

MONDAY DECEMBER 7

JAPAN LECTURE THEATRE, UNIVERSITY HOUSE

4^{PM}: REGISTRATION OPENS IN THE UNIVERSITY HOUSE FOYER

6^{PM}: PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS (JAPAN LECTURE THEATRE)

6⁰⁰-6¹⁵: Professor Tai Black will deliver a karakia (Māori blessing)

6¹⁵-6³⁰: The Hon. Steve Maharey, Vice Chancellor, Massey University

6³⁰-8⁰⁰: Dr Adriane Rini (Massey University)

Aristotle's Fall: Corruptions in the History of Logic

In 1968, in his Inaugural Lecture as occupant of the first Chair in Logic at the University of Leeds, Peter Geach describes a Fall from Grace. He describes "a disaster, comparable to the Fall of Adam". This Fall was Aristotle's invention of Logic. Geach isn't talking about Aristotle's notorious modal logic; he's talking about Aristotle's invention of a simple deductive logic and how that represents a catastrophic fall. Clearly Geach thinks things were good before Aristotle's invention of syllogistic logic, and so there is something ruinous and damning in Aristotle's first steps toward a deductive system. This paper begins by looking closely at Geach's claim about "corruptions in the history of logic". The paper ends by suggesting that Aristotle may have been smarter than Geach gives him credit for.

8^{PM}: WELCOME DRINKS IN THE UNIVERSITY HOUSE FOYER

TUESDAY DECEMBER 8

				Philosophy of Biology
	BSC1.05	BSC1.06	BSC2.04	BSC2.06
9:00-10:15	Matheson Russell <i>Intersubjectively mediated self-consciousness: a partial defense of the Habermasian account</i>	Christine Swanton <i>The Philosophical Power of Hume's Account of Love</i>	Greg Dawes <i>Galileo does Fine in NOA's Ark</i>	Ben Jeffares <i>Upstanding Citizens: Australopithecines and the Foundations of Human Behaviour</i>
10:15-10:45	MORNING TEA (BSC 3.05)			
10:45-11:45	Andrew Withy <i>How we use 'and', 'or' and maybe 'if-then' (but not 'but')</i>	Rekha Nath <i>Six degrees of Kevin Bacon: why we have obligations towards worse-off foreigners</i>	J.R. Kuntz and Joana R.C. Pimentel <i>Philosophical Intuitions, the Philosophers' View</i>	Martin Gray <i>Cave Art and the Evolution of Cognition</i>
11:45-12:45	Jeff Dauer <i>Relativism, Epistemic Modals, and Contextual Projection</i>	Nicholas Munn <i>Reconciling the Criminal and Participatory Responsibilities of the Youth</i>	Carl Brusse <i>Personal Identity: what is it good for?</i>	Adrian Currie <i>When are Analogies Okay?</i>
12:45-2:00	LUNCH			
2:00-3:15	Ben Blumson <i>A Never-Ending Story</i>	Jonathan McKeown-Green <i>Getting over determinism</i>	William Grey <i>Climate change and obligations to the future</i>	Matt Gers <i>Extending Supervenience and the Intrinsic Evolution of Mind</i>
3:15-3:45	AFTERNOON TEA (BSC 3.05)			
3:45-5:00		Luke Russell <i>Doing Away With Evil?</i>	Stuart Brock <i>The Argument from Scripture</i>	Kim Sterelny <i>Niche Construction and the Extended Mind</i>

WEDNESDAY DECEMBER 9

	<i>Pictures and Proofs in Mathematical Thought</i>				<i>Philosophy of Biology</i>
	BSC1.05	BSC1.06	BSC2.04	BSC2.05	BSC2.06
9:00-10:15	Patrick Greenough <i>Deflationism about Facts</i>	Charles Summers <i>Coercion Claims and Restorative Justice</i>	Colin Cheyne <i>Belief Formation and the Enjoyment of Fiction</i>		John Wilkins <i>Cognition and social psychology as explanations of religion</i>
10:15-10:45	MORNING TEA (BSC 3.05)				
10:45-11:45	Matthew Dentith <i>Official Theories vs. Conspiracy Theories: The Officious and the Official</i>	Stacey Broom <i>Is Human Enhancement Eugenics?</i>	Melanie Rosen <i>Dreams are Narrow Minded</i>	Li Wanquan <i>Conception of Self and Partiality toward Family Members: The Case of Holding</i>	Rachael Brown <i>A revised look at behavioural evolution through the prism of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis debate</i>
11:45-12:45	Dirk Derom <i>Applying the mechanistic philosophy to the storage and analysis of neuroscience data</i>	David Merry <i>Joe's Carpet and the Great Aesthetic Cognitivism Conflation</i>	Raamy Majeed <i>Representationalism without Experiential Deflationism</i>		John Matthewson <i>What is explanatory generality?</i>
12:45-2:00	LUNCH				
2:00-3:15	Zach Weber <i>The Mathematics of Vagueness</i>	Stephen Winter <i>Against Posthumous Rights (For Nonconsequentialists)</i>	Charles Pigden <i>Is George a Traitor? Geach's Problem and Imperative Consequence</i>		Gillian Barker <i>Naturalism and the Organism-Artifact Analogy in the Functions Debate</i>
3:15-3:45	AFTERNOON TEA (BSC 3.05)				
3:45-5:00	Anne G. Newstead <i>Blind Mathematicians and the Role of Vision in Mathematical Understanding</i>	Christoph Henning <i>Perfectionism and Equality: The Ethics of Flourishing in Marxian Theory</i>	Josh Parsons <i>Command and consequence</i>		Robert Nola <i>Inference to the Best Explanation and Darwin's argument in favour of Natural Selection</i>
5:00-6:00			AAPNZ AGM		

THURSDAY DECEMBER 10

	<i>Pictures and Proofs in Mathematical Thought</i>			
	BSC1.05	BSC1.06	BSC2.04	BSC2.06
9:00-10:15	Clemency Montelle <i>The Greek Mathematical Diagram as a Metonym for an Epiphany</i>	Glen Pettigrove <i>Apologizing for who I am</i>	Adam Green <i>The Value Problem for Knowledge: A Relational Solution</i>	Roy Perrett <i>Can I doubt that I exist?</i>
10:15-10:45	MORNING TEA (BSC 3.05)			
10:45-12:00	Philip Catton <i>Newton's Diagrams</i>	Geoffrey Roche <i>Much Sense the Starkest Madness: Sade's Moral Scepticism</i>	Brent Madison <i>Epistemic Internalism: Mentalism or Access?</i>	Aneta Cubrinovska <i>Creating Time with Language</i>
12:00-1:00	Kirsten Walsh <i>Speculation, Experiment and Mathematics in 18th Century Optics</i>	Kate Tappenden <i>Embodied Animal Cognition: A case study with domestic dogs, canis familiaris</i>	Lynne Bowyer <i>The Question Concerning the Environment: A Heideggerian Approach to Environmental Philosophy</i>	Michael Gilchrist <i>Paradigm and paradox: Is a Saussurean theory of truth possible?</i>
1:00-2:00	LUNCH			
2:00-3:15	Catherine Legg <i>The hardness of the iconic must: can Peirce's existential graphs assist modal epistemology?</i>	John Maier <i>The Epistemic Condition on Intention</i>	Michael Morreau <i>Absurd Tradeoffs in Evaluating Counterfactuals</i>	Justine Kingsbury <i>Being conciliatory about aesthetic appreciation</i>
3:15-3:45	AFTERNOON TEA (BSC 3.05)			
3:45-5:00	Koji Tanaka <i>Diagram, logic and normativity</i>	Neil Sinhababu <i>How Jenny and the cannibal desire Orlando Bloom</i>	Carsten Hansen <i>Might a Speaker's Knowledge of Meaning be Practical Knowledge?</i>	Fred Kroon <i>Fictional realism and fictional emotions</i>

