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*“A cold week away from
civilization”*

ABSTRACTS

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KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

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Giving Dualism its Due

As a methodological exercise, I pretend to be a Cartesian Dualist, and argue that if one really were such a person one would be rightly unimpressed by the case against Dualism; from a neutral point of view, Dualism is entirely defensible.

Professor Eleonore Stump

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Modes of Knowing: Autism, Fiction, and Second-person Perspectives

The rapid, perplexing increase in the incidence of autism has led to a correlative increase in research on it. The most salient feature of autism is now thought to be its severe impairment in what psychologists call ‘social cognition’, or what some philosophers call ‘mindreading’, namely, the knowledge of persons and their mental states. Autism’s deficits as regards social cognition or mind-reading have made researchers increasingly aware of what normally developing children can do effortlessly, and the recent studies of autism have been matched by new studies of the abilities of normally functioning children. This research in developmental psychology and neurobiology has done a great deal to illuminate the nature of social cognition or mind-reading. These new insights about the knowledge of persons illuminates the nature of a second-person experience or perspective, and these results are in turn highly suggestive for the philosophy of art. A fiction – that is, a story, play, or film – can be thought of as a second-person account, making available to an audience a real or imagined set of second-person experiences. On this way of thinking about fiction, it is a means of mediating knowledge of persons.

APPLIED ETHICS

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On the Autonomy of Nanoethics

Recently, a big deal has been made about "nanoethics" or, less colloquially, the ethical and social implications of nanotechnology. Governments are shelling out huge amounts of dollars for research into the pure science as well as for these aforementioned investigations. Despite all of the interest, it is still hard to separate the reality from the hype of these new technologies and, therefore, any critical ethical investigation is hard to delimit. More skeptically, there is nothing new in either nanoscience or nanoethics; rather these fields are just the amalgamations of already existing ones, and whatever there might otherwise have been to talk about has already taken place under other guises. While I share much of this skepticism, I nevertheless maintain that these discussions are important and therefore will defend a tempered legitimization of nanoethics.

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Emotional Autonomy, Depression and Psychotherapy

The two common treatments for depression, antidepressant medication and Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, are of roughly equivalent efficacy. However, I make an ethical case for psychotherapy as the preferred treatment, based on its capacity to promote autonomy. Through therapy the depressed person is apprised of facts about negative biases and the causative role of stressors. In consequence there is greater understanding of the evidence afforded by affect for both pessimistic predictions and the presence of psychosocial stressors. Understanding these evaluative properties of affect promotes what might be termed "emotional autonomy".

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Schmoralising: Applied Error Theory

Simon Blackburn has questioned why an error theorist, such as J.L. Mackie, does not develop an alternative to traditional moral discourse - perhaps, as Blackburn suggests, it could be called "schmoralising". Schmoralising would avoid the alleged error of presupposing the objectivity of first-order moral claims. Richard Garner attempts to show

what such an alternative might be like, in his recommendation (with examples) that we adopt a practice of "applied amorality". Although he does not suggest any radically revisionist changes to first-order moral discourse, Mackie does engage in an element of schmorality: he attempts to address practical moral and political problems within the framework of his meta-ethical theory. Furthermore, it appears possible to apply Mackie's framework to many practical questions - if the purpose (in some sense) of moral and legal norms is to serve human interests and projects, it is possible to deliberate about which norms would be most effective for that purpose. For example, an issue such as stem-cell research can be discussed in terms of what interests and projects are advanced by either endorsing or condemning the practice (and by using the power of the state either to encourage or discourage it). Assuming that Mackie and Garner are essentially correct, two deeper questions arise from this discussion. How far should moral philosophers go in revising their first-order moral language? How far is it possible, or desirable, to revise the language of everyday, non-philosophical kinds of moral deliberation and argument?

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Ethics as Praxis: Contemporary Movements

Michel Foucault is well known for his earlier archaeological and genealogical works. In comparison, Foucault's later ethical period, which includes works such as *The Use of Pleasure* (UP) and *The Care of the Self* (CS) explore "practices of the self". In UP, Foucault explores the "self's relationship to self" or what he terms ethics, focusing predominantly on the self's constitution of self as a moral agent. CS, though an ongoing elaboration of ethics, primarily discusses a dominant theme within ethics, that is, a certain epoch in time when care of the self was a dominant mode of ethics. Within the context of Foucault's later work I explore two recent ethical movements. The Yamakasi are a group of French practitioners of the sport of l'art du déplacement. Similar to parkour in their effortless negotiation of both urban and natural terrain, they move beyond parkour to embody an asceticism of being "strong body, strong spirit, strong person". Originating in the first generation of densely urbanised mixed ethnicity, it is this generation's response to urban obstacles and their freedom from the urban landscape's seeming limitations. Further afield, in San Francisco, the Compactors are a group of individuals dedicated "to a 12 month flight from the consumer grid (calendar year 2007)". They aim to move beyond recycling in the simplification of their lives by avoiding commercial consumption and giving preference to non-commercial economies and local markets. Blogging, for compactors, has become a shared space in which to negotiate the "fair and reasonable person" standard when considering necessary exceptions. Interesting examples include debates on windscreen wipers to tidbits on recycling and local green economies. Yet blogging also forms the basis for sharing insightful personal discussions on the ascetic values of compacting within the wider debate of globalization.

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A Qualified Defense of Principles of Justified Acquisition and Duty-Imposing-Powers

Theories of Natural Property Rights, including various classical liberal, libertarian, and left-libertarian paradigms, grant humans Appropriative Powers (APs). Such powers allow moral agents, through their activities, to acquire property-rights over previously unowned objects. An important set of arguments arrayed against APs hinges in on one ostensibly acrimonious feature; such powers necessarily involve the unilateral imposition of new duties upon the entire world's people. APs are in this way a member of a larger species of moral relations: they are Duty-Imposing-Powers. Seizing upon the putative weirdness, unfamiliarity and baselessness of Duty-Imposing-Powers, some commentators have argued that APs may be simply rejected, while others have demanded they answer to certain exacting criteria.

I argue that an investigation into the many plausible (but oft-unnoticed) ways in which we mundanely impose duties on each other provides a much-needed backdrop to application of this methodology, dissolving claims of weirdness, unfamiliarity and baselessness, and allowing the distillation of criteria which successfully demarcate the worrisome aspects of some APs.

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The Lesser of Two Terrors

Michael Ignatieff argues that suspensions of human rights in times of emergency are legitimate if and only if they are publicly defended by the government, are subject to judicial review, and have sunset clauses built into them. He claims that this represents the lesser of two evils for liberal democracies fighting terrorism. I argue against this way of thinking about the challenges international terrorism poses of liberal democracies.

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Ethical Disagreement, 'Bioethics Policy' and the Demands of Democracy

What are the sources and limits of legitimacy in public policy development? To whom should contentious policies be justified? In this paper, I explore the democratic demands placed on policy-makers charged with developing policy in areas that challenge distinctions between public and private spheres of activity and are recognised as ethically

contentious. There is a long theoretical literature on the legitimate exercise of state authority and ethical disagreement, this paper focuses on the 'real life' problem for contemporary liberal democracies of justifying policy in ethically contested domains as legitimate. I draw on theoretical and empirical work on deliberative democracy in an assessment of whether some ethical policy contests may be “too hot” to be resolved through a process of deliberation that confers legitimacy. I then ask whether, in such cases, policy-makers should aim more modestly, not for legitimacy, but for contestable processes that will, at best, yield a *modus vivendi* justification for policy (without conferring legitimacy). This paper forms part of the theoretical framework for a four year ARC Discovery Project “Big-Picture Bioethics: policy-making in liberal democracy” <http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/research/bigpicturebioethics/index.html>

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The Death Penalty and the Principle of Goodness

This paper examines the death penalty question from the perspective of the new ethical theory, the Principle of Goodness. At first sight, the Principle seems to be a strictly tighter moral principle than Kant's categorical imperative; yet we find that the application diverges from the recommendations of Kant in this case. Unlike many discussions of this question, which often argue either no, or yes with a discussion of which crimes are “bad enough” to deserve the penalty, we find that the ethical guidance from this Principle allows one to either argue for no death penalty or for a death penalty where the conditions for its application are remarkably clear compared with much contemporary and historical argument. It will be assumed that the reader is familiar with a range of existing argument on the topic, and the paper will develop its own theme with contrast where necessary against Kant's principles and utilitarian-style arguments.

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A Reason Why Informed Consent is Impossible (or at Least Very Hard)

Just about everyone agrees that a patient being prescribed a therapy should be given enough information regarding the likely benefits and harms of the therapy such that the patient can make an informed decision about whether they wish to take it. While much of this debate has occurred in relation to informed consent for clinical trials, the ethics is readily applicable to day-to-day therapeutic decision-making by healthcare professionals and patients. The key problem has been the question of how to express to a patient the risks and benefits of the therapy in an objective as possible manner that is, without substantial framing from the health professional while still communicating the inherent uncertainty present within all available information. There is a growing section of health

literature that sees this as a problem of communicating complex information. The approaches developed typically involve putting the results of trials, in particular number needed to treat (NNT) and number needed to harm (NNH), into a format that aids communication. I suggest that the issue could be seen as a problematic consequence of the assumptions of classical statistics. Within the classical statistical model a given hypothesis is either true or false. There is no natural measure of uncertainty about the hypothesis. If the hypothesis is accepted then the observed magnitude of the effect is also typically accepted. Current approaches to the problem of adequately informing the patient about the treatment look to “probabilise” this magnitude information. I argue decision-makers need probabilistic information regarding therapeutic hypotheses for informed consent. Classical statistics does not provide the right kind of information for informed consent. This makes risk communication and informed consent difficult, if not impossible.

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Tolerance. Virtue? Value? Neither?

Tolerance is a surprisingly difficult concept to get a grasp of. The philosophical discussion has focused mostly on justification and limitation; how it can be right to allow wrong, and which wrongs it is right to allow. A different, and neglected, problem is whether tolerance is in fact the virtue it is widely believed to be. In this paper I present two claims, one rights-based and the other consequence-based, to argue that tolerance is not a virtue. I conclude that it is at best an interim value, and at worst an excuse for ignorance and error.

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Toward Inclusive Citizenship: Analysing Morality Within Citizenship Participation.

The problem of attaining citizenship expansion has always been a question of how does one intervene in the political domain when one is not recognized as a political subject with a concomitant capacity for political participation. Historically, progress has been achieved by refiguring political agency as based on performance rather than entitlement. As such, many theorists concerned with attaining political citizenship for oppressed groups of people evoke protest and enactment as a means of citizenship expansion. While there is no doubt that such enactments and protests have been formative to highly developed civil rights, the ability to enact those rights can often be denied. In this paper, I argue that the current incongruence between civil rights and one's ability to politically participate occurs due to a twofold problem. Firstly, is a failure within citizenship theory

to acknowledge that a specific morality, historically embedded in citizenship rhetoric, continues to perpetuate cultural concepts of what is “good” despite claimed moral neutrality. Secondly and consequentially current citizenship rights, won through public protest, have not been initially granted due to public acceptance of resistant categories as often theorized. Rather the “act” of public protest demonstrates a protestor’s ability to enact those moral qualities such as autonomy and courage, which signify and validate “traditional” citizenship morality. The protestor is thereby morally recoded as displaying a capacity to be one of “us” despite their possessing an exclusionary category. Thus, the category of exclusion, be it woman, black, Aboriginal, gay, lesbian, ethnic or religious, becomes culturally tolerated as one aspect of an otherwise apparently “good” citizen. Examples drawn upon in this paper include discourses and events surrounding the Cronulla Riots, The Sydney Gay Mardi Gras, and feminist analysis of the continuing lack of full political participation for women.

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Legitimizing Market Egoism: the Availability Problem

It is a common enough view that market agents are self-interested, not benevolent or altruistic--call this market egoism--and that this is morally defensible, even morally required. There are two styles of defence--utilitarian and deontological--and while they differ, they confront a common problem. This is the availability problem. The problem is that the more successful the moral justification of self-interested economic activity, the less there is for the justification to draw upon. Religious justifications of market egoism at least make a stab at dealing with the problem, secular accounts typically do not.

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Moral Imagination, Disability and Embodiment

(Paper co-authored with Jackie Leach Scully, University of Newcastle, UK). In this paper we question the basis on which judgements are made about the “quality” of the lives of people whose embodied experience is anomalous, specifically in cases of impairments. In moral and political philosophy it is often assumed that, suitably informed, we can overcome epistemic gaps through the exercise of moral imagination: “putting ourselves in the place of others”, we can share their points of view. Drawing on phenomenology and theories of embodied cognition, and on empirical studies, we suggest that there are barriers to imagining oneself differently situated, or imagining being another person, arising in part from the way imagination is constrained by embodied experience. We argue that the role of imagination in moral engagement with others is to expand the scope of our sympathies rather than to enable us to put ourselves in the other’s place. We argue

for explicit acknowledgement that our assessments of others' QOL are likely to be shaped by the specifics of our own embodiment, and by the assumptions we make as a consequence about what is necessary for a good quality of life.

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Tools for Research as Activist Literature: Peter Singer and Animal Experimentation

Much of the philosophical debate arising out of Animal Liberation focuses on the first chapter in which Peter Singer articulates the idea of speciesism. The philosophical significance of the second chapter concerning the practice of animal experimentation is often understood in terms of its status as exemplar of speciesism in practice. My account rejects this view. "Tools for Research" is morally persuasive in its own right and to explore the nature of this persuasiveness I resituate the chapter within the larger historical context of activist literature. The strategies employed by Singer in the writing of the chapter were similarly employed by the 19th century animal activist Frances Power Cobbe, and in identifying and evaluating these strategies, drawing on Cora Diamond's characterisation of the animal experimentation debate by which to do so, the philosophical significance of the chapter is made plain.

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A Structured Taxonomy of Responsibility Concepts

In debates about responsibility people frequently, rapidly and fluidly switch between different senses of the term "responsibility", often without signalling or even acknowledging that these switches take place, and the distinctions and relationships between these responsibility concepts are also seldom made explicit despite their important roles within people's arguments. This imprecision creates ambiguity, and in turn the ambiguity makes it difficult to discern the precise source of particular disputes about responsibility. To overcome this ambiguity, I will distinguish several different responsibility concepts from one another, as well as exploring how those concepts relate to each other. The resulting 'structured taxonomy of responsibility concepts' will help me to identify several common sources of disputes about responsibility, and that in turn will suggest some effective strategies for resolving such disputes.

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Why Terrorists Have the Right to be Treated as Persons

The moral enormity of terrorist acts has prompted several writers to claim that terrorists should not be accorded the legal rights and protections granted to other wrongdoers by most liberal societies. Terrorists, it is claimed have not only forfeited their rights to liberty and property (which could be said of ordinary criminals); they have forfeited their right to be treated as persons--as fellow members of the moral community. Under this view, the right to be treated as a person is conditional on meeting certain basic standards of behaviour. When a person commits wrongdoing of sufficient gravity, we are no longer obligated to treat them with the basic respect and constraint that we are required to show others. In this paper I take issue with this claim. I argue that terrorists, if they are responsible moral agents, are members of the moral community and are entitled to the respect due to all such agents. The nature of rational moral agency means that, while the right to be treated as a person could, in theory at least, be justifiably infringed, it can never be forfeited even by individuals who have committed acts of great evil.

