Responsiveness and robustness in the David Lewis signalling game**

We consider modifications to the standard David Lewis signalling game and relax a number of unrealistic implicit assumptions that are often built into the framework. In particular, we explore realistic asymmetries that exist between the sender and receiver roles. We find that endowing receivers with a more realistic set of responses significantly decreases the likelihood of signalling, while allowing for unequal selection pressure often has the opposite effect. We argue that the results of this paper can also help make sense of a well-known evolutionary puzzle regarding the absence of an evolutionary arms race between sender and receiver in conflict of interest signalling games.

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**Climate Change, Feasibility, Political Realism**

I raise objections to an influential 'realist argument' about what it is politically feasible to do about climate change. According to this argument, climate regimes are infeasible if they make current citizens of powerful nations worse off. On the basis of this argument, commentators argue for a variety of divergent views, some taking it to imply that an unjust global response to the problem of climate change is the best we can realistically hope for and is thus the solution that we should actively promote even from an ethical point of view. The common realist conclusion behind these divergent views – which might be called Efficiency Without Sacrifice – has been endorsed by a wide range of commentators in philosophy, economics, law, and international affairs such as John Broome, Cass Sunstein, Eric Posner, David Weisbach, Richard Stewart, Jonathan Wiener, and many others. I offer internal objections to both of these realist views. I then argue that the realist argument is invalid, and the nature of its invalidity also points the way toward a more desirable response than these commentators endorse.

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**Response to Yablo’s “If-Thenism”**

This paper is one of five short commentaries on Stephen Yablo’s paper “If-Thenism.” The paper will be part of the Yablo stream.

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**Identity and Quantification**

Does quantification presuppose the identity of the objects that are quantified over? Is quantification intelligible without such identity? In this paper, I examine a number of arguments in favor of identity’s fundamentality in the context of quantification, and I argue that classical quantification (that is, quantification in classical logic and set theories) requires identity. In particular, I consider the argument from the permutation of objects in the domain, the argument from the range of quantifiers, the argument from the collapse of the existential and the universal quantifiers, and the argument from the intelligibility of quantification. In each case, I identify the crucial role that the identity of the objects that are quantified over plays in quantification. I then consider quantification in non-classical contexts, and argue that even in logics and set theories that allegedly do not require identity for quantification, identity is still presupposed.

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**Doxastic Desire**
Some attitudes can be reductively explained in terms of others. For example, the attitude of fearing that p arguably consists of (i) believing that p is possible; (ii) desiring that p not be the case; and (iii) being caused to feel the emotion of fear by this belief/desire combination. How many attitudes must be posited at the level of reductive bedrock in order to reductively explain all the others? A common view is that at least two are indispensable, belief and desire. I here seek to show that in fact only one is needed—namely, belief—and that desires are reducible to a certain form of belief. If this is correct it has major implications both for the philosophy of mind, with regards the problem of naturalizing the propositional attitudes, and for metaethics, with regards Michael Smith’s ‘moral problem’.

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An evaluation of Schopenhauer’s theory of will
The aims of this paper are twofold: firstly, to give the reader a comprehensive understanding of Schopenhauer’s theory of will, and, secondly, to elucidate certain problems inherent in this theory. Schopenhauer’s epistemology, dual aspect ontology, aesthetics, ethics, and pessimism will be examined. Additionally, a cursory exposition of Kant’s metaphysics will be presented, along with Schopenhauer’s critique of this. Possible solutions to problems in his theory will be expounded and subsequently critiqued. Most salient of these problems is his identification of the will with the Kantian thing-in-itself. I argue that Schopenhauer’s theory of will contradicts the Kantian confines on metaphysical knowledge. Consequently, and in light of his own epistemology, there are serious, if not intractable, problems with his contentions that the will is the Kantian thing-in-itself, and it is knowable.

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Pluralism and Contextualism
According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. Various critics argue that logical pluralism suffers from the collapse problem: that despite its intention to endorse a plurality of logics, the view unintentionally collapses into logical monism. If logic L1 judges an inference valid and logic L2 judges the same inference invalid, L1 exerts greater normative pull than L2. So, even if several accounts of logical consequence fare equally well on some criteria, the normativity of logic upsets this balance. In this paper, I propose a contextualist account of validity that captures the insights of logical pluralism, but avoids the collapse problem. An apt model is epistemic contextualism, according to which ‘knows’ and its cognates include a parameter for an epistemic standard, i.e. a selection of worlds that function as relevant alternatives. Contextualism about validity, analogously, is the view that ‘valid’ and its cognates include a parameter for a deductive standard, i.e. a selection of cases that function as salient counterexamples. Anyone moved by logical pluralism should instead embrace my proposal. Logical contextualism makes plain why the plurality of logics do not collapse into one, and it does so by appeal to well-understood semantic machinery.

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Reflections on Cross-cultural and Interdisciplinary Philosophy of Mind
What is the value of cross-cultural and interdisciplinary approaches to philosophy of mind, and what exactly do they add to more traditional analytic approaches? Are the benefits and challenges of both types of approaches similar—or are they too different to allow for a single, coherent answer? In the closing session of the “New Perspectives on Mind” stream, we will outline possible answers to these questions, followed by a general discussion.

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The Virtual and the Real
Is virtual reality truly real? The most common view is that virtual reality is a sort of fictional or illusory reality, and that what goes in in virtual reality is not truly real. I will defend the opposite view: virtual reality is a sort of genuine reality, and what goes on in virtual reality is truly real.
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The Argument from Modal Intuition: A Critique
The Humean intuition (HI) (as Langton (2006) calls it) suggests that it is conceivable and thus possible that things have causal behaviours different from their actual ones. The argument from modal intuition (AMI) by Langton (1998) and Lewis (1986b) argues that given that HI is correct, strong categoricalism, according to which dispositional properties are realized by categorical properties but are not reducible to them, must be true; major rival doctrines concerning the nature of categorical properties and dispositional properties are false. We argue that AMI is unsound because of a lack of consideration of possible worlds with two kinds of laws of nature.

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Resisting damaging imaginaries: A structural role for Smithean sympathy
In The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination (2013), José Medina underscores the importance of practical interventions into dominant social imaginings of racial and sexual difference that undermine mutual understanding, concern, and reciprocity between privileged and oppressed social identities. I suggest that Adam Smith’s early modern sentimentalist philosophy offers a valuable contribution to Medina’s work on resisting dominant social imaginaries. Smith’s nuanced and sophisticated account of the role of imaginative perspective-taking (‘sympathy’) in generating a viable sociability between members of different social groups – in particular, his appeal to structural supports for sympathy – offers a productive starting point for thinking through how to intervene in damaging imaginaries in ways that support rather than undermine harmonious social relations across difference.

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Logical Omniscience and the Logic of Questions
When we ask and answer questions, we’re engaged in the giving and receiving of information: we’re updating our knowledge. Thus, it makes sense that a dynamic epistemic logic would be suitable for modelling this. However, if our knowledge is represented by some set of possible worlds, then all necessary truths will be represented in that set, because there are no worlds at which they are false. So, using possible worlds leads to all epistemic agents knowing all necessary truths in all our models. This is the problem of logical omniscience, and is especially clear when we consider questions, as it makes perfect sense for us to ask and receive answers to questions about necessary truths, and to learn something new in the process. To solve this problem, I introduce the notion of ‘inference capacity,’ which is agent-specific and describes the ability of the agent to make inference leaps. Restricting the allowable possible worlds to those which could be reached with the agent’s inference capacity allows us to model logically competent, but not omniscient, agents. It also helps to explain how we can come to know new logical principles and necessary truths, sometimes through asking and answering questions.

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Platonism and Mathematical Invention
With regard to mathematics, Platonism is usually defined as a claim about the independent existence of abstract mathematical objects. In this version of Platonism, the development of mathematics is determined as the process of the discovery of such objects. However, in this paper I want to look at a significantly different version of Platonism proposed by the philosopher Albert Lautman. What is of particular interest is the way that Lautman attempts to account for mathematical creation and invention through the development of a platonic dialectic. The two central terms of this dialectic are ideas, which pose problems (the problem of the relationship between the discrete and the continuous, or the finite and the infinite, for example) and mathematical theories, which propose new solutions to these problems. I will show how Lautman’s Platonism can get around a number of problems of standard Platonism, and in particular its relationship to mathematical structuralism, and then touch on some important issues for his largely unfinished work.
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**Epistemic Injustice as Distributive Injustice**  
Is epistemic injustice a form of distributive injustice? In her early, profoundly influential, work on epistemic injustice Miranda Fricker makes it clear that she does not think it is. In a recent article, however, she has expanded her conception of epistemic injustice to include something she calls distributive epistemic injustice, which she characterizes as ‘the unfair distribution of epistemic goods such as education or information’. She contrasts this with her earlier, narrower, conception of the subject, which she now prefers to call discriminatory epistemic injustice. In this paper I will challenge Fricker's distinction between discriminatory and distributive epistemic injustice; each of the forms of epistemic injustice that Fricker describes is a form of distributive injustice (or at any rate can be fruitfully treated as such) and that important insights into the nature of these injustices, and into the relationships between them, can be gained from recognizing this fact.

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**Response to Yablo’s “If-Thenism”**  
This paper is one of five short commentaries on Stephen Yablo’s paper “If-Thenism.” The paper will be part of the Yablo stream.

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**Dualism and the Logical Structure of Love**  
The Australian feminist philosopher Val Plumwood argued that the logical structure of oppression is dualism: (not merely a dichotomy, but) a relation characterised by grounding, radical exclusion, incorporation, instrumentalism, and homogenisation, in which one side or subject is centred and another is subordinated to that centre. Intimate partner abuse, I claim, is characterised by this same structure. Building off Jessica Benjamin's work, Lundy Bancroft's research, and bell hooks' and Erich Fromm's philosophical writings on love, I argue for a way of understanding love which conceives of it as the precise logical opposite of dualism: a practice of care, openness, empathy, respect, and recognition. Where abusiveness imposes complementarity, these characteristics of love invite mutuality, and are precisely those characteristics which make a de-centred mutuality of full subjects (Fromm's "union with the condition of maintaining your integrity") possible. This kind of love is obscured by our present inculcation of gender, I claim, which encourages complementarity rather than mutuality as the romantic ideal. Understanding love as the logical opposite of abuse, I argue, clarifies both abuse and love, and fleshes out bell hooks' claim that love and abuse cannot coexist.

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**Towards a phenomenology of mindfulness: the mindful state, its causes and effects.**  
Contemporary cognitive science, psychology and philosophy, often inspired by ancient Buddhist texts, have invested a significant amount of energy into understanding the phenomenon of mindfulness. While often insightful, these attempts are ultimately unsatisfactory. And they are unsatisfactory because of a certain proposition under which the research is being done. This is the belief that the phenomenon of mindfulness can be wholly accounted for in terms of the presence or absence of such transient conscious events as different modalities of attention, judgment, working memory etc. This reductionist presupposition leads to two kinds of conflations, which are detrimental to a proper understand of the phenomenon. One is the conflation of the mindful state with its causes or motives; with the experience that establishes it. Just as one must distinguish the experience of falling asleep from the state of sleep itself, so one must distinguish the practice of meditation from the mindful state that is potentially established through it. The second conflation is between the mindful state and its effects, the peculiar pattern of transitory consciousness that, in a manner of speaking, expresses the state. Just as anxiety has its own pattern of familiar conscious states, all kinds of tightenings saturate the lived body, life's tasks appear as not-worth-doing, attention is drawn to dull colours, so it is with the mindful state. But the state should not be confused with this pattern, or so I
will argue. This main aim of this paper is to employ phenomenology in order to justify the claim that there is a need for a threefold distinction, between the mindful state, its causes and motives, and to show that the recognition of this distinction is a necessary condition for a valid account of mindfulness.

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A Fine Balance: Hobbes' Sovereign and the challenge of meaningful limitation
On the traditional reading of Hobbes' political theory, the Sovereign is absolute, answerable to no one and possessing the power to act as he chooses. In recent years however, a new interpretation of Hobbes' political system has emerged which argues for a Sovereign who is limited, who quite simply does not have the authority to perform certain acts. This new reading, championed in various forms by Lary May, Susanne Sreedhar and Perez Zagorin, attempts to provide a Hobbesian political theory not marred by the threat of tyranny, a threat which has traditionally been seen as unavoidable. Unfortunately, however, it is not clear how this limitation could be a meaningful one. Since political subjects in Hobbes' system are duty bound to obey the Sovereign in all matters, how then could the subject bypass this duty in order to even question the Sovereign, let alone impose limits upon him? In this paper I suggest that Hobbes himself offers an answer to this question, an answer which can be found in his unique approach to the division between command and counsel. By exploring this division in Hobbes' political works, this paper shows firstly that Hobbes was in fact aware of the apparent contradiction in having an all-powerful yet limited Sovereign, and shows secondly how he thought this contradiction could be addressed.

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Models, Mechanisms and Modularity: Lessons for the metaphysics of causation.
In recent years, the structural causal model (SCM) framework, as developed by Judea Pearl and others, has become increasingly popular as a philosophical tool for understanding the nature of causation. James Woodward, in particular, has advocated such an approach and has used it to argue that causal relations are distinguished by a certain kind of invariance, which he labels “modularity”. Woodward claims that his notion of modularity is closely connected to the notion of modularity that Lindley Darden has argued is necessary for mechanistic explanation. In this paper, however, I show that kind of modularity required for mechanistic explanation cannot be captured within the SCM framework. I then present an amended version of the SCM framework that can capture the required modularity, and argue that this amended model has some important lessons to teach us about the fundamental nature of causation.

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The Politics of Context
‘Context’ is often used as a technical term in philosophy of language, and plays a prominent role in pragmatic theories. However, many speech act theorists rely on an informal, intuitive sense of context which is typically under-described. This paper argues that the informal sense mistakenly treats context as settled by the object of evaluation. Instead, we should understand appeals to context as an attempt to make certain features of the world relevant to judgement-making, to prompt re-evaluation of an event or utterance. This means that the ability to invoke context is important, as influencing the judgements of others is a powerful political tool. Speech act theory accounts of slurring should therefore utilize this notion of context, or risk reinforcing structural subordination. I suggest that we should treat context as a type of thought experiment, and apply conclusions based on these thought-experiments to the real world only through analogy. This offers greater explanatory force to current models of slurring, and a way to challenge appeals to context by the powerful.

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Q is for Qualia
This is an essay written by my late partner, Dr Alan Saunders which I will be presenting as a performance piece. I will be introducing the dialogue, while the parts of Socrates and Alcibiades will be played by students from the Monash School of
Drama. Q is for Qualia is a comic dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades on the issues of food and flavour, addressing questions such as; What is flavour, how many kinds of flavour are there and how can we communicate our experience of flavour to others.

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Moral Virtues and Responsiveness to Reasons
Moral discourse contains judgements of two prominent kinds. It contains deontic judgements about rightness and wrongness, obligation and duty, and what a person ought to do. As I understand them, these deontic judgements are normative: they express conclusions about the bearing of normative reasons on the actions and other responses that are available to us. And it contains evaluative judgements about goodness and badness. Prominent among these are the judgements that evaluate the quality of our responsiveness to morally relevant reasons. We have a rich vocabulary for making such evaluations – our vocabulary of aretaic terms. Aretaic terms are those which can be used to attribute virtues: terms such as “kind”, “honest”, “fair”, “tolerant” and “reliable”. However, while they can be used to attribute virtues, they have other uses too; and they can be applied not only to persons but also to various states of persons, to actions and other responses, and to patterns of response. In this paper, I offer an account of the relationship between some of the principal uses of aretaic terms; and I show how a useful taxonomy of moral virtues can be generated from the thought that these are ways of being well oriented to morally relevant reasons.

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The Direct Perception Thesis, Cognitive Penetrability and the ‘Bewitchment of Language’
This paper argues that the debates concerning the veridicality of perception since Pylyshyn’s paper - ‘Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive penetrability of visual perception’ (1999) - up until today have been led off track by the ‘bewitchment of language’. Specifically, I propose that the choice of the metaphor ‘penetration’ is erroneous. To more accurately account for our conditioned perceptual experiences, the metaphor of ‘obfuscation’ serves us better as it allows for error recognition and for the possibility of enhanced veridicality in our perceptual judgments.

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Presentism & Passage
According to the presentist, only the present moment exists and, as time passes, what’s present changes. But beyond that there’s disagreement amongst presentists about which version of presentism is best. For instance, David Ingram has recently argued that thiness presentism is preferable to other versions of presentism because it’s able to handle certain problems other versions of presentism cannot. I argue here that this assessment is premature. More specifically, I argue that Ingram’s response to an objection from Lisa Leininger fails to address the core issue she raises. But hope is not lost for the presentist; I also argue that presentists do have the resources available to address the underlying issue Leininger articulates, but these resources are equally available to various versions of presentism—which undermines Ingram’s case for thiness presentism.

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Evolutionary debunking of morality and companions in guilt
Those who advance evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) against morality invariably deny that EDAs produce "companions in guilt." That is, they deny that their debunking arguments overgeneralize in a way that would debunk our scientific beliefs or our beliefs about the external world. In this paper I argue that proponents of EDAs are wrong to think this. In particular, I consider recent arguments by Max Barkhausen (2016), Richard Joyce (2015), and Sharon Street (2016) to the effect that EDAs do not overgeneralize, and I argue that they all fail. I conclude with a parity argument designed to show that all EDAs are likely to produce either companions in guilt (if they are accepted) or companions in innocence (if they are rejected). Either way, there is no good reason to think that EDAs pose any problem that uniquely affects our moral beliefs.
Empiricism and Atheism
One might expect, at first sight, that empiricists would be hostile to religion. But in fact empiricists have held a wide range of religious views. This paper outlines the varieties of empiricism that we find in the history of philosophy, from that of the ancient Greek medical writers to that of the logical positivists of the early twentieth century. It then discusses the implications of each form of empiricism for religious belief. It concludes by offering some reflections on the relation between empiricism and what is commonly referred to as the 'naturalism' of the sciences.

The Bitter Lakes of Time - duration and pollution in Andrei Tarkovsky's Stalker
This paper investigates the metaphysics of time, and the question of this metaphysics in the context of the 'Anthropocene' or 'human epoch.' The Anthropocene, a period characterised by profound, human driven changes to the Earth’s lithosphere, presents us with an image of humanity as situated in time, as a temporal phenomenon. One of the starkest expressions of this image is pollution, understood here as the process by which human activities unintentionally contaminate ‘natural’ systems. As such, this paper contends that pollution represents a human signature in time, one of the means by which humanity is physically expressed in temporality. Filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky characterised his practise as an expression of the visual, that is to say physical, presence of temporality. Pollution too, is a key aesthetic element in his work. This paper proceeds with an in-depth critical reading of his 1979 film Stalker, using scenes from the film to explore the interrelation of time (or ‘duration,’ following Bergson) and pollution, in its ontological dimension. The mischievous metaphysical suggestion implicit, that humanity may have polluted time, is intended not as a thesis, but as a provocation, an attempt to demonstrate the profound implications of industrialisation to all schemas by which we order and make sense of reality.

To resolve problems not posed. Merleau-Ponty on literary language
In my contribution I address some related aspects of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's "middle" philosophy of language. As it is been widely shown in literature, this phase is characterised not only by the reappraisal of themes from Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of perception, but also from his study of De Saussure's linguistics (see for instance Edie, 1971; Schmidt 1985; Dastur, 2001). Firstly I propose a preliminary terminological clarification of relevant concepts such as prose, prosaic and poetry, as they occur not only in the Prose, but also in the Phenomenology of Perception and in the course notes collected in Recherches sur l’usage littéraire du langage. Secondly I discuss the "disturbing" force of literature as described in the Prose and its function in respect to language in general. In this section I will mainly refer to the unfinished Prose of the World. By drawing on these analysis I will finally propose to identify the distinction between "ordinary" and "expressive" language (Prose, 64) with the (revised) saussurian distinction between langue and parole which plays a crucial role in the Prose.