Conference Dinner

ABSTRACTS

Gillian Barker (Rotman Institute for Science and Values,
University of Western Ontario)

Naturalism and the Organism-Artifact Analogy in the Functions Debate

The two dominant accounts of function are motivated by different approaches to the naturalistic treatment of teleology and normativity - reductionism and assimilationism. Though many commentators have urged a reconciliation of these two accounts via either pluralism or integration, this is not possible without resolving the underlying conflict about naturalism. This conflict results from poorly-articulated assumptions about the relationship between natural and artifactual functions; attention to some details of biological fact and the theoretical resources offered by recent innovations in evolutionary biology show a way to revise our understanding of the organism-artifact analogy, resolve the conflict over naturalism, and give an integrated account of biological and artifactual function that solves several outstanding problems in the treatment of teleology and normativity.

Ben Blumson (National University of Singapore)

A Never-Ending Story

Take a strip of paper with 'once upon a time there' written on one side and 'was a story that began' on the other. Twisting the paper and fastening the ends produces John Barth's (1986, 1-2) *Frame-Tale*, which prefixes 'once upon a time there was a story that began' to itself. I argue that the possibility of understanding *Frame-Tale* cannot be explained by tacit knowledge of a theory of truth in English, since a derivation of what it represents requires an infinite number of steps.

Lynne Bowyer (Massey University)

The Question Concerning the Environment: A Heideggerian Approach to Environmental Philosophy

This paper engages with the thinking of Martin Heidegger in order to show that our environmental problems are the necessary consequences of our way of 'knowing' the world. Heidegger questions the abstract, theoretical approach that the Western tradition has to 'knowledge', locating 'knowledge' in the human 'subject', an interior self, disengaged from and standing over against

the other-than-human world, as external 'object'. Such an approach denies a voice to the other-than-human in the construction of 'knowledge'. Heidegger maintains that we are not a disembodied intellect, but rather we are finite, self-interpreting beings, embodied in a physical, social and historical context, for whom things *matter*. In view of this, he discards traditional notions of 'knowledge', in favour of understanding and interpretation. Accordingly, he develops what can be called a *dialectical ontology*, whereby we come to understand and interpret ourselves and other beings in terms of our involved interactions. This involved understanding acknowledges the participation of other-than-human beings in constructing an interpretation of the world, giving them a voice. Following Heidegger's way of thinking, I suggest that by developing an *ontological-ethic*, a way of dwelling-in-the-world based on a responsive engagement with other-than-human entities, we can disclose a world that makes both the other-than-human and humanity possible.

Stuart Brock (Victoria University of Wellington)
-and-
David Eng (Victoria University of Wellington)

The Argument from Scripture

One of the foremost interests of religious philosophers is the reasonableness of religious belief. Indeed, a central concern—if not *the* central concern—of Philosophy of Religion is with arguments for and against the existence of God. Strangely, though, the most commonly wielded argument for the existence of God, the Argument from Scripture, is given comparatively scant attention by philosophers of religion. And while there are some notable exceptions, the analysis given of the argument is invariably superficial and unsatisfying. This is unfortunate, for by dismissing the argument in this way, philosophers overlook obvious escape routes available to those more sympathetic to it and misdiagnose what is really wrong with the argument. We believe that the Argument from Scripture—on its most charitable interpretation—is not circular. Instead the argument suffers from a far more insidious flaw. The argument, we maintain, is either self-defeating or is no better than an appeal to literary fiction, and it is our aim in this paper to explain why.

Stacey Broom (Massey University)

Is Human Enhancement Eugenics?

For decades the face of 'eugenics' has been Hitler and his Nazi war campaign, but in the 2004 work *Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement*, Nicholas Agar rejects 'authoritarian eugenics' and instead puts forward a case for what he calls a "version of eugenics worthy of defence" (p. 5). Agar argues

that the new, or *liberal*, eugenics differs from authoritarian eugenics in that it is “primarily concerned with the protection and extension of reproductive freedom” (p. vi). Opponents of any sort of eugenics and/or human enhancement are quick to draw our attention to popular media such as Aldous Huxley’s *Brave New World* and modern films like *Gattaca*. Enhancement, they warn, may lead to a slippery slope resulting in a humanity that consists of the genetic elite and those not so fortunate. In this paper I will defend the new eugenics from such claims. I will address questions such as the following: What is eugenics? Is human enhancement eugenics? And, is there really a difference between Nazi eugenics and the new eugenics? I will show that regardless of the potential for a slippery slope we are justified in using enhancement technology.

Rachel Brown (Australian National University)

A revised look at behavioural evolution through the prism of the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis debate.

The recent movement for an "Extended Evolutionary Synthesis" (or EES) within evolutionary biology has come out of dissatisfaction with the continuing acceptability of some of the theoretical assumptions of the standard approach in the field, the Modern Synthesis. To a large extent this challenge to the status quo has arisen from empirical work in Evo-Devo and has focused particularly upon morphology evolution. This paper considers the extent to which the challenges to the Modern Synthesis presented by the EES movement for morphology are applicable to behavioural evolution and argues that the evidence for a new approach to behavioural biology is just as strong, if not stronger than that available in the morphological case.

Carl Brusse (Australian National University)

Personal Identity: what is it good for?

In contemporary analytic philosophy the Personal Identity debate still flirts with its less reputable cousin: Philosophical Anthropology. For example, the contrast between the psychologically-based persistence criteria of Neo-Lockeans and the biological (or physical) criteria of their Animalist rivals is often characterised with the question: “What are we most fundamentally: persons, or animals?” However this presupposes some sort of equivalence between claims about persistence criteria and claims about natural kind membership, and the exact connection between these two ways of talking (and associated ontological inter-commitment) is relatively under-explored. I propose and defend a simple formalism to spell out this connection; in a manner which is neutral between Lockean, Animalist or alternative positions. This allows for a more systematic way of characterising and developing realist

theories about personal persistence, persistence kinds and persistence conditions. However I also argue that the "what are we most fundamentally" question is itself unjustifiably biased against an alternative view, which I motivate via an appeal to Personal Identity's role as a forensic concept. If we take seriously the idea that Personal Identity has use in normative reasoning (for example) but proceed with this in the light of the proposed formalism, then we should lean (I argue) toward a pluralist realism which would be curiously deflationary for both Personal Identity and Philosophical Anthropology, as the traditional aspirations of neither can be met.