ASIAN PHILOSOPHY

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The Two-tiered Illusion of Self

Philosophers such as Hume, James, Dennett and Flanagan have denied existence to the self: a bounded, unified, enduring subject of experience that is an owner, thinker and actor. They have invariably pinned the self's illusory status upon its unity and (moment-to-moment) unbrokenness of conscious existence. Consciousness, they say, is in fact blippy and disunified; any (synchronic or diachronic) unity that seems attributable to the self via consciousness is a mental construct built from bundles of discrete thoughts and perceptions. In this paper I outline a different way to deny the self's existence, a way that has not been propounded in the West. In line with Buddhist and Eastern thought, I propose consciousness to be intrinsically unified and unbroken, such that these features, when conferred to the self, have their origin in something real. The illusory status of the self is pinned, instead, upon the self's mental separation from other things, arising primarily from patterns of thought and emotion. The sense of a bounded and unified self thus arises from the confluence of two main tributaries: a stream of thought, perception and emotion on one hand and unbroken unified consciousness on the other. In virtue of these two main feeders to the self-illusion, I term this model the "two-tiered illusion of self".

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Koan Zen and Wittgenstein's Only Correct Method in Philosophy

In this paper I attempt to show that Zen, especially koan Zen, represents a commitment to something like Wittgenstein's 'only correct method in philosophy'. For Zen is a refusal to say what cannot be said. However, Zen's silence in the face of the metaphysical is no more a rejection of metaphysics than is the silence of Wittgenstein. Rather, through its use of koans, Zen marks and respects the limits of what can be said. But the Zen admission that the unsayable cannot be said, is not the end of the matter. Through koans and stories Zen manages to show (in Wittgenstein's sense of show) that which cannot be said. This is in keeping with my view that Zen, at least if we accept Wittgenstein's notion of philosophy, can find a home as a philosophical practice within the tradition of Western philosophy. My paper involves discussion of a number of koans, and draws parallels between these and some of Wittgenstein's more paradoxical utterances.

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Knowledge and Inquiry in Early Chinese Philosophy

The early Chinese philosophers were guided by observations of the world rather than theoretical schemes. Their views reflect their attention to empirical aspects of life, and especially to how the manifold things in the world are interrelated in causally complicated ways. Accordingly, they were oriented to notions of relationships and change, and to processes rather than events. In this paper, I discuss how these views of the world are manifest in Chinese philosophy. In particular, I focus on how they shaped its methods of inquiry, reasoning and argumentation.

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Pathologies of Environmental Crisis - East and West

Ever since Lynn White jr. speculated that Christianity is the source of environmental destruction, theorists have either joined in support of the thesis, or produced rival pathologies that might be regarded as the source of our environmental ills--patriarchy, Confucianism, Marxism, capitalism, and others. On closer study, many of these attempts at identifying a cause for our problems (including White's original) have a common argument structure: (1) X leads to anthropocentrism, (2) anthropocentrism is very damaging (harmful) to the environment; therefore (3) X is the origin of environmental crisis (where X is some ideology, set of beliefs, set of religious convictions, etc). In other words, the X factor is the source of the problem because it is implicated in anthropocentrism. We argue that claims about anthropocentrism, and the attractions of non- or anti-anthropocentric positions, seldom distinguish between non-anthropocentrism as an evaluative thesis, on the one hand, or as a psycho-behavioural thesis on the other. We outline ways of empirically testing the psycho-behavioural thesis that anthropocentric beliefs may be associated with environmentally harmful attitudes and behaviour, and also the further thesis that religious, cultural or philosophical belief-systems may be associated with anthropocentric beliefs. Such tests can yield philosophically interesting results. For example, after a pilot study in China last year we found that Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism, though arguably philosophically distinct, were not empirically separable in the population under study. If this finding is more generally confirmed, it would be virtually impossible to test, say, a theory that postulates Confucianism as having a certain influence on the population against another theory that postulates Buddhism or Daoism instead as having that particular influence. We consider whether more general lessons can be drawn from this kind of empirical research when considering philosophical, historical and other theories that try to account for environmental destruction.

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The Interdependency between Self and Society in Confucian Thought

A major issue that confronts the pluralistic modern world is the perceived tension between self and society. In a society constituted by members from different cultural socio-political backgrounds, individuals experience the palpable fear that their own identities are undermined; meanwhile, society as whole faces the challenge that effective societal governance will be hindered by a web of diverse interests. This article proposes that Confucian ethics can proffer a viable alternative to this tension. Through an analysis of the integrated concepts of ren and li, this article examines the Confucian conception of the relation between self and society and argues that the two are understood as mutually dependent by Confucius.

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On Nagarjuna's Ontological Paradox

Express something that can't be expressed. That which can't be expressed can't be expressed; yet it has just been expressed. This is the general structure of the limit of expressibility that Graham Priest finds some instances of throughout the history of philosophy. The limit of expressibility is, Priest argues, paradoxical. Jay Garfield and Graham Priest argue that while (modern) Western philosophers typically provide a semantic explanation, the second century Buddhist philosopher, Nagarjuna, has given an ontological explanation for the paradox of expressibility, i.e., it is ontology itself that is paradoxical. Since this ontological explanation is yet unknown in the West, Nagarjuna delivers a new lesson to Western philosophers, so argue Garfield and Priest. In this talk, I argue that the ontological paradox that Garfield and Priest attribute to Nagarjuna isn't as profound as they make it out to be. As I will show, Nagarjuna's ontological paradox has the same structure as the Barber paradox which has an easy solution. Nonetheless, Nagarjuna's ontological paradox provides us with an opportunity to consider the limitation that an ontological project has. By showing how Garfield and Priest's Nagarjuna has overstepped the limitation, I illustrate what can't legitimately be done in the name of ontology.

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Thinking with the Songs

An obstacle to viewing Confucian thought as philosophy has much to do with its apparent lack of discursive reasoning. Yet, it seems clear that Confucians have coherent thoughts; more difficult is to understand how those thoughts are arrived at. The question is, What are the salient features of Confucian thinking? What more could we say beyond the general description that it is a kind of intuitive thinking? One possible response to the question would be to begin with an exploration of the use of the Book of Songs and its role in Confucian thought. In particular, it might be instructive to look more closely at two passages from the Analects (1.15 & 3.8) that recount exchanges between Confucius and students which involve the use of specific verses taken from the songs. This paper seeks to show that a key aspect of Confucian thinking--by considering its use of imageries from the songs--is not precisely committed to rationality but to a kind of attentive reflection. The imageries themselves seem to form, as it were, both foci and context for their reflection in a way that blurs the distinction between philosophy and religion. Through making associations, applications and interpretations of those imageries, the Confucians are able to arrive at thoughts that are insightful, creative, and productive of appropriate conduct. A further task is to then to identify the manner by which thinking with the songs is guided, if indeed it is not centred on seeking truth--particularly if there are still appropriate and inappropriate ways of conducting it.

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Introducing Ethics to Anxiety

More than a few philosophers after Kierkegaard recognised the unique status of his account of anxiety, seeing in it intimations of a category with vast philosophic potential. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this account was the way in which Kierkegaard “sought to transfer the moment of sublime anxiety” from the realm of aesthetic spectatorship to that of ethical involvement.”(Milbank) This paper considers the implications of such a move by examining the connection between Kierkegaard’s “psychology” of anxiety and his rejection of an ethics based on speculative metaphysics in “The Concept of Anxiety”. The examination proceeds firstly by way of a careful reading of the Introduction of CA in which the author, in regards to the notion of sin, lays out a detailed map of the various “sciences”, including their “moods” and limits, and the arrangements between them. Here, philosophical ethics is shown to distort and even falsify the concept by altering the mood appropriate to it, namely, that of “earnestness” in which sin is responded to as a task (of resistance) for the individual. In the place then of disinterested speculative methods, the reader of CA is offered a “psychological treatment of the concept of anxiety”. It is the second task of this paper to clarify what exactly psychology involves here for Kierkegaard and to explore some of the key aspects of his treatment of anxiety, including the notions of subjectivity, freedom, and possibility (and as time permits: anxiety’s resonances with the aesthetics of the sublime, its unique temporality of “the moment” and the therapeutic role it can play). The final question I explore, concerns whether this “psychological” perspective might not be instructive for the treatment of other “ethical” phenomenon, my particular interest here being: responsibility. For instance, could we not contrast two approaches to philosophical reflection on responsibility, one where it is treated under the auspices of a metaphysically grounded ethics, and another possible mode of approach which might be indicated by the Kierkegaardian “psychology” of anxiety?

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Kierkegaardian Love, Friendship and Contemporary Virtue Ethics

Some of Kierkegaard’s key concerns about erotic love and friendship relate to their “preferential” nature and their allegedly being a form of (perhaps disguised) self-love. Recent attempts to defend Kierkegaard’s position against his detractors have focused in part upon a distinction between selfish and proper forms of self-love. Against this background, I bring Kierkegaard into dialogue with recent philosophical work on

friendship and contemporary virtue ethics. First, with respect to friendship, I argue that Kierkegaard's endorsement of the ancient idea of the friend as "second self" involves a common but misguided assumption: that friendship depends largely upon varieties of likeness between friends. This focus obscures an important yet surprisingly overlooked element, highlighted by the so-called "drawing" view of friendship argued for by Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett. According to this view, characteristic of friendship is one's being distinctly responsive both to the other's interests and world-view, and to their way of seeing oneself. Second, I consider Christine Swanton's recent book *Virtue ethics: a pluralistic view*, in particular her discussion of the roles of "expression" in self-love and universal love. Swanton looks to Nietzsche in her discussion of expression, and the result is a welcome extension of the scope of virtue ethics. However, this paper starts to explore what might be added to this debate by bringing some insights from Kierkegaard into such aspects as Swanton's account of universal love and self-love as expressions of the capacity to bond.

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Kierkegaard and Kanzo Uchimura

Kanzo Uchimura (1861-1930) is famous as the founder of the non-church movement [Mukyokai Undo] in Japan and he was one of the biggest opinion leaders in Japan after the Meiji Restoration. He became a Christian as the student of Hokkaido No Gakko (Agricultural School of Hokkaido) from W. S. Clark (1826-1886), who was also famous for the phrase; "Boys Be Ambitious" which was given to the students of the inaugural class. After graduation, Uchimura worked as a government clerk in Hokkaido, and after that he visited the United States to build up his belief (1884). In hard times in USA he had a decisive conversion from the president of Amherst College, Julius Hawley Seelye (1824-1895) in 1886. He was disappointed in the reality of Christian churches in the US, so he had a great ambition to establish a church for the Japanese by the Japanese. He wrote a book, *How I became a Christian*, in which he introduced his life at that time. This book was found by Wilhelm Gundert (1880-1971) and translated by his friend from his father's publisher into German. Gundert visited Uchimura and afterwards he became a very famous Japanologist. This book was very popular in Germany and after that it was translated in many countries in Europe. Some of the leaders of this book wrote letters to Uchimura and called him as a Japanese Kierkegaard. Uchimura probably was told Kierkegaard's name from Gundert, but from the above mentioned situation, he was much interested in Kierkegaard. Uchimura regarded Kierkegaard as his vanguard of his own non-church movement. The title of Uchimura's *How I became a Christian* reminded us of Kierkegaard's religious task; "How to become a Christian". Uchimura published this book under the pseudonym, Jonathan X. He said, "I like to send it out anonymously, without any introduction by a favored author or dedication to any of my friends, but solely upon its own merits." (3.Jan.1894). This writing style also has the similarity to Kierkegaard's. Not only an exterior similarity between Uchimura and Kierkegaard, but also we can find the same pietistic spirituality in his book as Kierkegaard's. I would like

to introduce Uchimura's How I became a Christian and through this introduction I show one reason why Kierkegaard has gotten popularity in Japan.

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Demonic Boredom

Kierkegaard diagnoses boredom as a malady of modernity, though a malady which has significant continuities with the medieval conception of the sin of acedia. For Kierkegaard, boredom is an affliction of spirit, which springs from a misrelation in the constitution of the self, between the elements of temporality and eternity, self and other. This misrelation is due to the failure of the individual to give sufficient weight to the eternal in the task of becoming a self, so that everything becomes unbearably light. Without the gravitas of eternal salvation to ground meaning, the individual's temporal existence degenerates into a series of arbitrary "nows" which are only distinguished by relative intensity of mood. The aesthete caught up in the immediacy of modernity only finds purpose in pursuit of "the interesting" and its converse, flight from boredom. However, none of the distractions of the modern city, from peepshows to vaudeville, from the camera obscura to the wax museum to the gossip of the popular press, can distract the aesthete from the despair that underlies boredom. This is a malady of modernity, on Kierkegaard's view, because modernity has a tendency to disconnect reflection from passion. Reflection alone is unable to transform a self which is narcissistically preoccupied with self-image. For self-transformation to occur, the self must engage emotionally with another, in a manner which entails personal risk. Reflection must be grounded in passionate concern for another, guided by earnest faith in the eternal, to escape the despair of demonic boredom. Although boredom afflicts individuals, and its ultimate antidote is the spiritual transformation of the individual, modern society predisposes individuals to become bored. Kierkegaard's analysis allows us to see how boredom emerges as a socially-enabled disposition, which has the ambivalent potential both to stall and to motivate spiritual growth.

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"See For Your Self": Contemporaneity and Co-presence

This paper examines the cognitive/experiential aspects of Kierkegaard's concept of "contemporaneity", a theme developed across several works (signed and pseudonymous) in the authorship. Kierkegaard develops an account of contemporaneity as an experience of co-presence with (imaginatively-mediated) past events. This distinctive quality of co-presence in imaginative experience, which does not depend on the content of what is imagined but on a way of seeing that supervenes upon that content, somehow serves to

bridge the temporal gap between the contemplator and object of contemplation. Kierkegaard's work here contains interesting insights into the nature of moral cognition, arguing that in the "autopsy of faith", the contemplator sees her "involvement" in past events in a way that makes her authentically contemporaneous with them. Equally, though, imagination can be used to create distance from what is contemplated, and neither of these uses depends upon the resources of imagination itself for their efficacy. Moreover, if Kierkegaard is right, and there is such an experience of co-presence with past events (as well as projected future ones), this will have implications for discussions of self-constitution. Philosophers such as Galen Strawson and James Giles have denied there is any sense of "being in" memories and imaginative constructions of the future. A convincing account of such an experience could therefore be an important move in utilising Kierkegaard's reflexive account of selfhood in contemporary debates on psychological criteria for personal identity.

PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY

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Masking Desires (and Perhaps Finking Them Too)

While dispositions clearly have some kind of intimate relation with counterfactuals, the standard counterfactual analyses have all encountered problems. In particular, there is the problem of finks and masks - conditions which act to remove the disposition or interfere with its manifestation, when the object is put into conditions which should be the stimulus conditions for the disposition. Here we want to say that the object still has the disposition (at least when not in the stimulus conditions), but that it is being interfered with. Sophisticated counterfactual analyses have been proposed to remedy these problems, while still preserving the link with counterfactuals. However, the finks and masks considered are always conditions which are extrinsic to the object usually wicked sorcerers, or angels with fetishes for vases, and other such exciting extrinsic properties. Generally, it is thought that if it were an intrinsic property of the object (or state of affairs concerning only the intrinsic state of the object) which was interfering with the disposition, we simply wouldn't ascribe the disposition to the object in the first place. If it were some intrinsic property of a vase which caused the vase to become shatterproof when dropped, so the claim goes, we simply would never have called it "fragile" in the first place. Things are trickier when we get to people, which are usually more complex than vases. Dispositional analyses of desires, for example, are commonplace, but seem to fail even when we restrict our attention to motivational desires. The fault, I think, lies not in attempting to give a dispositional analysis of motivational desire, but in attempts to accommodate only external finks and masks in an analysis of dispositions. Intrinsic properties of a person can mask that person's dispositions, and these amended counterfactual analyses cannot deal with this.

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Mental Maps?

I argue that the hypothesis that the structure of thought is map-like is not distinct from the hypothesis that the structure of thought is language-like.

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How Does Intentionality Derive From Consciousness?