The Conceivability Fallacy
Famous examples of conceivability arguments include: (i) Descartes’ argument for the distinctness of mind and body; (ii) Kripke’s modal argument against identity theory; (iii) Chalmers’ zombie argument against psychophysical supervenience; and (iv) Plantinga’s modal version of ontological argument for theism. This paper shows that all conceivability arguments are fallacious. Any such argument can be ‘mirrored’. That is, it can be turned around to prove a conclusion that directly contradicts the conclusion it is intended to prove. A proponent of A conceivability argument must therefore reject the premises of the ‘mirrored’ version of her argument, but can’t do this without undermining her own argument. We maintain that each of arguments (i)—(iv) are for this reason persuasively bankrupt as they stand.
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At arm’s length: Predictive coding and arm-based cognition in the octopus
In this paper, I examine how the free energy principle, and its cognition-specific instantiation, predictive coding are implemented within the nervous system of the octopus, with emphasis on the peripheral arm nervous system. The free energy principle has been proffered as fundamental to biological systems, and as such has been used as the cornerstone of many embodied and dynamical cognitive models. The predictive coding scheme is favourable due to its mechanistic parsimony, which entails that it can be implemented by just one type of causal operation that nevertheless can be instantiated in various ways to account for diverse neural processes. Octopus cognition is interesting and unique due to its being comprised of distinct and highly autonomous representational and dynamical elements that coincide with clearly demarcated neuroanatomical structures. The arm nervous system, which is the aforesaid dynamical component, resists explanation by traditional models of cognition. Demonstrating that a predictive coding model can successfully account for the nature of cognitive operations within the octopus arms can be extended into a claim about dynamical cognitive models in general.

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Probabilistic Proof of an External World
I present a novel probabilistic argument against skepticism about the external world. As I will argue, there are many more ways for there to exist an external world (for all I know with certainty) than there are ways for there not to exist an external world (for all I know with certainty). Since the number of ways in which a given proposition can be true (for all I know with certainty) has important bearing on how confident I should be in that proposition, I will argue that I should be much more confident that there exists an external world than not. In particular, I will argue that I should be at least 99.99999% confident that an external world of some sort exists.

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Hume on Causation: Projectivist and Sceptic
Beebee (2006) presents Hume as a projectivist on causation, whereby talk of x causing y is a projection of the habit of expecting y given x. Projectivist causal talk is non-descriptive, since habits are not the sorts of things that represent how the world is at all. The upshot of this, supposedly, is it allows us to avoid potential problems with interpreting Hume as a sceptic about causation. In order to make causal talk rationally evaluable, Beebee stipulates that some habits can be better than others, specifically those that are in accordance with normative belief forming methods such as Hume’s own “rules by which to judge of causes and effects” (T 1.3.15) and the contemporary causal modelling tradition as described by Woodward (2003). My aim is to reveal that it is nothing to do with projectivism that saves Hume from scepticism because inductive scepticism attacks prediction-making abilities and the legitimacy of the norms that would govern habits for the projectivist depend precisely upon such abilities.

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The Political Affinity of Peirce and Arendt
C.S Peirce and Hannah Arendt are unusual bedfellows, but together they inform a rich and novel vision of “the political”. Arendt theorises that the uniqueness of totalitarianism is essentially the ideological elimination of unpredictable experience along with spontaneous thought and action, making the actualisation of humanity impossible. In Peirce’s terms, this involves the destruction of the capacity for doubt and belief to respond to experience through hypothesising and experimentation. This informs a normative argument for the preservation of “the political” as conditions that maintain the possibility of the creation, comprehension, and sharing of a plurality of opinions about the common world of radically indeterminable political action. I argue that central to these conditions of political reality is the capacity for abduction and critical commonsensism - two of Peirce’s most important contributions to philosophy.
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**When Two Become One: Folie a Deux and the Two Factor Theory of Delusions**

Folie a deus occurs when delusional ideas are shared by two or more individuals in close association with one another. I use the term ‘classical folie’ to denote a sub-class of cases in which a ‘primary’ transmits their delusion to a ‘secondary’ who does not suffer from a pre-morbid psychiatric condition, and who relinquishes the delusion after the pair are separated. In her paper, ‘Folie à deux: Lessons for Two Factor Theorists’, Langdon applies the two-factor theory to a case of classical folie. Langdon recognises, however, that the content of the secondary’s belief is not (as proposed by the two factor theory) the result of an endogenous sensory-processing deficit, but acquired via testimony. This leads her to suggest that the first factor of the secondary’s delusion is best conceived of as exogenous. After articulating Langdon’s account, I argue that this amendment transgresses methodological individualism, a substantial precept of both cognitive psychology and psychiatry. If we take this move seriously, adherents of this model face a dilemma: either deny that the two factor model is an all-encompassing one, or embrace a controversial form of externalism about delusion.

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**Composite Objects, Extended Simples, and Heterogeneous Properties**

According to the orthodox view of composition, a composite object is a further thing, numerically distinct from the objects that compose it (individually and collectively). The alternative – composition as identity – says that a composite object is numerically identical to the objects that compose it, taken together. I will argue that the orthodox view faces a serious problem when it comes to accounting for composite objects which have heterogeneous properties – properties like being black and white, and having blue and red stripes. In doing so, I will defend two claims which together, I think, strongly favour composition as identity:

1. If (and only if) we accept the orthodox view, then we have to give up on the idea that for an object to be black and white (for example) is for it to have parts which are black, and parts which are white, and no parts of any other colour. This means dealing with the same problems facing those who defend the possibility of extended simples (objects with no proper parts which are extended in space).
2. The problems facing those who defend the possibility of extended simples are very serious – far more so than has been recognised in the literature.

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**Endurance and Spacetime**

I outline a version of endurantism which can be understood as the minimal endurantist modification of supersubstantivalism. I show that this conception of endurance avoids a number of problems that plague existing endurantisms.

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**How Scientific Models Explain: A Holistic Account**

This paper aims to develop a holistic account of model explanation on the basis of James Woodward’s interventionist account of explanation. I claim that a model can be explanatory because it can answer what-if-things-had-been-different questions, that is, it can answer how changes or interventions in explanans would be systematically associated with changes in the explananda. I further suggest that the reason why a model can do so is because a model is a structure, that is, an interdependence relationship among elements. Given this conception of model explanation, I then address the problem of how non-causal models can also be explanatory. Since the term “structure” is also employed by the semantic view of theories and models, I finally clarify my position by suggesting a deflationary conception of the notion of structure.
## Path Integration in Connectionist Networks: A Structural Account of Celestial Navigation Cues

Path integration in the Desert Ant is a paradigmatic case of basic cognitive phenomena in animals. However, exactly how the ants perform such a sophisticated computational task has been a topic of debate in cognitive science. In particular, it has been a point of criticism against the connectionist research programme. In a prior talk, I outlined a defence of connectionist computation, giving an analogue and structuralist account of an artificial neural network model that could plausibly implement the required trigonometric computations to achieve path integration. However, that model assumes a ‘solar compass’ module that gives heading information for the later computations to be successful. This talk will round out that work, developing a structuralist account of a neural mechanism that would allow the ants to compute the required heading information from the ‘solar ephemeris function’; particular patterns of polarisation of sunlight, at various times of day. This involves using an array of neurons that structurally resembles a ‘vector field’, to capture the relationship between heading and the pattern of polarised light. Some ruminations on the implications this has for biological representation of various coordinate systems will be given along the way, as well as how this defends the connectionist programme.

### Linguistic and Philosophical Intuitions

With the advent of Generative linguistics in the 50’s, the idea of linguistic intuitions has been picked up in related fields of philosophy, and formed an important basis for research. However, many philosophers fail to draw a distinction between acceptability judgements and grammaticality judgements, which have a crucial difference in their epistemic grounding in linguistic theory. This divide is especially relevant to so-called expert intuitions, which philosophers make use of in building their theories and dealing with conflicting intuitions, especially with ‘layfolk’. This makes use of the notion of grammaticality intuitions, but faces issues as it uses the epistemic grounding of acceptability judgements. I will show the differences between these two types of judgements in linguistic theory, and show how this is a consequence for how philosophers have used these ideas in their approaches. This is especially relevant for modern research into cross-cultural differences in intuitions, for which linguistics can provide a solid basis for investigating intuitions in a cross-disciplinary manner.

## A ROAMER with a (better) View

Psychiatry is in a state of disarray. Its main tool of classification, the DSM, has been under increasing criticism for its lack of validity. The DSM-5 was supposed to remedy the situation, but according to many (Cooper, 2015; Demazeux, 2015), it just failed at it. It is thought that solutions will have to come from somewhere else. In previous papers, I (with Simon Goyer, 2015, forth.) have examined the capacity of the RDoC initiative to provide a way out of the muddle in which psychiatry is stuck. Though I think the RDoC can make psychiatry move forward, I pointed to some potential problems with the initiative. In this talk, I will engage in “comparative social epistemology”, that is, I will compare the features of the process that lead to the establishment of the research priorities figuring in the Strategic Plan for Research of the NIMH (from which the RDoC emanate) and the ones that lead to its European equivalent, the ROAMER (the Roadmap for Mental Health in Europe). I will argue that some of the features of the process that lead to the ROAMER protected it from some of the problems that many sees in the RDoC.

## ‘Reconciliation,’ Racial Difference, and ‘the Child’: Thinking Relationality and the Post-colonial with Luce Irigaray

The relationship between colonising and Aboriginal peoples in Australia is arguably fraught, and as a nation Australia has not yet come to terms with its past and the ongoing implications of colonial violence. This is in spite of a national apology to the stolen generations, delivered by the Prime Minister in 2008, which had ostensibly provided an occasion for reflection upon colonial violence and its continuity into the present, through the sympathetic image of the stolen child. While this belated responsiveness to the stolen child brought a new attention to injustice done to Aboriginal peoples, this paper argues that this
attention also perpetuates paternalism and ultimately does not engender a fruitful form of relationality between coloniser and colonised. By drawing on Luce Irigaray’s concept of sexual difference and the interval, figured by the placenta rather than the child — as well as some kindred figures drawn from Indigenous cultures — this paper attempts to theorise an alternative understanding of this relations.

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Valuing for Others: A Framework for Proxy Decision Making
Advance directives are intended to provide clinicians with a clear set of instructions, ensuring that patient’s autonomous choices are respected in instances where they are rendered incompetent. Recently, emphasis has been placed upon the importance of completing such directives as a guarantee that one’s wishes will be honoured. Despite the best efforts of many, the advance directive framework has proven to be an inadequate tool for clinical decision making, largely due to its narrow scope. The response has been to suggest that a proxy decision-maker can bridge the gap between the document and the case at hand. The primary role of a proxy, as it is now understood, is to infer what the incompetent patient would choose in a particular set of circumstances on the basis of knowledge of that patient’s wishes. I will argue that understanding proxies as occupying an informational role is a fatal error. My argument is that knowledge of patient preferences is a poor substitute for decision making on the basis of shared values. In place of the current model of proxies, I suggest that we supplant this paradigm with the role of a value-proxy, whose job is to better ensure that patient values are honoured.

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Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Ontology
This presentation surveys current writings on necessity and sufficiency and determines a distinction between (what is called here) ‘conditions of description’ and ‘conditions of ontology’. It is proposed that studies into essential definitions have been hampered by conflating these two, in particular by using conditions of description when it will be argued that conditions of ontology should be the correct conditions used when defining real world examples. I aim to show that seemingly successful essential definitions (e.g. ‘bachelor’, ‘vixen’) are only uncontroversial by accident of the fact that conditions of ontology and description do not ‘come apart’ in these few cases.

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Time: Making Things True and Making Things Happen
It strikes many of us that there is a fundamental difference between the past and future—the future is ‘open’ in a way the past is not. I will present a new analysis of openness, separating openness understood in terms of truth value, and understood in terms of ontology. I will outline these different conceptions of the open future, and clarifying what it means for the future to not exist. I will show that the future might be open in the sense that the future doesn’t exist, even if how the future will unfold is determined already. I will do so by making a distinction between direct and indirect truthmaking. I will then motivate the non-existence of the future by showing that it fits compellingly with a certain conception of causation, for example that defended by J.L. Mackie (1980). If we think of the passage of time as causation making things happen, then even if there are truths about what will happen, the non-existence of the future gives us a metaphysically substantial sense in which such things have not happened yet.

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What is logic?
Nearly all of philosophy relies on logical inference, but there is no agreed story of what that is. In virtue of what are logical inferences valid? What sort of entities are connected by logical relations? Why is it good to infer validly if you want to reach the truth? A default position for workers in other fields is a Fregean Platonism, according to which logical relations are eternal relations holding between Platonist entities called propositions. But Platonism is even less plausible about propositions
(apparently dealing with human “meanings”) than it is about numbers. Other, mutually incompatible, views of logic include: it’s tautological; it’s our most change-resistant empirical generalizations; it’s a linguistic feature like grammar; it’s how we ought to think; it’s about truth in all possible worlds/models; it’s the most basic principles of being … Without some answer to those questions, we cannot get to important questions about logic, such as: is logic formal (and why)? Can there be a non-deductive (probabilistic) logic? Is mathematics more than logic? The paper introduces these issues via some examples that illustrate we know less than we thought about the nature of logic.

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Moral Mismatch
This paper will describe the form of an evolutionary mismatch hypothesis, illustrate this with a non-moral example, then present the 'moral mismatch' hypothesis. It will focus on a specific element of our evolved moral psychology – our tendency to objectify morality – describing its plausible past benefits and the costs it imposes in modern contexts.

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Anorexia Nervosa and the Oversized Experience
Anorexia Nervosa patients have a distorted experience of their body size. In the Anorexia literature this ‘oversized experience’ is referred to as a ‘body image disturbance’. Recently, new evidence has surfaced showing Anorexia patients have a distortion in their body schemas, a body representation used for motor control and planning. In this paper I discuss this new evidence and explore what kind of ‘oversized experience’ it results in. I argue it causes Anorexia patients to experience their bodies as oversized through the faulty perception of affordances in their environments. This reconceptualised ‘oversized experience’ cannot be captured by the term ‘body image disturbance’. I also argue that propositional attitude formation in Anorexia can be accounted for with an empiricist model. Adopted from the literature on monothematic delusions, empiricist models explain abnormal beliefs as grounded in abnormal experiences. I argue that the propositional attitudes Anorexia patients have about their body size are grounded in the oversized experience.

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Seeing Double: Towards identifying the cognitive difference between seeing and interpreting.
When we look at ambiguous pictures such as Salvador Dali’s “Head of a Woman in the Form of a Battle”, what we see shifts between a battle scene with horses and the face of a woman. Wittgenstein argues in "Philosophical Investigations" that in cases of seeing dual aspects, such as with his duck/rabbit drawing, it is not appropriate to say that we are interpreting the picture because we have no choice as to what we see. When we look at such ambiguous optical illusions we do not always have control over which one of the dual aspects we see at any given moment. Using a number of examples my paper explores the phenomenon of alternating aspect pictures with a view to identifying the cognitive difference between seeing and interpretation.

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Reassessing Distributed Cognition
Distributed cognition is a framework that is used to analyse what is evocatively called "cognition in the wild" (Hutchins 1995a) in a wide range of fields of enquiry - for example, medical practices (Hazelhurst et al 2007), memory (Sutton et al 2010), scientific laboratories (Nersessian 2005), and navigational teams (Hutchins 1995a) amongst others. However, despite this useful work there remain a number of conceptual issues with the framework that jeopardise its legitimacy and uptake by other researchers. In this paper, it shall be argued that - contrary to standard discussions - this is due in large part to the fact that there are at least two distinct interpretations of the position in the literature. A more prevalent narrow view in which distributed cognition is a special kind of synchronic group system. And the wider view that was originally put forward by Hutchins in
which distributed cognition is a paradigmatic approach to all human cognition. This paper explores why the former view is more prevalent and offers a defence of the latter view.

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**Duality, paraconsistent modal logic, and advanced modalizing**

Metaphysics is tied to logic in the same way that science is tied to mathematics. Whereas the thesis the thesis that “whatever is necessary is true” is uncontroversial, its counterpart “whatever is true possible” has raised suspicion, especially in the context of advanced modalizing. But if negation and implication are the Boolean negation and material implication of twentieth century logic, the two are logically equivalent. This is a recognised problem for David Lewis’ modal realism, as pointed out by John Divers. Past suggestions have believed Lewis’ modal realism. Instead, I propose to build a modal logic in a paraconsistent framework. Crucially, and in contrast to most past attempts, I work entirely within a paraconsistent meta-theory. In paraconsistent meta-theory, negation does not force dualities between necessity and possibility. This allows a divide and conquer strategy. The idea is to develop a logic for necessity and possibility independently. If logical commitments have incredible philosophical consequences for otherwise plausible theories, a rational response is to adopt a logic better suited for philosophical investigation.

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**Social Norms and Moral Hindsight Bias**

Anthony Appiah, in his The Honor Code, argues that moral revolutions are sometimes the result of changes in honor norms. I argue that Appiah’s work has interesting implications for moral epistemology. Specifically, I claim that his work supports the existence of what I call moral hindsight bias, where we think, mistakenly, that past generations should be just as certain of what the moral truth is as we are today. Following Cristina Biccheri, who argues that social norms are driven by participants’ beliefs about what others believe they ought to do, I show that Appiah’s moral revolutions are driven by changes in social norms. Although Appiah endorses the intuition that honor norms and moral norms are different things, I argue there is no non-question begging way to sustain this intuition. The result is that moral revolutions can justifiably increase a culture’s credence in the truth of a moral proposition that p, but that we make a mistake in assuming that people prior to that revolution should have the same credence in the truth that p that we have.

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**The Force in Law: Rethinking the Legal Relevance of Coercion**

What makes coercion legally relevant? Some scholars try to answer this question by treating coercion as an aspect of the normativity of legal obligations. For instance, it is argued that legal obligations are intrinsically such that they authorize the use of coercive force, or that legal obligations occasionally provide reasons for enforcement on demand. Others believe that coercion is an aspect of the efficacy of legal institutions arguing that it is part of what makes a legal system persist through time. But there is another idea. What if coercion is legally relevant not because of how legal obligations manifest their normativity or how legal systems can endure violations of the law but rather because of how the obtaining of legal obligations is related to the actions of legal institutions? This approach locates the legal relevance of coercion in the relationship between the normativity and the efficacy of law. More precisely, I plan to argue that the production of legal obligations by the actions of legal institutions is governed by a principle of justified coercion. The principle is a jurisprudential variant of AJ Julius’ Independence Principle. It states that: Legal institutions should not [Y, believe that Y-ing is a way of making X-ing obligatory and that this fact is a reason to Y, and fail by Y-ing to help make it the case that by virtue of some actions other than Y-ing, X-ing upholds equal freedom]. Law-making actions are wrongfully coercive when they purport to make obligatory an action X whose structure is such that not everyone who does Z, Y or Q gets to count as doing the same thing, namely, X. Respecting this principle rests on whether the actions of legal institutions invite our trust that everyone can fulfill the obligation to X without being wronged.

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A moral reason to avoid eating lab-grown meat

Many philosophers believe that eating meat is immoral. Advocates of this view generally take eating meat to be a wrong against the animal whose meat is eaten. However, there is a growing scientific interest in what I will call "lab-grown meat": animal flesh grown in a laboratory, not taken from an actual animal. In the future it may be possible to produce most or all of the meat we eat without wronging any animal at all. It is commonly believed that such a state of affairs would have no moral downsides. In this paper I will present doubts against such a belief. Although switching from regular meat to lab-grown meat would represent a moral improvement, I contend that, for almost all of us, eating lab-grown meat would satisfy an immoral desire. I argue we have a moral reason to avoid satisfying immoral desires, and therefore almost all of us have a moral reason to avoid eating lab-grown meat.

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Uptake, Refusal, and the meaning of "no"

What are refusals? A popular view says that they are communicative acts that require ‘uptake’, that is, that an utterance only counts as a refusal if it is recognised as one by its addressee. Rae Langton uses this view to argue that pornography could render women unable to verbally refuse sex by teaching their partners that women who say ‘no’ are not really refusing. This paper argues that not all refusals require uptake. I begin by looking to the normative functions of a ‘no’ to build an account of how refusals succeed. This investigation reveals that refusals can perform different normative functions: some create new duties, and some create epistemic licenses about the old ones. The latter do not require uptake. I then reply to two objections that may be levelled against my view: that a speaker’s aims for a speech act set its success conditions, and that refusals require uptake because they generate second-personal accountability.

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Hylomorphising Lewis’ Transworld Objects

David Lewis takes ordinary objects -- such as people, wombats, and waterfalls -- to be worldbound individuals. He accounts for ordinary objects’ modal properties via his modal realism with counterparts theory. Hillary possibly loses the election (in the actual world) in virtue of having an (other-worldly) counterpart who loses the election. Hillary is necessarily human (in the actual world) in virtue of all of her (other-worldly) counterparts’ being human. A nearby view -- which Lewis considers and rejects -- is that ordinary objects are transworld objects. Rather than being a thin (worldbound) object whose modal properties are accounted for via representation de re, Hillary is a thick (transworld) object whose modal properties are internal to her. I argue that (i) the later view provides an intuitively more satisfying account of both the nature of ordinary objects and of de re modality, and (ii) the objections Lewis raises to taking ordinary objects to be transworld objects can be avoided by defending a hylomorphic account of ordinary objects whereby they consist of both matter and form. Their material part is worldbound; their formal part is not.