Philip Catton (University of Canterbury)

Newton's diagrams

When in his published writing Newton reasons out for us what he terms the mathematical principles of natural philosophy, he does so with diagrams. How essentially? Supposedly, not essentially at all. Scholars generally say that Newton had in fact used secret, roundly analytical means to develop the *Principia*. For, from roughly two decades previously, Newton had secured for his own use the calculus, a secret as yet largely private to him, in the use of which he was prodigiously adept. Supposedly, Newton's suppression of the calculus from his *Principia* was a trick. Whereas calculus would reduce the function of diagrams to mere pedagogy, this would have been an untraditional thing to do. Moreover, the resulting presentation overall would also have been mathematically much simpler. Supposedly, Newton sought in *Principia* the best way to show off his mathematical genius to his contemporaries. That alone supposedly is why diagrammatic reasoning is left essential within that work. In this talk I challenge this historiography, and not only on seventeenth-century historical grounds. To picture Newton as faking his dependence upon diagrams is furthermore to nourish some philosophical confusions, which I will identify and address.

Colin Cheyne (Otago University)

Belief Formation and the Enjoyment of Fiction

Recent research on belief formation indicates that we are prone to believe (although often very briefly) what we have just read. I argue that this plays a crucial role in explaining our emotional response to fiction.

Aneta Cubrinovska (University of Canterbury)

Creating Time with Language

Language is capable of re-creating real time by creating its own 'linguistic' time. Accounts, narratives, reports, tales, stories, historical settings, ... all possess time frame according to which the events and situations they convey are arranged in temporal order. Much of this is due to the grammatical means of temporal reference inherent to any natural language. The rest is produced in the interaction between the language structures, its pragmatics, and the speech act. In this talk I examine the extent of the role each of them plays in the time creation.

Adrian Currie (Victoria University of Wellington)

When are Analogies Okay?

If we want to know how traits have evolved in a particular target species, looking at unrelated species may be very helpful. Perhaps cases of convergent evolution act as 'natural experiments' which can inform models of Natural Selection. However, there appear to be good reasons to be conservative when using one species to model another. When we compare disparate lineages the similarities we find are 'shallow'. Natural Selection is too constrained by development to mould forms in a fashion which allows robust inferences to be made between them. If we stick to closely related lineages it is more likely that similar developmental mechanisms will be involved, and perhaps more stable inferences. I will reject this move and show that under certain conditions we are justified in looking at disparate lineages.

Jeff Dauer (University of Missouri-St. Louis)

Relativism, Epistemic Modals, and Contextual Projection

The last few years have seen a growing interest in the semantic analysis of epistemic modal claims such as "John might be in his office". By my lights, the most appealing analysis of epistemic modals is a relativistic account in which the truth-values of sentences containing epistemic modals vary with parameters of a context of assessment. However, in their paper, "CIA Leaks" Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies present some problems they think any relativistic account must deal with in order to constitute an acceptable semantic analysis of epistemic modals. I hope to show these objections are objections only to a particular type of semantic relativism. My aim in this paper is to defend a relativistic approach in which epistemic modal claims are sensitive to a context of assessment, not a particular assessor, which therefore avoids von Fintel and Gillies' objections.

Greg Dawes (Otago University)

Galileo does Fine in NOA's Ark

It seems that Galileo's disagreement with the Church might have been avoided if he had chosen to adopt a merely instrumentalist understanding of the Copernican theory. But Galileo was, it seems, a realist about scientific knowledge. The question is: What kind of a realist was he? Alexander Koyré argued for a strongly realist interpretation of Galileo's science, suggesting that his mathematically-oriented science shows him to be a Platonist. By way of contrast, I argue for a minimalist view of Galileo's realism, which attributes to the founder of modern science a "natural ontological attitude" (NOA) similar to that defended by Arthur Fine. Rather than endorsing a particular metaphysical view, Galileo's new science attempted (so far as possible) to avoid metaphysical commitments.

Dirk Derom (Victoria University of Wellington)

Applying the mechanistic philosophy to the storage and analysis of neuroscience data.

The transition from neuroscience data to information and knowledge is far from trivial. It's the combination of various expert disciplines, ranging from anatomy over network theory to behavioural neuroscience. The interplay between such intrinsically different data sets makes neurosciences a truly multidisciplinary effort. In this paper I reveal some of the major hiatuses in neuroscience, present a philosophical framework to resolve the methodological gaps and apply this philosophy-based mechanistic approach onto ontology design and our neuroscientific workbench. The emphasis of this paper therefore lies on the translation of data into information, an often, both by philosophers as by neuroscientists, neglected essential part of the neuroscience methodology. Here I present the consequences of the methodological lacuna: missing controlled vocabulary leading to semantic errors, not validated crossspecies interoperability inducing incorrect data exchange, shortcomings in data reports obstructing data exchange and ignored contemporary network theories simplifying highly complex functional models. I argue that the construction of a philosophical framework, which combines philosophy of information and the mechanistic model as advocated by Craver and Bechtel, allows to reveal the source of previous hiatuses and at the same time allows to explain data and therefore deduce information. Philosophy of information is able to reveal the characteristics of data, derivative data and information. The mechanistic model on its part focuses on the explanation of the studied neuroscience mechanisms. This mechanistic model is characterised by the predominance of effects over laws, a components- and properties-based modelling and the importance of various levels of explanation. It allows to initiate a set of explanatory criteria required for the explanation of neuroscience data. To conclude, I present the application of such philosophical framework onto our

neuroscience workbench called Metaneva (www.metaneva.org) and ontology design such as OBI (www.obi-ontology.org). I show that an ontology (cf. OBI) allows to exchange data, whereas a neuroscientific workbench is required to explain data.

Matthew Dentith (University of Auckland)

*Official Theories vs. Conspiracy Theories:
The Officious and the Official*

One of the arguments that belief in Conspiracy Theories is irrational stems from a common preference for “Official Theories”. Official Theories, in an ideal world, would be supported by a legitimate Appeal to Authority. However, some Official Theories are supported by appeal to merely political authorities. Any Conspiracy Theorist worth their salt will tell you that theories that are only supported in this way should be treated with suspicion. The mere fact that someone is in power doesn’t imply that they are an epistemic authority. If, in some cases, an Official Theory is backed up solely by appeal to political authority, should we prefer it over a Conspiracy Theory? I say “Yes,” but with caveats.

Matt Gers (Victoria University of Wellington)

Extending Supervenience and Intrinsic Evolution of the Mind

Jaegwon Kim argued in his paper ‘Psychophysical Supervenience’ that minds supervene upon internal states of organisms. He explicitly discounted the possibility that external states and relations may be part of the supervenience base of minds. Recent work in the philosophy of mind has cast doubt on this claim. In particular the thesis of Extended Mind suggests that some external objects, including cultural technologies, are properly seen as elements of the supervenience base for cognitive processes. I argue that real evolution of a thing necessitates intrinsic change of that thing. Much recent evolution of the human mind, and much ongoing change, is change in the ways that minds relate to external objects, and particularly to symbols and representations. If such objects are proper parts of the supervenience base of minds, then changes and evolution in these external objects, and the ways that brains relate to them, constitute intrinsic change and therefore real evolution of the human mind.

Michael Gilchrist (Victoria University of Wellington)

Paradigm and paradox: Is a Saussurean theory of truth possible?

There is an inchoate theory of truth in Saussure's theory of language: the truth predicate as a "sign of collective usage". But if it is a part of collective usage, the truth bearer must then be situated within the complex, partly random interaction between syntagmatic (combinatorial) and paradigmatic (compositional) relations which constitute a Saussurean sign system. This opens up the question of how the veracity of combinations of signs such as statements interacts with the authenticity of the signs that comprise such statements. This paper outlines how the truth predicate appears to function within this interaction and briefly considers whether such an account could be strong enough to explain the Liar paradox.