A number of authors have argued that intentionality in some sense depends on consciousness. Two main views of this kind have been considered in the literature. The first is the state-level view according to which all intentional states are at least potentially conscious (if not conscious). The other position is that there is nothing more to the dependency of intentionality on consciousness than the requirement that every subject of an intentional state be capable of undergoing experiences, whatever their nature. I will call this the subject-level view. Neither the state-level nor the subject-level view offers a satisfactory account of the dependence of intentionality on consciousness: the former because it appears too strong, the latter because it appears too weak. In this paper I develop and motivate a position between these two extremes. I distinguish between two kinds of intentionality: derived and underived. I claim that underived intentionality is always conscious and derived intentionality never is. I also discuss how derived intentional states are formed. There are in my view four principal mechanisms of derivation: conventions (or interpretation), dispositions (or inferential role), descriptive match, and external causal relations. Together, these four mechanisms account for the wide range of unconscious intentional states without diminishing the central role of consciousness in grounding intentionality.

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Unravelling "Theory of Mind"

The ability to "think about what others are thinking about" broadly describes what is known as "theory of mind" but what exactly is meant when using this term? Since the 1970s, debate amongst cognitive scientists has focused upon the possibility of theory of mind in nonhuman animals. As regards theory of mind in the chimpanzee, Pan troglodytes, an impasse centering upon a set of experiments investigating the species' understanding of the notion "seeing" has split the two predominant research groups in the area; the "Cognitive Evolution Group," University of Louisiana, Lafayette, USA led by Daniel Povinelli and a group based at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, Germany led by Michael Tomasello. Importantly, this impasse reflects several much greater, and seemingly intractable, methodological and theoretical issues which confound the entire field of theory of mind research. This paper unpacks this impasse thereby exposing these broader difficulties and their implications for our use of the term "theory of mind".

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Memory Qualia

What is it like to remember? It depends on what is meant by the term “remember”. Aristotle divided memory into two distinct varieties: remembering and recollecting. He argued that remembering was a capacity of most living creatures. On the other hand, recollection is a conscious act known only in humans. This important distinction pre-dates a similar division in cognitive science between implicit knowledge or skills and the explicit capacity to recall facts or recreate past experiences. Russell argued that all acts of “remembering x” require the “belief that x occurred”. Martin & Deutscher (M&D) denied Russell’s hypothesis. I argue that M&D are right in the sense that remembering does not require an occurrent belief. But, they are wrong about Russell for two reasons: 1) Russell is referring to recollection, not just remembering. This subjective feeling, the qualia of memory, essentially involves an occurrent belief that it is a representation of the past. 2) Even if Russell was referring to just remembering, this capacity requires a functional notion of belief or knowledge. By separating the experience of recollection from biological facts of memory, unusual cases make sense, such as memory qualia without memory (false memories) or a failure to have memory qualia with memory (e.g. M&D examples).

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How to Build a Person

In philosophy, persons are often distinguished by a propensity for reflection-- a conscious and concerted mentation effecting control of behavior. In psychology, quantities of research on automatic processing suggest that this philosophical conception of persons is unrealistic; much human behavior is not consciously controlled, and evaluatively incongruent with the deliverances of reflection. A psychologically lifelike conception of persons will therefore de-emphasize reflection; instead, the human ethical distinctiveness marked with such philosophical honorifics as “person,” “agency,” and “the self” is to be found in the narrative transactions by which humans living in groups order their lives.

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Nijinsky: Ballet, Schizophrenia & Philosophy

At the beginning of the 20th century, Vaslav Nijinsky was the most famous dancer in the world. Through his work with the Sergei Diaghilev and the Ballet Russes, he had

captivated ballet audiences throughout Europe, South America, and the United States, and his fame had spread. He was most renowned for his prodigious leap, during which he seemed to be able to suspend himself in the air. In 1919, Nijinsky began to show signs of an illness that would follow him for the rest of his life schizophrenia. He began to withdraw from social contact, exhibiting extended periods of silence. He began to approach strangers on the street and demand they go to church. He began having delusions, hearing God talk to him. He was seen clinically by Eugen Bleuler, the man who coined the term “schizophrenia”, and was diagnosed under this category. He spent the remaining 30 years of his life in and out of institutions. In 1919, as Nijinsky was falling into madness, he kept a diary. This paper analyses these diaries, examining both their philosophical content, and the philosophical implications that they inspire. It also looks at Nijinsky’s life, examining points of philosophical interest.

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On the Need to Better Understand Our Computers

This paper deals with the following question: What are the criteria that an adequate theory of computation has to meet?

The 5 answers that are examined in this paper are as follows:

1. Smith's answer: an adequate theory of computation has to meet the empirical criterion, the conceptual criterion and the cognitive criterion.
2. Fodor & Pylyshyn's answer: an adequate theory of computation has to meet the semantic level criterion, the symbol level criterion and the physical level criterion.
3. Piccinini's answer: an adequate theory of computation has to meet the objectivity criterion, the explanation criterion, the right things compute criterion, the right things don't compute criterion, the miscomputation criterion, the taxonomy criterion and the empirical criterion.
4. Von Neumann's answer: an adequate theory of computation has to meet the precision and reliability criterion, the single error criterion and the analogue – digital distinction criterion.
5. “Everything” computes answer: an adequate theory of computation has to meet the implementation theory criterion.

There's a widespread tendency to compare minds to computers and some even say that they can be explained in computational terms. However, a deeper understanding of computation is required before we even attempt to analyze minds computationally. After briefly discussing the importance of providing a satisfactory theory of computation, I outline some of the answers to the foregoing question. In particular, I argue that Smith's criteria are inadequate and over demanding. My aim is to show why his answer has eventually led him to conclude with a strong claim that an adequate theory of

computation is highly unlikely. By presenting the competing answers I show that there are adequate alternatives to Smith's view.

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A Shift in Vision: Recognition, Context and Depiction

Recent work on the human visual system and on the development of computer based visual recognition systems indicates that shape-matching is an unworkable basis for human or machine recognition of objects, scenes and pictures. Studies of “gist views” have shown that scene recognition is prior to object recognition. Therefore context, broadly construed, has a primary role in object recognition. This paper argues that we recognise objects in pictures using the same mechanisms that we use to recognise objects in the real world. It therefore follows that context, as opposed to shape matching, is the key to understanding how we see content in depictions.

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A Tale of Two Concepts (Innateness and Representation)

A discussion of the past, present, and future of two apparently pivotal concepts in psychology, focusing on the relation between foundational criticism and practical utility.

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Explaining Causation the Way Russell Explained Consciousness

In this paper I point out the following parallels between philosophical concerns about consciousness and philosophical concerns about causation:

Intuition about consciousness

The conscious experience of organisms does not supervene on observable properties.

Intuition about causation

The causal powers of objects do not supervene on observable properties.

Deflationary account of consciousness

Contrary to appearances, the conscious experience of organisms does supervene on observable properties (perhaps functional properties).

Deflationary account of causation

Contrary to appearances, the causal powers of objects do supervene on observable properties (perhaps the regularities we observe).

Inflationary account of consciousness

The conscious experience of organisms supervenes on observable properties in conjunction with psychophysical laws of nature.

Inflationary account of causation

The causal powers of objects supervene on observable properties in conjunction with ontologically additional laws of nature (perhaps relations between universals). There is a middle way between the deflationary and the inflationary accounts of consciousness:

Sub-empirical physicalism

The conscious experience of organisms supervenes on unobservable physical properties. I suggest that we might parallel this middle way position in philosophy of causation:

Sub-empirical causalism

The causal powers of physical objects supervene on unobservable categorical properties. I then go on to defend sub-empirical causalism.

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The Concept of Innateness: Taking the 'Concept' Part Seriously

Co-authored with Edouard Machery (Pittsburgh) and Stefan Linquist (Queensland).

It is a truism in behavioral biology that the term 'innate' is vague and ambiguous. The term remains popular in psychology and cognitive science, however, and philosophers continue to offer analyses of the concept of innateness. In this paper we report an 'experimental philosophy' (X-phi) study of the vernacular concept of innateness. We show that subjects judgments of innateness can be accounted for by the presence of three distinct properties which we term Fixity, Typicality and Teleology. We argue that the purely additive interaction between these properties is evidence that all three are independently constitutive of innateness, making innateness itself it a conjunction of the three independent properties property. Our results reveal the sources of the intuitions underlying some of the proposed analyses of the concept. They also explain why such analyses are subject to compelling counterexamples.

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Realization

Many philosophers take it as a given that properties of the sort figuring in explanations in the special sciences are “multiply realized”. Pains, for instance, are thought to be differently realized in human beings and in mollusks; hearts have both biological and mechanical realizations. Various attempts have been made to explicate the realizing relation in a way that preserves the independence of realized properties from their realizers without rendering them epiphenomenal. I discuss the realization relation and raise doubts about its ontological standing.

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Self-representationalism and Phenomenology

To a first approximation, self-representationalism is the view that a mental state *M* is phenomenally conscious just in case *M* represents itself in the appropriate way. Self-representationalism has sometimes been argued for on phenomenological grounds (Kriegel 2003). More recently, however, it has been argued *against* on phenomenological grounds (Levine 2006, Gennaro forthcoming). In this paper, I consider the phenomenological merits and demerits of self-representationalism. I argue that there is phenomenological evidence in favor of self-representationalism, and rather more confidently, that there is no phenomenological evidence against self-representationalism.

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Is Perceptual Phenomenology Thin?

Several philosophers adopt thin views of perceptual phenomenology. On the most radical version of such view, the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is exhausted by sensations organized in an apparent spatio-temporal framework. Visual phenomenology, for example, is regarded as merely a matter of color sensations scattered in an apparent space. Rather moderate versions add experiences of shapes, depth and voluminousness to this picture. The thin view plays an important role in historical and contemporary debates about the nature of experience. The view, however, is usually adopted with no supporting argumentation. This paper critically evaluates potential reasons in support of the thin view, and concludes that the view lacks good argumentative support.

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Chalmer's Two-dimensional Semantics Turned Kant Upside Down

Chalmer's Two-Dimensionalism claims to restore the golden triangle of modality, reason and semantics. He especially claims to restore the reason/modal couple, that Kripke destroyed by making what is a posteriori necessity, by making it a priori again. Chalmers does this through dualistic extensions: one to the actual world and the other to potential possible worlds. I will claim this is an upside 'transcendental idealism' and Kant would be horrified with the outcome. Chalmers has the structure of reason depending on modality but believing that what is conceivable is logically possible. By having reason depend on modal necessity, the disjunction between science and reason is sealed. Kant wanted a synthesis between the two. Chalmers dualism is at fault here by accepting non-natural facts. This leaves no inter-subjective epistemic method. I am going to propose a semantic dualism that I think Kant would have liked if he made the dualistic distinction between propositions and propositional content. This involves one for the creation of meaning (a metaphorical production) and another for epistemic certainty (schematic postulation). The semantic content of metaphorical production is internal (held in the mind) and schematic postulation holds the semantic content to be external (in the real world). This metaphoric/distinction draws heavily on psychological principles and scientific methodology so I would like to present in this stream. Not to give my whole argument away, metaphorical meaning occurs when sense data is fed through the perceptual system to leave the impression of an experience. Language that is metaphorical refers to such an impression. Its semantic properties are opposite to the schematic process. Schematic content is produced through postulating a structural relationships onto reality and testing natural processes against it (experimentation). Upon any type of confirmation of its validity, schematic content is used deductively to predict further empirical phenomena.

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The Feeling Self and the Reflexive Self: the Role of Inner Dialogue in Pragmatist Conceptions of the Self

The Feeling Self and The Reflexive Self: The Role of Inner Dialogue in Pragmatist Conceptions of The Self
Abstract
The classical pragmatists are famous for rejecting the Cartesian conception of the conscious self. James is also credited with articulating the notion of the "stream of consciousness," the continuous flow of thoughts, sensations and emotions, which make up our conscious lives. However, what, if anything, structures or directs the stream? Is it simply a blooming, buzzing, confusion as James once put it? The other classical pragmatists give us ways of thinking about how the stream might be directed by the structuring role of inner speech, especially dialogue. Peirce explains how

inner speech is necessary for “critical self-control” in deliberating about ends. Dewey explains the way in which inner speech is used to perform mental experiments and Mead extends this by showing how inner dialogue (the self- talking to itself as Plato put it in the Theatetus) is used to solve problems. The picture that emerges is one of a primitive, or basic, sense of the stream of consciousness, our experience of un-conceptualised reality, which is directed and made the object of thought by the structuring role of inner dialogue.

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Imagination is a Powerful Deceiver

The task of interpreting and understanding other minds can be a difficult enterprise. Luckily, the tools that are available for interpretation are many. They include, but are not limited to, impressions received from direct experience of others acting in the world, such as linguistic communication, body language, etc. Often times, these impressions are used in conjunction with imaginative capacities to entertain scenarios that do not have grounds in the actual world. It may be the case that all instances of theorizing, empathetic response, and simulation, involve going beyond what is directly seen by utilizing the imagination; in other words, imagination is in some sense seems required of all interpretive activity. In spite of its usefulness in certain forms of interpretation, the imagination is not always helpful to the interpretive process. Those processes that hinder interpretation will be referred to as imaginative fantasy in the pages that follow; these include, but are not limited to, cases of fantasizing, projection, wishful-thinking, and the like. It is my contention that persons who conceive of imaginative fantasies involving those they are trying to interpret are in effect handicapping their chances of successfully interpreting the person in question. Not only that, but it seems to be the case that in actuality we are so often influenced by the desires (or desire-like states) that drive us to imaginative fantasy, that the grounds we have for thinking we understand others are radically less sound than we ordinarily think.

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Phenomenology and Intentionality

Horgan and Tienson (2002) argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states which is not established by Horgan and Tienson’s arguments. Further, if HT did establish covariation or equivalence between phenomenal and intentional states, they would be aligning themselves with recent forms of representationalism, which is not their intent. They would then require some independent means of demonstrating that it is the phenomenal which determines the intentional (rather than the other way around) and it is hard to see from where it might

come. We also make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. In particular, it is clear that a particular phenomenology can be associated with any number of beliefs. Further, unlike in the case of perception, establishing the converse relation (that intentionality fixes phenomenology) is unappealing; it seems clear two individuals with the same beliefs may have different associated phenomenology. HT lean on narrow (phenomenal) truth conditions to motivate phenomenal intentional content, but we find this question begging in this context. Finally, we introduce some worries about the capacity of phenomenology to map onto intentionality in a way that would be appropriate for any determiner of content / fixer of truth conditions.

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Defining (Mental) Disorder

A fairly large literature has accumulated on both an appropriate definition and an appropriate conceptual analysis of the bio-medical notion of 'disorder' (and related notions such as 'disease', 'illness', 'disability', etc). The clinician's handbook the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders focuses on offering an operational definition to enable clinicians to identify individuals (or conditions) that are disordered. There has also been much controversy over the concept of disorder, however, and in particular whether the notion of function can ground psychiatry (and related fields such as clinical psychology) as objective scientific disciplines just like biology, or whether function is intrinsically normative such that those fields are really concerned with treating people who violate certain kinds of social norms. I will consider different aspects to the bio-medical notion of mental disorder including prototypes, aetiology, course, response to treatment, and theorising about the nature of mental disorder. I wish to argue that there is indeed a gap between purely causal processes on the one hand and facts about malfunction on the other. Rather than the facts about function being determined by social norms, however, I wish to argue that they are instead crucially dependent on our interests. While it is important to be explicit about our interests so they can be subject to critique this does not undermine the status of psychiatry as an applied science, however.