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Catharine Macaulay as Critic of Hume

Catharine Macaulay’s The History of England challenges Hume’s interpretation of the history of the Stuarts, as developed in his The History of Great Britain, and is grounded in meta-ethical, religious, and political principles that are also fundamentally opposed to those developed by Hume, as she makes clear in her Treatise on the Immutability of Moral Truth. Here it is argued that the contrast between them poses a problem for a number of recent accounts of the enlightenment period, and that Macaulay’s work demonstrates that one path to radical politics went via an optimistic strand of intellectualist theism. Macaulay’s ‘republican’ history, which was read on both sides of the Atlantic as justifying the overthrow of arbitrary governments, was grounded in conceptions of liberty, virtue, and sincere theistic belief, similar to those of the Cambridge Platonists. By contrast, Hume’s moral and religious scepticism led naturally to the political conservatism evident in his history. This paper offers an outline of their alternative accounts of the significance of the two English revolutions, and the opposing metaphysical and meta-ethical positions that underpin those accounts. It concludes with a discussion of the contrast between their concepts of liberty and their consequent very different evaluations of the value of liberty.
Response to Emotion, Imagination and the Limits of Reason
Response to Talia Morag's Emotion, Imagination and the Limits of Reason.

Holding Pathology Hostage
In *The Biological Foundations of Bioethics* (2015) Tim Lewens states that the concept of pathology should not be “hostage to evolutionary enquiry”. In this talk I disagree, and discuss some ways in which recent advances in biology ought to change ideas about about health and disease. Amongst other things, I suggest that the health of an organism and the quality of its environment are entwined conceptually, as well as causally.

Keynote Address
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Vulnerable Agency. Concepts and Contexts
In my lecture, I will analyze the concept of vulnerable agency, arguing that this concept is better suited to ground moral theory than the narrower concept of autonomy. I will proceed in two steps: First, I will develop the concept of vulnerability in its ontological, moral, and structural dimension and show how vulnerability and agency are dialectically related concepts. Ontological vulnerability is the susceptibility to pain and suffering and the openness to the world that is necessary for one to be affected by others and/or to be transformed in new experiences. Moral vulnerability rests upon the insights of social identity theories, which have explained the process of self-constitution at least in part by the internalization of the evaluative recognition by others. Recognition confirms a person's status as being one of the 'same kind' as others, while being acknowledged as a 'unique' individual. Moral vulnerability is the susceptibility to moral harm, i.e. violence and misrecognition, but at the same time it addresses the openness to others who co-constitute the self as moral agent, and openness to others who one co-constitutes. The intertwining of moral and social norms, however, renders those who are underrepresented potentially vulnerable to social norms of misrecognition. Structural vulnerability refers to states of increased susceptibility to suffering, potentially reducing the social agency of persons and withholding their needs to security, safety, and opportunities to social freedom in the public space by way of continued, institutionalized, or habitual discrimination and exclusion. With this conceptual analysis, I argue, it is possible to critique an interpretation of autonomy that is centered predominantly on the power of the sovereign agent. In contrast, vulnerable agency embraces the insights of social identity theories while calling for special attention to the potential moral and structural harms inflicted in and through the webs of human relations. Without critically reflecting upon the dialectic relation between vulnerability and agency, misrecognition, humiliation, and degradation – the three core violations of human dignity – cannot be accounted for.

In the second part of the lecture, I will turn to two contexts that concern women's agency in particular. The first context exemplifies my critique of the concept of autonomy lest it is tied to human dignity (as analyzed by way of 'vulnerable agency') in one particular example: the move towards the so-called social egg-freezing is depicted as empowering women by means of reproductive technology; I argue, however, that it merely responds to women's given ontological vulnerability while concealing and ignoring any underlying moral and/or structural vulnerability of human reproduction. The second context concerns what the WHO has called the pandemic of sexual violence against women. I will show that a person's 'trust in the world and trust in the other' that I determined as necessary for upholding one's sense of self may be severely damaged in denying a person the status as vulnerable agent. While reproductive technologies operate with a reductionist understanding of autonomy and agency, potentially undermining the openness to the 'other' as part of women's agency, sexual violence exploits and violates exactly this openness toward the other, in acts of moral violations of women's dignity. Although my conceptual argument will apply to both 'man's' and 'woman's' agency, my contextual focus in this paper will be on the vulnerable agency of women, because as an intellectual and societal voice, I hold that (moral) philosophy must respond to the social misconception of human vulnerability as an obstacle to one's freedom and well-being, and the social and public silencing of women who are continuously harassed, assaulted, or sexually abused. Moral philosophy in particular, I hold, must reinterpret one of its core concepts, agency, in order to integrate agency's other side, namely vulnerability.
Ensuring and the Timing of Wrongdoing
Consider the direct moral rule ‘Each agent must not murder’ and the ensuring rule ‘Each agent must ensure that she does not murder’. Are these rules equivalent? More generally, are pairs of direct-rules and ensuring-rules like these always equivalent? Many assume that they are equivalent because they appear to give the same deontic verdicts across all possible cases. However, I argue that in some cases the rules locate moral wrongdoing at different times and hence give different verdicts. Since the rules are not equivalent, the question arises as to which kind of moral rule we should adopt. For example, if you are opposed to murder should you endorse a direct-rule, an ensuring-rule, or both? I give two arguments for the claim that the most plausible moral theories will always contain ensuring-rules and eschew direct-rules. I then draw some interesting implications for moral theory.

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Productivity and Self-Respect in a Growing Economy
Economic growth is one of the most important forces in the world, and, yet, political philosophers have spent surprisingly little time thinking about it. This paper explores one way in which taking growth seriously complicates our thinking about justice, namely by forcing us to rethink our conception of what it means to be a productive member of society and why we care about whether an individual is productive or not. In particular, I argue that philosophers must confront the fact that providing low productivity individuals with the resources needed for them to have meaningful opportunities to support themselves often takes resources off the table. In other words, there is sometimes a tension between an individual’s ability to see herself as productive and her actually being productive, and this matters because theories of justice that put great emphasis on the latter (as many do) run the risk of being self-effacing. Furthermore, this issue is especially pressing in a world like our own where an increasingly large number of individuals may have little to no marginal productivity. A compelling account of justice must therefore look for alternative ways of grounding desert claims and supporting the social bases of self-respect. Without rejecting the importance of productivity as one such ground, I sketch some alternatives.

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Sexual violence and the presumption of innocence
A number of recent sexual harassment and sexual violence cases within philosophy departments have sparked ongoing debate about how we ought to respond to sexual violence claims. Sexual violence cases often involve conflicting testimony between an accuser and an accused person, with little or no corroborating evidence available. As very few sexual violence claims are ever evaluated through the criminal justice system, this places particular pressure on ordinary moral agents to respond to sexual violence claims in a way which recognises wrongdoing and avoids a mistaken judgment of guilt. I will argue against a prominent response to this dilemma – the idea that we have an extra-legal obligation to presume a person accused of wrongdoing to be ‘innocent until proven guilty.’ The presumption of innocence can be conceived of in two key ways: as an epistemic presumption in favour of the testimony of the accused, or as a requirement to remain epistemically neutral by withholding belief in relation to both the accused and the accuser’s testimony. I will contend that, in both cases, the presumption of innocence functions to promote injustice towards sexual violence victims by normalising patterns of belief and action which unjustly prioritise the testimony of the accused.

Keynote Address
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Ideaology, Illusion, and Material Injustice
Is there a philosophical use for the notion of ideology? I argue in this paper for a “practice first” conception of ideology. I begin by considering the shared practical orientations that enable us to interpret and coordinate with each other. To be effective, such practical orientations depend on shared social meanings, scripts, patterns of reasoning, and the like (in my terms, a cultural techne); these are learned and materialized in social practices. A cultural techne is ideological when the social practices it constitutes engage, produce, and reproduce material injustice. On this conception, ideology critique provides one of several ways to disrupt the unjust practices that we so fluently enact.
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Liberal' Paternalism; because Beneficence does not apply.
The four principles of bioethics, as described by Beauchamp and Childress (B&C) have been discussed extensively in
medical ethics. This discussion originated from the belief that doctors interact with their patients in an unacceptably
paternalistic manner. B&C describe an analogy of beneficence and autonomy each being in a pan of a scale; balanced by
justified paternalism. I discuss why I believe beneficence is an inappropriate consideration in surgical ethics; and on the basis
of a clinical observational study, describe a different form of paternalism; novel to philosophy, but routine to surgery. The
study is from a busy practice in the UK’s NHS, involving obese patients and their support groups. I choose this group
specifically, as it is one where both libertarian paternalism and beneficence have been used by the DoH, with no substantive
evidence of the desired effects having been achieved. I argue that surgeons grade respect for autonomy over the other
principles; beneficence does not come into conflict with autonomy. The surgeon’s duty is to ensure that the quality of
information and education s/he provides enhances rather than restricts patients’ choices. I term paternalism that
simultaneously enhances choices and autonomy as ‘liberal’.

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Against the Right to Know
It is commonly argued that consumers possess a “right to know” particular properties of products for sale (e.g. country of
origin, production labor practices, presence of genetically modified ingredients, etc.). The main argument for this “right to
know” is that it protects consumer autonomy. In this paper, I critically evaluate this argument by distinguishing between
several different interpretations of autonomy, and articulating the circumstances under which they would support mandatory
labeling of a property. I argue that the range of circumstances under which an appeal to consumer autonomy justifies
mandatory labeling is much more limited than proponents of the right to know assume.

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Not Fearing One’s Being Dead
Long ago, Epicurus urged us, on metaphysical grounds, not to feel fear about our own deaths. I supplement his thinking with
some epistemological grounds, also directed at defusing any such fear. The result is an Epicurean knowledge-fallibilist
picture, reflecting on the rationality – or otherwise – of fearing one’s demise.

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Reasonable Deliberative Justification: A re-casting of Rawlsian reasonableness as a virtue necessary for fair
deliberation.
John Rawls’ later works rely heavily on the notion of reasonableness to secure a justificatory consensus for the exercise of
political power. Rawls gives a loose definition of reasonableness in Political Liberalism that ultimately casts reasonableness
as a feature of acceptable public deliberation. I will argue that we are best served by casting reasonableness as a virtue that
we need to develop, rather than as a faculty that some citizens possess while others do not. This allows us to engage in a
process of becoming reasonable, rather than dividing citizens into those who possess this faculty and those that don’t. By
doing so, we can respond to three challenges facing Rawls’s account: firstly, that the reasonable can only operate in a society
that is already fundamentally just; secondly, that we can access a neutral “original position” from which to judge the
acceptability of propositions to all others; and thirdly, that partitioning public reasoning in this way serves to silence
‘dissenting’ citizens, both through exclusion and self-censorship. This allows us to maintain a robust, inclusive dialectical
process of justification, as opposed to a conception of reasonableness that partitions citizens into those who are reasonable
and those who are not.
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**To Elaborate Is No Avail: Agency & Narrative**

J. David Velleman’s *The Self as Narrator* (2005) argues that human agency is grounded in a capacity to tell stories about our desires and beliefs. Such story-telling is supposed to permit the identification and selection of behaviour which narratively coheres with our previously stated intentions and our broader sense of personal identity. The concept of narrative at play rests on the analysis advanced in *Narrative Explanation* (2003) by the same author. I demonstrate that this definition of narrative is incoherent as it relates to agency, and argue that story-telling about our choices is neither necessary nor sufficient for agential action. I also propose that narrative can directly impede human agency; the stories we tell about ourselves can disable as much as enable our capacity to decide and act.

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**Plato’s response in the Gorgias to his central question**

That central question, presented in the same four Greek words at Gorgias 500c and Republic 352d, and given special emphasis at both, is best translated “In what way should one live?”. The major questions, words, and answers (MQWA) of a Platonic dialogue need more attention than they have generally received. Here are eight other MQ in the Gorgias, some implicit and all related to the central one. (1) What is rhetoric as generally practised? (2) To what class of behaviour does it belong? (3) Don’t many so-called powerful people who can do what they like fail to bring about what they want? (4) On what criteria are we to decide whether someone is eudaimôn (count him or her happy)? (5) Is it better to suffer wrong than to do it? (6) Is it “the justice of nature” that the strong dominate the weak? (7) Does moderation (sôphrosunê) deserve scorn? (8) What are the features of the best and worst kinds of political leader? Other words deserving attention are ‘kolakeia’, ‘poiein’, ‘paideia’ and ‘aischron’, and eleven nouns at 508a!

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**Sex on the bench: biases in implantable device testing**

Bench testing standards for implanted medical devices play an important role in ensuring safety and effectiveness, particularly as new devices are often not subject to clinical trials prior to approval for use in patients. It is challenging to ensure that bench tests accurately reflect the real stresses and conditions a device will be subject to once it is implanted. For example, a recent study found that replacement hips are not bench-tested through the full range of movements associated with normal sexual positions for women. This prompts concern about whether gender differences are more systematically disregarded in the development of bench testing standards. There are three ways this might occur. (1) When those setting the standards assume that there are no gender differences relevant to the device in question. (2) When standards are based on mistaken assumptions about which patients will receive the device: for example, some disease conditions are strongly associated with a stereotypical disease population, as when osteoporosis is regarded as a disease of elderly women despite occurring in some men. (3) When those setting the standards make naïve assumptions about the everyday activities of recipients (e.g. that women do not play contact sports) and fail to anticipate likely stresses on the implanted device. In view of these risks, I argue for increased transparency in the development of bench testing standards, and for regulators to be more attentive to the risks that non-inclusive standards pose for women patients.

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**Basic Emotions and Beyond**

Comments on Talia Morag's Emotion, Imagination and the Limits of Reason.

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Memory and Narrativity
This presentation will offer compelling empirical and theoretical grounds for thinking that one familiar kind of memory autobiographical memory depends upon the mastery and exercise of narrative capacities. It is structured as follows: Section 1 contrasts features of utterly non-narrative forms of purely enactive and embodied remembering with that of the declarative variety required for autobiographical memory. Section 2 explicates the core tenets of the Social Interactionist Theory, SIT, of autobiographical memory, highlighting differences between possible weaker and stronger formulations and the roles that the mastery of narrative practices plays in both. Section 3 address a challenge to Strong SIT, exploring how it is possible to understand pure episodic remembering which apparently operates before and below the capacity to autobiographically narrate the past in a way that is compatible even with its strongest version. Section 4 concludes by considering arguments, motivated by empirical findings, which are compelling a rethink of what the primary function of autobiographical memory may be that speaks in favour of Strong SIT.

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The force of Nietzschean parody
Given its apparently scholarly form, the Genealogy of Morality is often read as a succinct, relatively systematic, and canonical exposition of Nietzsche’s mature views on morality. However, such readings are difficult to reconcile with Nietzsche’s views on the nature and value of truth, particularly the dramatic self-cancellation of the ascetic ideal he diagnoses. This paper examines how the work might instead be read as having the overarching aim of parodying a scholarly treatise. It first briefly surveys some evidence, in the context of Nietzsche’s work and the Genealogy itself, for attributing it this aim. By considering potential advantages and costs for Nietzsche’s philosophical project, its main task is to assess how the intended parody is best interpreted. Does this have the force of a strong parody that denies the possibility of truth-directed enquiry, or a weak parody denying the intrinsic value of truth-directed enquiry? Although a strong parody is likely to have seemed particularly attractive to Nietzsche’s anti-ascetic trajectory, I argue that the Genealogy is best read as a weak parody, because this maximizes its overall coherence while allowing it to be seen as exemplifying Nietzschean ‘Gay Science’, which – in supposed contrast to Wagner – aspires to combine cheerfulness with profundity.

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Moral Modal Realism
According to Lewisian modal realism, non-actual possible worlds are concrete worlds just like our own, home to persons who are no less real than ourselves. Although the modal realist is no stranger to philosophical challenges (incredulous stares and all), a particularly interesting objection to the position is that it is immoral. Some have moved to reject modal realism on account of its purportedly morally undesirable consequences. In this paper, I argue that the morally undesirable consequences of modal realism are poor grounds for rejection; if anything, it is our moral theories that need to give. Moreover, I consider a way in which our perspective on our moral duties might need to change in order to accommodate the supposition that there are other concrete worlds out there.

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Let’s Talk About Censorship
In this paper I argue that speech regulation should not be confused with censorship. Public discussion of speech regulation is frequently stymied by claims that speech regulation is censorship, even when the regulations in question do not appear to chill speech any more than existing regulations such as defamation laws. In advancing my argument, I defend the goods valued by free speech defences and propose that censorship, if it is to have conceptual value to free speech debates, ought to indicate a direct threat to those goods rather than merely indicating an impediment to saying anything we want, at any time, to anyone.
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Kierkegaard on Comparison, Selfhood and Moral Value
This paper inquires into the moral dimension of Kierkegaard’s notion of comparison, seeing it as harmful to human being and doing in the world. I show that “being like others” compromises the essence of true self, which Kierkegaard sees in being (and becoming) oneself. “Being like others” is essentially grounded in comparison as it entails looking for relative similarities and/or differences that qualify it. In that sense, comparison directs our attention, interest and agency towards pursuing being-like-someone, or alternatively, avoiding being-like-someone, distancing ourselves from that which should be of our actual interest, being-oneself. Following Kierkegaard’s reading of the problem in question, comparison is not a value-neutral notion, but a negative phenomenon that impinges upon authenticity and completeness of the self.

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Following Quus
There has been a great deal of discussion about the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox. In this paper, I focus on one of the most typical responses, that is, the dispositional response. As is well known, one of the most serious problems is how to distinguish having the disposition to conform to a rule and following a rule. Recently, Millikan (1990) and Schlosser (2011) present a modified version of the dispositional response. The aim of this paper is to show that both of them fail to solve the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox. I point out that both responses are similar in two respects and they face two problems which stem from the two similarities. Finally, I end by giving a diagnosis of why they fail to solve the Kripke-Wittgenstein paradox.

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Beyond information vs influence: A multi-dimensional account of communication
Some argue that the nature of animal communication can be captured by the idea that signals carry information. Others argue that an informational approach fails to address animal communication on its own terms; that we should understand communication in purely functional terms. Others propose a hybrid information-mediated functional definition: communication is information-mediated influence of receivers by senders. I take a different approach and present a multi-dimensional account of communication, which I think captures the space of variation inherent in communication that other accounts miss. I argue that communication can vary in important ways across three dimensions: (1) sender-receiver functional interdependence, (2) arbitrariness of signal form, and (3) whether communication coordinates acts with states or acts with acts.

Presidential Address  
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Mind the Gap: social sentiments, psychopathology, and moral obligation
Accounts of morality that are founded in an examination of our social practices and affective responsiveness to others within a participant stance have a number of apparent advantages over more rationalist alternatives. However, as some of their exponents acknowledge, they face a problem of partiality and it is not clear to me that they have the internal resources to overcome it. Drawing upon evidence from psychopathology I argue that conscientious moral agents need not be particularly adept social agents. But they do need to be susceptible to Kantian forms of moral feeling – feelings which I claim are partly constitutive of rational agency and underwrite moral commitment and obligation.

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Why Intuitions About Disagreement Support the Normativity of Meaning
Derek Baker (2016) argues that a semantic analog of Hare's 'missionary' thought experiment cannot yield intuitions that support the normativity of meaning. According to Baker, we simply do not have analogous intuitions in the meaning case. As such, we cannot plausibly view 'means' as having the same normative status as 'good'. I reply to Baker's argument in two stages. First, I argue that Baker's scenario is not a suitable analog of Hare's thought experiment. The main reason for this is that Baker mislocates the relevant disagreement. If we remedy this issue, the scenario does yield evidence for the normativity of meaning. I develop my own thought experiment to show this. Second, I object to Baker's focus on the explanatory constraint on any account of meaning. I argue that this is a red herring on Baker's part. The real issue, as my amended scenario shows, has to do with another constraint on any account of meaning—the requirement that any such account must leave room for the distinction between what seems right and what is right when ascribing meaning to a speaker and her utterances.