Martin Gray (Victoria University of Wellington)

Cave Art and the Evolution of Cognition

Cave art appeared in Western Europe some 40,000 years ago and perhaps even earlier in other parts of the world, but what function (if any) did it play in the cognitive evolution of our minds? I begin by providing a brief overview of some of the leading ideas concerning what could have motivated our ancestors to produce cave art – an issue that is closely tied to whether this sort of behaviour was the result of a by-product or an adaptation. I then attempt to determine the likely cognitive tools that would have been needed to accomplish this amazing example of the skills of early humans. Finally, I look at an alternative to the by-product vs adaptation debate by suggesting another possibility: that cave art was in fact an early step in the development of an extended mind.

Adam Green (Saint Louis University)

The Value Problem for Knowledge: A Relational Solution

In a forthcoming manuscript with Oxford University Press, Duncan Pritchard argues that knowledge does not have "final value". This means that knowledge has no intrinsic, non-instrumental value. He reasons that knowledge has final value only if it is an achievement of a knower. Since, however, virtuous efforts by an agent are not sufficient for knowledge, he reasons that knowledge cannot have *final* value in virtue of being an achievement. Rather, only a part of knowledge, virtuous cognitive endeavour, has final value, and one is not justified in predicating this value to knowledge as a whole. Pritchard neglects the possibility that knowledge could have final value in virtue of a relational good. In this paper, I use arguments based on thought experiments, linguistic

implicature, and our experience of knowing as inherently satisfying in order to give a relational account of the value of knowledge. The value of knowledge is being well connected to the world, a state that we value both instrumentally and for itself and which is not equivalent to a mere achievement.

Patrick Greenough (University of St. Andrews / University of Sydney)

Deflationism about Facts

Deflationism has typically been taken to be a thesis concerning truth. However that is just *one* kind of Deflationism. Another, and related, kind is Deflationism concerning facts (hereafter 'DF'). Surprisingly, DF has received little attention in the literature. In this paper, I set forth a version of DF and scrutinise its credentials. Specifically, I assess whether DF is compatible with the possibility of indeterminacy. Five conceptions of indeterminacy are scrutinised. DF is found to be incompatible with each. This gives us good reason to reject DF.

William Grey (University of Queensland)

Climate change and obligations to the future

Climate change poses serious ethical, social, political and technical challenges. The science is complex and (like all complex science) uncertain, but because of the potential seriousness of the problem posed by global warming the task of making significant and far-reaching choices in a situation of uncertainty is both urgent and important. Our individual and collective choices have potentially far-reaching implications for both non-humans and for future generations of humans. This paper will explore some of the central issues which arise in this complex debate, which include important concerns of environmental philosophy, such as obligations to the nonhuman world, and in applied ethics, such as issues of intergenerational equity and justice.

Carsten Hansen (Oslo University)

Might a Speaker's Knowledge of Meaning be Practical Knowledge?

In a stimulating recent paper, Jennifer Hornsby brings novel considerations to bear on the many-faceted issue over the nature of knowledge of meaning, and puts forward the view that 'the semantic knowledge exercised by people

when they speak is practical knowledge'. (Hornsby, 2005) In a response, Jason Stanley maintains that Hornsby 'does not succeed in her project', and argues in favour of the opposing idea that speech is a matter of making 'consciously accessible decisions' about which words to use – decisions that are based on knowledge of a semantic theory for the language in question. (Stanley, 2005) My aim in this paper is to adjudicate in the debate between Hornsby and Stanley, as well as to advance the issue on two fronts. First, I shall show that Stanley's arguments against Hornsby's view, and in favour of his own, are straightforwardly question-begging. Next, I shall explain why I think current psycholinguistic theories of speech production count against Stanley's view. Now, since novel proposals concerning such basic issues as the present one are far and few between, and since the psycholinguistic evidence points in the direction of the kind of view she favours, I think Hornsby's central thesis merits further exploration. And my final aim is to consider what exactly 'practical knowledge' might be. Hornsby herself claims to have done no more than 'give us a way of thinking' about the key notion of practical knowledge. In and of itself, however, this 'way of thinking' about practical knowledge is compatible with at least three, quite different, conceptions of what practical knowledge might really be: (1) a practical ability, (2) a form of propositional (though non-metalinguistic) knowledge, and (3) a sui generis form of knowledge. I consider the relative merits of these options.

Christoph Henning (University of St. Gallen, Switzerland)

*Perfectionism and Equality:
The Ethics of Flourishing in Marxian Theory*

In recent years moral and political theory have seen a "new" approach: perfectionism. It assumes that the moral good is the development of human abilities. Whereas most authors draw rather non- or even anti-egalitarian consequences (see, e.g. philosophers Harry Frankfurt and Richard Rorty, or political theorists like Lawrence Mead or Anthony Giddens), I will argue that perfectionism, properly understood, is egalitarian. Moreover, perfectionism can help to justify equality in a new way - which is also necessary, since in political philosophy equality is on the defensive. On a closer look, many egalitarians (like Rousseau or Tawney, e.g.) also prove to be perfectionists. This is also true for Karl Marx. I want to show in which way he was, from where he took this ideas (e.g. from William Thompson), and what this means for contemporary political philosophy.

Ben Jeffares (Victoria University of Wellington)

*Upstanding Citizens:
Australopithecines and the Foundations of Human Behaviour*

From the point of view of cognitive evolution, the Pliocene hominins have often been overlooked. For instance, Steven Mithen suggested that nothing much interesting happened until the emergence of the Homo genus. The notion that the Australopithecines are not much more than bi-pedal chimpanzees as far as cognitive evolution goes is wide-spread. I suggest that this is misguided for one simple reason: Bi-pedalism. Many theorists of previous generations thought that bi-pedalism was as crucial to human cognitive evolution as language or tool making. I answer two questions: Why it has been ignored, and why it should make a comeback as an important and unique "human" trait.

Justine Kingsbury (University of Waikato)

Being conciliatory about aesthetic appreciation

Some philosophers are very prescriptive about aesthetic appreciation. Allen Carlson and Kendall Walton think that you cannot properly aesthetically appreciate something without having and deploying considerable background knowledge about it (knowledge of genre and era in the case of artworks, scientific knowledge in the case of natural objects such as shells and sunsets). Formalists are opposed to this view but equally prescriptive: they think that you cannot properly aesthetically appreciate something without bracketing any such knowledge, which might otherwise distract you from fully experiencing the perceptible qualities of the object. One might wonder how any such claims can be defended. Surely there are lots of different ways of aesthetically appreciating things: why would you want to rule any of them out or privilege any one of them over the others? (This sort of pluralist view is defended by Noel Carroll.) This paper attempts to reconcile these three apparently inconsistent views. The pluralist, the formalist and the proponents of the Carlson/Walton view are each right about something; their mistake is to think they are all talking about the same thing.

Fred Kroon (University of Auckland)

Fictional realism and fictional emotions.