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Rousseau's Narcissus: the Problems of Self-love

Narcissism is generally taken to mean self-love. However, the use of the concept of self-love had been framed in the terms of the mythical Narcissus by Rousseau some 150 years prior to Freud's appropriation of him at the seat of the Oedipal Complex, ensuring that

his conceptual influence was sustained. The 'self' that Freud illustrates is initially identical to the ego at the centre of our psychic organisation, and is formed from the combined effects of human instincts, which are 'barely imagined' but strongly felt, and the unavoidable formative milieu of the society. Added to this are the reactions, perceptions (to both external and internal stimuli) which are enculturated in the characters, ideals, and ethical code of the Collective, which in the modern era has taken on a global proportional perspective. But without a way of seeing oneself as a free thinking 'I' we are totally subject to, and so constructed by the opinions and observation of others. This is entailed in Rousseau's conception of inauthenticity, which results from our awareness of ourselves. Authenticity, for him, existed in the 'state of nature' in contrast to the ills of modern socialisation. But is this identification with others, simultaneous with self-awareness (or failure to identify and thus be self-aware), one emerging from an imaginary, 'primary narcissistic' state from which one is expected to outgrow, as Freud held, or - given that object relations phenomenon are fundamental to self-reference, knowledge and desire - simply an originary object attachment, albeit one which fails to be wholly displaced by the comparisons and identifications which fall short of ideals which comes from socialisation? The power to refute any and all, or to go with the tide of opinion though never revealing the fact of one's absolute disagreement is parallel with Rousseau's notion of Resistance, which for him consists in the endurance of moving against the current, yet clinging to branches ahead of one, in order impel oneself forward despite the ceaseless current; Is it the illegitimate political State or just natural capacities which produce immediate, and possibly unwarranted, pathological or negative reactions which are then labeled 'pathological narcissism;' Does the reflexive relation between psyche and polis become unbalanced or disintegral from external or internal forces?

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Representations, Relations, and Perceptual Content

I defend a way of thinking of perception as both representational and relational. I argue that a view on which perception represents objects is compatible with a view on which perception is a matter of standing in relation to objects, if the content of experience is understood in terms of potentially gappy content schemas. I show that by acknowledging that perception is both relational and representational, the problems of pure relational and pure intentionalist accounts can be avoided. In contrast to pure relationalism, the view I defend can explain how veridical and hallucinatory experiences may be phenomenologically indistinguishable. Both experiences share a content schema that grounds the phenomenal character of the experience. But in contrast to pure intentionalism, the view I defend can explain the differences between the two experiences with regard to their content. In the case of a hallucinatory experience, the content schema is gappy. In the case of a veridical experience, the gap is filled by a de re modes of presentation of an object.

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Attention-based Concepts

In recent work, John Campbell has made a compelling case that conscious attention explains our grasp of certain concepts, including perceptual-demonstrative concepts of objects and observational concepts of colours. I respond to this work by considering the question of how conscious attention explains our possession of concepts. Here, I offer a personal-level account and contrast it with the subpersonal-level account proposed by Campbell. I go on to consider the question of which concepts are such that our grasp of them can be explained in terms of conscious attention. I argue that conscious attention explains our possession of a wide range of perceptual-recognitional concepts and perhaps even some basic introspective, logical and mathematical concepts.

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Magical Thinking and the Bodily Narrative of Grief

Drawing on Merleau-Ponty's notion of the chiasmatic, and his understanding that perception is the source of all meaningfulness, Suzanne Laba Cataldi discusses the expression of grief and loss as reflecting our intertwining with others and the ways they are incorporated into our being. The process of grief is one of becoming accustomed to this loss and of re-incorporating ourselves into a changed world--the other no longer occupies nor orchestrates our world. We also confront our gestures, our conduct and our actions which once opened onto our loved ones but no longer do. We recognise a behavioural pattern with grief--that of mourning, which can be highly ritualized or more personal and, often, messy. Mourning is observed, recognized, and, to a great extent, understood and excused. Yet if one does not display sufficient or appropriate signs of mourning the loss of a loved one this too is observed and read as meaning something. This invites us to examine the nature of grief as a bodily narrative that is tacitly understood. Our bodies, which once narrated the presence and meaning of the other in our life, now, in grief, narrate our confusion, our sense of incompleteness and loss. I claim that our bodies narrate our inherence in the world and I explore the way that this bodily narrative of grief expresses a time when this inherence is ruptured and must be mended. In this paper I explore the bodily narrative of grief and mourning with particular reference to Joan Didion's conception of "Magical Thinking" that she says accompanied her in the year after the sudden death of her husband. This magical thinking and her continued actions towards her dead husband are poignantly revealing of her process of mourning and her personal re-orientation to and re-incorporation within the world.

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

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“How a Modest Fideism May Constrain Theistic Commitments: Exploring an Alternative to Classical Theism”

Theistic religious commitment takes place, I will assume, in the face of evidential ambiguity, and the question thus arises under what conditions it is permissible to make a 'doxastic venture' beyond one's evidence in favour of a religious proposition. In answer to that question I sketch the modest 'moral coherentist' Jamesian fideism I have recently defended in my forthcoming book *Believing by Faith*. I then consider why classical theistic commitment might fall foul of these fideist conditions, and begin a discussion of a possible alternative (in the Christian tradition) which - one may hope - might not. Crucial to my discussion is the need for ethical evaluation of both the motivation and content of religious doxastic ventures.

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Why is There STILL Something Rather than Nothing

The Universe persists. Why is it so stubborn? One explanation that is not in fashion is that it is sustained in existence by a timeless cause (maybe the Form of the Good, more likely God). The alternative is that the universe exists now because it existed a while back. Or maybe the bits and pieces that make up the Universe exist because they or other bits and pieces existed a while back. I call this the existential inertia explanation. If Time is discrete this explanation is fine (as far as it goes). The purpose of this paper is to explore the hypotheses we might have to postulate in order to defend existential inertia if Time is not discrete. One of these is that the Universe still exists because it is sustained in existence by a temporal but indestructible being (again God is a good candidate). Or we might combine two hypotheses: (1) anything that has a finite duration has a last moment; (2) the universe is sustained by Spacetime. I discuss these as well as less acceptable hypotheses and reach two conclusions: (1) Answering the question "Why is there still something rather than nothing?" puts a significant constraint on metaphysical speculations. (2) If a Whiteheadian No Instant theory of Time is correct then the Universe is sustained in existence by something that is not implied by contemporary Science even when interpreted. This something might be some physical thing, such as indestructible matter or the aether, or it might be God.

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The Supernaturalistic Fallacy

The well known naturalistic fallacy, and what I wish to identify as the 'supernaturalistic fallacy', are both about the fact/value distinction, and will be considered in relation to evolutionary ethics. In its simplest, Humean inferential form, the naturalistic fallacy (later reformulated and named by G. E. Moore) condemns any attempt to derive an 'ought' from an 'is' - a value from a natural fact. In this paper, I am taking up the 'is-ought' divide in reverse - namely attempts to derive facts from values. In particular, I argue that supernaturalistic monotheism is partly based on such a confusion - that from some belief we 'want' to be true, that we think 'ought' to be true, that it 'must' be true, and therefore, it IS true. This move has been noted in other contexts by Steven Pinker and Matt Ridley, but applied differently. I acknowledge their contributions while pointing to my contention that this is the basis for theism, giving several different ways that it has contributed to an erroneous understanding. This is a much more widespread and serious error in thinking than trying to derive values from facts. As Daniel Dennett says, "If ought cannot be derived from 'is', what can it be derived from?...from some inexplicable ethics implanted in our brains (or our 'hearts' to speak with tradition)? (1995, p. 467). The relationship between fact and value is crucial if we are to understand ourselves and our moral behaviour in a non-supernaturalistic way. The target of my critique is the psycho/logical basis of supernaturalism.

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Aquinas on Participation

The views of St. Thomas Aquinas on the notion of participation have been the subject of lengthy dispute. In the light of his explicit acceptance of Aristotle's rejection of Platonic forms, his extensive use of the Platonic notion of participation has seemed incomprehensible. The paper will argue that his use of the notion can be understood by interpreting it in the light of his acceptance of the Eleatic principle, the notion that all real properties of things are causal properties. Two things will then instantiate the same property when they have the same causal features; this conception of instantiation is understood by Aquinas in an Aristotelian sense. One thing's property X will participate in the property Y of another thing, on the other hand, when property X confers part, but not all, of the causal features that property Y does. So understood, the notion of participation does not commit Aquinas to any of the Platonic views that Aristotle rejects. It explains his view of how creation participates in God, and how attributes that belong to created things can be used analogously to describe God. It also explains how he thought that his Fourth Way, which is usually dismissed as an unworkable hangover from neo-Platonism, could provide a convincing argument for the existence of God.

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Some First Meditations on Deliverance from Error

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058-1111 C.E.) is well known, among other things, for his account, in *al-Munqidh min al-Dalal* (“The Deliverance from Error”) of a struggle with philosophical skepticism that bears a striking resemblance to that described by Descartes in the *Meditations*. This paper aims to give a close comparative analysis of these respective accounts. Here, I will concentrate solely on the processes of invoking or entertaining doubt that Ghazali and Descartes describe, respectively. In the process, I will bring to light some subtle differences between them in this regard that are relevant to the comparative issue of the respective solutions at which they arrive. I will not touch on the latter issue here, though I do intend the present discussion as a prelude to a future treatment of that topic.

PHILOSOPHY OF PROBABILITY

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A Puzzle About Stochastic Independence

It is customary to assume that all other things being equal, distinct probabilistic trials are stochastically independent. Independence assumptions are important for predicting the behavior of large ensembles of experiments: many standard statistical patterns are derived from the supposition that the trials in question are identical and independently distributed. But what grounds are there for treating pairs of real-life trials as stochastically independent? Why expect sequences of coin tosses or quantum measurements to display the patterns found in statistics textbooks? One common rationale for stochastic independence assumptions is that the trials in question are causally independent. This rationale needs cashing out: on the most readings of “causally independent”, it is simply not true of most pair of trials. I develop a sketch of what the relevant concept of causal independence might look like.

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Best Systems for Laws of Nature and Chance

Philosophical accounts of laws of nature fall into two broad groups. Roughly, Humean accounts consider laws to be particularly good summaries of facts, while non-Humean theories take them to “govern”, or determine, what the facts are. My paper is concerned with the most sophisticated extant Humean theory, the so-called Mill-Ramsey-Lewis “best-systems account,” and an extension of it advocated by David Lewis, which is supposed to provide a foundational theory of objective chance. My claim is that while the best-systems account of laws of nature is well-motivated, the extension to chance is not; and since the extension is beset by technical difficulties, it should be rejected. According to the best-system account of laws, the laws of a world w are the universal sentences that belong to the true theory of w that achieves the best combination of syntactic simplicity and semantic strength, or informativeness. According to the best-system account of laws of nature and chance, the laws and the chances of w are jointly determined by the system of w that combines the best combination of simplicity, strength, and fit. Intuitively, a theory has a good fit at a world if the chance it assigns to types of events match the relative frequencies. Lewis tried to make the notion of fit precise by stipulating it to be the probability assigned by a theory to the proposition that world w is actual. But this proposal faces several problems. In “Infinitesimal Chances and the Laws of Nature” (AJP 2004), Adam Elga posed the “zero-fit problem” for Lewis’s proposal. I argue that Elga’s solution to that problem does not work, and raise two further problems: the

“indeterminate-fit” and the “free-fit problem”. I illustrate them with examples of scientific theories that have been taken seriously as candidates for the laws of nature.

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Probability in Evolutionary Theory

Evolutionary theory is up to its neck in probability. For example, probability can be found in our understanding of mutation events, drift, fitness, coalescence, macro-evolution, and in the formulation of the principle of natural selection. Some authors have attempted to provide a unified realist interpretation of these probabilities. Or, when that has not worked, some have decided that this means there is no interpretation available at all, defending a ‘no theory’ theory of probability in evolution. I will argue that when we look closely at the various probabilistic concepts in evolutionary theory, then attempts to provide a unified interpretation of all these applications of probability appear to be poorly motivated. As a consequence of this, we need to be more careful in drawing conclusions from the fact that each interpretation fails for just one particular area of evolutionary theory. I will also argue that a plurality of interpretations is much better than no interpretation at all. On a more positive note, I will outline a particular way that a plurality of objective and subjective interpretations of probability can be strung together which provides a suitable understanding of the role probability plays in evolutionary theory.

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Subjective Probabilities, Degrees of Truth and Degrees of Belief

A number of authors have noted that if we have degrees of truth, then we should have corresponding degrees of belief--but that these degrees of belief do not behave like subjective probabilities. So should we countenance two different kinds of degree of belief? I argue that we cannot coherently do so, and present instead a formal framework in which there is a single notion of degree of belief, which in certain circumstances behaves like a subjective probability assignment, and in other circumstances does not. The framework is surprisingly neat and uncomplicated, and affords a clear picture of the relationship between subjective probabilities, degrees of truth and degrees of belief.

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Mathematical Coincidences

The decimal expansion of pi has six consecutive nines beginning at digit 712. That is a bigger coincidence than Commodus having the same birthday as Caligula. Since we can compare the size of a numeric coincidence with an historical coincidence, But wait! How can a necessary truth be a coincidence? The appearance of the six consecutive nines is inevitable, a priori, and provable. It is no coincidence that all theories of coincidence preclude mathematical coincidences! 'coincidence' applies univocally to both the physical and mathematical realms. I supplement my mathematical counterexamples with metaphysical ones. Things need not coincide in objective space or time to be coincidences. It is sufficient that they coincide in a "mental space" of perceived similarities. There could be coincidences even if there were no events. An empty world might just happen to be devoid of concrete entities. Their absence would be a coincidence. So what are coincidences? I characterize them as a genre of misleading evidence. We are always on the lookout for patterns. This speculative tendency makes us especially vulnerable to "false positives". Coincidences are truths that falsely appear to be based on an interesting fact or principle. The interesting fact can be the operation of a hidden agent or some other common cause. The interesting principle can be a law of nature or a central theorem of logic or axiom of geometry or a sweeping metaphysical insight.

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Probabilistic Coherence and Rationality Constraints on Credences

The probabilist subscribes to two doctrines: first, that there are such things as credences, and second, that rational credence functions are probability functions. I subscribe to the first doctrine, but will not defend it in this paper. Instead, I will focus on the second doctrine. Given that credences exist, must rational credence functions be probability functions? I answer 'No', and propose some other rationality constraints on credences to take the place of those provided by the probabilist.

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Hume's Probability Revisited

The aim of this presentation is to reconsider the gap between the notion of Hume's probability and our modern notion of "mathematical" probability. Although this has been addressed by some commentators, still it has not been fully examined.

REASON AND VALUE

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Rationality for Dummies

Possible worlds are common currency in epistemology. A standard claim is that if an agent believes that p then p is true at all of the worlds in the agent's doxastic space. These worlds are usually understood to be complete and consistent. Such a framework may be suitable for modeling logically omniscient, or “ideal”, agents. But as a framework for non-ideal agents, the use of complete and consistent worlds seems to place rationality constraints, which are far too high for cognitively limited agents. For example, on the usual possible worlds framework, if an agent believes that p , and p is logically equivalent to q , then agent is irrational if she does not believe q . This is particularly striking when, say, p is ‘ $1+1=2$ ’ and q is ‘ $\nexists a,b,c, n>2 \in \mathbb{N}, \text{trm}\{s.t\} a^n = b^n + c^n$ ’. A similar issue arises for Bayesian epistemology. If an agent has a credence in p of 0.5, and p is logically equivalent to q , then the agent is irrational if she has a credence in q of anything but 0.5. We think there is an important notion of rationality according to which, the above cases are not cases of irrationality. Replacing possible worlds with situations, or “partial worlds”, seems to be a natural way to get around these problems. But situations are nowhere near as well studied as possible worlds. In this paper we introduce a situation-based framework for both traditional and Bayesian epistemology. We will explore the benefits and costs of this approach to epistemology.