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Collaborative Philosophical Inquiry as an effective model for Peace Education
The aim of this paper is to show how collaborative philosophical inquiry (CPI) can improve the quality of everyday relationships, argue that CPI can be considered as an effective model for peace education. Existing peace education and conflict resolution models generally appeal to a negative notion of peace, i.e., the absence of conflict, rather than a positive one, i.e., the capacity to respond to conflict as a way of promoting growth. They lack a rich philosophical foundation that prepares children to turn conflict into inquiry; appealing instead to models of values education or character education that instill values of fraternity and non-violence. The philosophical foundation for CPI as a peace education model derives from pragmatist epistemology and social theory which appreciates the dynamism of conflicts. CPI affords children the opportunity to deal with real disagreement in practice and to learn how diversity and differing opinions enrich their inquiry and can result in more reliable judgments. I propose a peace education model that draws on philosophy, psychology and sociology, which will provide a framework for a study in a Brisbane primary school.

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Girls and Philosophy for Children: Ensuring Gender Equity in a Philosophical Community of Inquiry
This paper analyses some of the ways in which girls may be disadvantaged in the classroom during Philosophy for Children programs. Gender equity in the classroom is an important consideration in education and teachers should be aware of gender differences in learning needs. These gender differences have significant impact on Philosophy for Children programs. The standard mode of conducting Philosophy for Children sessions provides more access for boys to participate and engage in sessions due to Philosophy for Children programs often naturally suiting boys' learning styles. This creates inequitable classrooms where boys and advantaged and girls are disadvantaged during Philosophy for Children sessions. This paper will analyse some of the ways that girls are disadvantaged through standard Philosophy for Children practices, and look at some ways in which this disadvantage can be mitigated in order to ensure gender equitable classrooms for all.

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Dignity, Respect, and Public Discourse
In this paper I explore a challenge for public discourse under conditions of pluralism. The paper will proceed in three parts. First, I'll sketch a theory of dignity, on which to be dignified is to uphold a certain kind of normative standard. Second, I'll consider the connection between dignity and respect, with particular attention paid to the kind of respect we owe one another when engaging in public discourse, in light of our dignity. Finally, I'll show that under certain conditions it will prove impossible to respect all participants to public discourse, and offer a tentative response to such conflicts.

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Response to Yablo's “If-Thenism”

aap.org.au/Conference
This paper is one of five short commentaries on Stephen Yablo’s paper “If-Thenism.” The paper will be part of the Yablo stream.

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Narrative autonomy in health care

Autonomy in health care finds its application most explicitly in the setting of consent. Consent legislation and thought about adequate levels of autonomy for consent is usually based on considerations concerning current health events. Yet, over the last decades health care policy has put increasing emphasis on notions of autonomous care planning for distant future events. This is referred to as advance care planning. Advance care planning faces metaphysical problems which can undermine the authority of the person who provides the instructions for their distant future care. These problems originate from a conceptual framework which must incorporate an idea of personal identity. My paper explores how an idea of narrative autonomy can address these metaphysical worries and thus establish a better conceptual foundation for advance care planning. It also looks at how the idea of narrative autonomy relates to current legal standards of competence for decision making. As these standards are based on contemporary decision making, they are unprepared for the relevant metaphysical worries. I will then conclude that despite its theoretical attractiveness, narrative autonomy is unlikely to find effective application in health care, because of practical constraints and issues with dual standards.

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A New Argument From an Old Enemy (Of Scientific Realism)

Recently, literature has been published advocating removing the condition that a scientific explanation must be true or approximately true. Insofar as scientific theories are used to explain, false theories such as Ptolemaic Astronomy could potentially enjoy the status of a genuine explanation of why the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. Removing the requirement of truth from a theory is a strategy employed by the instrumentalist; the old enemy of the scientific realist. I argue that removing truth from an explanation likewise commits one to instrumentalism. Insofar as instrumentalism is an undesirable position, it will be shown that the minimum requirement for a scientific explanation must be truth or approximate truth.

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Divine Providence and Unrestricted Actualization

Michael Almeida has recently made interesting and highly ingenious contributions to philosophy of religion. Some of them have involved his novel claim (Freedom, God and Worlds, OUP 2012) that necessarily, God can ‘unrestrictedly actualize’ various states of affairs, actions, events, and possible worlds. This paper introduces the core idea, draws attention to its bearing on some current issues, and explains why I think it does not work.

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Population-Level <Free Will>, Individual-Level <Free Will>

It has been suggested that the folk concept of free will may take a conditional form. That is, if the world contains indeterministic states of the appropriate sort, then our free will concept picks out those states. However, if the world is merely deterministic, then free will simply picks out the deterministic states that answer to our free will concept. In this talk, I want to do two things. First, I will describe a set of data that reveals that while the conditional form of the concept may be true of the population taken as a whole, no one individual actually possesses the conditional form of the concept. Second, I will to sketch three possible stories about the relationship between the concept at the individual and population level. These are: one, the population-level concept is merely epiphenomenal, two, the population-level concept is an epistemic guide for how people would respond should the world turn out to be different than they had supposed, and finally, the population-level concept is a distinct concept that population members can show deference to. Whilst current data gives us good reason to believe that the
A population-level concept is not merely epiphenomenal, the other two options remain available. I will finish by proposing some possible means of adjudicating between these options going forward.

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**What the Glut? Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Explaining the Many**

Indeterminacy is indefiniteness as to whether or not something is the case. Examples include the boundaries of objects like mountains and cats, and the possibility that the future is open in a way where future events are not yet settled one way or another. Metaphysical indeterminacy takes the source of this indeterminacy to come from the world itself, rather than from imprecision in our language, or from our inability to know or have epistemic access to a metaphysically precise state of affairs. "Glutty" cases of metaphysical indeterminacy arise when there are too many admissible candidates to determine whether or not something is the case, such as the case where there are many admissible candidates for determining the exact boundary of Mt Kilimanjaro. After discussion of contemporary diagnoses of the phenomenon, I will spell out how glutty instances of metaphysical indeterminacy arise, and how we can account for them in our ontology. This will address challenges that contemporary accounts of metaphysical indeterminacy face, whilst helping to identify ways to resolve them.

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**Labour, Money and Need: Marx’s Ethical Critique of James Mill**

Marx’s notes on James Mill reflect his rapidly developing thought. Where his 1843 critiques of Hegel show him grappling with the State, the 1844 Manuscripts contain Marx’s famous discussion of alienation. This paper will focus on the significance, however, of his 'Comments on James Mill' written between both these texts. 'Comments on James Mill' has been a neglected text in Marx scholarship, yet it shows a critical path of departure. This text presents some of Marx’s earliest engagement with political economy and gives insight into the nature of Marx’s nascent form of critique. Through a discussion of money and credit, ‘Comments on James Mill’ presents the limitations of Classical Political Economy in understanding the underlying essence of modern economic forms. Marx argues that Classical Political Economy naturalises value in only its fetishised form, that is as exchange value. Marx attributes this view to the standpoint of Political Economy, which he contrasts to the standpoint of labour. Here Marx outlines the architecture of his theory of alienation and outlines how this is mystified in the work of Classical Political Economy. This paper traces how, in this critique, he provides a social ontology that has its roots in human need and the nature of collective productive activity.

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**The Deep Structure of Experience**

When we think about the structure of the physical world, we take the wide variety of macrophysical properties we can perceptually discern to be ultimately grounded in a small collection of microphysical properties we cannot perceptually discern. In other words, we ascribe to the physical world a deep structure. For the most part, theorists have assumed that we cannot ascribe a similar kind of structure to experience, where the wide variety of macrophenomenal properties that we can introspectively discern are ultimately grounded in a small collection of microphenomenal properties we cannot introspectively discern. In other words, theorists have assumed that a deep theory of the structure of experience is untenable. The main challenges to the deep theory are the introspectibility problem—the problem of making sense of phenomenal properties that are not introspectively discernible—and the palette problem—the problem of generating qualitative diversity from qualitative sparseness. This paper characterizes the deep theory, addresses the major challenges for the view, and illustrates why the deep theory is an attractive picture of experience.

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**A Properly Pragmatist Pragmatics**
This paper takes indexicality as a case-study for critical examination of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics in current mainstream philosophy of language. Both a ‘pre-indexical’ and ‘post-indexical’ analytic formal semantics are examined and found wanting, and instead an argument is mounted for a ‘properly pragmatist pragmatics’, according to which we do not work out what signs mean in some abstract overall sense and then work out to what use they are being put; rather, we must understand to what use signs are being put in order to work out what they mean. This move is highly congenial to recent Brandonian explorations of the pragmatic topography of the space of reasons (e.g. Kukla and Lance, 2009), to which comparisons and contrasts will be made.

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Incorporating Women Philosophers’ Thoughts and Ideas in the School Curricula via Anthropological and Bioethical Aspects in the Philosophy of Hildegard of Bingen.
In the last decades there has been a growing interest worldwide not only to incorporate intercultural philosophical topics but also women philosophers’ thought and ideas in the school curricula. The demand, however, is not met by the few publications available that actually address and cover this subject. Even though the effort to include women philosopher’s works into the school syllabi has been improved in recent years, it is crucial to further improve. Precisely because the mediation of the often neglected, but essential philosophical issues of women philosophers helps to promote a correct and holistic picture of the world when established into the curricula at schools. In this sense, this paper aims at contributing to the integration of women philosophers’ thoughts and ideas in the school curricula by outlining how anthropological and bioethical aspects can be taught via texts of Hildegard of Bingen.

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Science gone wild: explaining irrational beliefs.
There is robust scientific consensus concerning climate change, evolution and the safety and efficacy of vaccines. But many people reject these consensus views, in favour of beliefs that are strongly at variance with the evidence. It is tempting to try to explain these anti-consensus beliefs by reference to ignorance or irrationality, but those who reject the consensus seem to be no worse informed or any less rational than those people outside the relevant scientific community who accept it. I argue that overconfidence in the power of individual reasoning plays an essential role in explaining these beliefs. However, while there is extensive evidence for such overconfidence it is itself mysterious, given that there are good reasons to think that our epistemic success is owed very significantly to collective deliberation. I argue that epistemic individualism is actually an adaptation for collective deliberation, explaining the apparent paradox. In fact, a more complete explanation of anti-consensus beliefs requires us to cite mechanisms of social dissemination. Ordinary people embrace these views due to local deference to genuinely more knowledgeable, but extremely overconfident, individuals they trust.

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Responsiveness to Reasons and Actual Sequence Views of Responsibility
A number of philosophers follow Harry Frankfurt in contending that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise; that it is a matter of the actual sequence of events. A number of philosophers also think that responsibility requires control, where control is understood as responsiveness to reasons. Can one hold both views together? The most influential positive answer to this question, provided by John Martin Fischer, faces serious issues (despite its influence) due to its focus on mechanisms rather than agents as having the property of responsiveness. This talk considers a couple of recent attempts to reconcile the two theses that attempt to avoid a mechanism-based approach.

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The hard, the easy and the efficacious.
There is a widespread view in the philosophy of mind that treats the hard problem of consciousness and the easy problems of consciousness as independent from each other. For instance, one can be a physicalist of verbal report without being a physicalist of the experience of verbally reporting. In this paper, I argue against this independent treatment of the problems of consciousness.

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**Some features that make a discourse more objective**  
The question of what features make a discourse more or less objective could be essential to many meta-discourses, such as meta-ethics, meta-ontology, and so on. In this paper, I consider some features that, if all other things are equal, exhibiting one of those features will make a discourse more objective than otherwise. Features that are considered are chosen from Crispin Wright’s marks of realism in ‘Truth and Objectivity’, including Cognitive Command, Euthyphro Contrast, Explanatory Depth and Wide Cosmological Role. I discuss some merits and difficulties of each feature, and propose some re-characterisations accordingly. The conclusion I reach is that it is possible to have a comprehensive account of the objectivity of discourses. Independence, Convergence and Data Sensitivity are some of the plausible features of that account.

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**From Revolutionary Moral Fictionalism to Revolutionary Moral Realism**  
According to revolutionary moral fictionalism, moral discourse massively misrepresents the world. But even so, speakers can use moral discourse in a way that motivates prudentially beneficial behaviors. This, however, would involve a “revolutionary” change in the way moral discourse has traditionally been used. I shall suggest that arguments for revolutionary moral fictionalism can be modified to support a novel form of moral realism—a revolutionary moral realism. Revolutionary moral realism holds that, currently, moral discourse fails to accurately ascribe objective moral properties to things. However, through discursive activism on the part of speakers, moral propositions can be made to accurately ascribe objective moral properties. Moral predicates could be made to have objective referents, if speakers began using moral predicates to refer strictly to objective properties—for example, if the predicate “wrong” was used to refer to the property of causing avoidable suffering. Like revolutionary moral fictionalists, revolutionary moral realists hold that moral discourse could be used to motivate beneficial behaviors. Revolutionary realism, however, enjoys two advantages over its fictionalist counterpart: first, it would not call for the epistemically suspect practice of employing a discourse one knows to be false, and second, it can strengthen people’s motivations to be moral.

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**What is Psychedelic Experience?**  
Recently, there has been an explosion of scientific research into the effects of psychedelic substances. Initial results indicate that psychedelic experiences can treat psychological problems such as depression, PTSD, and drug addiction. Initial results also seem to be shedding new light on the structure of the mind and the functional structure of the brain. For example, a common phenomenological component of psychedelic experience is the dissolution of the ego, and recent research suggests that this correlates with a reduction in the orthogonality of the default mode network and the task positive networks. The concept of psychedelic experience has thus now made its way out from the wild 60’s counterculture and into serious contemporary scientific research. This research is also leading to the development of new theories. For example, it has lead some researchers to develop the theory that different conscious states correspond to brain states with different levels of entropy and that psychedelic experiences correspond to brain states with higher-than-usual entropy. Like any concept that has recently transitioned from folk theorising to scientific theorising, the concept of psychedelic experience needs to be examined carefully. In this talk, I’ll do this by raising the question “what is psychedelic experience?” and developing an answer to it.

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Modern Crisis of Chinese Traditional Philosophy, behind Economic Development In the New Era
From late eighties in the 20th century till now, along with the economic policy changes, the productivity has been emancipated and the economy has been developed by leaps and bounds in China. The standard of living is also improving. However, the traditional thought and perceptions are facing great challenges. As a consequence, the crisis of the traditional philosophy occurs. Firstly the change of the mode of production, leads to ideology change, including the traditional Confucian culture and Marxism. There is too much emphasis on money worship, utilitarianism and hedonism in our society. The spirit of the benevolent to love people and to serve people has been spumed. This is the source of social and political corruption. Secondly, the change of lifestyle leads to lose connection of the family. The perception of Worship of Heaven, the Ancestor and Saint is fading gradually. Inherent ethics order falls apart. Lie in the following three aspects: The ultimate level - holy profaned; Rational level - mind or soul confused; Ethical level - moral missing or distorted.

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Response to Emotion, Imagination and the Limits of Reason
Response to Talia Morag's Emotion, Imagination and the Limits of Reason.

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Human obsolescence: Why strong AI is not the problem
Much philosophical effort has focused on understanding strong AI — what it would be like for a machine to have a mental life just like us. Some philosophical work and a great deal of discussion elsewhere has focused on the more speculative project of understanding the likelihood and possible consequences of machines becoming much smarter than humans. This phenomenon is variously known as Super-intelligence, The Singularity or the Intelligence Explosion. I argue that The Singularity and its variants are based on faulty assumptions about the nature of intelligence and that philosophy should instead focus on characterising the nature, risks, and benefits of the rapid growth of weak AI which we are already experiencing.

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Aversion, Avoidance, and the Allais Paradox
It is difficult to formulate a reasonable precautionary principle in response to risk or uncertainty. This problem leads some philosophers, like John Broome, to recommend using expected value theory to express different rational attitudes toward risk. It is also difficult for expected value theory to solve the Allais paradox in ways that are intuitively appealing. In this paper I will describe three different responses to Allais that express different kinds of attitudes toward risk. One response is to order one’s preferences in a way that avoids the paradoxes, because rationality requires this kind of coherence. A second response is to redescribe the problem in a way that includes feelings of regret in addition to the monetary outcomes. This response avoids the paradox, but at the cost of either denying the intuitive appeal of the paradoxical responses or trivializing expected value theory by making it empty. A third response is to appeal to a precautionary principle — I will call it a principle of risk avoidance — that is intuitively appealing but incompatible with expected value theory. I will discuss the pros and cons of each of these responses.

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On Justifications and Excuses
Does whether or not a perceptual belief is justified depend on whether the belief is true, or reliably produced, or if the perceptual experience the belief is based on is veridical? Many will contend that it does not: one enjoys sameness of justification in either case, which in turn implies that epistemic justification solely depends on how things seem from the
first-person perspective. Opponents of such views in epistemology deny sameness of justification in good and bad cases. Since this conflicts with the intuitive judgment that justification is immune to such external differences, error theories have been provided for why we judge that justification is present, if it is not. In this paper I shall critically examine a new family of error theory according to which in a bad case a subject is merely excusable: while the subject has a good excuse for believing as they do, they nonetheless lack epistemic justification. Does this excuse manoeuvre provide an adequate error theory that explains allegedly false judgments of justifiedness in New Evil Demon cases? Clarifying how best to think about these cases has important implications for theorizing about the nature and value of epistemic justification, rationality, and reasons.

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Emotions in the Bhagavad-Gita
My paper aims to carry forward the cross-cultural dimension in the philosophy of emotion especially in relation to the Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gita or the Gita. Both Bilimoria & Johnson contend that the Gita offers a view “regarding the regulation of emotions and appropriate role of emotions in moral reasoning.” They also argue that the Gita provides us with a social construction view of emotions where the moral import of a dilemma or a counsel is contextualized in terms of the emotions appropriate to the specifics of one’s personal and cultural settings. My paper explores the relationship between emotions and morality in the Gita from a different direction. By focusing on a concept central to the Gita’s morality, namely, equanimity (samatvam), I consider its conceivability as an emotion. Equanimity, in its cognitive dimension involves mastering one’s mind and senses. A typical interpretation is that emotions play no role in this process. However, the Gita also depicts the yogi as marked by positive emotions like compassion, love and joy. The main goal of my paper is to develop a theory of emotions in the Gita especially by considering whether equanimity can be viewed as primarily a result of social construction.

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Reflecting on Global Development
One hundred and twenty million dollars was invested in the Millennium Villages Project, a project aimed to ameliorate the living conditions of villages in 10 countries in sub-saharan Africa. Based on a traditional development model channelling funds via a very top-down approach, it was held up as a model of how to end poverty. It did improve the lives of some people, for a short time. However, it also fostered aid dependency, disempowerment, and disillusionment. Within development organizations, there is a need to generate a space for critical reflection and dialogue about the values and beliefs that influence decisions. This dialogue can support identification of potentially damaging differences and enhance communication by enabling colleagues to see the development landscape through each other’s eyes. The Toolbox Project (http://toolbox-project.org) offers an innovative, concrete, and tangible approach to critical dialogue that can help in two ways. First, it can generate a space for critical dialogue within development organizations; second, it can enable discussion and analysis of specific concerns that afflict development organizations, such as conflicting assumptions, power dynamics, implicit biases, ethical issues, and epistemic injustice.

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Wo/man as Amorphous: Philosophising the Aswang in Filipino Culture as Embodiment of Evil
Both mythology and philosophy go back a long way as each independently of the other had served as vehicles in articulating important human concerns, as ancient peoples searched for answers to basic fundamental questions such as, who am I? Where did the world come from? How do we value good versus evil? This paper is an attempt to grapple with basic philosophical concepts of humanity, our relation to the world, and the balance between good and evil engaged in the Filipino context, particularly in discussing the ontology and fictive embodiment of the Aswang. The usual places to find information about this being would be via folklore, lower mythology, film, and more recently graphic novels. The author would be interrogating the controversial status of the Aswang as both amorphous and evil ontologically, and yet narratively and visually represented in various contradictory guises such as: (wo)man, monster, supernatural. Using gender politics in analysing this being, the author claims that the concept of evil assigned to the Aswang is rooted on the ascribed gender of the Aswang, hence the (en)gendered evil of the Aswang as the shape-shifting deceiver.
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Modelling communication and common interest
Biological communication is increasingly studied with the tools of game theory. As a method of representing strategic interaction, this branch of mathematics derives results from heavily idealised scenarios. In particular, recent approaches to the analysis of common interest require assumptions that trade realism for tractability. We discuss prospects for the game theoretic approach to biological communication, particularly the relation between common interest and informative signalling. Such a link is intuitive and reasonable, and motivates much ethological discussion. We argue that the validity of the intuition for models points to important ways of refining our interpretation of those models. Altogether the account provides justification for the game-theoretic approach to communication.