According to Walton, we don't really fear objects of fiction. What we really experience is quasi-fear, a complex of sensations and physiological states that make it fictional that we fear the monster. Recent work on the paradox of fictional emotions, such as Gendler and Kovakovich's article on the topic in

Blackwell's *Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics*, has tended to favour the contrary view that we do bear genuine, rational emotions to fictions. In this paper I argue for a compromise view. We do experience genuine emotions like fear when engaging with the content of works of fiction, but to the extent that with fictional objects there is literally nothing to fear, it can't be the case that we genuinely fear *fictional objects*. It is at best fictional that we do so.

J. R. Kuntz (University of Edinburgh)

- and -

Joana R.C. Pimentel (University of Canterbury)

Philosophical Intuitions, the Philosophers' View

This paper addresses the definition and the operational use of intuitions in philosophical methods. The authors conducted survey research encompassing several regions of the globe and involving 282 philosophers from a wide array of academic backgrounds and areas of specialisation. We tested whether philosophers agree on the conceptual definition of intuitions, ascertained how philosophers use intuitions to formulate (discovery) and to test (justification) philosophical theory, and investigated whether specific demographic variables and philosophical background influence how philosophers define and use intuitions. The results obtained point to a number of significant findings regarding the definition and the operational use of intuitions. This paper canvasses the relevant literature on intuitions, provides a quantitative summary of survey findings to inform a debate on this topic, and advances more defined routes for subsequent approaches to the study of intuitions, including responses to objections suggested in the literature.

Cathy Legg (University of Waikato)

*The hardness of the iconic must:
Can Peirce's existential graphs assist modal epistemology?*

The current of development in 20th century logic bypassed Peirce's existential graphs, but recently much good work has been done by formal logicians excavating the graphs from Peirce's manuscripts, regularizing them and demonstrating the soundness and completeness of the alpha and beta systems (e.g. Roberts 1973, Hammer 1998, Shin 2002). However, given that Peirce himself considered the graphs to be his 'chef d'oeuvre' in logic, and explored the distinction between icons, indices and symbols in detail within the context of a much larger theory of signs, much about the graphs arguably remains to be thought through from the perspective of philosophical logic. For instance, are the graphs always merely of heuristic value or can they convey an 'essential icon' (analogous to the now standardly accepted 'essential indexical')? This paper claims they can and do, and suggests important

consequences follow from this for the epistemology of modality. It is boldly suggested that structural articulation, which is characteristic of icons alone, is the source of all necessity. In other words, recognizing a statement as necessarily true consists only in an unavoidable recognition that a structure has the particular structure that it in fact has. (What else could it consist in?)

Brent Madison (The University of Notre Dame, Australia)

Epistemic Internalism: Mentalism or Access?

The so-called internalism/externalism debate is of interest in epistemology since it addresses one of the most fundamental questions in the discipline: what is the basic nature of epistemic justification? What has been called epistemic internalism holds, as the label suggests, that all the relevant factors that determine positive epistemic status of a belief must be “internal”. A common way that the “internal” is understood is those things that are, or easily can be, available to the agent’s conscious awareness. However, there is another, and increasingly popular, way of spelling out the epistemically “internal”. A view advocated by Feldman and Conee which they regard as a kind of epistemic internalism, called ‘Mentalism’, holds that epistemic justification strongly supervenes upon the mental. In this paper I will show that even many of those who claim to deny an awareness requirement implicitly appeal to it to motivate their accounts of justification. By considering the arguments for ‘Mentalism’ I will show that, unless an awareness requirement is presupposed, the cases that such arguments appeal to are of no intuitive force. Therefore, insofar as one wants to be an internalist about epistemic justification, one needs to motivate, articulate, and defend an access/awareness condition. Epistemic Internalism, properly construed, ought to stress the epistemic significance of consciousness and the first person perspective.

John Maier (ANU RSSH)

The Epistemic Condition on Intention

Intention, like belief, is subject to requirements of consistency and coherence.

Some authors, such as David Velleman, have tried to explain this fact by claiming that intention is, or at least entails, a belief of a certain sort, and that the requirements on intention derive from the corresponding requirements on belief. Others, such as Michael Bratman, have denied that there is any such entailment, and have argued that the requirements on intention are to be explained instead in terms of the practical demands on effective agency. I propose a different explanation. Intention is not, and does not entail, any belief. But an agent’s intentions are rationally governed by his knowledge, in the following sense: S ought to intend to A only if he is in a position to know

that he can A. This condition on intention is motivated by reflection on what we can rationally intend under conditions of uncertainty. And the truth of this condition is what explains why intention is subject to requirements of consistency and coherence. I close by discussing the relationship between the epistemic condition on intention and other epistemic conditions that have recently been proposed, such as Timothy Williamson's "knowledge rule" for assertion.

Raamy Majeed (The University of Sydney)

Representationalism without Experiential Deflationism

Usually when we attempt to account for the phenomenal character of our experiences, we either end up denying that our experiences have a phenomenal character and we thereby become deflationists about experiences or we end up granting that our experiences have a phenomenal character at the expense of committing to nonphysical properties. Representationalists however can offer us a novel way to deal with the phenomenal character of our experiences that might enable us to avoid both experiential deflationism and a commitment to nonphysical properties. In this paper I explain what this representationalist strategy consists of and I then raise some problems that need to be overcome for this strategy to ever be successful.

John Matthewson (Australian National University)

What is explanatory generality?

Scientists and philosophers of science agree that when a model is intended to be explanatory, it must be general. But what this generality amounts to is usually not explicitly discussed, and when authors are explicit, they disagree. I offer an account of explanatory generality that connects this desideratum to the insight that explanation is *contrastive*. This account is used to show that in order to be explanatory, a model must apply to systems beyond the one to be explained, and that sometimes these relevant other systems are non-actual. It also shows why alternative accounts of generality have been tempting to philosophers, but ultimately fail.

Jonathan Mckeown-Green (University of Auckland)

Getting over determinism

It is still widely assumed that the possibility of determinism either threatens free agency or constrains the kind of agency we can reasonably take ourselves to have. This is puzzling, given the state-of-play in the philosophy of science and the philosophy of action. I argue that the question of whether determinism is true is irrelevant to the question of whether we have free will.

The falsity of determinism does not, in and of itself, derail any challenge to our freedom: the relevant challenge comes from naturalism, whether or not the laws of nature are deterministic. Meanwhile, the truth of determinism arguably does not, in and of itself, constitute any threat to freedom: even the libertarian can have the kind of agency she endorses in a deterministic world. My aim is to distil, streamline and enrich arguments for these conclusions that are mostly in the literature already.

David Merry (University of Auckland)

Joe's Carpet and the Great Aesthetic Cognitivism Conflation

Let aesthetic learning be the thesis that our capacity to learn from artworks contributes to their quality as artworks. Let aesthetic truth be the thesis that the truth or falsity of the contents of artworks contributes to their quality as artworks. The former thesis is more interesting than the latter, but the two have traditionally been conflated under the catch-all 'aesthetic cognitivism'. However, the example of problem-solving in mathematical education shows how these two theses come apart. This distinction is useful in casting new light on two recent treatments of the question of aesthetic cognitivism: one by Gaut and the other by Lamarque. As they stand, neither of these accounts is an adequate treatment of the aesthetic learning thesis, but Lamarque's can be modified to create a powerful argument against aesthetic learning.