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Strategic Reason and the Value of a Veil of Ignorance with a Couple of Holes in It

The paper looks into a clash between practical and epistemic rationalities in supergames that display the following features: [1] at the starting point the participants only know the core game up to a non-trivial set of epistemic alternatives; [2] for some, but not all, of the alternatives, the only core game equilibrium is Pareto-suboptimal; [3] before embarking on the core game, the participants may decide to select and run one of a whole spectrum of inquiries about it. The inquiries differ in their epistemic efficiency: some result in complete (common) knowledge about the core game, some in only partial reduction of the initial set of epistemic alternatives. Call such supergames “risky games with completable information” (“RGCI” for short). One fundamental fact about RGCI is that, under some further well-motivated conditions, (1) an RGCI will always feature a Pareto-

optimal equilibrium, and (2) the equilibrium rationality will always dictate the participants to refrain from running a most efficient inquiry. Sometimes they will shirk the inquiry opportunity altogether and prefer to remain behind the initial veil of ignorance; sometimes their need to solve coordination problems will prompt them to make a couple of holes in the veil and peep through in order to partially improve their epistemic situation in a cautiously selected manner, but a complete removal of the veil will never be in their interests. Thus, deficiencies in their epistemic rationality become part of their optimal equilibrium path through the supergame because they compensate for the probable suboptimality of the core game. The paper ends with a discussion of possible generalisations of the notion of RGCI and their significance for making RGCI-based models relevant for social and moral epistemology. In particular, the paper argues that they may provide a missing link in the argumentation of some well-known theories of moral norms.

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Two Conceptions of Dignity

The modern conception of dignity - central to arguments about human rights, medical treatment, dispossession, and other significant matters - is a complex of two ingredients that are often not separated in discussions of dignity, respect and autonomy. First, there is the notion that is found in the great monotheistic religions, which is given voice in Renaissance thought and reaches its most elaborate philosophical expression in the work of Kant: that dignity is something that every rational being possesses to the same degree, and based in a number of capacities that are summed up by the word 'autonomy'. Second is the idea that because they are possessors of autonomy, rational moral agents should be permitted--as far as practicable--to exercise this autonomy to an equal degree. We argue that autonomy is not in fact a single capacity but resides in a number of capacities including the capacity for knowledge or understanding and the capacity for taking decisions. While much of the literature on dignity, rights and respect focuses on the equal exercise of autonomy it ignores the pressing question of whether the capacities that constitute such autonomy are themselves equally present in all normal human beings. We argue that contingent upon facts of birth, disease and social practice, the capacities that constitute autonomy are actually unequally divided among people. We discuss the challenges of facing up to the unequal distribution of autonomy, and propose scepticism over founding claims about human rights and respects on a free-floating doctrine of universal and equal human dignity

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Cian Dorr on Non-cognitivism and Wishful Thinking

Cian Dorr has argued that non-cognitivism is false because it cannot account for a range of rational inferences, and that this is so for reasons independent of the Frege-Geach problem. In this paper, I criticize Dorr's argument on a number of fronts. Among other things, I argue that there is a subtle sense in which one often gets new evidence for empirical conclusions via a priori reasoning, and that this subtlety is essential to explaining why the inferences that are relevant to Dorr's argument are rational even if cognitivism is true. Once this is appreciated it becomes clear that, in contrast to what Dorr's argument claims, even if non-cognitivism is true the relevant inferences are based on adequate evidence, and that non-cognitivism is in fact consistent with the correct account of the rationality of the relevant inferences, at least if it is assumed that there is a solution to the Frege-Geach problem.

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Moral Sensitivity and Presumptive Reasons

On any credible moral theory, what is needed for good moral judgement is moral sensitivity or discernment in being properly responsive to all the relevant features of a situation, and their interaction with each other. I consider and reject three common pictures of what this sensitivity consists in. According to a first picture, it is a sensitivity to the relative "weights" of competing reasons. According to a second, it is a sensitivity to the qualifications that need to be added in progressively refining our moral principles. According to a third, particularist picture, it is a sensitivity to the way in which all the aspects of a particular context contribute to establishing reasons. I argue that a fourth view is more explanatory: a view that treats moral sensitivity as a sensitivity to the interaction of "presumptive norms".

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Equality and Scarcity

This paper examines whether being an egalitarian makes a difference when dealing with situations of scarcity (understood as cases where not all dues can be met). It discusses the nature of egalitarianism, and the deontological and teleological arguments for equality. It

considers proportional, priority, and combined proportion/priority responses to scarcity, and the rival merits of these responses to be considered fair and/or egalitarian.

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What Integrity Is Not

Cheshire Calhoun, identifies three views of integrity, the “integrated-self” view, the identity view, and the “clean hands” view. Calhoun remarks that each of these views “ultimately reduces integrity to something else to which it is not equivalent to the conditions of unified agency, to the conditions for continuing as the same self, to the conditions for having a reason to refuse cooperating with some evils”. I think Calhoun is right about the alternatives she identifies, but that essentially the same objection can be made to her own alternative, the idea that integrity involves “standing for something”, and to the interpretations found in the subsequent literature, which, for instance identify integrity with virtue. So if integrity is none of these things, what is it? A striking feature of all of the alternative accounts is that they include an element of reflection on the part of the person of integrity. In the developing an argument for a “reflective oversight” interpretation of integrity I will argue that integrity just is the commitment to such reflection. The states of affairs or outcomes identified by alternative accounts are the sorts of things a person of integrity should have regard to when reflecting upon their lives across time or at a moment, but integrity is none of them: each “reduces integrity to something that it is not”. Once one looks at integrity in this way, many of the objections and concerns about the alternative accounts fade.

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A Contrastive Account of Moral Luck

In this paper the author defends objective consequentialism from the charge that it is far too subject to moral luck than it’s rivals. In the course of providing this defense, the author develops a contrastive analysis of “moral luck.” Few accounts of moral luck offer an account of luck itself. The view the author argues for here holds that the best account of luck itself is contrastive. This means, among other things, that no one is just plain lucky or unlucky. We have various pragmatic rationales for identifying an outcome as lucky or unlucky. In the case of morality, the author maintains, some of the relevant reasons have to do with what it is reasonable to blame and praise someone for. Outcomes will be relevant here since we want to minimize the actual bad results of actions. Bad “willings” are to be reduced since these are what have a causal connection to the bad outcomes.

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Moral Rationality, McDowell and Particularism

In 'Virtue and Reason' McDowell rejects what he calls the 'deductive paradigm' of moral rationality. He argues for an account that accommodates the perceptual capacity of virtuous agents to ascertain salient features of the particular situations in which they act.

Some moral particularists have interpreted McDowell as claiming that moral rationality consists in nothing but this capacity; i.e. this capacity is taken to sufficiently explain how virtuous agents consistently and reliably act well. While many moral philosophers agree to the need for some capacity of this kind (understood as perception or judgment), they disagree that it constitutes a sufficient account of moral rationality. I will support McDowell's claim that an adequate account of moral rationality needs to accommodate this perceptual capacity. However, I will argue that this capacity does not sufficiently explain correct moral judgments and action. I shall offer an account of moral rationality that avoids the problems that arise for the sufficiency claim and that is consistent with McDowell's core insights.

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Broome on the Scope of Rational Requirements

An agent who believes that he ought to X is rationally required to X. In recent years John Broome has convinced many that rational requirements of this kind have wide-scope rather than narrow-scope. I will consider Broome's two most influential arguments for this contention and argue that neither is successful.

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Socially Dependent Science

Helen Longino and Philip Kitcher mustered a debate in the December 2002 issue of "Philosophy of Science". The center of discord is, how do values affect science? Philosophy has long recognized there are cognitive and non-cognitive values. Cognitive values are what science considers e.g. simplicity, coherence, explanatory power etc. Non-cognitive values like politics, religion, or social biases, it is readily recognized, can have adverse effects. Thus, scientists should not do research in the guise of non-cognitive values. Kitcher and Longino recognize different of stages in scientific

discourse, where non-cognitive values can influence research. Kitcher thinks this occurs at the funding stage. Where scientists and researchers receive funding, is an important consideration when determining the verisimilitude of their conclusions. Kitcher proposes democratizing solutions to this problem. If we make research funding a democratic process, we can solve the problems of non-cognitive values in science. Longino thinks the problem occurs during actual research i.e. data collection and theory interpretation. Kitcher thinks solving the funding problems, will solve these problems as well. She contends values can infiltrate discourse without the researcher ever being aware. Thus, to simply "democratize science policy" will not "democratize science"(Longino, 2002); values will continue to affect science regardless of funding. I argue, as they address in the debate, for the importance of individuality. Kitcher and Longino offer solutions from the perspective of the whole rather than of the parts, resulting in an infinite regress for this context. Non-cognitive values just as readily influence democratic solutions as scientific inquiry. Where this is acceptable politically, when pursuing objectivity, Truth, and empirical justification, solutions are only effective as the individual level.

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Reasons to Feel

Recently, there has been much interest in assessment of emotions along the dimension of aptness, or fit, as opposed to the all-in assessment of emotions in which considerations of fit are balanced with considerations of usefulness and moral value. However, assessments of aptness have been considered atomistically, taking emotions one-by-one rather than as members of sets of alternative possible responses. Not surprisingly, given this methodology, the notion of aptness available in the literature is non-comparative. I argue that real world emotional assessment is essentially comparative: there is always more than one emotion that in some sense "fits" the evoking situation. Comparative aptness assessment brings into focus the ways in which norms governing what to feel are practical and perspectival and this, I argue, undercuts at least one argument in favor of neo-sentimentalism.

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Reasons as Evidence

Reasons for action and reasons for belief are often thought to be very different. Reasons for belief are generally considered to be provided by evidence, but this is not so, it is said, of reasons for action. We argue for a unified account of reasons for action and reasons for belief, according to which both types of reasons are evidence. A reason to believe a proposition is evidence that you ought to believe the proposition (in the case of epistemic reasons to believe, as opposed to pragmatic reasons to believe, whatever is counting as evidence that you ought to believe a proposition just is evidence for that proposition). A reason to perform an action is evidence that you ought to perform the action. If correct, our thesis should prove very fruitful, e.g. in throwing light on the idea that practical reasons can be weighed up in terms of strength (something that is often said, but rarely elucidated). At the same time, we take it to be a virtue of our account of reasons that it is compatible with a wide range of substantive positions in ethics and epistemology. A number of counterarguments are also considered.

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Will the Real Moral Judgment Please Stand Up

In recent times philosophers, myself included, have drawn upon data from the social and cognitive sciences and from psychopathology to challenge or vindicate a variety of meta-ethical positions about the nature of moral judgment and its connection to motivation. One problem with this approach is that there is no unitary phenomenon about which scientists are gathering data. This paper develops a taxonomy of moral judgment and discusses which we should privilege and why when seeking to identify an agent's "true" moral judgment.

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Epistemological Critiques of Reflective Equilibrium

Epistemological Critiques of Reflective Equilibrium Reflective equilibrium is a term coined by John Rawls to describe a method of testing moral theories. Rawls believed that although moral philosophy must be systematic and rigorous, ethics is ultimately based on

more than logic alone. For this reason, Rawls felt no ethical theory can completely disregard our everyday intuitions about morality. But unlike the philosophy known as intuitionism (with which reflective equilibrium is sometimes confused), Rawls' equilibrium method does not see our untutored intuitions as sacrosanct. Rather it takes them as plausible yet potentially erroneous starting points, which require rational revision if we are to form a consistent moral belief system. We therefore apply critical analysis to our everyday beliefs, sometimes revising our philosophy in light of our intuitions, sometimes revising our intuitions in light of our philosophy. According to Rawls, the beliefs that survive this process are those that we can be most confident about. This approach is now the dominant methodology among analytic political philosophers. Yet while such philosophers have long debated reflective equilibrium's merits, they have largely overlooked a critique that originates outside political philosophy, and has instead been put forward by sceptical epistemologists such as Steven Stich. The epistemologists argue that Rawls' method is based on an idealized conception of rationality, and so will never result in a convergence of beliefs among people with different starting convictions. In response, Norman Daniels, a leading authority on reflective equilibrium, has written that a defense of Rawls' method requires, "a more developed response to many of these lines of criticism than exists in the literature." My presentation explores the degree to which reflective equilibrium can be defended from its epistemologist critics. I argue that it can, so long as we conceive of reflective equilibrium in less coherentist terms than is customary.

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Everyday Imagining: Defining Imagination in Social Knowing

To empathise with others and to act appropriately in the world humans imagine beyond their own brains and bodies. This happens in talk and in play as people imagine together, building structures they can jointly occupy. But historically, philosophical understandings of imagination have envisaged humans as primarily rational beings and focussed on how imagination happens in minds. In doing so, philosophers reinforced the classic dualisms mind/body, individual/society and thinking/acting. This is insufficient. Looking at imagination in primary schools requires a definition of imagination that goes beyond Plato's wax tablet, Kant's "objects not present to the senses" or even Cognitive Science's "representational pictures". In this paper I will draw on the work of philosophers, linguists and anthropologists to suggest a broader definition of the imagination, one that recognises its centrality in social acting and knowing.

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Law, Legitimacy and the Discourse Principle

The technical and bureaucratic nature of law in modern states is one of the sources of what Habermas calls a “crisis of legitimation”. This derives from the tension between the requirement that law and policy are legitimated through the democratic process and the increasingly specialised character of law. Habermas attempts to resolve this problem by appeal to what he calls the “discourse principle”. This principle is central to his theory of communicative action and requires that those affected by a law or rule could agree to it as participants in an impartial and rational dialogue. Public debate determines whether a law expresses general assent and provides justifications that would be acceptable to all in cases where consensus over a legal norm is unattainable. The discourse principle is part of a procedural theory of the legitimation of authority. This account of legitimation does not require that every authoritative norm be informed by public consensus, but that it could have been. This raises the epistemic question of how we might know that a suitably idealised discussion between those affected would have endorsed a given law. Habermas’ strategy requires a sufficiently rich conception of public reason to enable hypothetical reconstruction of the outcome of a debate without, at the same time, making actual public debate redundant. Our paper examines the conception of rationality embedded in the discourse principle and assesses whether this approach resolves or merely relocates the legitimation dilemma.

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The Normativity of Rationality

In a number of influential papers, John Broome has argued that the commonsensical view that rationality is normative can be preserved only so long as we hold that rational requirements have wide scope. Niko Kolodny apparently agrees, but argues that in fact rational requirements have narrow rather than wide scope. From these two claims, it seems to follow that the commonsensical view that rational requirements are normative is mistaken. My aim in this paper is to defend commonsense, while holding (with Kolodny and against Broome) that rational requirements have narrow scope.

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After Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethicists typically contend that the morally right acts are those that are such that the virtuous would do them, and that they are right for this reason. Many moral theorists who do not subscribe to virtue ethics agree that the right acts are those that the virtuous would do, but argue such acts are right because of the validity of an independent criterion, rather than because of the fact that the virtuous would do them. Such moral theorists believe that virtue consists in the having of appropriate dispositions with respect to the independently-construed right, all-things-considered. I contend that both virtue ethicists and their traditional opponents have misunderstood the relation of the virtues to right action. The virtuous do not always (or most of the time) act rightly, for it is possible for them to act wrongly (even most of the time). On the positive account of virtue to be presented, the essential feature of the virtuous is that they respond sensitively to normative reasons on the basis of knowledge concerning what they normally ought to do (as well as knowledge concerning what it is always right to do, all-things-considered, in a range of paradigmatic cases).