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Naturalizing Intuitions: Is experimental philosophy really a threat to arm-chair conceptual analysis?
Recently, experimental philosophers have shown that the intuitions of people are susceptible to deviate from the intuitions of professional philosophers. One explanation for this variance has been attributed to cross-cultural differences. In this paper, I argue that contemporary Experimental Philosophy can be conceptualised as having two distinct approaches: i) Ethno scientific approach (ES): experimental philosophy pursues an ethno scientific descriptive account of folk intuitions. It then follows that it makes use of arm-chair style theorising, i.e. survey studies are conducted of folk-intuitions by the aid of conceptual analysis.

ii) Cognitive scientific approach (CS): experimental philosophy pursues a causal and reductive explanatory account of folk intuitions. It does not make use of arm-chair style theorising, i.e. studies have no theoretical reliance on conceptual analysis and uses the methodology consistent with the psychological and cognitive sciences.

With these distinctions in mind, I show that the CS approach lies in opposition to some of the most basic assumptions about philosophical intuitions, and recapitulates debates in naturalised epistemology. Conversely, the ES approach is the only program that offers a feasible synthesis between conceptual analysis and experimental philosophy.

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How to argue for and against abstracta
Realism about abstracta is the view that there are abstract objects, such as properties, sets and numbers, whereas nominalism is the view that there are no abstract objects. The most powerful argument for realism about abstracta is arguably an abductive argument along the lines of (P1-2)(C).

(P1) The best total theory with respect to our evidence entails that there are abstract objects

(P2) If the best total theory with respect to our evidence entails that there are abstract objects then we are justified in believing that there are abstract objects

(C) We are justified in believing that there are abstract objects

(P1-2)(C) faces the following problem: There are good reasons to think that the argument is only credible if theories are understood to be abstract objects, such as sentence types or propositions. If theories are abstract objects, however, then the argument will be ineffectual against nominalists, since nominalists will reject (P1). This paper argues that (P1-2)(C) can be modified so that it avoids this problem. It also does the same for the related abductive argument for nominalism, which is obtained from (P1-2)(C) by replacing ‘there are abstract objects’ with ‘there are no abstract objects’.

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Degrees of Causation
In this paper I consider a new way of calculating causal contributions, and discuss its suitability for application to debates about individual and collective responsibility.

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Saying ‘no’ to heroin
Very severely addicted persons have significantly reduced autonomy. This has implications for their decision-making in the context of compulsory treatment and in the quite separate context where addicts have been offered prescribed heroin as part of a clinical trial. In both contexts a question is raised concerning whether these individuals are in a condition to be able to provide consent. If compulsory treatment is permitted, they are deemed to be in a condition in which they are morally unable to give consent. However, this raises a puzzle, because there is an argument for thinking that this same group (‘same’ in terms of severity of addiction) can consent to a maintenance dose of heroin on prescription, as has occurred in heroin trials. How can we explain the different ways in which compromised agency is understood in these different contexts? The paper will answer this by reference to the distinction between decisional autonomy and executive autonomy.

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From Unreasonable Metaphor to Formal Analogy in the Philosophy of Engineering
This seminar will look at the role of metaphor in the Philosophy of Engineering. Drawing from Aristotle and Leibniz I will argue for a view of metaphysics as a process for transforming unreasonable or even incredulous metaphors into formal analogies consequently adopted in engineering practice.

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Consistency Worries for Time Discounting
Time discounting and Prioritarianism are both plausible components of a consequentialist theory. However I will argue that combining these features can lead to problematic results. Prioritarianism is the view that a fixed improvement in someone’s well-being matters more the worse off they are. Time discounting represents the view that an event’s moral significance depends on when that event occurs. Typically, this involves ascribing less importance to events in the distant past and future than to events that occur near to the present. I demonstrate that, if a consequentialist theory incorporates both time discounting and Prioritarianism, it can lead to problematic inconsistencies in evaluation. In particular, this combination leads to a ‘money pump’, whereby the theory endorses a series of decisions that are ultimately disadvantageous by the theory’s own lights. I argue that, not just Prioritarianism, but any value that has certain general features, risks generating a money pump if it is paired with time discounting.

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The Puzzle of the Conflicted Carnivore
Many people, including many philosophers, think eating meat is morally bad. Many of these same people, however, also regularly eat meat. This presents an interesting puzzle: why do these conflicted carnivores continue to eat meat, even though they believe it is immoral? This is especially puzzling if we accept moral internalism - the thesis that moral judgement and moral motives are necessarily linked. There are three possible answers to this puzzle: 1) conflicted carnivores may judge the suffering involved in meat production to be bad, without thereby judging meat eating to be wrong; 2) conflicted carnivores may judge meat consumption to be wrong without this judgement having any necessary motivating force; or 3) conflicted carnivores may judge their meat consumption to be wrong and be thereby motivated to abstain from meat, while simultaneously being motivated by stronger, non-moral, considerations in favour of eating meat. All these possibilities lead to interesting problems with substantial implications for moral theory generally. In this paper, I will present the puzzle of the conflicted carnivore, and briefly explore the implications each of these hypotheses has for ethical arguments for vegetarianism.
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**Reactive attitudes, relationships, and addiction**
People suffering from addiction tend to act in ways that severely disrupt their close personal relationships. Yet they depend on those relationships in order to recover – both to scaffold non-drug using social environments and to develop a self-concept that involves more than being an addict. We provide an analysis of the ways in which addiction disrupts relations of love and friendship and argue that the Strawsonian reactive attitudes support a dichotomy that is unhelpful in this context. If others take the participant stance towards the addicted person, they hold him responsible for his actions and resent him. If they take the objective stance towards him, they don’t resent him but they treat him as something to be managed. Neither attitude is consistent with the kind of personal interactions that the addicted person needs to recover. We suggest that this dichotomy can be resolved by loosening the conceptual connection between the participant stance and responsibility.

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**Wigner’s Puzzle and the Pythagorean Heuristic**
It is argued that mathematics is unreasonably effective in fundamental physics; that this is genuinely mysterious; and that it is best explained by a version of Pythagorean metaphysics. It is shown how this can be reconciled with the fact that mathematics is not always effective in real world applications. The thesis is that physical structure approaches isomorphism with a highly symmetric mathematical structure at very high energy levels, such as would have existed in the early universe. As the universe cooled, its underlying symmetry was broken in a sequence of stages. At each stage, more forces and particles were differentiated, leading to the complexity of the observed world. Remnant structure makes mathematics effective in some real world applications, but not all.

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**Embedded Moral Agency and the Promise of Moral Technology**
Findings from moral and social psychology place considerable pressure on an isolationist view about moral agency, i.e. a view that prides the individual as the keeper of their capacities relevant to their being a moral agent. Against views of this sort, I will propose that we ought to consider moral agency as embedded, that is, considerably (but not solely) dependent on features or entities external to the individual. By thinking about moral agency in this way, we are better equipped to focus our attention on the fragility of our moral capacities and how we can improve them. I will then argue that we should look to offload some of our moral agency in order to better accommodate moral development. I will claim that this offloading can be picked up by what has recently come to be known as moral technology: social tools that we can utilise to the end of becoming better moral citizens.

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**Property from Honour and Reputation**
Honour and reputation are important components of social life – but what property rights, if any, should they provide? Philosophically, labour is usually taken to be the basis of property, yet provisions at law do supply a number of property rights on the basis of honour and reputation. This paper considers the merit of an honour-and-reputation approach to property rights, contrasting it with both traditional (i.e. labour) and alternative contemporary approaches. Alternative contemporary approaches to property make appeal to comparable interpersonal concepts, such as expression or communication.
Materialists' Need Not Explain What it's Like
Here are two questions we can ask about a potentially conscious system:
1. Does it have experiences?
2. If it does have experiences, what are they like?
These two questions mark a distinction between two hard problems of consciousness. Conclusively answering the first of these questions requires uncovering the underlying basis (material or otherwise) of experience in general. It requires discovering the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of experience. Conclusively answering the second requires not just uncovering the basis of experience, but in addition explaining why particular experiences have the particular qualitative character that they do.
While this distinction exists in the literature its implications have been overlooked. It is common for these two questions to be conflated into a single hard problem for materialism (the metaphysical thesis that only the fundamental properties of physics are instantiated in a basic way). I argue that answering the first of these questions is sufficient to conclusively vindicate materialism. Despite not knowing what red looks like, Mary (Jackson's colour deprived neuroscientist), can still be a materialist.

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The Plasticity of The Modern Mind
Modern human minds are peculiar. One of the reasons for this is that they exhibit profound and pervasive plasticity, or flexibility. How did they become like this? I'll pursue the question by evaluating three convergent routes to plasticity: The first is the cultural intelligence hypothesis - that social learning is an adaptation in modern humans - the second is that neural plasticity is driven by social learning - and the third is that humans innovated specialised niches for different cognitive needs.

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The FWT time-bomb
Conway and Kochen's (2006) Free Will Theorem (FWT) states that provided the SPIN, TWIN and FIN axioms are accepted, it must also be accepted that quantum particles have the same free will as experimenters. Tumulka (2007), (2009), Gisin (2010), Bassi and Ghirardi (2007) have all presented arguments against the free will theorem. Both Tumulka (2007) and Bassi and Ghirardi (2007) argued against the FIN axiom and FWT's assumption of causality. Conway and Kochen (2009) revised the FIN axiom to the weaker MIN axiom and this has motivated research towards the strengthening of the FWT. For example Suarez (2010) has presented an argument for a generalised FWT which attributes Conway and Kochen's free will of the particles to beings existing outside space-time called 'Johnbells'. Uijlen and Westerbaan (2016) claim to have shown that the Kochen-Specker System can be improved from the FWT's 33 vectors to at least 22 vectors. I argue that the FWT's basic conclusion is under threat due to an implicit metaphysical difference between the experimenters' and the particles' (and/or Johnbells') Free Will.

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Leibniz and the Limitations of Aristotle's formal system of logic
I shall briefly some of the limitations of the remarkable logical system Aristotle developed. These limitations have been philosophically important and have shaped various philosophical and scientific developments in the 2,300 years since Aristotle. In fact various important innovations in philosophy can be seen as responses to the constraints Aristotle's logic placed on the very possibility of certain sorts of judgment. Moreover Aristotle's logic fitted his metaphysics of substance very intimately and drew mutual support from it. Leibniz is an example of an influential philosopher whose philosophical system was shaped by the limitations of Aristotle's system. I shall spell out just how important those limitations are to shaping Leibniz's conception of metaphysics and his attempt to bring his metaphysics into conciliation with the manifest world.

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**A Response to a Concern Regarding Immediacy in Richard Moran’s Theory of Self-knowledge.**

In the study of self-knowledge, it is generally accepted that there are three features of the knowledge of our own mental states that strikingly differ from our knowledge of the world, and the mental states of others. First, is that knowledge of our own thoughts is immediate. Second, is that we have a form of authority over those states that we do not possess in relation to the states of others. Third, it therefore seems that we utilise a special method to achieve knowledge of our own mental states. In this paper, I aim to provide a response to one particularly damaging criticism of Richard Moran’s commitment theory of self-knowledge. In doing so, I move in three broad strokes. First, I briefly cover Richard Moran’s attempt to explain self-knowledge, and the features above mentioned. On Moran’s account, the Transparency Condition can be understood as the method utilised to achieve immediate, authoritative, and exclusively first-personal self-knowledge. Second, I will present a criticism of Moran’s account of the Transparency Condition, from Cassam (2010), to the effect that this method is unable to produce immediate, and therefore first-personal, knowledge. Third, I will sketch a response to this criticism, which will allow us to overcome it, if we are prepared to deviate somewhat from Moran’s original account.

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**Character at the End of Life: Why Australia is Shooting Itself in the Foot**

There is currently enormous disparity between what Australia’s legal framework permits and what the Medical Board of Australia’s code of conduct encourages with respect to euthanasia. My paper examines the character-based ethic advanced by the MBA’s code. Through three case studies, I come to the conclusion that such an ethic in medicine supports providing euthanasia, but that Australia’s current legislative framework places practitioners, patients and the general public, at an impossible ethical impasse.

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**Author Meets Critics**

In this session, Paul Griffiths, Daniel Hutto, and Catriona Mackenzie will discuss the book: Emotion, Imagination, and the Limits of Reason (Routledge, June 2016) by Talia Morag, who will then reply. This is a book in philosophical (including moral) psychology that inquires into the nature of emotion, their formation and subsidence, and their relation to practical reason. The book criticizes contemporary philosophical views of emotion and proposes a new account, based on key insights of psychoanalysis, that relies on imaginative and distinctively non-rational capacities of the mind. For further information about the book, see https://www.routledge.com/Emotion-Imagination-and-the-Limits-of-Reason/Morag/p/book/9781138656949

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**Navigating the social world: Socio-cognitive flexibility**

Standard folk psychology maintains that mental state attribution (i.e. mindreading) is fundamental for social understanding, enabling us to explain and predict the behaviours of others. However, mindreading has recently been criticized for being insufficient and unaccountable for the rich and diverse ways humans understand each other. In this paper I argue against the standard view and suggest that what is central to human social cognition is flexibility: the ability to understand others through different ways, involving a number of epistemic strategies and practices. Such flexibility has been crucial in light of the increasing complexity and variability that marked ancestral environments. By adopting a cultural inheritance and niche construction account of human evolution, I will show how socio-cognitive flexibility can be evolutionarily justified.

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[n] infants, [n] votes
The inclusive presumption suggests that we should only disenfranchise those whose inclusion will undermine democratic values. Most people think we ought not to enfranchise infants. What harm would enfranchised infants do to our democratic institutions? At worst, they would systematically vote badly, choosing the worst of the available options. More plausibly, they would (mostly) fail to cast valid votes, and those who did successfully cast ballots would select randomly among the available options (as do some enfranchised adults). Neither of these possibilities provides good reason to disenfranchise them. I argue that in a well-constructed democratic system, the inclusion of infants (and all other currently disenfranchised citizens) will on balance be positive. To the extent that in extant democratic systems, enfranchising infants will do harm, that is an issue not with the infants, but with the system, and ought to be addressed from that side.

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Evidence
The Uniqueness thesis holds that one’s evidence uniquely determines what is rational for one to believe. As a thesis about the relationship between evidence and rational belief, Interpersonal Uniqueness requires that evidence satisfy both an accessibility condition and publicity condition. I will argue that evidential externalism can satisfy a publicity condition but that failing to show how one can have unproblematic access to one’s evidence is a systematic failure of this view. Conversely, I will argue that evidential internalism may satisfy an accessibility condition but the view cannot capture how evidence can be publicly shared. This poses a dilemma for the proponent of Interpersonal Uniqueness: no account of evidence can adequately satisfy the demands imposed by the thesis. Moreover, I will argue that Intrapersonal Uniqueness fares no better if it is the case that introspection is not always a maximally reliable means of accessing one’s evidence.

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Durham University - Centre for Humanities Engaging Science & Society

Scientific dissent: threats to two key liberal, democratic, and egalitarian values
Undoubtedly, dissent within and about science often promotes epistemic progress. However, dissent can also have negative consequences (Biddle & Leuschner 2015), and these consequences have largely been neglected in the philosophical literature (e.g. de Melo-Martín & Intemann 2013; 2014 & Intemann & de Melo-Martín 2014). I argue that, in particular, insufficient attention has been paid to the non-epistemic costs of dissent. Using examples from climate science and climate change communication, I identify of two such consequences, both of which are important values in liberal democratic societies: the impact of some types of dissent (1) on citizens’ personal autonomy (freedom); and (2) on democratic deliberation. I contend that these consequences in turn have implications for the democratic legitimacy, stability and sustainability of public policy. Additionally, I will argue that such non-epistemic consequences often stand in a trade-off relationship with the epistemic benefits of dissent. While this does not challenge the prevalent intuition that dissent is often epistemically beneficial, I argue that this adds an important layer of analysis concerning the question of whether instances of dissent ought to be welcomed all-things-considered.

References:

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The ontological interpretation of informational privacy
The ubiquity of networked digital devices has rendered traditional conceptions of informational privacy inadequate. Luciano Floridi argues that the information revolution requires a radical reinterpretation of privacy, one which 'takes into account the informational nature of our selves'. The key step in this reinterpretation is to regard persons as 'constituted' by their information, such that what is done to a person's information is done to them, rather than to something they own. This paper examines Floridi's ontological interpretation of informational privacy. I argue that there are novel forms of informational harm
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<td><strong>Moralism and the Limits of Morality</strong></td>
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<td>The term moralism carries a pejorative sense in that it refers to the problematic part of overdoing things with the normative character of morality. Like a racist or a sexist who crosses the limits of moral acceptability by being excessively assertive about race and sex, a moralist is someone who takes herself to the extreme point of moral demandingness by being didactic about moral matters. Although this idea of moralism is quite common in our everyday parlance, including our vocabulary of moral condemnation, there has not been much effort of systematically analyzing its character and function in our moral thinking. This paper makes an attempt to investigate the characteristic features of this idea by exposing its different forms against the backdrop of some of our existing philosophical positions such as absolutism, paternalism, and perfectionism. It also aims to examine its relationship with two of its close relatives, moral policing and moral chauvinism, found in our common moral understanding.</td>
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<td>Dinh Nghiem (George) Nguyen</td>
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<td><strong>Causal Modelling for Republicans</strong></td>
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<td>Based on previous results suggesting the EPR/B experiment's incompatibility with the interventionist causal modelling framework, Näger (2015) argues that a causal problem of quantum entanglement arises even if we ignore the spatiotemporal constraints in EPR/B. This paper aims to show that, on the contrary, the causal problem arises precisely because certain spatiotemporal constraints—in particular, on the spacelike-separated experimenters’ epistemic access—are ignored in the examination of the EPR/B measurement statistics. Drawing on insights from the agent-centric causal Republicanism of Price &amp; Corry (2007) and Ismael (2016), I generalise the interventionist causal modelling framework to take agents’ epistemic access into account; and then apply this more general Republican framework to EPR/B, thus dissolving the causal problem. Finally, I show that the traditional causal modelling framework can be recovered from the Republican one at the local limit.</td>
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<td>Daniel Nolan</td>
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<td><strong>Theoretical Conservatism in Metaphysics</strong></td>
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<td>Theoretical conservatism is the doctrine that our current position deserves some extra weight in our theory choices just because it is our current position. Many metaphysicians pay especial attention to our starting beliefs when theorising, so may be especially interested in whether we are rationally entitled to privilege our starting place when inquiring. After some discussion of the role conservatism has played in some metaphysician's methods, I will discuss what seems to me the best prospects for defending theoretical conservatism as an epistemological principle, and will discuss some important challenges that defenders of theoretical conservative should address.</td>
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<td>Donald Nordblom</td>
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<td><strong>Mind-Brain Identity, the Grain Problem and the solution from Introspective Error</strong></td>
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<td>The identity theory in the philosophy of mind is faced with an old problem. Conscious experiences and brain processes differ in their qualitative and structural properties, and so cannot be identical. One popular solution is to argue that these apparent properties of conscious experience are not in fact properties of experience, but are instead merely properties that experience represents other things as having. Drawing on a thesis about introspective error, I offer an alternative solution, which maintains that experiences do in fact have certain qualitative and structural properties, just none of the trouble-making ones.</td>
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No Luck in Grounding

Tognazzini [AJP, 2015] argues that we ought to characterise the luck objection in terms of the recently popularised grounding relation. We argue that grounding, as it is traditionally conceived, cannot do the diachronic work required to spell out the luck objection. Thus, on Tognazzini’s behalf, we offer a broadened relation, grounding*. Unfortunately, if grounding* can obtain in such a way as to capture the spirit of the luck objection, it does not provide the necessary connection Tognazzini desires. On the other hand, those instances of grounding* that do preserve a necessary connection both fail to capture the spirit of the luck objection, and are instances of a relation that looks nothing like grounding. Thus, we conclude that the prospects of using grounding to illuminate the luck objection are dim.

Solving the vagueness problem by counting without numbers

If 100,000 hairs on the head of a man is not bald but one hair is bald then there must be a point where losing one more hair makes a man change from not bald to bald. Vague boundaries as highlighted in Sorites arguments are resistant to satisfactory solutions. Formal language approaches based on bivalent classical logic do not yield distinct truth values for boundary cases. Multivalued logics offer a more fine-grained answer so that precise truth values somewhere between fully true and false are proposed for boundary cases. Multivalued approaches are controversial, however, because they work outside the bivalent framework of classical logic and are vulnerable to objections regarding how they settle higher order boundary problems. This paper is proposing a novel approach to vague boundaries. Recent cognitive psychology studies show humans deploy two distinct systems of numerical cognition - the familiar one based on the natural numbers and an implicit biologically primitive one. The more biologically primitive system employs a form of quick magnitude estimation which enables vague quantities to be ordered according to their estimated magnitudes without recourse to symbolic numerical cognition at all. The approach proposed here provides a means of sidestepping some of the disadvantages of classical and multi-valued logics in addressing Sorites arguments. I will outline how a suitable operator can be enlisted to estimate magnitudes and then apply the solution to interpret a problematic Sorites’ argument.