Clemency Montelle (University of Canterbury)

The Greek mathematical diagram as a metonym for an epiphany

A Greek mathematical text is essentially incomplete without a diagram. Not simply a pedagogical aid, nor merely a convenient visual summary of an otherwise complete mathematical proposition articulated in prose, the diagram is essential to the very recognition rationally that a proposition has been demonstrated. Furthermore, as was acknowledged even by some ancient thinkers, 'the diagram' in this context is ambiguous between many senses. As is implied by the dynamic language employed by Greek practitioners, we move about the diagram as we construct it, but it moves us too, to a timeless

insight. The diagram is both a production as well as a metonym for an epiphany. To both contrast and complement ancient views on diagrams, I summarise and endorse some conclusions of Reviel Netz and also consider work by John Mumma that possesses an opposite drift: for Mumma fashions the Greek mathematical diagram a symbol (viz. of all the uncountably many diagrams that there are of an equivalent type). That move then allows Mumma to urge that diagrammatic reasoning in Greek mathematics is after all symbolic, and logical. I consider the merits, but also the costs, of such a view.

Michael Morreau (University of Maryland)

Absurd Tradeoffs in Evaluating Counterfactuals

David Lewis relied throughout his philosophy on relations of overall similarity among ordinary objects, possible worlds and other things. And he recognized that for these relations to be useful, similarities and differences will have to trade off. That is, sometimes things will be more similar overall because they are more similar in some particular respect, even though this comes at the cost of a greater difference in some other respect. This talk is about the tradeoffs among similarities and differences in the account of conditionals that Lewis gave in "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow." These tradeoffs, I argue, are in a precise sense absurd; and so this account does not adequately characterize the possible worlds relevant for evaluating counterfactuals. I conclude by considering the prospects of other accounts that do not rely on aggregations of similarities and differences in several respects.

Nicholas Munn (CAPPE, University of Melbourne)

Reconciling the Criminal and Participatory Responsibilities of the Youth

In this paper I examine the differential responsibility attributed to the youth in criminal activities, and political participation. I argue that there are sufficient similarities in the requirements for responsibility in each of these fields, that the different responses to them currently instantiated cannot legitimately be upheld. I suggest alternatives.

Rekha Nath (University of Auckland)

*Six degrees of Kevin Bacon:
Why we have obligations towards worse-off foreigners*

The question of whether or not we ought to care about global inequality has been at the center of discussions of global justice. Several recent proponents of global egalitarianism have focused on the existence of a global rule-based structure as a sufficient condition for giving rise to duties of global egalitarian justice. Within this rule-based structure, the morally arbitrary nature of global inequality—exemplified by the bad luck of being born in Nigeria rather than the Netherlands—is given a central role in highlighting its injustice. In this paper, I present an alternative account of what is wrong with global inequality, which I call ‘global social egalitarianism’. According to this account, the unjust nature of global inequality can only be determined by assessing the actual social and political relations in which individuals from different parts of the world stand. Following my discussion of the implications of this account, I consider some of the major objections that appear to threaten it.

Anne Newstead (University of New South Wales)

Blind mathematicians and the role of vision in mathematical understanding

What is the role of vision in mathematical cognition? It cannot be essential to mathematical understanding and knowledge, because we can study mathematical structures that cannot be visualized at all. For example, certain functions in analysis ('monsters') cannot be visualized at all, but we can study their properties. Furthermore, uncritical reliance on pictures and visual diagrams can lead to faulty generalizations. It is therefore important to attend to only the relevant universal features of a particular diagram.

Nonetheless, suspicions about the misleading nature of visual experience should not lead us to dismiss the role of vision in mathematical cognition altogether. The concordance of visual-spatiality ability and mathematical ability is well established. Furthermore, studies of congenitally blind children show that without visual experience acquisition of geometrical (shape) concepts is delayed. To be sure, other kinds of non-visual experience may substitute for visual experience: blind children can learn geometry through touch rather than sight. What these considerations suggest is that visual experience is very helpful but indeed not necessary for mathematical knowledge and understanding.

Robert Nola (University of Auckland)

Inference to the Best Explanation and Darwin's argument in favour of Natural Selection

It would appear that in *The Origins of Species* Darwin uses some version of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) to argue in favour of his theory of Natural Selection and against Special Creationism. Some, such as Tim Lewens, cast doubt on the role of IBE here while others, such as Elliott Sober look to a theory of how one hypothesis is to be favoured over another based on a Principle of Likelihood. The paper will examine some of Darwin's own arguments in this context, what is the best way of characterising the arguments he employs, Darwin's claim that Special Creationism is in the long run wholly useless as an explanation, and the connection between explanationism and evidence.

Josh Parsons (Otago University)

Command and consequence

"Attack at dawn if the weather is fine! The weather is fine. Therefore, attack at dawn!" Is this a valid argument? Is it an instance of modus ponens? Supposing it is, what does that show about validity and about the imperative mood?

Roy Perrett (University of Hawaii)

Can I Doubt That I Exist?

The standard received view (held by many philosophers, all of whom take it to be self-evidently true) is that I cannot doubt that I exist – though it remains controversial exactly why this is so and what it implies about the nature of the self. Psychiatric patients suffering from an extreme form of Cotard's Delusion, however, assert that they do not exist. I address this apparent empirical challenge to the received view about the first-person indubitability of one's own existence.

Glen Pettigrove (University of Auckland)

Apologizing for who I am

Philosophical investigations into the nature of apologies typically focus on apologizing for a transgression, a sin or, more generally, a wrong-action. The accounts of apology that emerge from these investigations are chiefly concerned with actions and their outcomes. A quick glance at the literature on forgiveness reveals a similar focus. The standard philosophical account of forgiveness presupposes that the thing for which a person is forgiven is a wrong act and that the focus of the forgiver's resentment or anger prior to forgiving was that action. One result of this focus on actions is that a very important dimension of moral failures remains unaddressed, namely, failures of character. I shall present a case for expanding the standard accounts of apology and forgiveness to include this neglected dimension.

Charles Pigden (Otago University)

*Is George a Traitor?
Geach's Problem and Imperative Consequence*

Can you validly derive imperatives from indicatives? No. Can you validly derive indicatives from imperatives? Sometimes yes. As Geach pointed out, when the King says 'If you are a faithful subject, rise up Sir George - but do not rise up, stay on your knees fellow!', it is a consequence of the King's two imperatives that the unfortunate George is not a faithful subject. I develop a concept of imperative consequence designed to accommodate Geach's observation and use it to disprove prescriptivism.

Geoffrey Roche

Much Sense The Starkest Madness: Sade's Moral Scepticism

In this paper I evaluate the claim made by Adorno and Horkheimer that Sade's fictional works contain a robust argument against moral convention. More specifically, I evaluate Sade's arguments for moral scepticism and hedonistic egoism. Firstly, I show that Sade's moral scepticism relies heavily on both moral essentialism and a questionable appeal to moral relativism. Secondly, I note that Sade's characters enter into mutually beneficial agreements in order to flourish as criminals, even as they adhere to an immoralist doctrine that rejects any moral obligation to others. This suggests that, in practical terms, Sade's attempt to evade morality collapses into contradiction. Thirdly, I evaluate Sade's argument that, on both hedonistic and pragmatic grounds, a life lived outside the confines of conventional morality is preferable to the agent than a moral life. I conclude that Sade's

argument for an immoral life is compelling only for those who lack any sense of guilt or empathy, and who live amongst moral agents. More generally, I show that Sade offers no compelling criticism of normative ethics.