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Particularism, Supervenience and Resultance

It is often believed that it follows from the thesis of supervenience that there are true moral principles. Many particularists believe that this will do no harm to particularism. They think that the moral principles resulting from supervenience are quite useless in terms of guiding actions or providing explanations for their moral status. And even though those moral principles may well be true, they are far from what most principlists would expect moral principles to achieve. Although this approach may well be justified in defusing the attack from epistemological principlism, it leaves metaphysical principlism unscathed. The difference between these two versions of principlism lies in the fact that epistemological principlism is concerned to show, contra epistemological particularism, that moral principles are useful in guiding actions or providing explanations for their moral status, whereas metaphysical principlism is concerned to show, contra metaphysical particularism, that there are true moral principles. In the literature, it is typically assumed that the refutation of epistemological principlism would entail the refutation of metaphysical principlism. However, this assumption is entirely ungrounded. The fact that moral principles are not useful does not entail the fact that they are not true. For it is not hard to imagine that the true moral principles are so complicated that they are beyond the ken of human comprehension to be of any serviceable use at all.

So it may well be the case that epistemological principlism is false while metaphysical principlism is true. To refute metaphysical principlism, we need to run an independent argument against it. In this paper, I will examine an argument regarding supervenience which the metaphysical principlists use in support of their claim that there are true moral principles. And I will argue that it is not sound. Although this would not refute metaphysical principlism completely, as metaphysical principlism may appeal to some other independent arguments for support, nevertheless, if I am right about this, it would be indicative of a reason for us to be less confident about the truth of metaphysical principlism and more confident about the truth of metaphysical particularism.

TRUTH AND BEAUTY

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The Aesthetic Value of Literary Tragedy

Literary tragedy is often thought to present a paradox. We seem to derive pleasure from tragedies, a pleasure which depends on their causing us to experience unpleasant emotions such as fear and sorrow. While some have sought to show that pleasure in tragedy is not paradoxical, others simply deny that tragedy is a source of pleasure. Instead, they claim, we value tragedy for its cognitive and/or moral benefits. I steer a course between these two approaches. First, I enumerate a number of constraints on any adequate account of the aesthetic value distinctive of tragedy and evaluate existent explanations of this value according to their ability to meet these constraints. This leads me to reject existing hedonic theories of tragedy. I then defend a cognitive theory of tragedy, according to which it has a distinctive aesthetic value because it can provide justified affective beliefs: in particular, beliefs about what it is like to suffer. Such beliefs have inherent epistemic value. My theory both meets the constraints on an adequate account of tragedy, and enables me to explain why tragedy is a source of pleasure.

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An Intellectual Revolution: Malraux's Account of the Temporal Nature of Art

The paper will discuss one of the most revolutionary aspects of Andre Malraux's theory of art his account of the relationship between art and time (i.e. the temporal nature of art). Despite its importance, the question of the relationship between art and time has been widely neglected in the philosophy of art for several decades, especially by what is sometimes termed "analytic aesthetics", which is the dominant Anglo-American school of aesthetics. The paper will begin by briefly outlining the main explanations of the temporal nature of art currently at our disposal: the idea, stemming principally from the Renaissance, that art is "timeless" or "immortal"; and the alternative view, which arose with nineteenth century thinkers such as Hegel, then to be widely adopted by Marxist and post-Marxist theorists, that art belongs essentially within historical time. Both explanations, it will be argued, pose major explanatory problems, and neither provides us with a plausible account of the world of art as we now know it. The paper will then discuss Malraux's own explanation of the temporal nature of art the proposition, as he writes, that "metamorphosis is the very life of the work of art in time, one of its specific characteristics." The analysis will show that Malraux's explanation is directly linked to the fundamental propositions on which his theory of art rests, emerging as a necessary

consequence of these propositions. (This step is important since Malraux has at times been accused e.g. by E.H. Gombrich of merely providing a series of disconnected aperçus about art rather than a coherent theory.) Malraux's explanation will be illustrated by brief reference to two major events in art history the Renaissance, and the emergence over the past hundred years of what he terms the "first universal world of art." It will be argued that Malraux's explanation provides a solution to the serious problems posed by the alternative theories mentioned above, that it provides a powerful and convincing explanation of the temporal nature of art, and that it implies a revolutionary change in our thinking about what should, despite its current neglect, be a topic of major importance in the philosophy of art. The paper will also comment briefly on certain recent attempts by analytic aestheticians to develop an account of the temporal notion of art and point out the inadequacies of these attempts.

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Realism about Totalities

This is an attempt to deal with unfinished business about truthmakers for negative truths. It is argued that it is clear that there are totalities objectively there in the world. Given this, there are limits objectively there in the world, so there is negation there in the world. Totalities then furnish truthmakers for absences also.

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'What Is Music?'

The overall theme of this paper is 'What Is Music?' Throughout classical philosophy, music has been described as the site of two applied universals, harmony and proportion, captured in Pythagorean ratio and the concept of 'harmonia'. This paper seeks to align ratio and harmony with (geometric?)space in an attempt to answer the title's question. In this paper I will outline a version of P. F. Strawson's chapter 'Sounds' from his book *Individuals*, in which he investigates the dimensions of a sound-only world. A contrast to this is Leibniz's metaphysics in which a relative order of objects in space is *de rigueur*. This is best exemplified by Bach's 'A Musical Offering'. These two approaches will be discussed with the aim of a response to 'What Is Music?'

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Meaning: Truth-Referential or Use?

In *Coming to Our Senses* (1996), I argued for a certain truth-referential theory of meaning and against various other theories, both truth-referential and not. There have, of course, been developments since then. I propose to summarize my view and then assess some of these developments in light of the view. I will consider the latest from direct-reference theorists Scott Soames and David Braun and finally, in most detail, Paul Horwich's use theory, proposed in *Meaning* and defended in *Reflections on Meaning*.

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A Liar's Thorn in the Austere Minimalist's Side

One of the prevalent deflationary theories of truth, Horwich's minimalist theory of truth, confronts tremendous difficulty of the traditional paradox of the Liar. The basic claim of the minimalist theory is that, by applying the propositional structure of " $\langle p \rangle$ is true iff p " to every proposition, one yields an axiom. It is awfully easy to see why the instances of the Liar paradox pose such a great threat to the minimalist. I argue that, due to its austere characteristic, the minimalist theory only has a very slim chance to dispel the Liar. In this paper, brief discussions of some basic principles behind Horwich's minimalist account, along with how and why a Liar thorn is in the side of this account because of those principles, will be given in the first two sections. In the third section, I will illustrate what the notion of parasitic Liar is and further explain why this notion can be used to provide significant analysis of some major accounts. Ironically, Horwich and the opponent of the minimalist theory of truth, Simmons, for instance, both focus on finding a minimalist style of Kripkean solution to the Liar, though they give us totally opposite conclusions. By utilising the notion of parasitic Liar, I argue for two things: first, Horwich's account is untenable; second, the failure of finding a Kripkean solution does not amount to a passing bell of the minimalist theory. Finally, I will give my own analysis of why the Liar thorn is inevitable to be in the minimalist's side. By using JC Beall's interesting brevity, I will indicate the only approach available to the minimalist theorist that is, the Liar instances are not legitimate truth bearers and further show that it is unlikely to make available such an account.

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Art and Proper Function

Functionalists about art are sometimes but not always explicit about the fact that the kinds of functions they appeal to in defining artworks are proper (or teleological) functions. The proper function of a thing is what that thing is for; what it is supposed to do. I argue that proper functions are the only kind of function that will serve the functionalist about art, and consider whether or not there is any sense to be made of the claim that art has proper functions.

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Music for Metaphysicians: Response-dependence in Musical Expressiveness

When we listen to certain pieces of music, for instance the Adagio of Beethoven's Third Symphony, to some of us it appears to be sad. The piece is said to be "expressive" of sadness. The primary aim of this paper is to introduce the concept of "expressiveness" as used in the philosophy of music. I shall do this by drawing attention to the two accounts of response-dependence assumed in the concept. (The first account involving the higher-level role property, the second involving the lower-level realiser property). I then defend the accounts from typical problems that arise with response-dependent concepts in general. I show that some of the problems can be overcome by solutions already proposed by those such as Philip Pettit, whereas with other problems, a solution can be found with respect to the idiosyncrasies surrounding the concept of expressiveness.

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Fact and Value According to a Critical Aesthetic Realism

The aesthetic realist would treat the structure of aesthetic judgment as analogous to the structure of cognitive judgment where disagreement indicates a fault on one side. This is apparently incompatible with aesthetic expressivism, according to which aesthetic judgments are autonomous (not based on proofs). I will reconcile what I understand is the motivating intuition of the aesthetic realist with expressivism. I will argue that an aesthetic judgment is apt, or not, according to whether its perceptual object represents a comprehensive interpretation of the object. It is the objectivity of this interpretation that motivates the aesthetic realist even though the interpretation is predominantly perceptual

rather than propositional. That is, the relevant interpretation is not the result of an argument as one would expect if aesthetic judgment really was analogous to a cognitive judgment. Instead, it is arrived at through discernment and feeling. A major part of my paper will be taken up with explaining how interpretation and the ascription of value are one and the same in the course of apprehending aesthetic form. This will form the basis of my argument that the objectivity of aesthetic judgment and its expressivist core can be acknowledged as complementary aspects of a quasi aesthetic realism or what I will characterise as a critical aesthetic realism.

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Do Singular Causal Claims Have Truth-makers?

It is common ground among all currently discussed theories of singular causation that causal statements have truth-makers in patterns of actual facts, processes and laws. More precisely, these theories endorse the thesis that the truth-values of all singular causal statements are determined by the sum total of actual facts, processes and laws. I shall present a range of examples that demonstrate that this thesis is false. After rejecting two defences of the thesis against these counterexamples, I explain how certain counterfactual default settings of causal variables play a crucial role in determining the truth-values of causal statements.

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On Making True

Work on the relation of making true has been somewhat divorced from the lessons which may be gleaned by looking at the best and clearest example of making true provided by the model theory for first order logic. I suggest that paying due attention to that theory allows us to see that certain metaphysical claims made about the relation of making true are false.

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Truthmakers, Truth and Metaphysics

The paper examines some motivations for, and conceptions of, truthmakers and some roles for them in relation to theories of truth and in metaphysics. There may be some uncertainty, and perhaps conflicting views, about where truthmaker theory 'belongs'. Is it primarily concerned with truth, though having important applications in metaphysics? Or vice versa? In any case, a number of issues arise in each area. Does the truthmaker concept have a place alongside others in any comprehensive account of truth? Can it be used to help decide issues of truth aptness? Or to adjudicate between theories of truth? Is it best thought of as supplementing or clarifying one theory or as replacing it? Similarly, what are its implications or applications to issues of (meta) ontology and metaphysics? Does it help settle issues of ontological commitment? And what ontological commitments might it bring with it? Does it have a role in characterising, clarifying or settling issues of realism vs antirealism? Does it help with various 'location problems'?

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Assessment-contextual Indexicals

In this paper, I consider whether tenses, temporal indexicals, and other indexicals are contextually dependent on the context of assessment (or a-contextual), rather than, as is usually thought, contextually dependent on the context of utterance (u-contextual). I begin by contrasting two possible linguistic norms, governing our use of context sensitive expressions, especially tenses and temporal indexicals, and argue that one of these norms would make those expressions u-contextual, while the other would make them a-contextual. I then ask which of these norms are followed by English speakers. Finally, I argue that the existence of a-contextuality does not in any sense entail relativism about truth.

WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY

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Seeing Oneself Through the Eyes of the Other: Asymmetrical Reciprocity and Self-respect

Iris Marion Young bases her idea of asymmetrical reciprocity in the work of Levinas, Irigaray, Arendt, and Derrida. In her essay “Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder, and Enlarged Thought” she argues that we cannot understand others’ experiences simply by imagining ourselves in others’ place or in terms of symmetrical reciprocity, which is simply a projection of the self’s perspective onto that of the other. (Intersecting Voices, 1997) For Young, reciprocity expresses moral respect and means “that each acknowledges and takes account of the other” without assuming their perspective. (1997, 41) The asymmetry or lack of reversibility arises from people’s different life histories and social positions, which vary by sex, age, ability, and culture, for example. Critics of Young have claimed that she argues people cannot understand each other (Lorenzo C. Simpson, 2001) or that she fails to recognize the significance of distinct bodily existence to asymmetry. (Silvia Stoller, 2005) The first criticism misinterprets Young and the second is addressed in many of Young’s other works. My view is that asymmetrical reciprocity is an important concept for thinking about relations between self and other and has implications for both ethics and political philosophy. However, I argue that there are some problems with Young’s articulation of asymmetrical reciprocity in terms of wonder and the gift, problems which centre on her neglect of the difference between wonder and respect and her neglect of the significance of self-respect. Using the examples of friendship and political representation, I show how taking self-respect into account complicates and refines the picture of asymmetrical reciprocity.

OTHER(LOGIC)

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Disjunctive Obligations

A classic counter-example by Ross (1941) put pressure on the principle of *Inheritance*,

$$(I) \quad A \models B \rightarrow (a \text{ is required to do } A) \models (a \text{ is required to do } B)$$

Ross pointed out that (1), but not (2), seems true:

- (1) You are required to stop at red traffic lights.
- (2) You are required to stop at red traffic lights or to murder a pedestrian.

Defenders of deontic logics in which (I) holds (e.g. Wedgwood (2006)) propose Gricean approaches, based on Grice's maxim of quantity. In the first part of this paper, I articulate the Gricean strategy and argue that, while it may explain some phenomena, it does not get to the heart of Ross's puzzle. As many have pointed out, implicatures derived through the maxim of quantity are suppressed in certain embeddings and in some non-assertive speech acts (*questions, suppositions, etc.*). I defend the claim that the intuitions involved in Ross's puzzle are preserved also in these types of contexts, and conclude that the Gricean approach is unsatisfactory.

In the second part of the paper, I argue that, although the Gricean approach fails, even semantic frameworks that give up (I) fail to account for the intuitions involved in Ross's inference. Although these logics do not satisfy (I), they satisfy a principle that is just barely weaker than (I). Somewhat informally the principle is:

$$(IP) \quad A \models B \rightarrow (a \text{ is required to do } A) \ \& \ \text{it is not settled true that } B \models (a \text{ is required to do } B)$$

(IP) is no less problematic than (I) *vis-à-vis* Ross's puzzle. I conclude with an argument that, given some assumptions about the semantic framework, no operator can violate (IP) and 'look' like a deontic necessity operator.

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What Is the Principle of Uniform Solution and Why Should We Buy It?

In philosophy of logic, decision theory, and elsewhere, it is generally thought that similar problems should be solved by similar means. This advice is sometimes elevated to the status of a principle: the principle of uniform solution. In this paper I will explore the question of what counts as a similar problem and consider reasons for subscribing to the principle of uniform solution.

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Semantic Entanglement

A natural picture of how meaning and truth are determined seems to be undermined by a rather strange semantic phenomenon structurally similar to quantum entanglement. I describe the phenomenon of semantic entanglement, compare the semantic with the quantum mechanical case and explore the prospects for disentanglement.

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The Closing of the Mind: How the Particular Quantifier Became Existentially Loaded Behind our Backs

The paper argues that the view that the particular quantifier is "existentially loaded" is a relatively new one historically; and that it has become entrenched in modern philosophical logic more for sociological reasons than for rational ones.

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Is Gödel's Sentence Flawed?

Gödel's 1931 Theorem depends on the legitimacy as a sentence of the formula, $\ulcorner \text{Gen } r \urcorner$. This formula is obtained by replacing the free variable in the expression $\ulcorner \text{Gen } q \urcorner$ by $\ulcorner \text{Gen } q \urcorner$'s own Gödel number. Gödel treats $\ulcorner \text{Gen } r \urcorner$ as a sentence; and indeed a sentence about the unprovability of the sentence $\ulcorner \text{Gen } q \urcorner$ by reference to its own Gödel number.