Creating regulatory environments for practical wisdom and role virtues in medical practice

Several philosophers have recently provided more empirically-informed accounts of virtue and virtue ethics, according to which acting virtuously requires, among other things, the development of deliberative strategies to counter common decision-making biases which can impede virtuous action. These accounts employ a comprehensive conception of virtuous character-traits, whereby practically intelligent virtues include an awareness of situational factors which conduce to or inhibit virtuous behaviour. In this paper I argue that in the context of professional life, these personal strategies for facilitating virtuous behaviour should be supported by the development of regulatory environments which assist practitioners acting from the relevant professional dispositions to hit the targets of those virtues. Taking medical practice as an example, I discuss two important ways in which policymakers can help enable virtuous practitioner behaviour. First, policymakers should create institutional environments which help practitioners avoid biases diverting medical role virtues from their targets. Second, when evaluating an existing or proposed policy which has some independent rationale, policymakers should consider the position doctors may be put in by this policy – such as whether the policy threatens to undermine therapeutic doctor-patient relationships. In doing so, I also aim to clarify the links between professional role virtues and properly-oriented practitioner-patient relationships.

No defence for epistemic infinitism

Epistemic infinitism is the theory that justification of a proposition for a person requires, at least in part, an infinite, non-repeating chain of propositions, each providing a justifying reason for its successor in the chain. Various philosophers have argued that infinitism has the consequence that no one is propositionally justified in anything. An attempt to rebut this
argument has been made by Scott Aikin, who considers that infinitism can be defended by the insistence that non-propositional input play a part in the justification of any proposition. In this paper, I will show that Aikin’s defence fails, and develop a more powerful version of the basic reductio argument against infinitism. I will also try to isolate the fundamental error in the infinitist’s thinking that leads to the possibility of the reductio.

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Antirealism and Abstract Objects in Carnap and Sellars
Carnap’s “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (ESO) exerts a broad influence on contemporary antirealist theories in metaontology (see for instance Chalmers [2009], Hirsch [2002; 2005], Price [2009], Putnam [1987], Sidelle [2002], Thommason [2008; 2009] and Yablo [2000]). The deflationary ire of these theories tends to fall on debates concerning the existence of composite material objects. It is worth remembering though that Carnap’s central goal in ESO is the development of a deflationary account of abstract objects. I compare Carnap’s approach to abstracta with that taken by Wilfrid Sellars in the 1963 paper “Empiricism and Abstract Entities” (written for an edition of The Library of Living Philosophers dedicated to Carnap). I argue that, while Sellars levels some important criticisms at ESO, his overall thinking is very much in line with Carnap’s. Indeed, Sellars’ metalinguistic approach suggests some significant improvements to Carnap’s deflationary program. I suggest this has some interesting implications for some contemporary debates in metaontology.

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The Hard Problem of ‘Educational Neuroscience’
Differing worldviews give interdisciplinary work value. However, these same differences are the primary hurdle to productive communication between disciplines. Here, we argue that philosophical issues of metaphysics and epistemology subserve many of the differences in language, methods and motivation that plague interdisciplinary work. Researchers attempting interdisciplinary work may be unaware that issues of philosophy are intimately tied to the way research is performed and evaluated in different fields. As such, a lack of explicit discussion about these assumptions leads to many conflicts in interdisciplinary work that masquerade as more superficial issues. To illustrate, we investigate how philosophical assumptions about the mind (specifically the hard problem of consciousness and mind-body problem) may influence researchers in the interdisciplinary field of the science of learning. The methods employed by researchers in this field are shaped by their metaphysical beliefs, and arguments around these issues can threaten accepted disciplinary ontologies. Additionally, how a researcher understands reduction in the special sciences and how they place their colleagues in this ontology constrains the scope of interdisciplinary projects. In encouraging researchers to explicitly discuss the philosophical assumptions underlying their research we hope to alleviate some of the conflict and establish realistic expectations for collaborative projects.

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Thinking with Deleuze and Zen: Immanence meets consciousness and the brain
Deleuze’s immanentist ontology deconstructs the binary between idealism and materialism or matter and consciousness by accounting for difference in itself, without recourse to a mediating subject. Although the subject who mediates between matter and consciousness can differ, from concepts such as God, the cogito, ego, mind and even brain, Deleuze argues that each is the result of an unques tioned image of thought makes copies of itself, and thus fails to generate the new. In this paper, I follow the nuances of Deleuze’s radical immanence by mapping the influences of Zen on his concepts of difference, materiality, non dualism and subjectivity. Although Deleuze describes his philosophy as one-third Zen, he does not explicitly utilise Zen principles in his oeuvre. By reading Deleuze’s immanentist ontology via Zen, I consider the similarities and differences between the two philosophies, so as to further clarify Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism where the virtual and actual are inseparable. In concluding, I turn to the Rinzai school of Zen and their Koan practice, to demonstrate how philosophical questions may be framed to incorporate empirical, nondual and immanent modes of thinking, so as to reconsider current issues within philosophies of mind, particularly the relationship between consciousness and the brain.

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Do newborn babies have experiences of agency?
I will argue that babies have experiences of agency at birth. I present evidence from developmental psychology for this thesis, and I address objections. An important objection to the thesis that newborn babies have agency experience is that this experience involves a higher-order attribution of agency generated by a high-level cognitive mechanism, which requires self-consciousness and a self-concept, and that babies lack the capacity for self-consciousness and a self-concept. In the absence of these capacities, babies can be at best aware of certain actions they perform and not of their own agency in those actions. I will argue for an intermediate view on which the experience of agency requires nonconceptual self-representation but not a self-concept. More specifically, it requires mental states with non conceptual self-representation, but it does not require conceptual self-representation. I will also argue that although newborn babies may lack conceptual self-representation, they have nonconceptual self-representation. If these claims are right, the lack of conceptual self-consciousness is no obstacle to the claim that babies have agency experience. On this view, the sense of agency requires more than the action awareness enjoyed by the creatures that lack self-representation, where the conscious subject represents the world but does not represent itself. I argue that some actions only involve action-awareness while others involve agency-awareness, and that consequently some but not all actions in babies involve the experience of agency.

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Free Will Put to the Test: Operationalizing Harry Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will
Can a non-Cartesian concept of free will be empirically corroborated? Often in the neuroscience and psychology literature, free will research has centred on a Cartesian conception of volition, meaning that “freely voluntary acts”—in the words of Benjamin Libet (1983)—are based on a conscious decision making process (Dennett, 2004). Several experiments have shown that the role of consciousness in this is highly problematic: unconscious processes seem to play the key role in our actions, while our consciousness is just there along for the ride (e.g., Wegner, 2002). Because of this it is sometimes concluded that free will does not exist. I will argue that Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) influential conception of free will is an alternative to the Cartesian approach, and can be operationalized for empirical investigation by combining it with Slors’ (2015) account of conscious intending. If I am correct and Frankfurt’s theory can be prepared for potential falsification, we will have a philosophically plausible and scientifically relevant alternative to the Cartesian approach on free will.

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Towards an Australian Psychogeography
Contemporary memory studies has two core themes: the operation of memory within the individual, and the social or external structuring of memory. Each has a political character. The former (through, for example, reconciliation proceedings and literature) is recognized as having transformative powers: the sharing of memory facilitates the re-imagining of a nation's past and future. The social structuring of memory, however, is generally recognized as conservative: the environment overdetermines or constrains individual mnemonic capacities, and so resists the transformation of the political imaginary. Nevertheless, external memory is recognized as transformative particularly in association with ‘the local’ (e.g. place names, artworks, and the destruction or alteration of historical sites). This implies that ‘the local’ can have an effect on ‘the global’ for each may be seen as effecting a transformation of a national consciousness; yet there seem to be tacitly accepted limits to the geographical scale that national memory can be worked on. This paper brings these limits into question through an exploration of the phenomenology of place memory (e.g. Casey, Halbwachs) and how historians (e.g. Cathcart, Curthoys) have used ‘the character of the land’ and settler reactions to it as an explanatory force in Australian history.

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A Question for Feminist Epistemology
Feminist epistemologists have shown that mutually reinforcing conceptions of right ways of knowing and gender have granted men and denied women epistemic authority, thus preventing women from participating in the creation of knowledge. These epistemologists have quite reasonably been concerned with contesting these conceptions. But these conceptions have not merely granted men and denied women epistemic authority, they have, as Catharine MacKinnon first comprehensively
showed, made men’s oppression of women unknowable. This prompts the question: how can women know their oppression? Few feminist epistemologists have sought to answer this question, and they have not succeeded. So, however insightful, feminist epistemology remains without an answer to what seems to me to be the epistemological question for feminism. Without an answer to this question, women’s knowledge of their oppression cannot be afforded the status, and thus the credence, of knowledge, and so need not be taken seriously in the way that knowledge need be. In other words, women’s insistence that they are oppressed appears an unfounded lament, a delusion of sorts. So that feminists might return their attention to this question, in this paper, I firstly explain how this question arises, and secondly, show that attempts to answer it have not succeeded.

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**Blaming the Excused: Reactive Attitudes and Causal Responsibility**

Recently, Doris and Murphy (2007) have argued that the soldiers involved in committing atrocities at Abu Ghraib prison and in the My Lai massacre may have been cognitively degraded, and if so should be excused for their actions. Talbert (2009) has responded that even if this argument is successful, on a reactive attitudes approach to moral responsibility the soldiers are still responsible for their actions as they are appropriate targets of our reactive attitudes. In this paper, I will resolve this tension. I will argue that Talbert has misdiagnosed the target of our reactive attitudes. By reflecting on arguments regarding William’s lorry driver (1981) I argue reflection on our moral practices reveals that mere causal responsibility is sufficient for the imposition of new duties of reparation. If an agent fails in these new duties, they thereby display poor quality of will to the victim, and are thus fitting targets of the reactive attitudes.

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**Evolving a Language of Thought**

Many theorists believe that at least some facets of human and animal cognition are most plausibly explained by the existence of a language of thought. In spite of this fact, virtually no attention has been paid to the question of how a language of thought might evolve in the first place. In this talk, I attempt to make progress on this question by bringing to bear some recent work on the evolution of communication. I discuss some features that sign systems can possess which contribute towards their being language-like, and then consider how a language of thought might be constructed out of these features. In short, my goal is to provide several key theoretical ideas that will figure into an incrementalist account of the evolution of a language of thought.

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**Response to Yablo’s “If-Thenism”**

This paper is one of five short commentaries on Stephen Yablo’s paper “If-Thenism.” The paper will be part of the Yablo stream.

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Department of Philosophy and Charles Perkins Centre, University of Sydney

**Giving substance to biological information**

The lack of a rigorous account of biological information as a proximal causal factor in biological systems is a striking gap in the scientific worldview. In this talk, we will present a way to give substance to the idea of biological information, based on the original account by Francis Crick in 1958.

**Christopher Pollard**  
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Deakin University
Merleau-Ponty and Embodied Cognitive Science

What would the Merleau-Ponty of Phenomenology of Perception have thought of the use of his phenomenology in the cognitive sciences? This question raises the issue of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the relationship between the sciences and philosophy, and of what he took the philosophical significance of his phenomenology to be. In this paper I suggest an answer to this question through a discussion of certain claims made in connection to the “post-cognitivist” approach to cognitive science by Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher and Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. I suggest that these claims are indicative of an appropriation of Merleau-Ponty’s thought that he would have welcomed as innovative science. Despite this, I argue that he would have viewed this use of his work as potentially occluding the full philosophical significance that he believed his phenomenological investigations to contain.

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Sceptical Siblings?: A Comparative Appraisal of Hume and Madhyamaka Buddhism

"Given its resistance to positive foundationalist assertions, contemporary interpretations of Madhyamaka Buddhism are prone to casting the enterprise as sceptical. This tendency has given rise to comparative work in which Hume and foremost Madhyamaka figures such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti are placed in the same ‘sceptical family’. While it is evident that there are ostensible thematic similarities that obtain between Humean scepticism and certain elements present in Madhyamaka, I contend that it is problematic to characterize Madhyamaka itself as a sceptical enterprise. This is due primarily to the deep-seated structural incongruence between the Two-Truths Doctrine in Madhyamaka and the Humean vulgar-philosophical divide. The Two-Truths taken together form a structure of interdependence, as opposed to the Humean need for exit from one doxastic mode (the philosophical) and entry into another (the vulgar), or vice versa. Given this lack of mutual exclusivity between doxastic modes in Madhyamaka, the task of tracing a common sceptical filament that runs through Hume and Nāgārjuna or Candrakīrti, should be jettisoned. It is hoped that the ground-clearing task with regards to Madhyamaka vis-à-vis scepticism, will also generate insights regarding Hume’s sceptical project; in particular, the reconciliation of both its negative and constructive phases."

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Externalism and the Indeterminacy of Translation

Panu Raatikainen has argued that Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation can be successfully countered by appealing to externalism about reference. In this paper I will examine in more detail how an externalist view of reference would respond to the difficulties which Quine raises in Word and Object and elsewhere for determinacy in translation. I will argue that Raatikainen is correct that Quine’s thesis depends on his view of the relationship between linguistic behaviour and linguistic meaning. However, the suggestion that the indeterminacy thesis can be successfully countered by invoking the externalist observations which he cites is mistaken. The suggestion fails to distinguish between Quine’s focus on linguistic behaviourism and the descriptivist or internalist views of meaning and reference which externalist examples from Putnam and Kripke are intended to undermine. Quine’s thesis rests on the view that language, as a shared social skill, must be determined through observable behavioural dispositions and hence it must be in principle possible to fix determinate meanings on the basis of that behaviour. It does not depend on the view that the meaning of expressions must be specified by individual speakers’ internal psychological states alone.

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How Cogent Is A Comparative Theory of Justice

Amartya Sen claims that we need to address states of injustice rather than theorize about states of "perfect justice." This needs "comparative" theories of justice, which rank alternative societal arrangements, instead of "ideal" theories of justice, for example those of Rawls or Dworkin, which simply cannot do comparative work. Cogent comparative theories can be derived from the social choice theory tradition of welfare economics that circumvents Arrow’s paradox by leveraging moral “information” from the “wide” public sphere. In this paper I show that a) it is not possible to rank order societal arrangements that constitute states of injustice, and b) any “information” leveraged to attempt to do such ranking will necessarily imply rejection of the “unrestricted domain” axiom of Arrow and thus be undemocratic.
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Pluralist Virtue Ethics, Self-Effacement, and Best Action
A normative ethical theory is considered self-effacing just in case, in some circumstances, exemplary agents cannot be motivated by what the theory says justifies their action when they are acting in the best way. Virtue ethics seems to have escaped the problem of self-effacement by adopting a pluralist conception of value, where a distinction is drawn between that for which virtuous people act, and that from which they act. I aim to show that pluralist virtue ethics is still self-effacing: there are still some circumstances in which exemplary agents cannot be motivated by what pluralist virtue ethics says justifies their action when they are acting in the best way. This result generates a cloud of conundrums beyond self-effacement for pluralist normative virtue ethics (and perhaps for normative ethics in general) upon which I shall attempt to throw some light.

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Proofs and what they're good for.
I present a new account of the nature of proof, with the aim of explaining how proof could actually play the role in reasoning that it does, and answering some long-standing puzzles about the nature of proof, including (1) how it is that a proof transmits warrant (2) Lewis Carroll's dilemma concerning Achilles and the Tortoise and the coherence of questioning basic proof rules like modus ponens, and (3) how we can avoid logical omniscience without committing ourselves to inconsistency.

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Embodied cognition and naturalism
This paper examines various dimensions of the embodied turn that was initially made by phenomenologists, but has also come to be taken up in a more empirical (and sometimes sub-personal) way by proponents of 4e cognition, sometimes expressly drawing on phenomenologists and sometimes not. The aim will be to ascertain how strong these claims concerning the connection between embodiment and cognition are, and whether they are compatible with some of the standard methodological and metaphysical construals of naturalism.

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Intersections of Privilege: Hate Speech, Harm, and Social Hierarchy
In this article I argue that all instances of hate speech interlock to privilege one dominant group, sustaining its hegemonic status. In the Western world, the group most privileged by hate speech is that comprised of White, heterosexual, secular or moderately Christian, able-bodied men. In addition, I argue that there is an epistemic discontinuity between what certain groups 'just know' about the harms and severity of hate speech. For some, hate speech is significantly harmful, a heavy psychic tax borne only by a section of society. For others, hate speech is random, isolated, and inconsequential. How can we close this epistemic gap? I argue that conscious awareness of the privileging effects of hate speech may enable the development of a kaleidoscopic social consciousness and increase the meta-lucidity of a diverse range of intersectional subjects. This, in turn, may shrink the epistemic gap.

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Dogwhistling is (mostly) not coded speech
"Dogwhisting, in the political sense, gets its name from a certain picture. According to this picture, just as only some animals can hear a real dogwhistle, only some audience members can hear a political dogwhistler's real message. The message is delivered "in code" so as not to be heard by those who would find it objectionable. While this may fit some (comparatively rare) cases, most paradigm cases of dogwhistling do not fit this picture. In this talk, I will argue that this is the case, and propose a taxonomy of dogwhistling.

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**Does Aristotelian Naturalism Offer an Escape from Moral Twin Earth?**
An influential objection to naturalistic moral realism is Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons' Moral Twin Earth argument. According to Horgan and Timmons, when two communities of speakers apply their putative moral predicates according to different standards of application, naturalistic moral realism implies that their respective uses of these predicates express different properties. This has the counterintuitive result that the moral disagreements expressed between the two communities are merely verbal. In a recent paper, Christopher Freiman argues that Aristotelian naturalism offers realists a solution to the Moral Twin Earth argument. The solution begins with Peter Geach's assertion that all uses of 'good' are logically attributive. When 'good' is used specifically in its moral sense, it modifies the noun phrase 'human being'. As a result, the criterion of application for 'good' is supplied by the characteristic function of Homo sapiens. If this is correct, Freiman contends, all genuine uses of 'morally good' by humans are univocal: they express the same property. If this is so, then it will not be possible for opponents of naturalistic moral realism to construct Moral Twin Earth counterexamples. Here, I argue that Freiman is mistaken. Aristotelian naturalism does not insulate moral realism from Moral Twin Earth counterexamples.

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**Two Kinds of Discursive Respect**
Following the influential work of Rawls, the term “public reason” has come to refer to a mode of reasoning that remains within the bounds of what can be publicly justified to a diverse (but liberal) citizenry. In this sense, public reason is a specific form of constraint or limitation on reason. However, an older (Kantian) idea of public reason, which refers to the use made of reason by free citizens unconstrained by any limitations other than those imposed by the demands of reason itself, is also in play throughout much of the contemporary literature. In this conception, public reason is the reasoning that secures its epistemic validity and normative legitimacy precisely by virtue of its being unconstrained and subject to correction through reasoned challenge by any and all comers. I argue for the primacy of the Kantian conception over the Rawlsian conception and describe their differing conceptions of discursive respect.

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**The Importance of Biological Cases of Conceptual Change**
My claim, in this paper, is that life sciences usually provide more complicated instances of conceptual change. If I show this, then, it would be reasonable to give more attention to life sciences in studying conceptual change, given the assumption that coping with more challenging examples broadens the generality of a philosophical account. I state two reasons for my claim regarding the complication of biological cases of conceptual change in comparison with other scientific examples: ontological and epistemological reasons. The ontological reason stems from the historical relevance of biological entities (i.e. evolution) and the epistemological reason is based on the complication behind the procedures scientists use to classify or theorize biological phenomena and deal with natural regularities.

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**Can We Do Without Realism?**
I will show how we can, and why we should.
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**Subjunctive Belief Content: what is it good for?**
In this talk I criticise Chalmers’s two-dimensional conception of mental content. There are reasons to think that one of the dimensions of content (the externalist dimension) does not play the explanatory roles it is supposed to play.