Melanie Rosen (Macquarie University)

Dreams are Narrow Minded

Alva Noë proposes a radical extended mind view, which he refers to as the extended substrate thesis. The majority of philosophers who argue that the mind is partially constituted by objects external to the brain limit their thesis to certain cognitive functions such as memory and mathematic ability, excluding phenomenal experience from the scope of their thesis. Noë, on the other hand, argues that we have no reason to discount the possibility that phenomenal states are partially externally constituted. In particular, Noë rejects the argument that dreams are a reasonable counter example to such a radical thesis. In this paper I shall evaluate his view and propose that dreams, in particular lucid dreams, provide a more convincing counterargument than he allows. I shall consider three main strands of Noë's argument. Firstly, the fact that dreams may involve no interaction with the external environment makes it unlikely that dreams are conscious experiences at all. Secondly, we have good reason to consider dreaming and waking experiences to be different types of consciousness, so that whatever is true of dreams, waking experiences may be partially constituted by things outside the head. Thirdly, dreaming experiences seem to be restricted to amalgamations of waking experiences, so there is not good reason to think even dreams are entirely restricted to the head. I shall in turn argue that these three arguments do not disprove that dreams are instances of full blown consciousness that exist in the head alone.

Luke Russell (University of Sydney)

Doing Away With Evil?

Some people claim that no actions or persons are evil, and hence that we should drop the concept of evil from contemporary moral discourse. I argue that everyday uses of the concept of evil are varied, and that we cannot assess the usefulness of the concept without first disambiguating it. Once these ambiguities are clarified we can see that there are various psychologically thick and psychologically thin conceptions of evil that apply to actual actions and persons. However, critics could argue that the very ambiguity of the concept of evil shows that everyday claims involving evil are problematic. If we need to stipulate refined definitions of evil in order to make ourselves clear, why not just drop the term 'evil' from moral discourse and instead use the terms that we offered as definitions? We seem to face a dilemma: either 'evil' is too ambiguous to be useful, or, if we disambiguate 'evil', then we can

say everything we want to say without using the term 'evil' at all. Either way, we seem to be better off if we stop talking about evil. Philosophers face similar problems whenever there are a plurality of refined concepts that are supposed to be versions of a comparatively unclear folk concept (e.g. biological species, weakness of will). Does the process of philosophical analysis drag us towards a kind of error theory about the referents of folk concepts?

Matheson Russell (University of Auckland)

*Intersubjectively mediated self-consciousness:
A partial defense of the Habermasian account*

Jürgen Habermas's contention that the "philosophy of the subject" needs to be supplanted by a "post-metaphysical" linguistic-pragmatic paradigm has been the subject of concerted criticism recently by a number of contemporary German philosophers, including Dieter Henrich, Manfred Frank, Ludwig Nagl and Dieter Freundlieb. The debate has centred around the status of the traditional philosophical categories of "subjectivity", "self" and "self-consciousness". In particular, objections have been raised to the claim made by Habermas that self-consciousness is only possible on the basis of intersubjective mediation. This paper aims to critically analyse these recent objections to Habermas's intersubjectivism and to defend a modified version of Habermas's intersubjective account of self-consciousness by drawing upon work by Edmund Husserl. An important theorist of intersubjectivity in his own right, Husserl provides relevant philosophical insights that have been largely ignored by the protagonists in the present debates. Indeed, the linguistic-pragmatic approach to self-consciousness and the phenomenological approach have heretofore operated in largely disconnected spheres. This paper seeks to build bridges between these two major theoretical strands of intersubjectivist philosophy.

Kim Shaw-Williams (Victoria University of Wellington)

The Hominin Narrative Faculty

Every theorist would agree that the behaviourally modern human mind is a narrative machine; we cannot help cognitively 'carving nature at its joints' and cannot function without our own self-narratives being embedded in the cultures we are born into, and that these cultures in turn are the result of the narrative devising and surmising of, at the very least, several hundreds of generations of our ancestors. I argue that this hominin narrative faculty (HNF), which I define as the cognitive capacity for narratively constructed decoupled mental simulations or imaginings of agents intentionally acting towards goals in the elsewhere and elsewhere, is what qualitatively separated the pre-hominin mind from the ancestral ape mind in the first place. In this

paper I will briefly explain why and when only pre-hominins got it, and how it provided them with the anticipatory cognition or foresight that is indicated by Oldowan archaeological cultural debris. In the process I hope to achieve a believable exposition of how our Oldowan ancestors may have actually 'thought' 2.6 million years ago.

Neil Sinhababu (National University of Singapore)

How Jenny and the cannibal desire Orlando Bloom

Michelle Montague argues that propositionalism, the view that all of our intentional attitudes are propositional attitudes, fails in the case of liking. I first discuss two advantages of propositionalism in the case of desire. Propositionalism correctly identifies the cases in which we regard two agents as desiring the same thing, and it also allows desire to do the explanatory work that it is supposed to. I then extend these arguments to propositionalism about liking. I conclude by considering ways for objectualists to defend their view in light of these arguments.

Kim Sterelny (ANU / Victoria University of Wellington)

Niche Construction and the Extended Mind

Many theorists currently argue that human intelligence cannot be explained solely by appeal to the intrinsic, internal resources of human agents. One set of theorists, defending "the extended mind models" argue that human cognitive systems include components external to human bodies, and those resources are crucial in explaining our cognitive competences. Others argue that we are component because we are informational engineers; individually and collectively, we adapt the informational characteristics of our world, to improve our capacities to act effectively in that world. Are these views notational variants of one another, or are they substantively different? If they are different, which is best?

Charles Summers (University of Auckland)

Coercion Claims and Restorative Justice

Discussions of restorative justice frequently note the difficulties in determining which processes and outcomes count as properly restorative. To date the debate has generally been cast as one between purist and maximalist models. Purist models hold that restorative justice requires face-to-face

encounters between the parties involved. Maximalist models hold that restorative justice requires an outcome that to some extent restores the parties to some morally appropriate level. Using examples from New Zealand's implementation of restorative justice, what I intend to do in this paper is show that a) the suggested implementation of restorative justice in the context of the criminal justice system presents serious worries about the unavoidable presence of coercion for both the purist and maximalist models, b) neither the purist or maximalist approach adequately explains how to implement restorative justice in the criminal justice system in light of the problems with coercion that it presents and c) that the solution to these problems requires a more flexible approach than the purist presents and a more robust insistence on voluntariness than the maximalist requires. This solution has significant implications for the possibilities of systematising restorative justice as a response to crime.

Christine Swanton (University of Auckland)

The Philosophical Power of Hume's Account of Love

Hume's notion of love is not one of the great sources of modern philosophical thought on love in the analytic tradition. I think this neglect should be rectified. In particular his idea that the object of love is an individual while its cause is properties including relational properties of individuals, as well as his account of the role played by the imagination in the psychology of love, can solve one of the great philosophical problems of love: the "Platonic Paradox". This paper elaborates Hume's notion of love as a passion distinct from both benevolence and compassion, and shows how it can resolve the Platonic Paradox. Hume rocks!