The Gödel number of $\neg \exists x \phi(x)$ refers to an open formula so it is an expression about the unprovability of an open formula. A formula containing an open variable cannot be a sentence because its content is indeterminate. Connecting an open formula to a sentence by a logical connective does not create a sentence. The provability of any sentence requires the existence of a proof sequence culminating in that sentence; so no formula which is not a sentence is provable. “Unprovable” must mean lacking such a sequence but that requires the formula which is unprovable to be a sentence—otherwise the proof chain is inexpressible. Treating non-sentential formulas as unprovable does not solve the problem. No contradiction arises from $\neg \exists x \phi(x)$ being unprovable (in that extended sense applying to mere formulae) if it is not a sentence because no provable/unprovable regression. Gödel sentences/expressions cannot be defined by reference to their own Gödel number; such a definition is circular. The corresponding expression used in Löb’s Theorem involves the same flaw. Lastly, if $\neg \exists x \phi(x)$ is a sentence then it is an object of an unprovability predicate; but it can be shown to be provable and unprovable; thus proving that no such (sentence) object exists.

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Paraconsistent Identity

The behaviour of identity when studied under a paraconsistent logic is full of surprises. I cite three areas where the non-classical results differ starkly from the classical: when objects are not self-identical; when we go to count non-self-identical objects; and when properties are extensionally equivalent but intensionally distinct. Then I offer a unified explanation of these results, which both prompts a reinterpretation of mathematical practice, and clearly demarcates the place of dialethic paraconsistency in general.

OTHER (METAPHYSICS)

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Bundle Theory and Triplication Problem

The bundle theory is a theory about the internal constitutions of individuals. It asserts that individuals are entirely composed by universals. Typically, bundle theorists augment their theory with constitutional approach to individuation entailing the thesis “no two individuals can share all their constituents” (CIT). But then the bundle theory runs afoul of Black’s duplication case, where two indistinguishable spheres are 5-meters from each other. Rodriguez-Pereyra, denying “CIT”, develops a version of this theory that promises to accommodate Black’s world. He distinguishes bundles from their instances and identifies individuals with bundle-instances. But the promise of his theory turns on his being able to account for the diversity of instances” without appealing to bare numerical differences between them. Since Rodriguez-Pereyra fails to do so, we should conclude that bundle-instances, while securing the diversity of Black’s spheres, are themselves subject to the very problem that their introduction is meant to resolve. I propose a new version of the bundle theory, which denies “CIT” and takes distance relations between bundles to be a ground for their diversity. For this new version, if spatial distance between two bundles is greater than zero, then these two bundles must be distinct. This version accommodates Black’s world. Nonetheless, there is a possible objection. Consider the “triplication case”--a world containing three indistinguishable spheres, each 5-meters from each other. Since distance relations are dyadic, this version must fail to distinguish three-spheres world from Black’s world. In response to this objection, I maintain that we must construe distance relations as irreducibly multigrade and n-ary. Then these two worlds will be distinguished by appealing to a triadic relation--R3--that three things enter mutually. Aren’t all relations in principle reducible to dyadic relations? I won’t deny that. But I will aim lower and argue that R3 cannot be reduced to dyadic relations that obliterate the distinction between three-spheres world and Black’s world.

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The Ontological Commitments of Mathematical Models

Some philosophers of mathematics argue that the role of mathematical models in science is merely representational: when scientists use mathematical models they only believe that they are adequate representations of the physical phenomenon under investigation.

Others disagree with this view and argue that mathematical models also serve as genuine explanations in science. Consequently, the application of mathematical models in science cannot be treated instrumentally and we ought to be realists about mathematics.

I advance two reasons to reject realist conclusion: genuine mathematical explanations are indistinguishable from spurious ones. And, for mathematical models to be explanatory, they have to be “bottom-level”; I deny that we can know which explanations are bottom-level in science. I contend that mathematical explanations can always be replaced by intrinsic physical explanations.

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Competing Themes in the Martin-Heil Identity Theory of Properties

This paper examines the Martin-Heil Identity Theory concerning properties and discusses two competing themes that underpin the Theory. First, that both the dispositional and qualitative (categorical) are required to give an adequate account of the world. Second, that there is a strict identity between the dispositional and qualitative and hence Martin’s term for properties as “disposition-cum-qualitative”, and Heil’s as “power-qualities”. This paper discusses why the first theme leads to properties being dual-natured; and the second theme to properties being single-natured. I argue that a theory which attempts to incorporate both themes is unsustainable. An alternate way to interpret the Identity Theory--the distinction between the dispositional and qualitative is not an ontologically-robust distinction, but is instead, merely a matter of perception” is also discussed and dismissed. If Martin and Heil wish to account for both the dispositional and qualitative and keep both as equally basic and irreducible, they need to bite the bullet and allow that there are two aspects to properties. This path, I suggest, is fraught with difficulties in attempting to say how the two are combined into one property. The alternative is to strictly identify the two as Martin and Heil have attempted to do. In this case, if there are not two, but instead only a singular nature to properties, it is difficult to see how the requirement for both the dispositional and qualitative, is not redundant. Keywords: metaphysics, property theory, Martin-Heil Identity Theory, dispositional, qualitative, categorical, nature of properties.

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Non-existence as Ontological Contradiction

The crucial problem of existence as a property is that the predication of such a property of an entity appears insufficient to distinguish cases where the entity exists, on the one

hand, from those where it does not exist on the other. That is, the property of existence does not add anything to the concept of a thing. However, if “non-existence” is deemed synonymous with “ontological contradiction” then the case of an entity existing is distinguishable from it not existing even while there is no distinction between the two cases. Once the adequacy of non-existence as ontological contradiction is established, existence can be deemed an excluder predicate, i.e. excluding ontological contradiction. Further, this synonymy of “non-existence” and “ontological contradiction” provides an account by definition as to why there are no actual ontological contradictions.

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Interactionism and Conservation of Energy

Interactionist dualism is sometimes summarily dismissed on the grounds that it is supposed to be obviously at odds with certain well established scientific results. One influential example this strategy is the claim that interactionist dualism is incompatible with the Conservation of Energy law in physics, and so must be rejected. One common way to respond to this challenge is by arguing that the mind causes changes in the brain by reconfiguring it in such a way that the level of energy is not changed: the mind exerts its influence by means of energy redistribution. In this paper I consider the merits of this response, and argue that there are other and preferable responses available.

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Taking the Human Sciences Seriously

Many naturalists today take the central questions of metaphysics to be placement problems: how can we "place" such things as moral, modal, mathematical, or intentional entities in the world-described-by-the-sciences. I want to argue that this general problematic is misconceived since it rests on not taking the human sciences seriously. A properly naturalistic conception of science allows for a much richer conception of the scientific image than orthodox naturalists are inclined to suppose.

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Survival and Causation

Psychological accounts of personal identity are thought to be appealing because survival lose its point unless there is something it is like to be consciousness of the past and to

anticipate the future. Included in most psychological accounts is the idea that this continuity of conscious must have an underlying causal condition. But there is nothing it is like for this causal condition to be present; it is possible for it to be absent and yet for this to make no difference in how things seem to us. Perhaps this is why some theorists have dispensed with causation and claimed that survival consists in a relation based on mere qualitative similarity. But the causal condition surely is necessary, even though the normal Lockean strategies for motivating mental continuity views are not directly relevant to an argument for its presence. I present reasons for thinking causation is necessary while using the issue as a foil for reflecting on questions of methodology.

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Waddayamean 'Concrete'?

Waddayamean “concrete”? A question about space (and spacetime). One reason why spatial realism seems implausible is that we are unsure what it commits us to. Both are explanatory items. Neither explains by causing anything yet both are concrete. Clarify that and the whole package look less bizarre. I’m aware that these seem wild claims. This paper is just about concreteness (I raked cause over the coals last conference so I’m letting it cool off.) It is not a technical paper, indeed it’s not philosophy of science, but the pure metaphysics. If the subject is new to you, you may find it fun. The meaning of concreteness, I claim, lies in how the identity of indiscernibles is false for the standard cases of the concrete material things. Perfect similarity in intrinsic qualities does not entail uniqueness since similar things are distinguishable in different places (or times). So space (time) is at the core of concreteness. The familiar intuition pumps about space almost all depend specifically on Euclidean geometry, a quite special and markedly bland case under the general ontological blanket of space-type things. That’s easily seen in 2D examples and figures. I go on to develop at length through easy 2D examples ways in which non-Euclidean spaces would impinge rather directly on perception, mainly sight and sense of push and pull. Some examples emphasise how both local and global spatial structures would bring concreteness immediately to the fore, and show space as concrete. I touch briefly and pictorially on how the world of General Relativity would make the structure of spacetime manifest. So spacetime is not a hidden cause, being neither hidden nor a cause. Relationism offers no escape since spatial relations are at least as hard to fathom as space itself is. Graham Nerlich University of Adelaide

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Idealism and Arguments against Infinity

One of the most influential arguments against actual (completed) infinities has been that such infinities exceed our intellectual comprehension. We show that this argument from epistemic limitations is unsound. We argue that (i) actual infinities are comprehensible, and (ii) that in any case, being comprehensible by a finite intellect is not a necessary condition for the reality of an object. We demonstrate that many great philosophers were fooled by the argument from epistemic limitations, with special reference to Kant and Wittgenstein.

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Backwards Explanation

'Backwards' event explanation is explanation of an earlier event by a later event. The paper argues that prima facie cases of backwards event explanation are ubiquitous. Some examples:(1) I am tidying my flat because my brother is coming to visit tomorrow.(2) The scarlet pimpernels are closing because it is about to rain.(3) The volcano is smoking because it is going to erupt soon.We then look at various ways people might attempt to explain away these prima facie cases by arguing that in each case the 'real' explanation is something else. We argue that none is successful, and so any plausible account of explanation should either make room for backwards explanation or have a good story to tell about why it doesn't have to.

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The Effective Indexical

In a famous paper in *Noûs* in 1979, John Perry points out that action depends on indexical beliefs. In addition to "third-person" information about her environment, an agent needs "first-person" information about where, when and who she is. This conclusion is widely interpreted as a reason for thinking that tensed claims cannot be translated without loss into untensed language; but not widely regarded as a reason for realism about tensed facts.

In another famous paper in the same volume of *Noûs*, Nancy Cartwright argues that action requires that agents represent their world in causal terms, rather than merely probabilistic terms: for, Cartwright argues, there's a distinction between effective and ineffective strategies, that otherwise goes missing. This is widely taken as a reason for thinking that causal claims cannot be translated without loss into merely probabilistic claims; and also -- in contrast to Perry's case -- widely regarded as a reason for realism about causation. In this paper I ask whether the latter conclusion is compulsory, or whether, as in Perry's case, the need for causal beliefs might merely reflect some "situated" aspect of a decision-maker's perspective.

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Counterfactuals, Context, and Chance

There are several issues that arise in attempting to develop a semantics for counterfactuals that can deal with situations involving chances. One such issue is determining how to best explain the phenomenon of inescapable clashes. We are inclined to accept many "would" counterfactuals of the form "If A were the case, then C would be the case", but considerations from physics can often convince us that if A were the case, then there would be a non-zero chance that not-C. These considerations often incline us to accept "might" counterfactuals of the form "If A were the case, then not-C might be the case". We are not, however, inclined to accept the conjunction of the "would" counterfactual and the corresponding "might" counterfactual with a negated consequent. This leaves us with a puzzle: should we reject the "would" counterfactual, the "might" counterfactual, or adopt a view on which the conjunction of the two is, despite appearances, semantically consistent? I will present a sketch of a contextualist semantics for counterfactuals that provides a solution to this puzzle and has the potential to solve other problems stemming from considerations of chance. My proposal will be based on the semantics for counterfactuals developed by David Lewis and will attempt to preserve what I consider to be some of the intuitive advantages of his view, such as the duality of "would" and "might" counterfactuals. I will argue that the puzzle presented by inescapable clashes can be resolved by considerations of context based on the use of non-epistemic modal notions in ordinary language. Rather than solely contributing to the resolution of vagueness in the similarity relation, I will suggest that context can also restrict the domain of possible worlds that can enter into that relation via the same mechanisms that govern the use of other modal expressions.

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The Nature of McTaggart's Paradox: A Defence of Dynamic Conception of Time

McTaggart offered a dynamic conception of time, known as the moving NOW, but he believed that time as dimension of change cannot be maintained so that time itself never exists. What he meant to show is as follows: 1) time needs such a change that what was future is now present and will become past: and 2) for this to be possible, mutually incompatible tenses of futurity (will), presentness (is) and pastness (was) are both essential and fundamental: but 3) given the notion of the moving NOW, every event in time has all of those incompatible determinations: therefore 4) the change in question is impossible, which in turn establishes that time is unreal. The purpose of this essay is to defend some dynamic conception of time, but not necessarily the notion of the moving NOW. In the course of doing so, I shall mention some contemporary debates between tenses (tensed theorists of time) and detenses (tenseless theorists). Detenses usually hold that tenses are analyzable in tenseless terms and therefore that tenses are unreal. Some tenses argue against this. I shall point out, however, that the question of whether tenses are analyzable in tenseless terms or not is irrelevant at least to whether a dynamic account of time is feasible. Then, I shall suggest that there are various tensed theories, i.e. presentism, open-future theory, and A-B hybrid theory, which hold different views about what tenses mean. The conclusion will be that presentism can never explain the passage of time, and that some version of open-future theory can develop a dynamic account without any contradiction, and that a general form of A-B hybrid theory is insufficient.

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Still an Objection After All These Years: Personal Identity and Quasi-Memory

This paper will examine the use of the concept of quasi-memory to respond to Butler's objection to Locke's view of personal identity, focusing on two main lines of critique. Butler's objection was that the memories that underpin our continuity are already assumed to be ours and so assume the identity that they are seen to define or locate, and thus Locke's view is circular. Modern psychological continuity views of personal identity, such as Parfit's, resolve this problem by appealing to quasi-memory, a concept introduced by Shoemaker. The tactic here is to concede Butler's point, but then substitute

the concept of quasi-memory for that of memory, altering the psychological continuity view accordingly, in order to overcome the objection.

This paper will discuss two lines of critique of this use of quasi-memory. Firstly, I will look at several responses to quasi-memory which argue that the conceptual substitution fails to respect mental holism, and would be incoherent practically and phenomenologically. Secondly, I will look at the concern from which the concept of quasi-memory comes, arguing that it is connected to the way that memories 'from the inside' are to be thought about, and to Locke's own concern with the first-personal nature of conscious experience. However the concept of quasi-memory, and the way it is now often used, abstracts this feature away. On these bases, I will assess whether the concept can be considered a successful rebuttal of Butler's objection.

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What Can We Learn about Imaginary Numbers from Their Presence in Special Theory of Relativity (STR) and Quantum Mechanics (QM)?