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**The Collective Grounds of Relations**
"I articulate and defend a new version of an old, broadly reductionist view about relations. On this view, all relational facts are grounded in non-relational facts about the relata. Relational facts are hence derivative -- there's no ungrounded relationality. Fundamental facts, if any, are non-relational. I begin by motivating the reductionist program with a general argument against the existence of fundamental relational facts. I then distinguish between three forms of reductionism: (1) Leibniz's, according to which all relational facts are grounded in singular, non-relational, extrinsic facts about each relatum taken individually; (2) Bradley's, according to which all relational facts are grounded in singular, non-relational, intrinsic facts about a composite entity having each relatum as a part; and (3) mine, according to which all relational facts are grounded in plural, non-relational, intrinsic facts about the relata taken collectively. After making a few important general clarifications about the connection between singular vs. plural, relational vs. non-relational, and intrinsic vs. extrinsic facts about some entities, I argue that my form of reductionism is preferable over the Leibnizian and Bradleyan versions. First, I show that Moore's and Russell's influential arguments against the so-called internality of all relations are effective only against the Leibnizian version, leaving the Bradleyan and my version unscathed. Then I offer a new argument against both the Leibnizian and Bradleyan versions, and show that my version is immune to it. I then respond to important objections due to Kit Fine and Tim Williamson, and close with a few general remarks about the upshot for debates on internal vs. external relations as well as broadly structuralist ontologies."

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**Names Are Not Predicates**
There are at least three sorts of cases offered as evidence that proper names ought to be treated as predicates: attribution cases, quantifier cases, and disambiguation cases. None of these cases conclusively shows that names are predicates. In fact, all of these constructions can be given alternative paraphrases that eliminate the predicative features of certain uses of names. The semantics of these paraphrases do not involve having names function as predicates in any way whatsoever. In attribution cases, the names within them function as comparatives. In the second two sorts of cases, they specify the domain rather than functioning as predicates. Given that both paraphrases can be given plausible semantic treatments that have significant advantages over their competitors, there is no longer any reason to focus on predicative views of proper names. Instead, we are now free to focus on only the other approaches to proper names, or invent entirely new views.

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**Physics' Inevitable Road To Dualism**
The promise of physicalism is that given just the physical, we can account for everything, including the mental. What is the physical stuff in our universe? We take the field of physics to have as its subject matter physical things. In this talk, I argue that physics itself cannot account for the mental. Moreover, I will argue that most attempts to expand physics to account for the mental will either fail, or will actually turn out to be examples of either property or substance dualism. For the physicalist, the most viable alternative is some form of mind-brain identity theory, or to give up on physicalism.

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Vanessa Schouten

aap.org.au/Conference
Climate Refugees: What To Do About Tuvalu?
"There are two scenarios people living in a nation threatened by climate change may face: the first is that the entire state becomes uninhabitable. The second is that the state does not become completely uninhabitable, but can only support a small fraction of its current population. The second case poses a problem: while it may be true that (say) the population must reduce by half, there is no group of people made up of specific individuals who must leave in order to remain safe. In a 2015 paper, Matthew Lister argues against corporate approaches in cases like these in favour of individualistic approaches. His argument is that while there may be some practical issues that arise when implementing an individualistic solution, such problems can be easily overcome. I argue that the problems with individualistic solutions are not just practical, but theoretical; and that in order to solve this problem we may need to move to a corporate approach in order to fulfil our moral responsibilities. I then consider the extent to which a solution to the reduced-population state scenario has implications for our obligations to states like Tuvalu – states which are likely to become completely uninhabitable due to climate change.

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Collective moral action problems and ‘we-reasoning’
Collective action problems occur where actions which are individually rational lead to suboptimal outcomes for all. Moral philosophy has its own type of collective action problems, which I call collective moral action problems. These are problems where in order to determine what is morally wrong or right we need to focus on sets of actions by two or more agents, rather than isolated individual actions. This may concern the ascription of moral responsibility for outcomes that have been brought about collectively (backward-looking). Or it may concern the question of individual obligations to collaborate towards producing specific outcomes (forward-looking responsibility). In this talk, I will focus on the latter problem. I will discuss whether the notion of ‘we-reasoning’ developed in recent literature on game theory and increasingly discussed in philosophy of economics can help us understand when obligations are genuinely held collectively by agents. I argue that in certain situations requiring cooperation, individual agents ought to we-reason, that is, they ought to frame the problem as one for the group.

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Discovering Quantum Causal Models
I present an interventionist account of quantum causation, based on the quantum causal modelling framework of Costa and Shrapnel (2015). The formalism generalises the classical methods of Pearl (2000), and allows for the discovery of quantum causal structure. I show that classical causal structure emerges in certain situations as a special case. I emphasise the crucial role causal discovery plays, in order to distinguish this approach from other recent alternatives.

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Rationality, Coherence, and the Possibility of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence
Certain plausible evidential requirements and coherence requirements on rationality seem to yield dilemmas of rationality (in a specific, objectionable sense) when put together with the possibility of misleading higher-order evidence. Often, epistemologists have taken such dilemmas to be evidence that we're working with some false principle. In what follows I show how one can jointly endorse an evidential requirement, a coherence requirement, and the possibility of misleading higher-order evidence without running afoul of dilemmas of rationality. The trick lies in clarifying a crucial ambiguity in the formulation of the relevant principles of rationality. The ambiguity is remedied by observing the difference between attitudes it is rational to hold and rationally holding those attitudes. I argue that in cases of misleading higher-order evidence one cannot rationally hold the attitudes that one's evidence makes it rational to hold.

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Climate Refugees: What To Do About Tuvalu?
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Minimalism and Determinacy in Human Rights
Some philosophers say human rights are essentially "minimalist" in character. Human rights norms -- unlike certain other kinds of political norms, e.g. the demands of comprehensive justice -- are meant to focus on a limited set of urgent concerns: not all wrongs, just grave injustices; not a flourishing life, just a minimally decent life. Of course, much contemporary human rights practice (and theory) reaches far beyond the boundaries that minimalism would impose. So, why be a human rights minimalist? This paper examines a particular theoretical desideratum that might be thought to favour minimalism, namely "determinacy". It's reasonable to expect that an account of human rights could issue determinate verdicts about the legitimacy of a wide range of putative human rights claims. Does that give us a reason to favour minimalistic approaches to human rights? The answer, I'll suggest is a complicated 'yes'. The complications stem from another theoretical desideratum, namely, "pluralistic adequacy", i.e. the idea that a good account of human rights should be generally acceptable to proponents of a broad cross-section of reasonable worldviews.

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Credence in psychological explanation
Belief is often understood in terms of the subjective probability that a proposition is true, ranging between 0 (certainty in the negation of the proposition) and 1 (certainty of the proposition). Subjective probability, or credence, is frequently used in explaining belief-formation and action. I discuss advantages of using credence in explaining additional psychological phenomena such as ambivalence and the intensity of pleasant and unpleasant feeling upon receiving news. I also investigate when we have the experience of calculation, and argue that a credence-based framework helps us explain this.

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Mood and Movies: Aesthetic and Ethical Aspects of Cinematic Moods
In this talk I examine the role of mood in our aesthetic experience of film and its ethical significance as a way of composing, and orienting viewers within, a cinematic world. I argue that mood functions as an orienting background that elicits appropriate forms of affective attunement and cognitive orientation that contribute to our experience of a (fictional) cinematic world. Without the successful evocation and expression of mood, our experience of perceptual immersion, emotional engagement, and moral allegiance would fail, and hence our aesthetic enjoyment and ethical appreciation of movies would be impaired. I explore three related ways in which mood can evoke ethical experience in film—the subjective-phenomenological aspect (showing how it feels to experience X, presenting an experiential perspective on Y); the moral-phenomenological aspect (how it affects our moral sympathies and antipathies towards characters, how it exercises or stymies moral imagination, shifts ethical attitudes); and the ontological-aesthetic aspect (how mood orients us towards a cinematic world, drawing attention to its salient features, making things affectively charged or matter to us)—and conclude by discussing some arresting examples (by von Trier, Malick, and Haneke) of the cinematic ethics of mood.

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Anthropology Between Politics and Ethics: Kant on the Historical Orientation of Humanity
"In Kant scholarship, there has long been a debate about the connection between his political and ethical thought. In his works concerned with politics, he concerns himself with coercively enforceable principles by which a society can be organised. In his works on ethics, on the other hand, concern moral principles, which require free and unconstrained action, stemming from rationality. Thus, the realms of politics and ethics in Kant's thought thus appear to be incompatible. This paper will close the gap between Kant's ethics and politics through an examination of his anthropological works. It will argue that Kant's philosophical understanding of human nature necessitates a connection between his ethics and politics. The project begins with a reading of Kant's anthropological texts to show that his concern with human nature was directly related to politics and to ethics. This will permit a discussion of the way in which human nature necessitates politics as a condition of possibility for ethical deliberation to occur. Finally, having shown the necessity of politics for ethics, and thus their necessary connection, this paper will present an overview of Kant's political philosophy in light of this connection to show precisely the way in which politics supports ethical deliberation."
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**Intuitions and the Omniscient Observer**

Soames (1989 183) says “The job of semantics is to specify the principles by which sentences represent the world.” This is the seemingly innocent view of reference that Devitt (1981) characterizes as the “age-old question about how language ‘hooks onto’ the world.” The metaphor is ubiquitous (e.g. McGinn 2015). Bach (1987) remarks “One might have thought the everyday phenomenon of referring to an individual by name to be something less that a mystery, but the debate on proper names keeps spreading and the epidemic of theories goes unabated.” Moreover, Pietroski (2003) suggests “despite a considerable literature on this topic, no one has shown that names do bear any interesting and theoretically tractable relation to their bearers.” Indeed, in his recent book Referential Mechanics concerned with the foundations of semantics, Almog (2014) offers only various strained metaphors for this spooky action-at-a-distance. To say that proper names are “historically loaded” or that reference is “ferried-back” is only to suggestively label the mystery and hardly counts as a “complete description” as Almog (2014, 21) claims. If Pietroski is correct, we are owed an explanation of how so many philosophers could have been so misguided. I offer a diagnosis of the seductive intuitions.

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**Individuals, Institutions and the Right to Object: Addressing Section 8 of the Victorian Abortion Law Reform Act**

My aim in this paper is to establish whether the rights of medical professionals who conscientiously object to abortion can be balanced against the rights of patients to access such treatments. In Victoria, the legal right to abortion is currently protected by the Abortion Law Reform Act 2008. Section 8 of the Act requires that practitioners with a conscientious objection refer a patient to another practitioner. Much debate has ensued since the inception of the Act, as some view Section 8 as requiring practitioners to render themselves complicit in moral wrongdoing. I here propose one method for balancing the rights of both doctors and patients, and hold that the right to conscientious objection ought to be protected, subject to two essential criteria. I will argue that, while individual doctors have a right to object, this right does not extend to institutions. I therefore examine how my proposal will affect organisations such as Catholic Health Australia, who manage public hospitals in Victoria, but whose Code of Ethical Standards prohibits the provision of, as well as referrals for, abortions, in clear conflict with Section 8 of the Abortion Law Reform Act in this state.

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**Acting as Though You Have Free Will: From Pragmatics to Epistemology**

There are, purportedly, reasons to ‘act as though’ a range of things exist; free will, other minds, universal rights, etc. Often such reasons are pragmatic reasons; supposing that such things exist will make our lives go better. But when ‘acting as though’ extends to theoretical reasoning we balk. We don't want to be bribed to give up on Truth for a merely pragmatic reward. We thus restrict our ‘acting as though’ to pragmatic situations and attempt to keep it out of theoretical reasoning. In this paper I will argue that there is an epistemic reason to ‘act as though’ free will exists, and that its justification extends to theoretical reasoning. This reason rests on a common thought in the literature; that one must suppose free will exists in order to rationally deliberate. However I show how the justification that this thought provides can be stripped of its pragmatic component and retain its force with only appeal to epistemic aims. Along with some plausible principles of rational decision making this will lead us to act as though we do have free will, even when we are only engaged in theoretical reasoning.

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**Risk and Liability Rule**

It is commonly argued in law and economics that liability rule is superior to property rule when 1) transaction costs are very high; 2) hold-out problem arises; and 3) information is incomplete. But very few works has been done in philosophy about liability rule and property rule. And the discussions have been focused too much on actual harmful consequence of agent’s
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Robots, rape, and representation.
Sex robots are likely to play an important role in shaping public understandings of sex and of relations between the sexes in the future. This paper contributes to the larger project of understanding how they will do so by examining the ethics of the “rape” of robots. I argue that the design of realistic female robots that could explicitly refuse consent to sex in order to facilitate rape fantasy would be unethical because sex with robots in these circumstances is a representation of the rape of a woman, which may increase the rate of rape, expresses disrespect for women, and demonstrates a significant character defect. Even when the intention is not to facilitate rape, the design of robots that can explicitly refuse consent is problematic due to the likelihood that some users will experiment with raping them. Designing robots that lack the capacity to explicitly refuse consent may be morally problematic depending on which of two accounts of the representational content of sex with realistic humanoid robots is correct. If sex with a robot that fails to explicitly consent is a representation of rape then the design of such robots will most likely be morally wrong for the same reasons. If, on the other hand, sex with such robots is never a representation of rape — and especially if that’s because they have been designed so as always to consent to sex — then the design of sex robots may well be unethical for what it expresses about the sexuality of women.

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Rules and randomness: recognizing and measuring linguistic structure and complexity
Evolutionary approaches to language often seek to explain the emergence and maintenance of structure and complexity. Because of the many ways in which these terms are used by linguists, it can be hard to pin down exactly which of these senses we are trying to i) recognize and ii) measure. Nevertheless, a general measure of structure and complexity would allow us to properly assess a number of claims involving, for example, the relative complexity of specific languages and how this evolves in response to various social and environmental pressures. I will first contrast structural descriptions with structural processes, and then survey a number of measures which have been used in the literature (e.g. entropy, n-gram entropy, and algorithmic and statistical complexity). I argue that none of these measures entirely fit the bill. Although we can still use a combination of approaches to look for traces of different types of structured behaviour, I will cast doubt on the prospect of finding a satisfying single, catch-all measure.

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Brandom’s Logical Expressivism and Logical Inferentialism
Robert Brandom takes inferentialism to provide an account of the meaning of a wide class of expressions. Brandom’s inferentialism is broader than logical inferentialism, which is the view that the logical connectives are defined by suitable inferential rules, typically in a formal proof system. Logical vocabulary, while similar to other vocabulary in that its meaning is determined by its inferential role, is singled out as philosophically distinctive because of its special expressive role, namely making explicit norms of a conceptual practice. The claim that logical vocabulary has a special expressive role is Brandom’s logical expressivism. So understood, Brandom’s logical expressivism is in tension with logical inferentialism, because some expressions that count as logical according to expressivism appear to resist the sort of proof-theoretic treatment that logical expressivism requires. In this talk, I will explain Brandom’s logical expressivism and its connection to normative aspects of meaning via his view of conceptual practices. I will provide justification for expressivism counting conditionals and some intentional vocabulary as logical. This will highlight some of the distinctive features of expressivism, and the latter example will provide the source of tension with logical inferentialism. Despite the tension, logical inferentialism can help us to understand an important aspect of logical expressivism, namely a kind of universality property singled out in Brandom’s Between Saying and Doing. I will then close with a brief exposition of how some familiar logical expressions
(identity, alethic modalities, quantifiers) might fit with logical expressivism and some challenges for expressivism as a philosophy of logic.

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**Artefacts, Symbols, Thoughts**  
Until relatively recently, it was often supposed that changes in the material record of hominin life indexed advances in hominin cognitive sophistication in a relatively direct way. In particular, the “Upper Palaeolithic Revolution” — an apparently abrupt increase in the complexity and disparity of our material culture — was thought to signal the arrival of the fully human mind. While the idea of a direct relationship between material complexity and cognitive sophistication still has some defenders, this view has largely been abandoned. It is now widely appreciated that aspects of ancient hominin’s demographic and social organisation have a powerful influence both on the material culture they need and the material culture they can sustain. But if this more nuanced view is right (and I shall defend it), what does the deep material record tell us about the evolution of hominin cognition? I explore that question in this paper, in the context of recent ideas about the evolution of norms and of social complexity.

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**What is good for your life might not be good for you**  
In recent work I have (rightly or wrongly) argued the concept of well-being can actually be split in twain, with ‘Doing-well’ in one hand and ‘Going-well’ in the other. I call this the Bipartite Distinction. Supposing I am correct, what are we to make of such a distinction? In this talk I ponder one possible interpretation: well-being, properly understood, should be limited to only one half of the Bipartite Distinction, namely Doing-well. Shelley Kagan has argued something similar — that there is a difference between ‘Me’ and ‘My Life’ – so I consider his idea and what kind of work we can do for each other. If this radical interpretation turns out to be true, it will mean that what is good for your life won’t necessarily be good for you (and what is good for you won’t necessarily be good for your life).

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**Chalmers vs Chalmers**  
The paper aims to bring out an inconsistency between David Chalmers's work in philosophy of mind (e.g. in *The Conscious Mind* and *The Character of Consciousness*) and his work in epistemology (e.g. in *Constructing the World*). The main point is ad hominem, but the inconsistency (if it can be established) is of considerable independent interest as well. The paper sets out the apparent inconsistency and then explores some ways of reacting to it.

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**The Unity of Consciousness in Perceptual Experience**  
In this paper I will argue that an individual can, in one and the same mental act, have both conceptual and perceptual data in consciousness. Specifically, I will argue that in perception we can be conscious of objectual data given us by the senses, and at the same time certain abstract entities — what I will call ‘type-concepts’. By type-concept I am referring to a general concept that captures the essential features of an object in the world and allows a perceiver to form beliefs about it. By objectual data I am referring sense perceptual information that has as its content non-conceptualised objects (as opposed to, say, syntactical propositions or states of affairs). In discussing the union of concept and percep in perception, I want to suggest that in mental acts like perception consciousness is undivided.

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**Relevant Alternatives and Scepticism**

"According to the Relevant Alternatives view in epistemology, S knows that p iff S is able to rule out not all the counter-p possibilities, but only the relevant ones. Thus, some sceptical objections to our knowledge claims can be legitimately labelled as irrelevant and ignored. In order to secure her knowledge of p, then, S only needs to show the falsity of the relevant alternatives. Nonetheless, the nature of these relevant alternatives and how they are determined is still debated. Some hold that they have a semantic nature, therefore determined by conversational contexts. Others conceive relevant alternatives as based on the knowledge attributor's pragmatic presuppositions, namely those propositions that she believes to be commonly accepted by all members participating in her discourse. In this paper I will firstly analyse the general Relevant Alternatives approach. Secondly, I will address the problem of how we should determine the relevant alternatives. Particularly, I will discuss the main features of both semantic and presuppositional perspectives, underlying how both share a pragmatic approach. Finally, I will investigate if the Relevant Alternatives theory is effectively able to rule out scepticism. I will argue it only does it partially."

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**Domain Restriction and Legal Subjectivism**

Bianchi posits that there are two ways that context can determine domain restriction (regarding quantified statements) – the Objective and Intentional Perspective on Context. The objective perspective stipulates that something about the world will determine the membership of the domain, whereas the intentional perspective stipulates that the speaker’s intentions will determine the membership of the domain. Over in legal scholarship, there is a theory of communication labelled subjectivism, where communication is successful when (a) a speaker intends for u to mean M and (b) the audience takes u to mean M because that is what the speaker intended. It is natural to think that subjectivists would be attracted to the Intentional Perspective on Context. Assuming that subjectivism has to be wedded to the intentional perspective, I argue that a subjectivist needs intentionally defined domains and potentially multiple domains for each sentence (which are not common conceptualisations of domain restriction). I propose that Stanley and Gendler-Szabo’s Nominal Approach can capture both these requirements for subjectivist domain restriction."

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**Subatomic Inferences**

Inferentialism naturally lends itself to a proof-theoretic semantics where meaning is understood in terms of proofs rather than models. Most work in proof theory has been focused on logical constants, with relatively little work on the semantics of atomic sentences and subatomic terms. Bartosz Więckowski (2011) has recently proposed an account of ‘subatomic systems’ which allow inferences to atomic sentences from ‘term assumptions’ associated with the terms of the sentence, and vice versa. These inference rules are claimed to be meaning-determinate for atomic sentences and terms. I criticise Więckowski’s proposal on the grounds that (1) there is no plausible interpretation of what these ‘term assumptions’ are, and (2) his account too closely mimics model theory. I then propose an alternative account of subatomic inference where the inference rules for terms license inferences between atomic sentences, rather than between terms and atoms. In this system the meanings of terms are their contribution to the validity of the inferences of the atomic sentences of which they are parts. This account ends up being similar to meaning postulates in the model-theoretic tradition.