Koji Tanaka (University of Auckland)

Diagram, logic and normativity

The main motivation for the development of the 'diagrammatical' Begriffsschrift, Frege says, is the need for the precision of expressions where 'nothing intuitive could intrude here unnoticed' and 'the chain of inference [is] free of gaps' (Begriffsschrift, p. IV). But what exactly does Begriffsschrift give us? Does it give us a way to construct a gap free proof? Or does it give us a set of expressions that a gap free proof must conform to? These two questions might be thought to be the same. However, the positive answer to the first question presupposes that logic is prescriptive for the process of the construction of a proof; whereas the positive answer to the second question presupposes that logic is prescriptive for the evaluation of a proof. It is this distinction that has been often overlooked in a discussion of the normativity of

logic, for example, by Gilbert Harman and, most recently, Hartry Field. In this paper, I argue that logic is normative in the second sense and not the first sense for Frege based on my analysis of the relationship between the 'diagrammatical' nature of Begriffsschrift and a proof. I will then show why the two senses of the prescriptive nature of logic must be kept separate even though they often work in tandem in a proof.

Kate Tappenden (Victoria University of Wellington)

*Embodied Animal Cognition:
A case study with domestic dogs, canis familiaris*

Embodied cognition has gained in popularity over the last ten years as an approach to the study of the human mind. At the basis of embodied cognition is the notion that cognitive processes are not confined to an agent's brain. Instead, cognitive processes incorporate the non-neural body and relevant aspects of the environment too. Using domestic dogs as a case study, I argue that much can be benefited from applying the framework of embodied cognition to the study of non-human animals' cognitive processes. With embodied cognition to sharpen our conception of the dog's cognitive processes, I go on to suggest that representations still have a role to play in the cognitive processes of domestic dogs. This presentation ends with an account of representation in the domestic dog and several arguments for their explanatory value.

Kirsten Walsh (University of Otago)

Speculation, Experiment and Mathematics in 18th Century Optics

Early modern natural philosophy is usually characterised as a period of animosity between rationalist and empiricist traditions. However, Anstey has argued convincingly that this period is better characterised as a battle between speculative and experimental approaches. I discuss two issues with this picture of early modern natural philosophy. Firstly, Kuhn makes a similar distinction between speculative and experimental traditions, but disagrees with Anstey over how it applies to particular cases. Kuhn argues that there is a natural division between speculative sciences, such as astronomy and statics, and experimental sciences, such as magnetism and electricity. However, Anstey argues that the sciences do not divide neatly in this way. Rather, the debate between speculative and experimental approaches took place within particular disciplines. Secondly, mathematics is a characteristic feature of modern science that developed during the early modern period. How does mathematics fit into the above picture of early modern natural philosophy? Kuhn argues that mathematics was employed in the speculative sciences, but not in the experimental sciences. Anstey similarly argues that mathematics

was considered part of the speculative approach, but argues that the experimental approach was not anti-mathematics. Rather, experimentalists simply could not see how mathematics could be used to generate knowledge. Against these two arguments, Hakfoort argues that mathematics was neither speculative nor experimental; rather, it was a different kind of approach. I use 18th century optics as a case study, in order to shed some light on these issues. My work in this area is at an early stage, but I present some interesting initial findings for discussion.

Li Wanquan (National University of Singapore)

*Conception of Self and Partiality toward Family Members:
The Case of Holding*

This essay attempts to examine the connection between certain conceptions of self and partiality in general and that toward family members in particular in an attempt to argue for a weak version of family-related partiality based on certain conceptions of self. The issue will be addressed in two steps. First, I will introduce the idea of identity-holding discussed by Hilde Lindemann and Rebecca Kukla and argue that identity-holding suggests partiality in general and that toward family members in particular. The identity-holding is distinguished into two different kinds, holding somebody as a person, and holding somebody in her particular identity. Although these two kinds of holding are closely connected, the distinction would prove to be of significance if we consider the idea of holding with similar yet different kinds of conceptions of self and partiality in general and that toward family members in particular. Second, after a brief distinction established between identity as identification and identity as definition, I will examine certain conceptions of self, for example, the idea of relational self in care ethics among others, which would support the project of identity-holding. The concept of relational self will be examined in two parts, each of which corresponds to some extent to one kind of identity-holding. If other conceptions of self bear resemblance to either of these two parts, it follows that they can also function in the similar way in other moral theories of which they are essential parts. Such comparison will be made between relational self in care ethics and the concept of self in communitarianism. In the end, it needs to be emphasized that, despite their similarities in conception of self in relation to identity-holding and partiality, it does not follow that these two theories are similar regarding the issue of partiality since there are other essential parts in each theory which would influence their attitudes toward the issue of partiality.

Zach Weber (University of Sydney)

The Mathematics of Vagueness

I consider the sorites paradox at increasing levels of generality: first, the canonical discrete grains-of-sand version; then a continuous version using elementary real analysis; and finally a completely general version using only basic point-set topology. The topological sorites does not include any notions of number, order, or metric, and yet is still recognizably a sorites paradox. With the topological version comes also a new and more flexible definition of vagueness. This exercise gives us a platform to discuss methodological questions about explanation, abstraction, and the role of mathematical tools in solving philosophical problems. It also gives us a deepened understanding of what makes the sorites paradox tick. This is joint work with Mark Colyvan.

John S. Wilkins (University of Sydney)

Cognition and social psychology as explanations of religion

There has been an extensive movement to explain religion in evolutionary terms by employing cognitive science and psychology in the past few years. However, it is not clear what the explicandum is. I will delineate the various kinds of explanation, and propose an account of religion as a convergently arrived at solution for social coordination, employing a shared human social dominance psychology, which humans share with apes in our own unique manner. I will attempt to reconcile this account with that of such researchers as Justin Barrett and Pascal Boyer on agency detection and minimally counterintuitive agents.

Steve Winter (University of Auckland, Political Studies)

Against Posthumous Rights (For Nonconsequentialists)

A number of prominent nonconsequentialists support the thesis that we can wrong the dead by violating their moral claims. In contrast, I argue that the arguments offered by Thomson, Scanlon, Dworkin, Feinberg and others do not warrant assent to posthumous rights because having claim-grounding interests requires an entity to have the capacity to experience significance. If dead people don't have this capacity, there is no reason to attribute claims to them. After raising doubts about prominent hypothetical examples of 'no-effect injury', I conclude that nonconsequentialists should consider adopting an error theory regarding posthumous claims, and suggest some other explanations of the relevant moral domains.

Andrew Withy (University of Auckland)

How we use 'and', 'or' and maybe 'if-then' (but not 'but').

I outline a semi-formal explanation of why some English sentences are acceptable and others are not. The so-called truth-functional connectives of natural language are used to convey much more than just their truth value. A simple modification of the classical truth tables allows us to indicate whether the left or right subformula provides epistemic support for the truth (or falsity) of the overall formula for each truth-table row. By imposing simple requirements on the set of reasons for the conclusion, I develop a family of epistemically motivated systems. The strongest of these systems models and predicts a range of Gricean implicatures generated by our different uses of 'and', 'or', 'if-then', and similar connectives. I will also describe how these epistemic requirements impose relevance on conclusions, and sketch how we can use this kind of relevant consequence to resolve the Tichy-Miller paradox that bedevils verisimilitude of false theories in Philosophy of Science.