The paper deals with a philosophical status of imaginary numbers. These numbers are treated as a part of complex numbers taken as ordered pairs of real numbers with defined addition, multiplication, subtraction and division. This subjugation of imaginary numbers does invalidate bewilderment when looking at the identity $i^2 = -1$ and equation $e^{i\pi} + 1 = 0$ joining all five fundamental numbers together. What is it in i that catch the eye? STR and QM cannot be formulated without imaginary numbers. Thus the paper suggests that something relevant can be learned from those theories, theories which rest basically on impossible to understand physical facts like constancy of speed of light and particular-wave duality. This impossibility is connected with impossibility of $i^2 = -1$ in conclusion that i might represent impossibility, but with no admission of impossibility to our world since there is no epistemic access to imaginary magnitudes of physics. In STR it can be argued that the forward $\hat{A}^{1/2}ct$ and $-\hat{A}^{1/2}ct$ backward light ray displacement in Poincaré's clock should be taken not only in sequential order but also at the same time denoted by $[\hat{A}^{1/2}ct, -\hat{A}^{1/2}ct]$. Why it is so can be indicated by saying that from relativistically valid perspective of a subjective Newtonian spacetime the ray doesn't age in the same way, as the speed-of-light twin from the Twins Paradox doesn't. A proper justification of this claim is presented. It is also possible to take these displacements as occurring forwards and backwards in time. Then it is claimed that $[\hat{A}^{1/2}ct, -\hat{A}^{1/2}ct]$ constitutes time-like dimension thus constituting interval: $[\hat{A}^{1/2}ct, -\hat{A}^{1/2}ct]^2 = -(ct)^2$. This is an import of interval metric from STR. It follows that $[\hat{A}^{1/2}ct, -\hat{A}^{1/2}ct] = ict$ leading to the conclusion: $i = [\hat{A}^{1/2}, -\hat{A}^{1/2}]$. Thus the imaginary number i is a scalar entity which has to ordered numerical values assigned to it. Remarkably the same equation for i is obtained from QM.

OTHER (OTHER)

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Teaching Philosophy Using Peer Instruction

Peer Instruction is a simple way to make lectures more interactive and engaging. Lectures are broken up with multiple-choice format “quiz questions” that test students’ understanding of the topic under discussion. All the students in the class “vote” on the answer to the question, using any of a number of different methods; flash cards, an electronic response system (“clickers”) or just show of hands. If most students have the right answer, the lecturer can confirm it and move on. If most have the wrong answer, the lecturer can explain the topic again. If 40-60% of students have the right answer, then students are given a few minutes to discuss the question with their neighbour and try to persuade them that their answer is correct. The whole class then gets to vote a second time. Typically, more students give the correct answer the second time around; students who have understood the topic are able to explain it effectively to students who have not, perhaps at times more effectively than the lecturer. These interactive lectures have several advantages over the traditional format; the questions provide immediate and useful feedback to both the lecturer and students; the “convince-your-neighbour” sessions promote active engagement with the material being taught; and the convergence on the correct answer suggests that the discussions are a useful learning tool. In this talk we will explain the Peer Instruction method in more detail and describe how we have incorporated it into several introductory philosophy courses (Ethics, Critical Thinking and Philosophy of Religion) at Monash University. We report on the positive results from student evaluations of the method and a study carried out in 2006 to measure gains in critical thinking ability. The presentation will be short, with plenty of time for questions and discussion.

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Humean Humility

This paper raises a puzzle for the sceptical realist interpretation of Hume. The puzzle is that the sceptical realist interpretation of Hume commits him to belief in 'unknowable somethings': the sceptical realist reads Hume as saying that there are necessary connections which we cannot know. I outline a way for the sceptical realist to solve this puzzle which makes good philosophical sense and which squares well with various Hume texts.

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Sperm, Eggs and Hunks: Why Kripke-Style Arguments for Origin Essentialism Fail

In 'Naming and Necessity' Saul Kripke offered "something like a proof" of at least one essentialist conclusion about the origins of everyday objects. Since then, it has been widely recognized that his argument did not reach the conclusion he intended. In response, a number of philosophers have attempted to give Kripke-style arguments by adding further metaphysical principles to his proof sketch. However, this paper argues that Kripke's original argument is not just incomplete, it also badly over-generalizes to yield implausible essentialist conclusions. Moreover, an examination of two different attempts to complete Kripke's argument those that appeal to metaphysical sufficiency principles, and those that appeal to certain strong compossibility principles reveals that they inherit the original over-generalization problem. This paper concludes that we have good reason to think that all Kripke-style arguments for origin essentialism will over-generalize.

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World, Subjectivity, and Meaning: Husserl, Heidegger, and the Transcendental Problem of Signification

This paper seeks to reexamine Heidegger's hermeneutic transformation of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology so as to show how the latter's conceptions of world, subjectivity, and meaning are reappropriated within a fundamental ontology of Dasein qua Being-in-the-world that refuses, at once, an immanentist, substantialist view of worldhood, a transcendental conception of consciousness qua intentionality, and a theoretical, referentialist view of meaning. Heidegger's critique of phenomenology in *Sein und Zeit* is shown to be better articulated with his later view of language as a radical hermeneutics responding to the challenges of an environmental ethics of dwelling, whose semantic perspectivism may still be characterised as "transcendental" only to the extent that its a priori radically departs from a philosophy of subjectivity. The recent interpretations of what might be dubbed a non-transcendental move in Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology in thinkers such as Apel, Tugendhat, Habermas, and Fiala are here evoked so as to enlighten our reconstruction of a defensible version of transcendental-semantic phenomenology.

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The Flawed Psychology of Libertarianism

This paper will address the libertarian, minimal state theories of two 20th Century political philosophers, F.A. Hayek and Robert Nozick. I will say that these theories incorporate and are grounded on certain beliefs about human nature, constituting a form of folk psychological theory. I will show how various elements of this theory are employed to justify main aspects of a libertarian political scheme, including both the egalitarian universality of negative freedoms or rights, and wide inequalities of material condition arising from their preferred laissez-faire market economy. Proceeding from this analysis, I will argue for two worries about the libertarian political scheme: if the inequalities of the market were shown to impact unequally on the universal psychological features appealed to in justifying the scheme, the scheme would be out of step with its ethical premises; and, if these kinds of differential effects on people were shown to threaten the sufficiency of the minimal state to its intended purpose to maintain a basic social order then the functional stability of the scheme in application would be in doubt. Finally, I will indicate how a contemporary, neuroscience-literate approach to psychology lends credence to both these areas of concern.

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Straight or Sceptical: A Naive Dilemma

Generalised denial of meaning facts is effectively promoted by the default, yet false, notion that solutions to the Kripke/Wittgenstein sceptical problem must be straight or sceptical according to Kripke's characterisations.

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Kant on the Limits of Human Evil

Kant has often been accused of being far too "optimistic" when it comes to the extremes of evil that humans can perpetrate upon another. In particular, Kant's claim, which I shall call the "diabolical evil thesis", that humans cannot choose to do evil for evil's sake, has struck many people as simply false. Another problem for Kant, or perhaps the same problem in another guise, is his supposed claim that all evil is done for the sake of self-love. While self-love might be a plausible way to explain some instances of evil, it seems

to be an implausible way to explain instances where people imprudently act in senselessly destructive and even self-destructive ways. The Holocaust, in particular, has been seen by many as an instance of diabolical evil that is beyond Kant's optimistic views. Can Kant handle such extreme cases of moral evil? By putting Kant's account of passions to work in understanding self-destructive evil, I shall seek to answer in the affirmative. Kant was far from unaware that the moral depths to which humanity can sink are almost bottomless. But just as we humans can but approach the perfection of angels, so to do we fall short of the depravity of devils.

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Most Counterfactuals Are False

It has long been recognized that counterfactuals are strange beasts. They involve a modality that makes empiricists uncomfortable; they resist truth functional analysis, yet the best-known possible worlds analyses of them make many philosophers uncomfortable; they violate intuitive inference rules that material and strict conditionals obey; and so on. I argue that they are even stranger than has been generally recognized: while we use them effortlessly in daily conversation, and while they are staples of numerous philosophical analyses, most counterfactuals (that are ever uttered) are false. I attempt some damage control: I concede that various counterfactuals are clearly true--for example, those in which there is some sort of necessary connection between antecedent and consequent. But they are rarely uttered, so they do little to offset the preponderance of false counterfactuals. How, then, does our practice of uttering counterfactuals survive? In the neighborhood of the ordinary but false counterfactuals that we utter, there are closely related counterfactuals that are true""for example, those with probabilistic consequents. They support our practice, at least when the prevailing standards for asserting counterfactuals are somewhat forgiving, as they typically are on the street. However, we philosophers often leave the street; the street is not always forgiving; and even when it is, falsehood is merely tolerated rather than eradicated.

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Conceptions of Autonomy and the People's Republic of China's Family Planning Policy

Autonomy, or self-determination, "stands at the core of liberal theory" (Nedelsky, 1989, pp.7); it carries with it the individualistic/atomistic characteristic of liberalism and is most often represented by either property or "the autonomous man." Yet as I illustrate, it is these ideal symbols that ultimately illuminate the problematic nature of the liberal

conception of autonomy. Consequently, in this talk I will reject the liberal conception of autonomy in favour of a relational concept, which takes into account the social nature of persons. Yet, a number of relational theorists, including Oshana, argue that “a sensible characterization of autonomy requires a certain environment external to the agent whose self-government is at issue” (Oshana, 1998, pp.95). This effectively has the same consequence as liberal autonomy; it entails that only individuals living in democratic nations can be genuinely autonomous. However, this seems to suggest that individuals must be autonomous in a specific way, which is itself non-autonomous. Thus I argue for a relational conception that acknowledges that while persons may not be autonomous in one sphere, it does not preclude them from being autonomous in others. It also recognizes the fact that government edicts may have different effects on different persons, thus allowing for a more interesting and nuanced discussion about The People’s Republic of China’s family planning policy and the impact it has had on women’s autonomy. Nedelsky, J., (1989). “Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities” *Yale Journal of Feminism*, Vol. 1 pp 7-36 Oshana, M., (1998). “Personal Autonomy and Society” *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Vol. XXIX, No. 1 pp 81-102

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T.H.Green and Sir Isaiah Berlin's "Two Concepts of Liberty"

Berlin’s famous lecture is substantially fair and scholarly when he deals in Section I with what he calls “The notion of negative freedom”, but not when in Section II he discusses “The notion of positive freedom”. The only exponent of positive freedom he quotes (and then out of context) is T.H.Green, to whose conception of it he entirely fails to do justice. Green has far more of great value to say about positive freedom than Berlin would lead one to suppose. Those propositions are supported respectively by the three sections of this paper.

Relevant texts other than Berlin’s lecture are his introduction to *Four Essays on Liberty* (now published in *Liberty*, 2002), George Crowder’s *Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism* (2004), and Green’s lectures “Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract” (in *Works* Vol. III) and “The different senses of ‘freedom’ as applied to will and to the moral progress of man” (Vol. II).

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Sport Philosophy: an Introduction

Sport Philosophy formally began its existence as a discipline in 1972 with the formation of the international association for the philosophy of sport. Regrettably, IAPS has recently lost Professor Bernard Suits, one of the disciplines founding fathers. Therefore to commemorate the work of Professor Suits this paper intends to shed some light on this interesting but little known discipline; and some of the foundational work that Professor Suits developed; much of which is still in evidence today. This paper will start with an overview of Suits' work and his influence on subsequent developments in this field and progress to detail some of the history, enduring themes and current research work being carried out, both abroad and here in Australia. This paper aims to provide an overview and introductory discussion of the salient issues of this young discipline, in an effort to inform the parent discipline and broaden its appeal.

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Husserl, the Monad and Immortality

In an Appendix to *Analyses of Passive and Active Synthesis* dating from the early 1920s, Husserl makes a startling assertion, one that he does not make in any other place. "Even if the presently "enduring" unitary object or event can cease, the process of the "enduring" itself cannot come to a halt. The "enduring" is immortal". This implies that the process of living on, and the [pure] ego that lives on, are immortal". Immortality is now given as the incapability of crossing out the present that is being ever newly fulfilled." This paper argues that this striking claim is an ineluctable consequence of Husserl's relentless pursuit of the ever deeper levels of time-constituting consciousness and, at the same time, of Husserl's increasing reliance on Leibniz's model of monads as the true unifiers of all things, including minds. There are many structural and substantive parallels between Leibniz's monadic scheme and Husserl's later views on the primal ego, points of convergence that the paper lays out step by step. For both theorists the monad is a self-contained system of being, one "without windows"; a monad's experiences unfold in harmonious concatenations; a monad is a mirror of its proximate environs and comprises multiple perspectives; the unconscious is a repository of potential activation; and, most important of all, a monad knows no birth and death and hence is immortal. In his very last years, Husserl proposed a third ego level, below (or beyond) the mundane ego and transcendental ego: the primal ego is neither psychological nor physical; it permits the transcendental ego to carry out its constitutive activities, including the mundane ego's birth and death in time; it is always in a process of becoming, so it can never be in a

state of only “having-been”, that is, dead; and hence the primal ego’s enduring cannot itself come to an end.

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Responding to a Dilemma for Internalism

I intend to defend the following as a necessary condition of a belief S being epistemically justified for a subject: Awareness Requirement: S is justified in believing that P only if i) there is something, X, that contributes to the justification of B; and ii) S is aware (or potentially aware) of X. This will be shown through drawing attention to our considered judgments about cases. That will then lay the groundwork for giving an account of the nature of this awareness in the second half of this paper. In doing so I will examine and respond to an argument against the awareness requirement that we might call Bergmann’s Dilemma. My solution invokes what I call “non-doxastic strong awareness” in a way that avoids the regresses that Bergmann advances.

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Howard: Should We Vote for Him?

The point of this paper is to discuss whether we should vote for the Liberal Party at the next election. I shall argue that we shouldn’t and to do so would be (amongst other things) fiscally irresponsible.

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Real Politics, Ideal Discourses, and the Value of Agreement

John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas, and Bruce Ackerman have identified legitimate political arrangements with those to which speakers in an idealized discourse could agree. Michael Walzer, Seyla Benhabib, and others have raised questions regarding this appeal to ideal speech situations, arguing that we ought to ground our political decisions in real, rather than ideal conversations. This paper responds to some of these criticisms, shedding further light on the relationship between real politics and ideal discourses.

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Knowledge in the Image of Assertion

According to the knowledge account of assertion, one may assert only what one knows. Suppose so. What light might this account shed on knowledge? How must knowledge be formed, if made in the image of what one may assert? I will argue that what assertions do is provide an answer to a question. Whether one may assert a given proposition is relative to both the question being answered, and the answer the assertion provides. So I will be arguing that knowledge made in the image of assertion is knowledge of an answer relative to a question being answered. The proper rule of assertion is that one should give the answer only if one knows the answer.

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Monsters and Creatures of Darkness: the Role of Propositions in Semantics

David Kaplan dubs as "monster" any linguistic construction that semantically operates not on the proposition expressed by embedded sentences, but on the function that determines this proposition relative to a context: the "character" of the sentence. Loosely borrowing from Quine, I will call a construction that non-trivially operates on the proposition expressed by an embedded sentence a "creature of darkness". Kaplan claims that there are creatures of darkness, but no monsters. I believe that there are monsters, but no creatures of darkness. In fact, since we don't need propositions, we can simply replace characters by their diagonals. In this talk, I will sketch the resulting semantics and meta-semantics, and illustrate the above points with two paradigm candidates for creatures of darkness: modal constructions and attitude reports.

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Are There Things We Shouldn't Think? Moral Inconceivability and the Methods of Ethics

It is sometimes claimed that there are thoughts which are so morally repugnant that no virtuous agent could entertain them, for to do so would necessarily lead to or involve moral corruption. Let us call these thoughts the "morally inconceivable". They are inconceivable in the sense that one cannot conceive of them without doing significant damage to one's moral character. In this paper I explore whether the category of

the morally inconceivable could be extended to regulate the conduct of ethical inquiry. Some philosophers have argued that certain bizarre and gruesome thought experiments involve morally inconceivable thinking. Equally, following Bernard Williams' idea of the one-thought-too-many, it might well be argued that, at least in some circumstances, the use of general moral principles involves the morally inconceivable. In this paper I argue that although there are indeed questions to which one should not respond and imaginary scenarios that one should not in earnest entertain, the arguments discussed do not provide justificatory grounds for placing constraints on the use either of thought experiments or of general moral principles.