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**Descartes’ Creation Doctrine and Theory of Modality**

This paper aims to re-evaluate some standard arguments in the literature to justify that Descartes was a possibilist of some kind -- i.e. that he held that every proposition is possible (or possibly possible). A key doctrine of Descartes’ which is taken to justify this position is the Creation Doctrine that every true proposition might have been made false by God. We show that the arguments in favour of this position rely on some modal assumptions which are highly suspect on Cartesian grounds. In particular, we argue that the normal modal principle of necessitation and versions of the Kripke axiom K are inadmissible reasoning principles for Descartes. The upshots are (1) that standard arguments for possibilism from the Creation Doctrine
invoke premises which Descartes ought to have rejected and (2) that Descartes’ theory of modality seems to suggest treatment in a weak non-normal modal logic.

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**Are Adaptive Preferences Bad for Us? Children, Transformative Experience, and Adaptive Preferences**

In this paper, I argue that for two seemingly conflicting claims. First, that the objects of adaptive preferences can come to genuinely prudentially benefit us more than any other objects could; and second, that we should nevertheless remain suspicious of adaptive preferences from a well-being perspective. I harmonize these seemingly conflicting claims by appealing to the phenomenon of personally transformative experiences: that is, those that change who an individual is in a fundamental way by changing her preferences, commitments, character traits, etc. Personally transformative experiences explain how the objects of adaptive preferences can come to genuinely prudentially benefit us, since the experience of developing an adaptive preference can itself be transformative, and can change our preferences, commitments, etc in ways that favor our new adaptive preference. However, personally transformative experiences can also explain why we should remain suspicious of adaptive preferences from a well-being perspective: before we underwent a given personally transformative experience, we had the opportunity to undergo a different one instead, and undergoing the alternative experience may well have left us with a set of preferences and commitments that made us better off.

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**A Case Against Zombie-Buddha Thesis: Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy of Mind Debate**

In contemporary philosophy of mind there is widely exploited thought experiment which involves a notion about a hypothetical being, referred to as philosophical zombie or p-zombie. In Mādhyamika philosophy we also come across the notion of what Mark Siderits have described as “zombie-buddha” or “Robo-Buddha.” Amongst the Mādhyamikas, there have been serious disputes over this notion. Some theorists provide defence in its favour and others who have found the theory incoherent, offer their critiques. Nevertheless there has been, so far no serious academic study of the zombie-Buddha thesis, and this paper aims to provide its detailed analyses, highlight the problems it faces and make a case against the thesis.

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**The Wrong of Genocide**

Genocide according to the UN Convention Against the Crime of Genocide is a crime against racial, ethnic, national or religious groups. But groups consist of individuals. How then does genocide differ from the murder of large numbers of people? I will argue that genocide is a crime of Intergenerational dimensions. It is a systematic attempt to eliminate an Intergenerational group carried out primarily by an attack on family lines. It wrongs not only existing members but also members of past and future generations.

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**Paths to Justice: Inconsistent Choice and the Social Contract**

Constructivist theories of justice are characterised by three conditions: constructivism, representation, and stability. Constructivism holds that justification does not rely on any antecedent moral or political values. Representation holds that the choice of agents in the contractual model must be rationally explicable to real agents. Their reasons need to be, in some sense, our reasons. Without this, the constructivist procedure will lack normative force. Stability holds that the principles chosen in the procedure should be stable upon reflection once we see ourselves as having reasons to endorse them. I argue that these conditions are jointly inconsistent with the segmented choice procedure in Rawls’s original position and other, similar procedures. Any choice procedure that segments choice into at least two-stages with different information, as Rawls’s theory does, will be path-dependent and not meet the condition of representation since it will not be globally coherent.
Attempts to solve this problem without eliminating the segmentation of choice in the procedure will run afoul of constructivism or stability.

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**Virtue and Kidney Selling**
While there has been a tremendous amount of recent philosophical work on the ethics of human kidney markets, there has been very little work that has investigated this issue from a virtue ethical perspective—the majority of philosophical work on this topic adopts a consequentialist or deontological perspective. The focus of this paper is on the virtues and vices that are most salient to the context of (regulated) markets in human kidneys, with the goal of understanding the extent to which that moral framework (i) endorses kidney selling, and (ii) can contribute new insights to ongoing debate in this area. In this paper, I critically engage with Björkman’s (2006) argument that it is never virtuous to sell that which one can donate altruistically. It is argued that this view depends on a narrow consideration of the relevant virtues in this context, that it offers an overly simplistic understanding of the virtues (that it does consider) as well as the nature of virtuous action, and that, ultimately, its main conclusion is false: Under certain circumstances, selling that which one can donate (including ones kidney) is consistent with a virtue ethical normative framework.

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**Against Truth-Conditional Theories of Meaning: Three Lessons from the Language(s) of Fiction**
"Fictional discourse and fictional languages provide useful test cases for theories of meaning. In this paper, we argue against truth-conditional accounts of meaning on the basis of problems posed by language(s) of fiction. It is well-known how fictional discourse—discourse about non-existant objects—poses a problem for truth-conditional theories of meaning. Less well-considered, however, are the problems posed by fictional languages, which can be created to either be meaningful or not to be meaningful; both of these ultimately also provide problems for a truth-conditional account of meaning, because it cannot account for the ways in which we use and evaluate such fictional languages. Instead, a pragmatic or use-based account provides a better explanation for some of the phenomena we discuss."

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**Response to Yablo’s “If-Thenism”**
This paper is one of five short commentaries on Stephen Yablo’s paper “If-Thenism.” The paper will be part of the Yablo stream.

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**Does anyone really think that “p” is true if and only if p?**
Tarski’s distillation of a rigorous account of truth into a system that turns on the acceptance of the so called Convention-T and its various instances has had a lasting impact on philosophical logic, especially work concerning truth, meaning, and other semantic notions. In a series of studies completed from the 1930s to the 1960s, Arne Næss collected and analysed intuitive responses from non-philosophers to questions concerning truth, synonymy, certainty, and probability. Among the formulations of truth studied by Næss were practical variants of expressions of the form ‘p’ is true if and only if p. This paper calls attention not only to Næss’ early findings but to a series of experimental results that collectively suggest that acceptance of expressions of the form ‘<p> is true if and only if p’ varies according to what kind of statement p is.

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Enfranchising the Youth
Children are, almost everywhere, denied the right to vote. Democratic theorists tend to assume, without a great deal of argument, that age-based discrimination in access to the franchise is justified. In this paper, I challenge the orthodoxy. I argue that all major, plausible accounts of the justification of democracy require the enfranchisement of a substantial proportion of the child population. Along the way, I consider and respond to several challenges raised to the idea of child enfranchisement.

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Beyond the Impossible
This talk discusses two approaches to the structure of modal space: partial modal space and the stratified modal space. According to the former, (im)possible worlds correspond to arbitrary sets of sentences. Stratified modal space’s strategy, on the other side, construes (im)possible worlds as worlds all of which are closed under logical consequence (of some sort). I argue that although partial modal space is preferable to stratified modal space, its limitations motivate even finer-grained account of modality. I conclude by sketching such an account.

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Public Justification Grounded in Social Trust
I argue that the idea of public justification can be grounded in the value of social trust. The reason we should care about publicly justifying legal and moral conventions is that, in doing so, we lay the groundwork for enduring relations of social trust between persons, which allow for the realization of the many social goods provided by institutions strengthened by social trust. This is because a publicly justified moral convention is one that each person has sufficient reason to endorse and internalize as regulative of her action, and so is a norm each person is prepared to comply with for its own sake and on pain of experiencing guilt for violating the norm. So publicly justified norms are especially excellent bases for public expectations, given that we can rationally expect for persons to generally comply with them. The value of social trust, I argue, captures what is right about many of the other proposed foundations for public reason liberalism.

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A Genealogy of John McDowell's Epistemological Argument in /Mind and World/
John McDowell's Mind and World has become a famous text for its attempt to outline an alternative conception of naturalism to the austere kind made famous by Quine in the twentieth century. Regarded by some as the less important part of Mind and World, the first half of the text makes an important argument about how the relation between the world and the human mind must be structured. It is argued that human experience must be "normative all the way down" if we are to avoid sceptical doubts about whether the mind is actually in contact with the world. Importantly, in conducting this epistemological argument, McDowell in Mind and World seeks to make good Wilfrid Sellars's attempt at (and I am purposefully using controversial language) constructing a non-traditional empiricist account of perceptual experience. In this paper, I will explore Sellars's attempt at building a non-traditional empiricism, drawing out the main themes and issues that come along with it. I will argue that McDowell does make good on Sellars's original vision."

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The Deep Green Ethicists and the Inescapability of Practice (Even in Theory)
My purpose in this paper is give a sympathetic but critical response to Richard Sylvan and Val Plumwood’s work on environmental ethics, particularly the paper which started it all (for them, and many others), Sylvan’s ‘Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental, Ethic?’. Sympathetic, in that I sympathise with Sylvan and Plumwood’s ultimate aims; but critical, in that I see the paper and subsequent elaborations and interpretations as unsatisfactory or even self-undermining. My first claim is that this paper’s purpose is ambiguous, and my second is that attempts to expand on it have often gone in an
unhelpful direction as a result. My hope is that, by directing attention to the sort of inconsistencies which appear in appeals to so-called 'Last Man arguments', I can help to move discourse in environmental ethics away from the archetypal debates over the shallow and the deep, the intrinsic and instrumental, and the pros and cons of anthropocentrism (as traditionally conceived).

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**Diagnosis, identity, and the experience of asymptomatic disease**
An increasing number of patients receive diagnoses of disease without having any symptoms. These include diseases detected through screening programs, as incidental findings from unrelated investigations, or via routine checks of various biological variables like blood pressure or cholesterol. In this paper we draw on narrative identity theory to examine how the process of making sense of being diagnosed with asymptomatic disease can trigger certain overlooked forms of harm for patients. We show that the experience of asymptomatic disease can involve ‘mismatches’ between one’s beliefs about one’s health status on the one hand, and bodily sensations or past experience on the other. Patients’ attempts to incorporate these diagnoses into their self-narratives often involve either forming inaccurate beliefs about bodily sensations and/or past experience, or coming to believe that feelings and experience do not necessarily track or predict health status, leading to an ongoing sense of vulnerability to ill health. These resulting alterations in self-understanding can sometimes be considered harmful, in view of their implications for ascriptions of responsibility and ongoing anxiety.

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**Please Explain: Radical Enactivism and its Explanatory Debt**
Radical Enactivism (Hutto & Myin 2013) is a position in the philosophy of cognitive science that aims to displace representationalism, the dominant position in cognitive science for the last 50-60 years. To accomplishing this aim, radical enactivism must provide an alternative explanation of cognition. Radical enactivism offers two alternative explanations of cognition. The first I call the dynamical explanation and the second I call the historical explanation. The mechanists have given us reasons for doubting that the first alternative makes for a good explanation (e.g. (Kaplan 2015; Kaplan & Bechtel 2011). The historical explanation does not hit the right explanatory target without the introduction of a proximate mechanism, but the proximate mechanisms suggested by radical enactivism are associationist mechanisms, the limitations of which led to the initial widespread endorsement of representationalism. Therefore, radical enactivism cannot displace representationalism in cognitive science.

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**On the Contemporary Nature of Poetic Language - Beginning from the Criticisms of Heidegger’s Poetic Language**
Late Heidegger’s thinking of language is on the way to pure language, for Heidegger tries to overcome the impurity and tool-treating of language. The pure language shows itself as poetic language. Poetic language overcomes the impurity of everyday language and theoretic language before it reveals itself as Saying and Silence, the conversation between poetry and thought, and the possible poetic dwelling. However, Heidegger’s poetic language has its limitation, which calls for our rethinking of his thinking of poetic language and language itself and makes us bring forth the contemporary nature of poetic language. In this sense, poetic language is to become the purest language or language of the very beginning. Also three sorts of languages are differentiated: language of desire, language of tool, and language of truth (poetic language), of which poetic language is simultaneously the play of language of desire, language of tool, and language of truth (poetic language). Poetic language in the contemporary times helps us to think about our fate in our times and urges us to build our own dwelling home.

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**Plural Bodily Self-Awareness: Schmid, Zahavi, and Merleau-Ponty**
The aim of this paper is to provide a speculative defence of the radical idea, most notably advanced recently by Hans Bernhard Schmid, that groups of individuals can possess a form of pre-reflective self-awareness (where, as argued by Dan Zahavi, pre-reflective self-awareness is held to be constitutive of subjectivity). While this approach faces several important objections, it will be suggested that these can be overcome by appealing to Merleau-Ponty’s account of the intrinsically bodily nature of the subject. Specifically, it will be argued that, with Merleau-Ponty’s view in hand, we can understand groups in general as continually developing from a more reflective, and therefore distributive, sense of group selfhood, towards more pre-reflective forms of self-awareness, through processes of group habituation. In other words, understanding self-awareness as bodily and understanding it as open to pluralisation are mutually supportive positions that, together, present a compelling defence of the possibility of plural subjects.

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**Personal Identity, Individual Autonomy and Group Rights**

Many liberals believe that individuals have a right to autonomy and self-determination, and that, consequently, strong group rights, which compromise individual rights, are unjustified. This position implicitly relies on a controversial endurantist metaphysics of personal identity. Some contemporary metaphysicians, however, accept a different, four-dimensionalist account of personal identity. From this perspective, exercises of individual autonomy and exercises of group authority are metaphysically on a par: each involves relations of domination among numerically distinct person-stages, justified by a unity relation. This raises a challenge for liberals. Supposing for the sake of argument that four-dimensionalism is true, what—if anything—justifies attributing a right to autonomy to individuals, while denying it to groups? I explore possible answers, none of which succeed fully in vindicating the orthodox liberal position.

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**Rational Inconsistent Belief: A New Version of the Preface Paradox**

I argue that there a maximally generalized version of the so-called ‘preface paradox’ that shows, not only that epistemic rationality may allow you to have inconsistent beliefs, but that it may actually require you to have them. Perhaps the most vigorous opposition to this claim comes from Doris Olin (2003). In what follows I defend it against her objections. To set the stage for this, I begin by considering the original version of the paradox, a less generalized version and a more generalized version. Each of these succumbs to objection. Then I defend a maximally generalized version of the paradox that escapes objection.

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**Burden of Proof Claims Are Epistemically Bankrupt**

Burden of proof claims are ubiquitous in philosophy. They are used by sceptics, common-sense philosophers, realists, anti-realists, metaphysical deflationists and just about everyone else. However, I will be arguing that burden of proof claims are all false or redundant. They are false when we don’t have any epistemic reason to prefer a position over another, but the burden claims say we can still believe one. They are redundant when we do have an epistemic reason to prefer a position, and the burden claim says that is the position we should believe. In either case, the burden claim is an epistemic freeloader.

Keynote Address

Susan Wolf
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**Aesthetic Responsibility**

Philosophers often suggest that the fact that we are morally responsible is an important mark of our distinctive humanity. But focusing exclusively on the attitudes and judgments we form toward people on the basis of their moral qualities leads to overly narrow conceptions both of responsibility and of humanity. As a corrective, this paper considers the attitudes and judgments we make of artists on the basis of their artworks, suggesting that there is such a thing as aesthetic responsibility that is both similar to and different from moral responsibility.
### Stephen Yablo

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**If-Thenism**

A number of strategies have been proposed over the years for finessing apparent truth-conditional commitments: fictionanism, quasi-realism, and presuppositionalism, to name a few. The simplest such strategy, if/thenism, which treats S as predicated on an unspoken assumption A, has fallen largely out of view. I ask why this might be and look at ways of modernizing the view to avoid standard criticisms.

In this stream, Professor Yablo will talk to his paper ‘If-Thenism’. After the talk five commentators will give short 10-15 minute responses. There will then be a short break for afternoon tea. The session will then resume at 4:30, at which point Professor Yablo will respond to commentators and the floor will be opened for questions.

Commentators for the stream are:

- Otávio Bueno (Miami)
- Mark Colyvan (Sydney)
- Seahwa Kim (Ewha)
- Matteo Plebani (Santiago de Compostela)
- Joseph Ulatowski (Waikato)

Professor Yablo’s paper ‘If-Thenism’ will be the target article for the second issue of the Australasian Philosophical Review (APR). It is a rich paper that deserves a close reading. Those who want to access the paper in order to read it before the conference can do so by registering as a commentator on the APR website: [http://aap.org.au/APR](http://aap.org.au/APR), and then clicking on the link for commentator ressources (Volume 1, Issue 2). Those who register as a commentator are under no obligation to provide commentaries, but by registering you will have access to target articles for the APR before they are published.

### Hora Zabarjadi Sar

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**Migration as a journey toward ‘Authenticity’**

Migration as the main gesture of post-modern era can be approached from different disciplinary perspective, e.g., sociology, anthropology, philosophy. Using existential phenomenology, a migrant being can be observed as a Being-in-the-world that experiences a dislocation both geographically and contextually. This paper explores the possibility of allocating sociological typologies of ‘stranger’ and characteristics such as ‘hybridity’, home/homelessness, within an existential ontology. Such an approach leads to the idea that migration in a broad sense is a journey of human as Dasein towards it’s own ‘Authenticity’. The focus of this paper would be on specific sociological typology of migrants called ‘intentional hybrids’. By collating sociological and existential characteristics of migrant being, this paper draws upon new perceptions of homelessness and the notion of ‘home’ for this typology. As result, we can redefine the notion of ‘home’ not as physical place but as a way of life for the sake of authenticity.

### John Zerilli

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**Against the "system" view of modularity**

Modularity is a fundamental doctrine in the cognitive sciences. It has a preeminent position in cognitive psychology and generative linguistics, as well as a long history in neurophysiology, with roots going all the way back to the early nineteenth century. But a mature field of neuroscience is a comparatively recent phenomenon, and has challenged orthodox conceptions of the modular mind. One way of accommodating modularity within the new framework suggested by these developments is to go for increasingly “soft” versions of modularity. One such version, what I call the “system” module, is so soft that it promises to meet practically any challenge neuroscience can throw at it. In this talk I will reconsider afresh what we ought to regard as the sine qua non of modularity, and offer arguments against the view that an insipid “system” module can be the legitimate successor of the traditional notion.
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Image of ADHD in Light of Evolutionary Medicine
Psychiatric diseases have been intensely examined from both scientific and sociological perspectives. The scientific sector views psychiatric diseases as medical entities as concrete as any bodily suffering, while the sociological sector treats psychiatric diseases as social constructs as fragile as Drapetomania. Adopting ADHD as a particular case, this article attempts to re-draw the image of psychiatric diseases in light of evolutionary medicine, combined with Milikan’s idea of direct proper function. By doing this, this article argues that both scientific and sociological images of ADHD are at least oversimplified. They are just two facets of a more complex picture of ADHD, the complexity of which is still yet to be uncovered.

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Immunity to error through misidentification and 'I'
There are at least two ways to characterize the ‘immunity to error through misidentification’ (hereafter IEM). Some philosophers (David Lewis, Dilip Ninan and so on) believe that IEM should be seen first and foremost as a property only enjoyed by the content of de se belief. Therefore according to them, IEM is first and foremost an epistemic property. But there are also some other philosophers (E.A. Anscombe, John Campbell) who insist that IEM should be regarded first and foremost as a property of the first person pronoun ‘I’, and accordingly IEM is first and foremost an semantic property for them. In this paper, I try to reconcile the epistemic property view and the semantic property view of IEM. On the one hand, if we trace the semantic view of IEM back to its origin, a productivist metasemantic account for the meaning of ‘I’ can be found, which sets up two criteria for the correct use of ‘I’ in order to preserve IEM. On the other hand, through a scrutiny of the epistemic view of the IEM, it can be discovered that as an epistemic property, IEM is sensitive to the evidence that a person has while having the relevant de se belief. My chief argument is that the very evidence required for a de se belief to enjoy IEM as an epistemic property meets the criteria raised by the metasemantics of ‘I’ at the same time.

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Global justice and enhancement: An expanded Health Impact Fund
One concern raised by the prospect of enhancement technologies is that they may exacerbate societal and global inequalities. Some have even claimed that unequal access to these technologies may lead to the emergence of an “unenhanced underclass”. I present here a mechanism that can mitigate this possibility. It draws on Thomas Pogge’s Health Impact Fund (HIF). The HIF is designed to incentivize drug innovators to a) focus on the development of products that reduce global disease burden, b) to sell those products at the lowest possible price, and c) to ensure that they reach and are used correctly by the right patients – all incentives that are lacking under the current patenting system. The HIF does this by rewarding innovators on the basis of their products’ actual reduction of global disease burden, rather than on the basis of how much they can make selling their product at the high mark-ups allowed by their patent. This approach can also be applied to enhancements. Some enhancements may hold great social value, but others may only offer positional advantages and come at the cost of diverting resources from developing more valuable innovations. To encourage the development and rapid diffusion of the former, the HIF can be expanded to take such innovations into account, reducing the chances of these technologies exacerbating inequality.